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THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. XII.

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THE EXPOSITOR

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EIGHTH SERIES

Volume XII



HODDER AND STOUGHTON
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C

MCMXVI

set. 8

Y. 12

1916:2

BUTLER & TANNER,
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
FROME, AND LONDON.

THE JEWISH ENVIRONMENT OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY.¹

I.

PERHAPS the most pressing problem of New Testament Science at the present time, and one that is slowly, but surely ripening for solution, lies in the task of reconstructing the Jewish background and environment of the Gospels and other New Testament Books. The problem is one that appeals—or ought to appeal—with peculiar insistence to the rising generation of New Testament scholars; and to them the task of attempting to solve it will probably fall. It is true that much labour, energy, and even genius have been expended upon this department of work in the past. The names of Lightfoot (the elder), Schoettgen, Spencer, Selden, Franz Delitzsch and Edersheim are sufficient to remind us of the debt of obligation we are under to former generations of students, who devoted their lives to the accumulation of the rich treasure of material that has been handed down to us; while Schürer's great work, in spite of a certain lack of sympathy with the idiosyncrasies of Rabbinical Judaism, will probably long remain the classical depository of the available *data* that concern the externals of Jewish life in the period immediately adjacent to the time of our Lord.

The older Christian Talmudists to whom reference has just been made have handed down to us a vast mass of

¹ The substance of the Inaugural Lecture delivered before the Faculty of Theology, King's College, London, October 7, 1915.

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material; but it is unsifted material. Furthermore, new material has been discovered, of considerable importance, within comparatively recent years. In consequence the aspect of the old problems has been completely transformed. Investigation, pursued in the new scientific spirit, and applying the exacting standards of modern scientific inquiry, has, with the help of the new material, put an entirely new complexion upon the old facts.

The main features and factors of the problem as a whole, and as it now stands, may be summed up briefly as follows :

(1) The external conditions of the Græco-Roman world generally during the New Testament period have had much light shed upon them by modern investigation and research. In particular new discoveries of documents—papyri—have illuminated the domestic and every-day conditions of the life of the period in a most wonderful way. All this has a more direct bearing upon the Jewish communities outside Palestine than upon Judæa and Galilee. But it must not be forgotten that Palestine itself had been exposed for a considerable period to Hellenising influence; it possessed numerous Græco-Roman cities; and the Jewish provinces of Palestine, which were more or less closely incorporated in the vast Græco-Roman Empire, were subjected in numberless ways to the subtle influence of non-Jewish civilisation and culture. A potent stream of influence, too, was always flowing in upon Palestine from the communities of the Jewish Dispersion which were necessarily more deeply permeated by the spirit of Greek culture. In our estimate of Judaism, and the forces by which it was moved, we must never lose sight of the commanding importance of the larger Judaism of the countries of the Dispersion.

Then (2) within the last thirty years much energy has been devoted to the study and investigation of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature of Judaism, and from this

direction a fresh and vital impetus has been given to the study of Jewish religious thought, especially in connexion with the rise of Christianity and the problems of Christian origins. We in England cannot be sufficiently grateful to Dr. Charles for the splendid series of editions of various apocalyptic books that he has given us, and for his studies in eschatology and apocalyptic generally. Indeed the study of eschatology may be said to have entered on an entirely new phase, thanks largely to the epoch-making work of Gunkel, and recently of his pupil Gressmann.¹ Among the new questions raised by it are some very interesting problems in psychology. But the most important new fact that has been elucidated is the traditional character of a considerable amount of the eschatological material, which carries back its origin to a period far anterior to its full literary expression. This consideration throws a flood of light upon many perplexing passages in the prophetic literature, and invests the study of the purely apocalyptic literature with enhanced interest and importance. It must constantly be remembered that while the apocalyptic books as literary productions belong to a comparatively late date, and doubtless contain much that in substance is of late origin, they yet reproduce, to a greater or less extent, material that their authors quarried from the mine of popular tradition. Indeed the authors of these works seem, as a rule, to have attached far more importance to what they derived in this way than to what was original to themselves; and so they habitually—in all good faith, it would seem—attached to their productions, which embodied parts of this ancient material, the names of great heroic and saintly figures of the past, such as Enoch, Baruch, Moses, Abraham, and even Adam. The authority of such names seems, in some

¹ See esp. Gunkel's *Schöpfung und Chaos* (1895) and Gressmann's *Der Ursprung der Israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* (1905).

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way, to have been deduced from the tradition, though the possibility of a symbolical or figurative meaning must sometimes be allowed for. The importance of the apocalyptic literature in forming a just and adequate view of pre-Talmudic Judaism cannot be over-estimated. It represents vivid phases in the development of popular religion, and sets before us the hopes and fears, the aspirations, longings, and regrets, of deeply religious souls, who were often perplexed by the problem of the providential government of the world, but were always ready with the venture of faith to believe in the imminence of a divine *parousia*, in the speedy establishment of the Kingdom of God. Apocalyptic language, as is well known, colours much of the New Testament writings, and it is clear that the early Jewish Christians were largely drawn from the circles of the apocalyptists. The apocalyptic literature is of special importance for the study of the development of Messianic doctrine.

But the apocryphal literature of Judaism is not made up entirely, or always even predominantly, of eschatological material. Many of the apocryphal books, such as, e.g., *Wisdom*, *Tobit*, *Ecclesiasticus*, are non-eschatological in character. But they are of the greatest value for the elucidation of Jewish religious thought and custom, and one supreme advantage that attaches to them is that many can be certainly dated within the critical period 200 B.C.-100 A.D. They thus form an invaluable criterion for determining what is early, and distinguishing such elements from later developments. This is sometimes of considerable importance in dealing with the *data* afforded by the Rabbinical documents. The oldest Rabbinical literature, though it contains much early material, was not compiled in its present form till the end of the second or beginning of the third century A.D. This fact often makes

it precarious to draw definite conclusions as to the prevalence of a particular practice, or the expression of a particular religious belief, within the first Christian century. But if the conclusion can be corroborated from an earlier apocryphal book—as is often the case—doubt disappears, and certainty, or comparative certainty, is attained. Sometimes, indeed, the Rabbinical *data*, if taken alone, would prove to be positively misleading. A good instance of this occurs in connexion with the doctrine of the seven heavens. In the tractate *Hagîgâ* of the Babylonian Talmud (12*b*) the formulation of this doctrine is expressly associated with the name of the Amora Resh Lakish who lived in the third century A.D. But the doctrine must have been current long before, for it is found in the *Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs* (*Levi* II. 7 f.), and in the Slavonic *Enoch*; while almost certainly allusions to it occur in 2 Corinthians xii. 2-4 and Ephesians vi. 12. The belief was, therefore, current in the first Christian century. In this connexion it may be added that two other criteria exist which can often be used in a similar way to distinguish early elements in the Rabbinical Literature, viz., the works of Josephus and Philo. The exact study of these, especially of Philo's treatises, has not yet secured the attention it deserves in this country. An important task that still awaits fulfilment is to determine Philo's exact relation to Rabbinic theology. The results of careful investigation are sure to prove illuminating and valuable.¹

(3) This suggests a third preliminary observation, viz., to emphasise the importance of some knowledge of Rabbinic theology and modes of thought for the study of early Judaism. I mean by early Judaism the Judaism that underlies the New Testament, and its antecedents.

¹ A good beginning was made by Ritter in *Philo und die Halacha* (Leipzig, 1879).

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It may sound somewhat superfluous to stress the importance of such study in such a connexion, but it is none the less necessary. Perhaps some may be inclined to ask in surprise, "Have not elaborate *Lives of Christ* been written which are full of illustrations drawn from Jewish Literature and custom? Have not collections of Rabbinic parallels to the Gospels and other New Testament books been made?" This is true enough, and some of these works are of great and enduring value in particular ways. "But"—if I may borrow some words I have used elsewhere¹—"a collection of Jewish illustrations formed with the express object of pointing a particular theme is not a presentment of the Jewish Religion. It still remains true that in order that such illustrations should be seen in their true bearings, and rightly appreciated, they must be viewed against a background where Judaism is realised as a living whole"—"as a vital organism with a soul and genius of its own." The difficulties attending such a study, it must be confessed, have until quite recently been almost insuperable to the average student. The only textbook available was a German one—Weber's pioneering work in Jewish Theology.² But now English students are more fortunate. Of the books which have appeared within the last few years and deal with the subject or parts of it, by far the most important is Dr. Schechter's masterly volume on Rabbinic Theology—*Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*. This is a book which ought to be read and studied far and wide by all who are interested in theological questions. It will give the reader a real insight into the religious thought of the men who reconstructed from its foundations the edifice of Judaism, and determined the direction of its development down to

¹ *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, Preface (p. vii. f. in 2nd edition).

² *Jüdische Theologie*: 2nd ed. revised by Franz Delitzsch and G. Schnedermann (Leipzig, 1897).

modern days. While Schechter does not profess to give a comprehensive survey of the whole of Jewish theology, his work is yet comprehensive enough. He disengages the principles—the essential thought that is so often wrapped up in strange and, to us, bizarre methods of expression, and sets it forth in a delightfully clear and attractive guise. The study of Schechter's book ought, in a real sense, to orientate the minds of non-Jewish students to Rabbinical modes of thought, and help them to understand the genius of Rabbinism as they have never understood it before.

At the same time the student must be put on his guard against supposing that Schechter's book conclusively settles any of the problems with which the study of Christian origins is directly concerned. It provides invaluable material for the student. But it does not attempt to trace the processes of theological development—it is rather a study in the genius of Rabbinic religion, than its history; nor does it deal with any but strictly Rabbinical sources and material (with some very slight exceptions). Thus the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature is dismissed, almost contemptuously, as being outside the pale of genuine Judaism. Referring to this literature Schechter says:

“However strange it may seem, the fact remains that whilst these writings left a lasting impress on Christianity, they contributed—with the exception, perhaps, of the Book of Ecclesiasticus—little or nothing towards the formation of Rabbinic thought. The Rabbis were either wholly ignorant of their very existence, or stigmatised them as fabulous, or ‘external’ (a milder expression in some cases for heretical), and thus allowed them to exert no permanent influence upon Judaism.”¹

¹ *Aspects*, p. 5.

This is true of Judaism, perhaps, from the middle of the second century A.D., when it became self-centred, and a disastrous antipathy grew up and was fostered between it and the outside world. But it is certainly not true of the Judaism that flourished in the first Christian century down to 70 A.D. and even later. Rabbinical Judaism, it must be remembered, "is but one offshoot from a larger stem. It sprang from a larger and richer Judaism which, to a greater extent than is sometimes supposed, held within itself the forces that afterwards diverged as Rabbinism and Christianity."¹

I wish to emphasise this point strongly, as it is one of supreme importance. What afterwards emerged as Rabbinical Judaism, and gathered and concentrated into itself the forces of Jewry, was only one among other elements in the Judaism of the first century A.D. This wider and earlier Judaism—which Mr. J. H. A. Hart has aptly termed "Catholic Judaism"—is, perhaps, well represented in the writings of Philo. This earlier Judaism had not yet banned the Greek language, nor the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture. It tolerated Greek translations of the Bible and a more or less Greek liturgy in the colonies of the Dispersion. It embraced within itself a great central body of moderate conservatives, together with an extreme right and an extreme left wing. Nor must it be forgotten that the Christian movement itself was during the first stage of its career within the Jewish body—it was regarded as a Jewish sect—while in the second stage of its career it entered into the fruits of the great Jewish missionary propaganda of the Dispersion.

The great cleavage between Judaism and the outside world, and the reconstruction of the religion and community on a purely Hebrew basis—a process which was begun soon

¹ *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, p. x.

after A.D. 70—was only consummated in the middle of the second century (after 135 A.D.).

Too often the Jew who has been Rabbinically trained cannot enter with any real sympathy or insight into the wider conditions that environed the Judaism of the earlier period. To him all that is not specifically Rabbinic appears to be un-Jewish, or alien to the genius of Judaism. This seems to be the point of view naturally assumed by Dr. Schechter. He limits himself rigidly to what is specifically Rabbinic. But all Jewish scholars, happily, do not impose such restrictions upon themselves. It is a pleasure to call attention to the splendid series of articles by Kohler in the *Jewish Encyclopædia*,¹ where full account is taken of sources and *data* outside the Rabbinic Literature. Kohler has presented the results of his studies in a valuable volume on the theology of Judaism,² which is unfortunately not available in English. Dr. Büchler also, Principal of the Jews' College in London, takes account of non-Rabbinical *data* in his elaborate and learned discussions of some of the problems of early Judaism.³ His work is specially important for questions connected with the Second Temple. But, perhaps, the most significant name in this connexion is that of the Jewish scholar Moritz Friedländer. In 1905 Friedländer published a volume on *The Religious Movements within Judaism in the Time of Jesus*,⁴ which for freshness,

¹ Cf. e.g. *Eschatology, Essenes, Merkubah, New Testament, Didaskalia*.

² *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage* (Leipzig, 1910).

³ *Die Priester und der Cultus im letzten Jahrzehnt des Jerusalemischen Tempels* (Wien, 1895); *Das Synedrion in Jerusalem* (Wien, 1902); *Der galiläische 'Am ha-'Ares des zweiten Jahrhunderts* (Wien, 1906); *The Economic Conditions of Judæa after the Destruction of the Second Temple* (1912), and *The Political and Social Leaders of the Jewish Community of Sepphoris in the Second and Third Centuries* (the two last published by the Jews' College, London).

⁴ *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu* (Berlin, 1905).

originality, and stimulating power it would be hard to match. The great merit of the book is that it sets forth in a most striking way the complex forces that were working within Judaism during the age of Jesus. The author divides his work into two parts. Part I., which is devoted to Palestinian Judaism, discusses the Apocalyptic movement, Religious movements among the "people of the Land" (*Am ha-'ares*); the Essenes; the Minim (Jewish heretics); Part II., which is devoted to Hellenistic Judaism, has chapters dealing with Jewish Hellenism—its teaching; life in the spirit of Jewish Hellenism (the Therapeutæ), the Sibylline Wisdom, Jesus, the message of Paul. Though his work is open to correction in detail it is, as a whole, on sound lines. The book is extraordinarily suggestive, and ought to be studied by all serious students. Unfortunately it can only be read in German, not having as yet appeared in English.

II.

I have already pointed out how indispensable some knowledge of Rabbinic theology and modes of thought is to the student of early (pre-Talmudic) Judaism. But the Rabbinical Literature is valuable in other ways for the study of the earlier period. When the material is handled critically it will be found to yield much that is of importance archæologically for the reconstruction of Jewish life and society in Palestine during the century that preceded the destruction of the Temple.¹ There is, moreover, a *human* side to the Rabbinical Literature which is not only interesting in itself, but also enshrines much that is precious of old popular life and custom. And in such matters as diction and phrasology, the mode by which ideas are expressed, the form in which Jewish oriental conceptions conventionally clothe

¹ A vast mass of material has been collected and presented critically in Dr. S. Krauss's *Talmudische Archäologie*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1910-12).

themselves, this literature affords a vast field of illustration of the highest value. How important it may prove to be for the New Testament scholar has been brilliantly shown in the first part of Dalman's *Die Worte Jesu*, which is now happily available in English under the title *The Words of Jesus*.

A good instance of the archæological value of the Rabbinical evidence is the information afforded by this literature respecting the customs and peculiarities of the population of Galilee.¹ This population was, as is well known, of a mixed character, consisting of Jews and pagans. We are told that people living there sometimes bore two names, one for use in Galilee, the other in Judæa (*Tosefta Gittin* vi.) The Jewish population is represented as warm, generous, and impulsive, of simple manners and earnest piety. Though, on the whole, there was far less rigorism than in Judæa, the Galileans were, in some respects, stricter in their piety. Thus, while it was customary in Judæa to carry on servile work on the eve of the Passover till noon, in Galilee all such work was suspended the entire day (*T. B. Pesahim* 53a). In Galilee, also, marriage customs were of a more decorous character (*Tosefta Kethuboth* I.). The Galileans are also said to have excelled in Haggada, i.e., the homiletic element (illustrative stories, parables, etc.) in the interpretation and illustration of Scripture. Indeed, according to Geiger, the Galilean Rabbi Jose (early second century) ought to be regarded as the creator of Haggada. The Galileans were not expert in the subtle dialectic that was cultivated in the legal schools of Judæa.² In the Talmud (*T. B. Megilla* 24b, *Erubin* 53b) the Galilean pronunciation of the gutturals is ridiculed (cf. Matt. xxvi. 73, "Thy speech be-

¹ See ch. iv. of Neubauer's *La Géographie du Talmud*.

² Only three Galilean rabbis are mentioned by name in the Mishna, R. Jose, his son R. Eliezer, and R. Hanina.

trayeth thee"). Josephus (*Life*, § 17) describes the population of the province, hard-working and brave as they were, as "by nature disposed to changes, and delighting in seditions"; and this is confirmed by the Rabbinic Literature, which, apparently, represents Galilee as in a perpetual state of war; the Galilean *sicarii* were especially dreaded (*Tosefta Gittin* II.; cf. Acts v. 37).

III.

How are we to reconstruct the Jewish environment of the Gospels? Our answer to this question must depend largely upon the view we take of the relation between the Apocalyptic and Rabbinic types of thought during the first three quarters of the first century. It is not sufficient, as some scholars have assumed, to construe the Judaism of this period purely in terms of apocalyptic, and to ignore everything specifically Rabbinic in the process. Nor is the reverse procedure, which would ignore everything specifically apocalyptic as "un-Jewish," any more justifiable.

I have ventured to remind Jewish scholars¹ that Rabbinical Judaism, i.e., the type of Judaism which became dominant in the second half of the second century, and was represented in the earlier period by the party of the Pharisees, has a background. It worked on pre-existing material, which it partly rejected, partly assimilated and transformed. It is all-important for the understanding of Rabbinical Judaism itself to reconstruct, as far as we can, the larger content included in the Judaism that preceded it. Herein lies the importance of the large pre-Christian apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature of Judaism.

This literature—which was extensive and popular in character, and in many cases, apparently, goes back to

¹ In a paper on "The Apocalyptic Movement, and Rabbinic Judaism" read at the Jews' College, London, March, 1914.

Semitic (Hebrew or Aramaic) originals—embodies an essential element of the larger Judaism of the First Century, but the whole of it was ultimately rejected by Rabbinical Judaism.¹ As I have remarked elsewhere :—

“What the attitude of the earlier (first century) Rabbis was to apocalyptic it is difficult to determine. In any case hostility was not so marked as it became later, though the natural tendency of Rabbinic thought would at all times have been to subordinate the apocalyptic to the legalistic element. It is probably true to say that the use of apocalyptic books in Essene and Christian circles—in the latter for controversial purposes against the synagogue, especially after 70 A.D.—was largely responsible for the decided anti-apocalyptic bias of the later Rabbis. But the alienation between Synagogue and Church was not complete till after 135 A.D.,² and the existence of such books as 4 Ezra and the *Apocalypse of Baruch* shews that apocalyptic had not yet been finally eliminated from orthodox Judaism at the time when these books were put forth (c. 120 A.D.). It is important to remember, in this connexion, that at the end of the first century A.D. (and possibly later) the Rabbis were much occupied with the question of the Canon of Scripture, and it has been suggested that in certain circles (apocalyptic and Essene), the apocalyptic books were put on a level not merely with the oral tradition, but with the canonical Scriptures. In delimiting the Canon precisely, at the end of the first century A.D., the Rabbis may have been influenced by a desire to

¹ See for a full discussion the writer's *Ezra-Apocalypse*, ch. iv. of the General Introduction (pp. lviii. ff.).

² 135 A.D. marks the date of the suppression of the Bar Kokba revolt.

safeguard the older collection of Scripture from the possible rivalry of apocalyptic books.”¹

I cannot here discuss at any length what is a most complicated problem. But I may venture, perhaps, to state summarily the conclusions which seem to me to follow from a close study of the *data*.

In the earlier, period, then, we must picture the mass of the people as permeated with apocalyptic hopes.

These hopes and longings pervaded popular piety like a golden haze. The people were loyal to the Law, as a whole, but they longed intensely for the coming of the Kingdom of God, for a real divine intervention. We must not conceive of the apocalyptic hope as expressed in a uniform and consistent body of doctrine. On the contrary it assumed divergent forms, some of which were mutually antagonistic. The political apocalypses—like the Eagle Vision in 4 Ezra²—breathe a spirit of fierce hostility to the oppressive world-power of Rome. On the other hand, there were smaller circles, of a quietist character, who were awaiting the advent of a Messiah who should effect the moral and spiritual redemption of his people; who should reign as a spiritual prince in the hearts of a regenerate people, and so fulfil the old promises made to the House of David; and one who should extend his spiritual dominion to the ends of the earth. These hopes were based and nourished upon Old Testament prophecy, and were cherished within a limited circle to be found both among the learned—especially among the disciples of Hillel—and also among the people. . . . The fulfilment of these hopes in the person and career of Jesus of Nazareth may be said to be the theme of the New Testament generally. The early chapters of the Acts reveal to us the presence in Jerusalem and Judæa of an active Hebrew-

¹ *Ibid.* (p. lix.).

² 2 Esdras x. 60—xii. 35.

Christian Church which was working—and not without considerable prospects of success—for the winning over of the Jewish people, as a whole, to acceptance of the Christian Messiah.

On the other side was the party of the Pharisees. Here, again, we must beware of making the mistake of assuming that all Pharisees were alike. There were doubtless apocalyptic Pharisees as well as Pharisaic apocalyptists. Nor were all Pharisees by any means formalists and hypocrites. As a party they were animated by a high ideal—they were intensely zealous for the Law, and expended themselves in extending its power and influence over the people generally. They tended to lay all the emphasis on the observance of the Law, and some members of the Party seem to have believed that the best and only legitimate way to hasten the Kingdom of God was by extending the exact and scrupulous observance of the Law. The Pharisaic schools, which more and more dominated the ideals of the party, were of an academic character, and tended to develop a scholastic theology. They were zealous in the study of the old sacred Hebrew language, and after a time succeeded in displacing, to some extent, the use of the popular Aramaic dialect in connexion with the Temple. Ultimately they were able to ban the use of the Greek language in Palestine, and, under stress of controversy, finally eliminated from orthodox Judaism the large pre-Christian and some later apocalyptic literature. I have said they eliminated this literature, and this is strictly true. But the popular religious instinct behind it could not be altogether suppressed. The purely apocalyptic element, however, was relegated to the background, and the whole emphasis was laid on the observance of the Law. Curiously enough, however, apocalyptic hopes, though relegated to the background, came to literary expression again at a later period in a new Hebrew

literature, which did not find much acceptance in orthodox Rabbinical circles, but has partially survived.

In thus cutting off the early apocalyptic and apocryphal Jewish literature, the Pharisees put a new complexion upon Judaism. It marked, to some extent, a breach with the past. And this fact is of cardinal importance for the New Testament student. In studying the Jewish background of the New Testament Books, and especially of the Gospels, we are often conscious of being in touch with an older Jewish tradition than that represented dominantly in the Rabbinical literature. This fact has been fully recognised by some of the best non-Christian Jewish scholars. Thus, to cite an example, Dr. Israel Abrahams, in an interesting note on John vii. 38-39, published in the *Expository Times* a few years ago,¹ says, "The Fourth Gospel shows throughout this context a peculiarly exact familiarity with Jewish traditions." In fact it seems probable that some early Christian literature outside the New Testament may depend upon lost Jewish sources of an earlier type. A good, though disputed, example is the *Didaché*. Dr. K. Kohler has also pointed out the immense importance of the first six books of the *Apostolic Constitutions* for early Rabbinical Judaism as well as for early Christianity. He claims as the basis of the work a Jewish original, which has often been only slightly modified in its present Christian form. "The work," he says, "is of very great value to the student of Jewish and Church history, as it contains a large amount of Haggadic and Halakic material, derived from unknown Jewish sources, and casts a flood of light upon Talmudic and New Testament literature." It is specially important, he thinks, for the reconstruction of parts of the Temple-liturgy.²

¹ Vol. xxiii. 180 (April, 1912).

² Art. *Didascalig* in *Jewish Encyclopædia*, iv. 588.

IV.

So far we have confined our attention mainly to the Judaism of Palestine. But we must not pass over in silence the significance of Judaism in its wider connotation as an element of decisive importance in the environment of early Christianity. The Judaism that flourished outside Palestine during the first two centuries of our era exercised in many ways an enormously important influence upon the development of Christianity, both in its outward forms and fortunes, and also in its inner life and thought.¹ Concentrated mostly in the cities of the Græco-Roman world these Jewish communities no longer, as in Palestine, made agriculture their almost exclusive occupation, but were largely engaged in commerce. In Alexandria they were especially connected with the mechanical trades; and in the vast synagogue there the congregation was grouped according to trades. In Rome, strange to say, the Jewish population, mostly of slave-origin, lived in wretched quarters and followed the humblest callings. But this was by no means the case with all Jews living in Italy and Greece. The texts and inscriptions refer to weavers, tent-makers, dealers in purple, butchers, tavern-keepers, singers, comedians, jewellers, physicians, and also poets and men of letters, as well as preachers, lawyers and theologians. In Egypt, under the Ptolemies, from the ranks of the Jews came forth soldiers, farmers of the revenue, and civil functionaries. Later, however, Hadrian could only find among them astrologers, soothsayers, and charlatans. It is a curious fact that scarcely ever before the Middle Ages are the Jews referred to as money-lenders, bankers, or usurers. Theoretically the intercourse of Jews with pagans was confined to

¹ See the elaborate article *Diaspora* (by Theodore Reinach) in *Jew. Encycl.* iv.

commercial relations merely, and even these were greatly trammelled by the laws of purity. The Jews lived, as a rule, in separate quarters grouped around their synagogues. The pious Jew could neither dine at the table of a pagan, nor receive him at his own table. He was not permitted to frequent the theatres, the circuses, the gymnasia, nor even to read a secular book "unless it be at twilight." Mixed marriages were prohibited under severe penalties.

These rules, however, were not always by any means rigidly adhered to. The Diaspora-Jews were profoundly affected by their environment in many ways. The influence of Greek culture told heavily upon them—as the Judæo-Alexandrine literature eloquently attests. They used Greek even in their religious services; they read the Bible in Greek; they adopted Greek names and, to some extent, Greek organisation in their communal institutions. Above all, they were animated by an intense missionary zeal to win over the pagan population to the higher monotheistic religion, of which they were the chosen representatives.

That this Jewish propaganda was highly successful there cannot be a shadow of doubt. The statements of Josephus, Philo, and even Seneca, "who represent the whole world as rushing towards Jewish observances," are, no doubt, in some degree exaggerated. At the same time it is indisputable that proselytes were found in considerable numbers in every country of the Dispersion. We are told by Josephus that in his time a large portion of the Greek population in Antioch judaised.¹ Later, as we know, they became Christians. According to the same authority also "almost all the women" in Damascus observed the Jewish customs. St Paul met with proselytes in Pisidian Antioch, in Thyatira, Thessalonica, and Athens. In Asia Minor numerous indications suggest that Jewish proselytes were numerous,

¹ *Jewish War*, vii. 3. 3.

In Rome the success of the propaganda is vouched for by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. We cannot account for the enormous growth of the Jewish population in Egypt, Cyprus and Cyrene without assuming a large adhesion of Gentile proselytes.

The question of the admission of proselytes stirred Judaism to its depths. It threatened, in fact, to separate Hellenistic from Palestinian Judaism, though there were divisions in both camps on the subject. The former was willing to admit Gentiles after having undergone the rite of Baptism; while the latter insisted upon circumcision. The story of the conversion of Queen Helena of Adiabene illustrates the controversy (see Josephus, *Antiquities*, xx. ii. 1-5).

The controversy still went on—at any rate the issues were discussed—at the end of the first and beginning of the second century in Palestine, R. Joshua asserting that the baptismal rite rendered a person a full proselyte, while R. Eliezer b. Hyrkanus made circumcision an indispensable condition, and declared the baptismal rite to be of no consequence.¹ A similar controversy was carried on earlier between Shammaites and Hillelites. After the Roman wars the more rigorous view became prevalent everywhere.

The liberal propaganda of the Jewish Dispersion prepared the way for the coming of a broad universalistic religion, freed from the trammels of race-connexion. The harvest was reaped by the Christian missionaries, headed by St. Paul. As Moritz Friedländer has said: "If Jesus was the Christ, then the religion of the Jewish Diaspora was Christendom."²

The Judaism of the Dispersion was subjected to Greek influence down to 70 A.D. (and even later), in numberless

¹ *T. B. Yehemoth* 46a.

² *Das Judenthum in der vorchristlichen griechischen Welt* (1897), p. 19.

ways, and reacted in turn upon the Judaism of Palestine, especially, so long as the Temple stood, by means of the steady stream of pilgrims that flowed to Jerusalem. It is important to remember this in estimating Palestinian Judaism, as it existed in the time of Christ and the Apostles.

V.

Let me in conclusion try to illustrate by one or two examples how the Jewish background of parts of the New Testament can be illuminated.

In the Ezra-Apocalypse, which is accessible to all in our Apocrypha as 2 Esdras, we have a Jewish book which in the main belongs to the latter part of the first century A.D., and is therefore partly contemporary with our New Testament. It is earlier than the present form of any part of the Rabbinical literature, and is therefore of the greatest possible value for estimating the character of the earlier type of Judaism. When we examine this book what do we find? It is full of parallels with the Pauline thought and theology. As Schweitzer has said :

“It is nothing less than astounding that the close affinities [of the Pauline theology] with the Apocalypse of Ezra should so long have escaped recognition. In this work there are elaborate discussions of the problems of sin, the Fall, Election, Faith and Works, the wrath, long-suffering, and mercy of God, the prerogative of Israel, the significance of the Law, the temporal and eternal Jerusalem, the prospect of dying or surviving to the Parousia, the tribulation of the times of the end, and the last judgment.”¹

That some of the questions debated in the Ezra-Apocalypse were discussed in Rabbinical circles, and that great

¹ *Paul and his Interpreters*, p. 51.

variety of opinion prevailed on such points in these circles, is attested by the Rabbinical Literature itself. One passage in the Talmud (*T. B. 'Erubin* 13b) is highly significant in this connexion. It runs as follows :

Two years and a half the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel disputed among themselves. One School declared it would have been better that man had not been created as he was, while the other declared it was better that man had been created as he was than that he should not have been created at all. Finally, they came to the conclusion that it would have been better if man had not been created, but since that had taken place, a man should always examine his actions ; according to another version, a man should always consider the deeds he is about to perform.

On this passage Professor Schechter remarks : ¹

“ This is all the tradition (or the compiler) chose to give us about this lengthy dispute ; but we do not hear a single word as to the causes which led to it, or the reasons advanced by the litigant parties for their various opinions. Were they metaphysical, or empirical, or simply based, as is so often the case, on different conceptions of the passages in the Scripture germane to the dispute ? We feel the more cause for regret when we recollect that the members of these schools were the contemporaries of the Apostles ; when Jerusalem, as it seems, was boiling over with theology, and its market-places and synagogues were preparing metaphysics and theosophies to employ the mind of posterity for thousands of years. What did the Rabbis think of all these aspirations and inspirations, or did they remain quite untouched by the influences of their surroundings ? Is it not possible that a complete account of such a con-

¹ *Aspects*, p. 8f.

troversy as I have just mentioned, which probably formed neither an isolated nor an unprecedented event, would have furnished us with just the information of which now we are so sorely in need ? ”

Now in the dialogue, which is given at length in the first eight chapters of the Ezra-Apocalypse (2 Ezdras iii.-x.), between the seer and the angel, the Shammaite position that it would have been better if man had never been created is definitely stated and maintained ; ¹ and not only so, but this is one of the fundamental positions of this section of the apocalypse throughout, and is constantly restated and sustained by argument. We have, therefore, in these chapters a statement of some, at any rate, of the arguments adduced in support of the Shammaite position, and the silence of the Rabbinical Literature on this point is partially made good in the Ezra-Apocalypse. Its value for the history of the development of Rabbinic theology in some of its earlier and more obscure phases, as well as for providing the Jewish background of much of the Pauline thought, could hardly be better demonstrated.

Our next illustration may be taken from the ancient liturgy of the Synagogue. I would like to be allowed to point out that in this direction lies a most fruitful line of study, which has by no means yet been adequately explored. To form anything like a just estimate of Jewish piety we must study its devotional literature, and especially its beautiful prayers. The ancient elements in these go back to the pre-Christian period. Liturgical diction would naturally influence popular religious language, and, to some extent, mould religious conceptions. I believe that this influence can be traced in the New Testament literature.

¹ Cf. 2 Esdras iv. 12 : *It would have been better that we had never been created than having come [into the world] to live in sins and suffer, and not to know why we suffer.*

One of the oldest and most popular forms of devotion still preserved in the Synagogue Liturgy is the Kaddish prayer. It is still recited in the old popular Aramaic dialect of Palestine. In its principal clauses it affords striking parallels to parts of the Lord's Prayer. The clauses

*Hallowed be Thy name,
Thy Kingdom come*

are closely paralleled in the Jewish form :

*Magnified and sanctified be His great name in the world which He hath created according to His will. May He establish His kingdom during your life and during your days, and during the life of all the House of Israel, even speedily and at a near time, and say ye Amen.*¹

Now this is based upon such scriptural passages as Ezekiel xxxvi. 23, and xxxviii. 23, which form an excellent commentary on the Prayer,

I will sanctify my great name which hath been profaned among the nations, which ye have profaned in the midst of them ; and the nations shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes. . . .

And I will magnify myself and sanctify myself, and I will make myself known in the eyes of many nations ; and they shall know that I am the Lord.

These verses belong to the great eschatological section of Ezekiel (ch. xxxvi.-xxxviii.), the influence of which on the prayer is very apparent. Thus the prayer may be regarded as a compendious expression of eschatological doctrine. The underlying ideas are essentially eschatological, full of vivid life, and are by no means abstract expressions of colourless processes. It is significant that this has remained the

¹ Cf. Singer's handy edition of the Synagogue-Prayers in Hebrew and English (*The Authorised Daily Prayer Book*), p. 37 (pub. by Eyre and Spottiswoode).

most persistent and popular expression of Jewish piety.

The refrain of the angels in the angelic annunciation to the shepherds at Bethlehem, forming the *Gloria in Excelsis*,

*Glory to God in the highest,
And on earth, peace to men of His good pleasure*¹

seems also to be an echo of the last clause of the same popular Jewish prayer :

*May He who maketh peace in the heavenly heights, may He
make peace for us and all Israel.*

And in an earlier clause,

*May there be abundant peace from heaven, and life for us and
all Israel.*

In Luke xix. 38 another echo of this language occurs :

*Peace in heaven
And glory in the highest.*

The idea underlying this is that in the blessed Messianic time the peace that prevails in heaven shall descend to earth.

Much might be said about the Midrash and the large numbers of parables preserved in the midrashic literature, some of them remarkably parallel to parables in the Gospels.² The extensive midrashic literature, largely in the form of homiletic commentary on Scripture, embodies much that is exceedingly valuable for the illustration of the New Testament. It would not be difficult, for instance, to derive from this literature a good deal of illustrative material which would form a remarkably suggestive Jewish background for the Fourth Gospel. The Johannine Gospel is indeed Jewish, through and through, and it is much to be

¹ Luke ii. 14.

² A most useful collection, with critical remarks and discussions, has been provided by P. Fiebig in his *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu* (1904) and *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu im Lichte der rabbinischen Gleichnisse des neutestamentlichen Zeitalters* (1912).

desired that a commentary on it, written from this point of view could be produced.

Enough has been said, I hope, to show the supreme importance of the study of contemporary Judaism for the elucidation of the New Testament and some other early Christian literature.

What is needed is a band of younger scholars who will devote their energies to this line of study in the interests of New Testament science. Sometimes our younger men, who start Hebrew, feel that it is hardly worth their while to pursue Hebrew studies seriously, because they imagine that the goal of such studies is specialism in the Old Testament pure and simple. They feel, perhaps, and very naturally, that their main interests lie in the New Testament. I would venture to put in a plea for the view that a course of Hebrew study, starting with the Old Testament, but continued into the threshold of the early Rabbinical literature, and accompanied by the study of Judaism generally, is one of the best kinds of preparation for approaching the New Testament literature. With such an equipment the scholar will be able to handle the problems that confront him with a surer touch ; he will approach them with a clearer vision and a keener sense of reality ; and above all they will appear to him instinct with vivid life. No greater service, I venture to think, could be rendered either to religion or theology than such a deepening and vivifying of human interest in the imperishable records of the beginnings of our faith.

G. H. Box.

*THE REGULATIVE VALUE FOR THE PAULINE
THEOLOGY OF THE CONCEPTION OF CHRIS-
TIAN SONSHIP.*

IF we are to grasp the full scope of Paul's conception of Christian sonship, we must attempt to focus upon it the light which radiates from *his idea of the Divine Fatherhood*. Here, of course, we have to deal with a position which in some form or other was accepted throughout the primitive Christian society. Wherever the tradition of Jesus found a footing it was inevitable that His message of the Father should be proclaimed. But the impression which it created even upon deeply religious minds shows remarkable variations. In 1 Peter, which, I believe, represents an earnest type of early Christian piety still in close touch with the higher Jewish Messianism, the Fatherhood of God, as Jesus announced it, is a fresh and living spiritual force. In Hebrews and the Epistle of James, on the other hand, whose authors can in no sense be accused of formality, this conception has an air of abstraction, which makes it (as in 1 Clement and repeatedly in Philo) the virtual equivalent of Creator. For Paul and "John," the supremely originative minds in the Early Church, this designation of God is primary. In John's case, indeed, the conception has become so completely assimilated that, as every page of the First Epistle reveals, "God" stands practically as a synonym for "Father." And the Fourth Gospel proves the indissoluble association of the term with the Sonship of Jesus. In the Pauline Epistles, the title seems still to strike in the apostle's soul the note of an amazing discovery. No doubt in the opening addresses of these documents it appears in a stereotyped phrase. But the paragraphs have only to be studied to demonstrate that the description is anything but otiose.

Perhaps Paul's conception of the Divine Fatherhood may fitly be made to revolve round two of his own phrases as axes, "the Father of compassions" (2 Cor. i. 3), and "the Father of Glory" (Eph. i. 17). In the one case Love, in the other Majesty, supplies the main content of the idea. Each, as we shall note in a later paragraph, does justice to a fundamental element in Jesus' revelation. And it is well worth observing that each is introduced by the extraordinarily suggestive clause, "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ." For that implies that the apostle quite deliberately assigns his own description of God to the power and influence of Jesus.

(1) The description of God as "the Father of compassions" (*τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν*) vividly recalls the term of intimate tenderness (*σπλαγχνίζεσθαι*) applied again and again in the Synoptic Gospels (e.g., Mark i. 41, vi. 34, viii. 2, etc.) to Jesus' demeanour towards suffering men and women. We know the impression this had made upon Paul's mind, for in Philippians i. 8 he speaks of yearning for his converts with the tenderness (*ἐν σπλάγχνοις*) of Christ Jesus. And it is noteworthy that in Colossians iii. 12 he combines the expressions in his exhortation, "As God's own chosen, then, as consecrated and beloved, be clothed with compassion" (*σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμῶν*, Moff.). This Divine compassion, which has its counterpart in Jesus' gracious attitude toward human need, finds supreme utterance in God's redeeming purpose. That constitutes its central significance for Paul. To be Father is, when confronted by sin-burdened souls, to redeem. So the apostle gives thanks "to the Father who made you fit for the inheritance of His people in the light : who rescued us from the sway of the darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His love, in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of our sins" (Col. i. 12-14). To be redeemed is to be transformed into the realm of the

Son, i.e., to be made sons of God. The same element is emphasised in Galatians i. 4, where Christ's redemption of His followers from the existing age which is evil is directly referred to "the will of our God and Father." And in 2 Thessalonians ii. 16 the Fatherhood of God is explained by the clause, "who loved us and gave us eternal encouragement and a good hope by His grace." But in many instances where Fatherhood is not explicitly mentioned, the conception is undoubtedly implied. A good example is Ephesians ii. 4 f., where Paul, who has just spoken of himself and his fellow-Christians as "by nature children of wrath," goes on to declare that "God, in the richness of His mercy, because of the great love with which He loved us, even when we were dead through our transgressions, made us alive with Christ." The idea is similarly latent in such passages as Romans v. 8 and viii. 35.

Closely akin to this thought of the demonstration of God's Fatherhood in the redemption mediated through Christ is one particular realisation of its power which always fills the apostle's soul with wonder. We have observed the intimate contact Paul finds between the sonship of Christians and that of Christ. Probably, therefore, it is not a mere coincidence when he connects God's revelation "of His Son in me" with His purpose that Paul should preach Christ among the heathen (Gal. i. 15, 16). After having reached the climax of his thought in Galatians iii. 26: "You are all sons of God through faith in fellowship with Christ Jesus," he draws forth the implications of his statement in verse 28: "There is no longer Jew and Greek, there is no longer slave and freeman, there is no longer male and female: for you are all one in Christ Jesus." This spiritual revolution is referred to in the same terms in Colossians iii. 11. But Paul reveals the large scope of its significance for his mind in various passages of his later Epistles. Sus-

tained reflexion on the processes of the Divine purpose has intensified his amazement and kindled his adoration, in presence of the profound issue which has emerged. God, in His love and wisdom, has been pleased to break down all barriers between Pagans and Jews in the nature of their spiritual relation to Him. Through Christ Jesus "both groups of us may in one Spirit approach the Father" (Eph. ii. 18). This is, of course, involved in the very nature of the Christian experience. "God," writes the apostle to former Pagans (Eph. i. 5), "destined us to be His sons through Jesus Christ." But there can be nothing higher than sonship. No member of the "chosen" people can get nearer to God than a "son."

Nevertheless, Paul, the former Pharisee, continues to be overpowered by this exhibition of God's grace. This is that secret, hidden from the former ages and generations, but now disclosed by the Divine will in the Gospel which he has been commissioned to preach (Col. i. 25 ff.), the secret "that in Christ Jesus the Gentiles are co-heirs, companions and co-partners in the Promise" (Eph. iii. 6, Moff.). Here is the background which reveals the full significance of the approach to God as "the Father from whom every family in heaven and on earth derives its name and nature" (Eph. iii. 14, Moff.).

(2) The second aspect of Paul's conception of the Divine Fatherhood finds utterance in the memorable expression, "the Father of glory." As the first meant Love, and especially redeeming love, this means Majesty, and especially the omnipotent Divine energy operating in and on behalf of those who are "sons," and the infinite Divine resources placed at their disposal. No doubt this may be called secondary, in a sense, for the apostle's thought, but it embodies the magnificent assurance that the power of God has love at the heart of it, and that the love of God has no

limits to its effective working for those who have welcomed it. To stand towards God as a son to the Father is to be in touch with the whole nature of God, not with a part of it. Redemption from sin, which is the immediate experience of the Father's love, must have the most spacious bearings. It is the pathway to "newness of life." This Paul conceives as nothing less than a participation in the very life of God. So we can grasp the inner meaning of such a statement as Romans vi. 4, which speaks of Christ being raised from the dead "by the glory of the Father." His Sonship involved access to all the wealth of the Divine energies. Therefore, as Acts ii. 24 puts it, "He could not be holden by death." I scarcely think it is fanciful to find the same shade of meaning in the important confession of faith in 1 Corinthians viii. 6: "For us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and we for Him." The juxtaposition of Fatherhood with the conception of originating Power and final Purpose is surely not an accident. In any case we cannot miss the bearings of Ephesians i. 7-22. There Paul prays that "the [Father of glory]" may reveal to his readers "the wealth of the glory of His heritage," "the surpassing magnitude of His power" for those who believe, the criterion of this magnitude being "the activity of the might of His vigour," which He displayed in Christ's case when He raised Him from the dead, seated Him at His right hand high above all other power, put all things under His feet, and gave Him to be Head over all things to the *ἐκκλησία*, which is His body. But indeed it has already entered into their personal experience, because God "gave them new life in communion with Christ . . . raised them with him and made them to sit within the heavenly sphere in Christ Jesus, that He might exhibit in the coming ages the surpassing wealth of His grace in His kindness towards us in Christ Jesus" (Eph. iii. 5-7).

We have attempted to analyse Paul's conception of the Sonship of Christians, and to examine its salient features individually and in their mutual relations. It remains to indicate briefly the bearing and value of the conception for special aspects of the Pauline theology.

(1) First of all, it may be said to form *the link between certain more or less technical ideas and the demands of practical experience*. Let us take so typically Pauline a doctrine as Justification. I say nothing here about its Judaistic background, its forensic setting, or the artificial colour to which many minds have been so sensitive in it. It may be admitted that there are various points at which Paul's declarations lend themselves to, or even invite, a somewhat mechanical formulation. The whole treatment of the doctrine of imputation in dogmatic theology is an instance in point, although often only the most slender basis is afforded by Paul for the structure of dogma. But all students of Paulinism, be their theological bias what it may, would agree that whatever else is involved in being "justified" it means a new relation to God. That new relation or status, however, is often described in a vague, negative fashion, or by means of semi-technical terms like "righteousness" which the modern mind finds it difficult to grasp. But when the relation turns out to be essentially that of sonship, the entire significance of Justification appears in a fresh light. There is no *real* distinction between justification, adoption, and sanctification, to use the time-honoured term, any more than there is a real distinction between cognition, feeling, and will. We isolate them formally for convenience' sake. In truth, they compose a texture which cannot be torn with impunity. Therefore, when we make the starting-point of our interpretation of Paul's soteriology the attitude of which he became assured in Christ, that attitude of God to him which transformed his

relation to God, the discovery which was primary for his experience, which made all things new, we are in possession of categories which can never lose their appealing power, for the love of father and child, including all that the relationship may involve of vicarious suffering and sorrow, is elemental in our nature, and wholly independent of time and place.

(2) Again, Paul's idea of sonship may be said *to strike the balance between the individual and the social aspect of Christianity*. There can be little doubt that a rough survey of the apostle's thought, in the first instance leaves the impression that he was mainly concerned with the personal faith of individuals. In all his letters intense emphasis is placed on the relation of the separate soul to Christ. Large room is given to the spiritual discoveries of his own experience. No change in this respect becomes evident as his life advances. In the Epistle to the Philippians, which belongs to the ripeness of his closing years, his most heartfelt utterance reveals the absorbing interest of personal salvation: "that I may win Christ and be found at the last in him, not having a righteousness of my own derived from the law, but that which comes through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God which rests on faith. I yearn to know him and the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings . . . if by any chance I may attain to the resurrection from the dead" (iii. 9-11). But he is far from ignoring the social implications of the faith. No conception lies nearer his heart than that of the Christian society as the Body of Christ. This is not a growth of the later period. The data of 1 Corinthians xii., to mention only one of the earlier passages, presuppose as carefully compacted a position as anything in the Epistle to the Ephesians. We are inevitably reminded of the outlook of Jesus. In the forefront of His mission is the appeal to individuals, and the most memorable

of His sayings show how He felt the future of His cause to depend on the winning of separate souls, individually loyal to His service. But for Jesus these single followers were not destined for isolated obedience. They were to be centres of spiritual contagion, channels of influence which should diffuse itself in all directions, until a community should take shape, the nucleus of the Kingdom. The Kingdom itself is the goal of His effort, and especially the consummated Kingdom which God alone can establish.

Paul, like his Master, has to adjust the relation of the individual to the society, and I believe that no category so fitly meets his requirement as that of sonship. Each sin-burdened or unsatisfied soul has for himself to deal with the God who claims him in Christ (Rom. xiv. 12 ; Gal. vi. 5) He discovers, as Paul had done, that God is willing to "justify him that believes in Jesus" (Rom. iii. 26). That means, as we have seen, to accept him as a son. But this new relationship is not *in vacuo*. It is reception into a family (*οἰκοθεσία*). There is a new environment, a new atmosphere, a new society, a new organic life. Whatever differences remain, they must be cast into the shade by the family-spirit. That is the organising principle which becomes regulative. Hence we are not surprised to find that in Paul's thought Jesus' central conception of the Kingdom, which gathered up in itself and purified all the effective hopes of Jewish religion, passes over into that of the Family, already, of course, latent in the Master's teaching. Reference has been made to Paul's favourite metaphor of the Body of Christ. That is a special application of the larger idea. Its basis is the notion of organic union with Christ. From that evolves the picture of the Head and the limbs constituting a single organism (*σῶμα*) pervaded by a common Spirit (*πνεῦμα*). But as soon as you relate the conception to God, which is inevitable, you are compelled to

emphasise the attitude of Christ as Son, and then there follows the inspiring vision of the great Family which He has redeemed from bondage.

(3) In the last paragraph I remarked that the goal of Jesus' striving was the consummated Kingdom, which God Himself should establish. It would overload our present discussion to attempt any estimate of the conflicting views of *Jesus' conception of the Kingdom*. Personally, one has little doubt that it is not a case of decision between two alternatives. Each view is justified, but not to the exclusion of the other. Only a violent handling of the Synoptic material makes any other verdict possible. As a matter of fact, a larger comprehension of Jesus' basal principles reaches a stratum of His thought where present and future are absorbed in an experience which is timeless.¹ The man who has realised his sonship in God's family, who already knows in his still hampered earthly circumstances the bliss of communion with God, to all intents and purposes is now in possession of the benefits of the Kingdom. For there can be nothing more satisfying than this relationship which he has begun to enjoy. He can merely conceive a state of existence in which those influences that spring from his bodily passions and earthly limitations and from an environment of beings similar to himself shall be for ever abolished, and replaced by an atmosphere in complete harmony with his spiritual aspirations. The formulation of his conception of that future condition will be shaped by inherited and current ideas.

Paul understood his Master's standpoint with an insight which puts many recent investigations of the subject to shame. At no point has he more faithfully followed His conceptions than in this of the Kingdom come and coming, even when he has discarded the familiar terms. To begin

¹ See, e.g., Titius, *Die N.T. Lehre von der Seligkeit*, I. pp. 192-196.

with what is external, a careful comparison of the eschatological imagery used by Paul with that of Jesus will reveal, as I have attempted to show in *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, pp. 97, 98, 166, 167, the most remarkable parallelism. But in Paul's writings we also find the two contrasted poles of Jesus' view of the Kingdom. On the one hand it represents for him the supreme good of the future, ushered in with the Parousia, the revelation of the glory of God (1 Thess. ii. 12 ; Gal. v. 21 ; 1 Cor. xv. 50, etc.) For this he yearns with unabated longing (Phil. iii. 20 f.). But on the other hand he has already come into possession of this priceless gift of the Divine love (Rom. viii. 38, 39). That love has been poured out in his heart through the Holy Spirit (Rom. v. 5). The Spirit is the pledge of God's faithfulness (2 Cor. i. 22). Because he is "in Christ," he has already become "a new creation": "the old things have passed away, behold new things have come into being" (2 Cor. v. 17). The supremely new thing is that he now knows himself a "son" of God (Rom. viii. 14 ff.). He has been already transferred into the Kingdom of the Son of God's love (Col. i. 13). Here is precisely the position of Jesus. To stand in this intimate relation to the Father is to attain a blessedness which cannot essentially be surpassed. So that the apostle, like his Master, is fundamentally independent of eschatological issues. To the last, indeed, he clings to his invincible hope (e.g., Phil. iv. 5). But in his consciousness of sonship for himself and for his fellow-Christians, he can declare without faltering, "All things are yours." Hence we may say that in any endeavour to estimate Paul's religious position, his eschatological outlook has always to be judged in the light of his filial consciousness. As tested by that criterion, it will be kept within its proper limits.

(4) This brief discussion of Paul's affinity with Jesus'

view of the Kingdom reminds us of *the intimate relation of his entire idea of Christian sonship to the teaching of the Master*. We have traced the emergence of his new attitude towards God to the transforming crisis in his experience. But this new attitude would be at first an impalpable alteration of thought and feeling, a yearning blended of hopes and fears, a sensitiveness aware of strange, dim forces playing upon the soul, a mood which refused to be translated into definite speech. I venture to think that it first took concrete shape under the influence of Jesus' teaching of the Father, treasured in the Christian society of which Paul became a member. As with tremulous heart he shrank from claiming a peace which dawned upon his inward vision and yet seemed too wonderful for him, he discovered in the impression of Jesus' character and words the guarantee that his intuition was true. This was the very God whom Jesus had interpreted, approaching him and reassuring him. And he yielded his soul to the illumination of the glory of God the Father in the face of Jesus Christ His Son.

Paul's conception of the meaning of God's Fatherhood is an arresting testimony to the influence of the tradition of Jesus. We can test that influence at innumerable points. The more deeply we penetrate the apostle's thought, the more crucial it will appear. In the present instance there can be no hesitation. I have tried to show that two main aspects of the Divine Fatherhood appeal to Paul, its redeeming Love, primarily, and then its Majesty which reinforces the Love. But these are the very features emphasised in the teaching of Jesus. "I thank Thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth" (Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21)—that title sums up Jesus' experience of God. "Father" comes first, for it was in the mysterious Love which encompassed His awaking life, revealed Him to Himself, and appointed for Him His vocation, that He met God and knew Himself His Son.

But as He followed the call of duty, and consecrated Himself without stint to His mission, He felt He was in harmony with a Majesty to which all things were possible. Thus, He could teach His followers to pray, "Our Father." But the Father is "in heaven," the transcendent and exalted One. Therefore the petition which gives its tone to the whole prayer must be, "Hallowed be Thy name."

It has been the aim of this discussion to set in sharp relief the normative significance for the Pauline Theology of the conception of Christian Sonship. But if that aim has to any degree been realised, we have here another proof that no man in the Apostolic Age so luminously apprehended the secret of Jesus as Paul did, and that his Epistles are the classical interpretation of the real mind of the Master.

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

THE MOSAIC ORIGIN OF THE DECALOGUE.

The Second Commandment (continued).

IF we could trust the historicity of the magnificent story told in Exodus xxxii., we could confidently say that it was ancient, but not legitimate. The calf was made at the foot of Sinai itself, and ground to powder by the indignant Moses. But it is as good as certain that the incident is not, in the strict sense, historical, at least not in the setting in which it occurs. The calf-image could hardly have been suggested by the bull worship of Egypt, for there it was the living animal that was worshipped; and hardly of any god borrowed from Egypt could it have been said that he had brought Israel up out of the land of Egypt.¹ Further,

¹ Exod. xxxii. 4.

"nomads, who had only sheep and goats, would not think of paying homage to the bull. This animal, on the other hand, is so necessary to the husbandman that its worship in an agricultural community is inevitably a part of agricultural religion. . . . Moreover, recent excavations at Samaria have brought to light the proper name Egelyo, meaning Calf-of-Yahweh,¹ parallel to the Palmyrene Egelbol, Calf-of-Baal. Other traces of bull worship in Canaan and Syria have been found, and it is well known that the chief god of Heliopolis (Baalbek) was a bull god."² Thus it is difficult to believe that the Hebrews indulged in calf worship until, at the earliest, their first contact with Canaan in the country east of the Jordan; and that Canaanite soil is presupposed for this worship even by certain features of the story is made probable by its allusions to war and enemies,³ which, though not altogether inapplicable to Israel's desert experience, nevertheless, when taken in conjunction with the previous considerations, more naturally went to Canaan.⁴ Further, the late date of the narrative, in its present form, is confirmed by a comparison with the story of Jeroboam's calves, of which it is an irresistible reminder. In Exodus xxxii. 4, after the calf has been fashioned, the people are represented as saying, "*These* are thy gods, O Israel, which *brought thee up* (אֱלֹהֵי אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלֶוּךָ) out of the land of Egypt." The use of the plural *these* and the plural verb is surprising and unnatural, considering that there was only one image in question. If these plurals be defended on the ground that אֱלֹהִים sometimes, though rarely (and then usually with

¹ Or, Jahweh is calf.

² H. P. Smith, *The Religion of Israel*, p. 85; Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, pp. 296-301; Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum Alten Testamente*, ii. 76-78, gives five illustrations of bull images, two from the country east of the Jordan.

³ xxxii. 17, 25.

⁴ Cf. Gressmann, *Mose*, p. 208.

heathen implications) occurs with a plural, it is enough to point out that, in the post-exilic reference to this same incident in Nehemiah ix. 18, the singular is used *יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ*. “*This is thy God who brought thee up.*”¹ The use of the plural, inappropriate in Exodus, but thoroughly appropriate in the account of Jeroboam’s measures where *two* images are involved (at Bethel and Dan²), renders it highly probable that the narrative in Exodus rests on the narrative in Kings.³ Thus by another route we reach the conclusion that the calf-worship so fiercely assailed in Exodus xxxii. reflects the practice of the monarchy.

But that does not settle the question of its origin. It is of profound significance that in Exodus that worship is traced back to Aaron himself. Though the impulse to it is represented as coming from the people, it is Aaron who tells them to break off their golden rings, and it is he who “fashioned it with a graven tool and made it a molten calf.”⁴ This fact, supported by the argument already advanced touching the conduct and temper of Jeroboam’s revolution, would seem to justify us in inferring that the supporters of calf-worship in Northern Israel, who must have been very numerous, probably the large majority, claimed for it a very high antiquity; and this receives confirmation from the allusion (if historical)—already discussed—to the grandson of Moses. The calf-worship, as we have seen, could not have well gone back to nomadic

¹ It is, of course, possible to explain this as a studious avoidance of the plural “from fear of misconception” (*Ges. Kautzsch*, § 145 i.), though there would surely have been little chance of misconception in the post-exilic age.

² 1 Kings xii. 28.

³ 1 Kings xii. 28 does not indeed read *אֱלֹהִים these*, but *הִנֵּה behold*. Still two images are involved, and the plural is justified—A.V., R.V. and Amer. V. rightly, *Behold, thy gods*; and on this seems to rest the *unnatural* plural of Exodus.

⁴ Exod. xxxii. 2-4.

days and the time of Moses and Aaron, it can hardly have ante-dated the contact of Israel with Canaan. But it is highly significant that a party in the northern kingdom should have assigned to it an origin contemporary with Moses himself, and justified it by the sanction of a great name.

It cannot be denied that these facts which we have faced relative to the calf-worship, immensely aggravate the difficulty of associating the second commandment with Moses. Nor can it be denied that there are fewer positive facts to set on the other side. But there are some;¹ and the chief is this, that the very narrative which carries the calf-worship back to the time of Moses contains a titanic protest against it, uttered through the person of Moses. There are few more dramatic scenes in the Old Testament than that in which the great leader, swept by a hurricane of indignation at the degraded worship of his people, dashed to pieces the sacred tablets that were in his hand at the foot of the holy mountain itself. Here is a protest—in the spirit of the second commandment—attributed to Moses. This fact is of great significance, and would be of still greater, if it were demonstrably very early. The tendency among scholars has been to place this protest too late, by insisting that it betrays only too clearly the prophetic spirit; and it is true that the narrative, in its present form, may not be much, if any, earlier than the middle of the seventh century B.C.² But a late narrative may well preserve an early tradition; and Gressmann is probably nearer the truth

¹ The following general consideration has also to be borne in mind. If it be argued that the prevalent practice of image-worship is inconsistent with an earlier prohibition of it, it could with equal plausibility be argued that the acknowledgment—e.g. by Solomon and Ahab—of other gods than Jahweh is inconsistent with an earlier prohibition of such worship, whereas, if anything is certain, it is that Moses imposed upon Israel the duty of exclusive loyalty to Jahweh.

² Kittel, *Bücher der Könige*, p. 107.

when he maintains that the kernel of the narrative is older than prophecy, because "there is not a trace in it of the spiritual weapons with which the calf-worship had later to be combatted by the prophets: it simply sets the true religion over against the false and regards the recognition of this distinction as something that goes without saying."¹ In any case, it is important to note that if there was one party in Israel that justified the calf-worship by referring its origination to Aaron, there was another party that traced the protest against it back to Moses.

But more. The narrative, in its present form, represents the consecration of the tribe of Levi to the priesthood as a reward for the uncompromising zeal they displayed in punishing the worshippers of the golden calf.² The chapter is one of the most complicated in the Hexateuch. It bristles with difficulties. It is certainly remarkable to find Aaron instigating a worship which the Levites, who in P are so closely associated with Aaron, are rewarded for endeavouring to exterminate. It is not even certain that the Levites' slaughter of three thousand Israelites has any connexion with the story of the calf-worship at all. There are even facts which look the other way. For example, it is they alone who respond to Moses' ringing appeal, "Whoso is for Jahweh, (let him come) to me." But the calf-worshippers themselves might conscientiously enough have answered such a summons as that, for the calf was to them a symbol of their God Jahweh, who had brought them up out of the land of Egypt; indeed it was Aaron himself who had put this view of it before them, and the festival which he had announced for the next day was to be a festival of Jahweh.³ The calf-worship might

¹ *Mose und seine Zeit*, p. 206. Cf. Hehn, *Die biblische und babylonische Gottesidee*, pp. 285-288, *Die Bildlosigkeit Jahwes*.

² Exod. xxxii. 25-29.

³ Vers. 4, 5.

be a degraded form of Jahweh-worship, but it was Jahweh-worship all the same. For these and for other reasons it has been maintained with considerable plausibility that verses 25-29 constitute an independent section, unrelated to its present context, and that the drastic punishment meted out by Levi to other Israelites was not for the offence of calf-worship, but for some other offence altogether. That, however, would not materially affect the question at issue. For, at any rate, the consecration of Levi to the priesthood, for whatever reason, is here specially ascribed to Moses, and Moses, as the whole chapter witnesses, was regarded as a most passionate opponent of the calf-worship. We should be justified, then, in inferring that, by a party in Israel, the earlier Levites, at any rate, were regarded as the sworn foes of such worship, and that in this they were following a Mosaic tradition. These traditions about the Levites ought not to be too lightly swept aside; we have seen that the other tradition, which associates their possession of the Urim and the Thummim with the example and authority of Moses,¹ is probably historical; and this tradition of Levitical opposition to calf-worship is, as we have shown, not really negated by the allusion in Judges xviii. 30 to the grandson of Moses, who is also said to have been a Levite (xvii. 7).

But the greatest argument for a very early opposition to the worship of Jahweh by images is the eloquent silence of the historical books in reference to Shiloh and Jerusalem. The ark of Jahweh was there,² but no image of Him. Considering the temptation to image-worship attested by the elaborate addition to the second commandment, this can hardly be regarded as other than remarkable. The early chapters of Samuel give us a sketch—pretty complete for

¹ Deut. xxxiii. 8; Exod. xxviii. 30.

² 1 Sam. iii. 3; 2 Sam. vi.

the Old Testament—of the religious conditions of early Israel, but they say not a word about an image of Jahweh. In keeping with this is the absence of images from the patriarchal stories,¹ which mention without scruple such things as Jacob's sacred pillar (מִצְבֵּה),² denounced and proscribed by Deuteronomy,³ as the thing which "Jahweh thy God hateth."⁴ Further in the account of David's transference of the ark to Jerusalem,⁵ and—what is more relevant—of Solomon's furnishing of the temple,⁶ there is no mention of an image of Jahweh: it might almost be added that the possibility is definitely excluded by the words of the very ancient dedicatory poem,⁷ according to which Jahweh dwells in the thick darkness. It is possible, of course, to maintain that an original reference to an object so distasteful to later religious feeling would have been summarily eliminated by the energetic hands of the redactor; but that is very unlikely, considering the frank disclosures which have been allowed to stand. Solomon in all his glory is severely handled by the Deuteronomic redactor for his idolatry;⁸ and the writers who spoke so frankly of the brazen serpent to which incense was offered,⁹ and who so candidly laid bare the abuses which the reformation of Josiah was a valiant attempt to sweep away,¹⁰ need hardly have hesitated to acknowledge the fact, if it had been a fact, of the existence of an image in the temple. Even more fearless in the acknowledgment of facts than the historians were the prophets; yet, however passionately Isaiah denounced the popular religion,¹¹ and lashed their image-worship of the good-for-nothing gods,¹² he never

¹ Cf. König, *Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion*, pp. 133 f.

² Gen. xxviii. 18.

³ xii. 3.

⁴ xvi. 22.

⁵ 2 Sam. vi.

⁶ 1 Kings viii. 6 ff.

⁷ 1 Kings viii. 12 f.

⁸ 1 Kings xi.

⁹ 2 Kings xviii. 4.

¹⁰ 2 Kings xxii. f.

¹¹ i. 10-15.

¹² Cf. ii. 8.

charges the people with having an image of Jahweh in the temple, nor does Jeremiah, whose charge is, nearly a score of times, against the worship of "other gods," and the unethical worship of Jahweh. The dreadful condition of the temple then in Manasseh's time,¹ and also later,² during Zedekiah's reign, just before the fall of Judah, may justly be regarded as an aberration into which a perplexed religious opportunism was driven by the political stress of the times.

Further, it is well to remember what Kittel³ has pointed out, as against those who maintain the improbability of an official imageless worship in early times, that, quite apart from "the contrast which exists between the Israelitic religion and many other religions . . . images were seldom found in the official religion of Canaan. . . . Characteristic features of the public worship of the Canaanites are that it was practised in the open air upon *rising ground* (the so-called high places), and for the most part without any temple buildings, and also that generally no *idols* were used. It must be regarded as being more than chance that, although the excavations have brought to light numerous Babylonian and Egyptian images which were used in private worship, not a single one was found which could be proved to have been intended for public worship, least of all an idol of the principal Canaanitish deities, Baal and

¹ 2 Kings xxi. 4 f.

² As we may infer from Ezekiel's vision in viii. 5 ff.

³ *The Scientific Study of the Old Testament*, pp. 39, 52 ff. Sellin, however, may be right (*Zur Einleitung*, p. 17) in accounting for the paucity of images discovered in the course of excavation by the fact that those made of the precious metals would naturally be carried away by the enemy as booty. Large stone images of a primitive kind, have been found in Megiddo, Gezer, and Jericho. Further, the prohibitions in Exod. xx. 23, xxxiv. 17, seem to be directed against Canaanite usage (cf. Hos. xi. 2, xiii. 1 f.). Beside the Baal images destroyed in the revolution of Jehoiada (2 Kings xi. 18) there is express mention of the Philistine Dagon (1 Sam. v. 2 ff.) and the Ammonite Milcom (2 Sam. xii. 30, emended text).

Astarte. The only cases which in this respect deserve serious consideration are a few bull images. The significance of this fact in determining the antiquity of the demand for a religion free from idolatry in Israel—which is reflected in the chief commandment in the Decalogue—is at once clear.”

It has been argued that the absence of any clear protest against the calf-worship until the days of Hosea are reached, tells heavily against, if it is not actually fatal to, an ancient demand for an imageless worship, sanctioned by the venerable name of Moses. The prophets challenge much, but, before Hosea, they do not challenge that. Elijah hurled all the weight of his titanic personality against the forces that were menacing Jahwism; but among those forces there is no mention of calf-worship, though that must have been flourishing at the time. Jehu is said to have “destroyed the Baal out of Israel” (2 Kings x. 28), but there is no record of any attempt of his to exterminate the calf-worship. A century later, Amos attacks with indignant passion the degraded religion of his time, but among its degradations he never numbers the calf-worship.¹ It has indeed been maintained that he selected Bethel as the seat of his short-lived ministry, because there, by the practice of the calf-worship, the essential quality of Israel’s religion was most conspicuously denied.² In truth, however, he chose Bethel, because, in the words

¹ viii. 14 is no doubt an incidental allusion to it, “Thy God, O Dan.” But it is not specially singled out: it is co-ordinated with two other false cults, one at Beersheba, the other at Samaria—the cult of Ashima (אֲשִׁימָה) of Hamath (by a brilliant emendation, cf. 2 Kings xvii. 39). It is possible that the name of this heathen deity, mentioned also in the fifth century Elephantine papyri, may have been later altered to the more colourless and innocuous מִצְעֵזָה, *the guilt of Samaria*, being then interpreted, especially in its parallelism to Dan, as a reference to the calf-worship.

² Bethel is scornfully referred to as *Bethawen* בֵּית אֵוֶן (house of trouble, vanity, idols) in Hos. iv. 15, v. 8, x. 5—a use which probably rests on Amos v. 5.

of Amaziah, "it was the King's sanctuary and a royal house."¹ He would find there more readily than anywhere else the guilty aristocrats to whom he had so ominous a message to deliver. Again, when he delivers his ironical invitation, "Come to Bethel and transgress," it is far from an inevitable inference that this is a covert allusion to the calf-worship. He may be thinking only of such disgusting scenes as that described in ii. 7 f., where the sanctuaries ring with revelry and reek with lust. There is not a word in Amos to prove that he condemned the calf-worship; but, considering the shortness of his book, it is another thing to say that his silence implies his approval of it.² Hosea's challenge, however, is clear and stinging. "I loathe thy calf, O Samaria. The calf of Samaria shall be broken in pieces"³; "The inhabitants of Samaria shall tremble for the calf⁴ of Beth-awen" (that is, Bethel); "Yea, his people shall mourn for him, and his priestlings shall writhe⁵ for him. Yes, this shall be carried to Assyria as a present to King Jareb."⁶ "Sacrificing men kiss calves."⁷ No language is too contemptuous for Hosea to use of the worship of an animal image made by human hands (viii. 5, xiii. 2). Already in his words we hear the scorn of Deutero-Isaiah.

If it be true, as has been pointed out, that the substance of Exodus xxxii. is older than prophecy, then Hosea is not, as is usually maintained, the first to denounce calf-worship; but is it fair to construe the almost unbroken silence of

¹ vii. 13.

² The fallacy of the argument from silence is well illustrated by the fact that Isaiah, in his extant prophecies, never condemns the serpent-worship, though he must have disapproved of it, as its abolition falls within the period of his activity (2 Kings xviii. 4), and was very probably instigated by him.

³ viii. 5 f. reading, with most, אֶזְנֵה for זֶנֶח.

⁴ *Calves* should be *calf* (sing.), as the following pronouns show (cf. LXX. μὲν ἑκατόν).

⁵ יִחַלּוּ, or *howl*, יִלְלִילוּ, for יִגִּילוּ.

⁶ x. 5 f.

⁷ xiii. 2.

Jahweh champions before his time as consent? Here, as so often, we have to bear in mind the very lamentable poverty of our material; much was never recorded, much was eliminated, much has perished, and therefore the argument from silence is always precarious. Apart from all this, however, we have to remember that different problems emerge in different ages. The evil which Elijah had to assail was compromise, the attempt to establish the co-ordinate legitimacy of the Hebrew Jahweh and the Phœnician Baal. Not till the battle for Jahweh's exclusive right to Israel's homage had been fought and won was it worth while to raise the issue of the nature of the worship to be rendered to Him. The significant sentence in 2 Kings x. 28. "Jehu destroyed the Baal out of Israel," marks a real turning point in the religious fortunes of Israel. Before that point the foe had been the Baal—external, foreign; after that point it was Baalism—that inward assimilation to Canaanite ideals and practices which was corrupting a worship professedly rendered to Jahweh and to Him alone. Doubtless there were many lapses into foreign cults; but this distinction between the periods is broadly true. Jahweh religion had first to be secured, then purified. The contrast between the periods has been happily illustrated by Professor Robertson, when he says, "The two crises are very much like those which Europe passed through in its religious history—first the struggle as to whether the Crescent or the Cross should be the recognised symbol of superiority, and then the Reformation of religion from its own abuses in the sixteenth century."¹

Serpent Worship.

The gravest difficulty, however, in associating the second commandment with Moses is the remarkable state-

¹ *Early Religion of Israel*, pp. 226 f.

ment in connexion with the reformation of Hezekiah—a reformation quite incidentally attested by the unimpeachable authority of the Rabshakeh¹—that “he broke in pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made; for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it; and it was called Neḥushtan.”² It is worth noting, to begin with, that this statement, though integral to its context, is really a later intrusion. In part that is plain even in the English translation which begins abruptly with *he* (הוא) instead of the familiar *waw* consecutive, *and he*; and it is still more plain in the Hebrew, where the verbs are introduced by simple *waw* with the perfect, instead of *waw* consecutive with the imperfect. But the statement, though late, is undoubtedly authentic. The hatred of the serpent-cult shines through the story of the Fall; and, without foundation in historical fact, no exilic or post-exilic writer would have invented such a statement, still less would he have implicated the honoured name of Moses in a worship so unworthy as to call for official abolition.

What, then, was the real origin and significance of the brazen serpent to which the Israēlites for generations had been paying the homage of worship? Clearly it is connected with the story of the brazen serpent which was lifted up in the wilderness, and which is said to have brought healing to the bitten who looked upon it.³ The late Dr. R. G. Murison⁴ suggested that this national idol, enshrined in the affections of the people, was “most likely a wonder-worker among the Canaanites before the Hebrews entered the land. These allurements of its worship and the proofs of its divinity proved too strong for these immigrants, and

¹ Isa. xxxvi. 7; 2 Kings xviii. 22.

² 2 Kings xviii. 4. ³ Num. xxi. 4–9.

⁴ *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, vol. xxi. No. 2, Jan. 1905, p. 126.

it became to them also a god of healing. It may have been the chief idol of Jerusalem, and remained there after David took the city and made it his capital; or it may have been removed to the temple by an early king, perhaps Solomon himself, in order to add popularity to the shrine which the kings desired should be the centre of the national religion." Against this it may be said that, whether the first commandment was then in existence or not, it is extremely improbable that so devoted a Jahweh-worshipper as David at any rate would have tolerated the existence of another god—least of all a god of the people he had subjugated—side by side with the God of Israel.

Murison regards the story in Numbers as an attempt to invest with Mosaic authority the long-established serpent-cult, which was being threatened by the rise of prophecy, one of whose characteristics was its apprehension of the spirituality of God.

But the temptation to withdraw the story from the Mosaic cycle vanishes the moment it is seen to be connected with cognate phenomena, which indisputably belong to that cycle. The magic staff of Moses is one of the familiar features of the story.¹ By raising it he works (in E) the miraculous plagues; with it he smites the rock and water gushes forth;² with the staff in his uplifted hands, as he stood and then sat on the hill top, he won the victory for Israel at Rephidim.³ Now this is the staff which he is said to have received from Jahweh, "the rod wherewith thou shalt do the signs,"⁴—hence the supernatural power with which it is invested—and it is of the utmost significance that this rod is said to have been transformed into a serpent.⁵ Plainly we have to do here with a serpent staff,

¹ Cf. the magic staff of Elisha, 2 Kings iv. 29, 31.

² Exod. xvii. 6; Num. xx. 11.

³ Exod. xvii. 8-13.

⁴ Exod. iv. 17.

⁵ Exod. vii. 8 ff.; cf. iv. 3.

many illustrations of which have come down from antiquity. Sometimes a serpent figure (or figures) is wound round the staff,¹ sometimes it is set on the upper end of the staff. The terms in which the famous brazen serpent of the wilderness is described² would be exactly met by a staff of the latter kind ; and in the light of all these facts it seems very probable that this healing staff is really the staff which appears elsewhere in the narrative.

It was originally, as we have seen, a gift of Jahweh. Considering the connexion of the staff with the victory at Rephidim, it is possible that it was primarily regarded as the weapon of the god ; it is at any rate quite certain that it is not identified with the god, and any worship offered to it such as is attested for the generations before and up to Hezekiah's time, is an illegitimate deviation from its original meaning. It is simply one of the material symbols with which Moses associated the worship of Jahweh, like the ark, the ephod, the Urim and Thummim. As the ark was Jahweh's throne, so the rod was his sceptre ; both together helped to visualise to a people to whom material symbols were indispensable, the presence, authority and power of Jahweh. If this explanation is correct, it is natural to find the staff deposited "in the presence of Jahweh,"³ which must at least mean in the neighbourhood of the ark. If this be held, as is most natural, to reflect also the practice of historical times, then the theory that the brazen serpent worshipped till Hezekiah's time was a Canaanite idol is immediately disposed of ; for the peculiar intimacy of the ark with the Jahweh religion, not to say its indispensableness,⁴ renders it inconceivable that an alien cult could have subsisted by its side. Kittel⁵ and König⁶

¹ See the illustrations on p. 92 of Gressmann's *Altor. Texte und Bilder*.

² Num. xxi. 8 f.

³ Num. xx. 9.

⁴ 1 Sam. iv. ; Jer. iii. 16.

⁵ *Geschichte*, ii. p. 494.

⁶ *Gesch. der A.T. Religion*, p. 220.

make too much of the possibility that the brazen serpent had no place in the temple—certainly it is not expressly said to have been there; but the probability, as we have seen, is that it was there, as part of the ancient furniture, so to speak, of Jahweh worship.¹ Doubtless the people soon learned to idolise it, but the intention of Moses was far otherwise, and in no way inconsistent with his promulgation of the second commandment. Still, the blow dealt by Hezekiah at the adored and ancient figure which had become a fetish was a blow struck at religious materialism, a blow struck for a more spiritual conception of God, an anticipation of the day when even the far more sacred ark would no longer be considered necessary as a guarantee of the presence of Jahweh. If it perished, “it would never enter into people’s minds, they would neither remember it nor miss it, nor would it ever be made again any more.”²

The Ark.

This leads to a consideration of the ark. Its nature and function can best be seen by an examination of its history, so far as that is possible. Of its great antiquity there can be no question, and practically no question that it goes back to Moses. A poem which has certainly the flavour of antiquity, and which, at any rate in its present setting, is definitely associated with Moses, runs thus :—

Arise, Jahweh ! that Thy foes be scattered,
That those that hate Thee flee before Thee.³

That, we are told, is what Moses said, whenever the ark started; and when it rested, he would say,—

Return, Jahweh !
To the myriad clans of Israel.⁴

These lines have been held to reflect the period of Israel’s

¹ The preceding argument is suggested by Gressmann’s illuminating discussion in *Mose und seine Zeit*, pp. 284–290, 453–460.

² Jer. iii. 16,

³ Num. x. 35.

⁴ Num. x. 36.

warfare in Canaan, rather than the earlier days of Moses and the wilderness: and in particular the word *Return* (שׁוּבָה) might very suitably be referred to the return of the ark "from battle to its fixed sanctuary, whether Shiloh, Nob, or some other place, after the people were settled in Canaan. It is less clearly suitable to the circumstances of the march through the wilderness; the people overtake the ark, the ark does not return to them: Yahweh is regarded as being with them on the march as well as in the camp."¹ But the mention of enemies is not inconsistent with the wilderness experience, as Israel may well have come into conflict with desert tribes; and if, instead of שׁוּבָה, the reading שׁוּבָה proposed by Budde be adopted, who further suggests the insertion before יְבָרְכֶה of רַבְבִּית which may have been accidentally lost through similarity to it, we get a couplet which would in no way necessitate a Canaanite background, or conflict with a wilderness origin for the passage.

Abide (settle), Jahweh! and bless
The myriad clans of Israel.

Or possibly, with Oort, who assumes that the one word was mistaken for the other—

Abide, Jahweh! and bless
The clans of Israel.²

The early sources say nothing of the construction of an ark by Moses: the detailed account of Exodus xxv. 10-22, where the ark is first alluded to, is the work of P. But a comparison of Deuteronomy x. 1-3 with Exodus xxxiv. 1, 2, 4, with which it very largely agrees and on which it is manifestly based, makes it as good as certain that originally in Exodus xxxiv. (J) stood the statements that Moses was instructed by Jahweh to make an ark and that he made it

¹ G. B. Gray, *Intern. Crit. Comm.*, Numbers, p. 97.

² See Baentsch, *Handkomm. zum A.T.*, Numeri, p. 503.

—statements which were afterwards suppressed in the final redaction of the Pentateuch in favour of P's account, which gives the ark a more ornate form and its construction a somewhat different historical setting. In any case the ark is attested by JE in connexion with the undoubtedly early stories of the crossing of the Jordan¹ and the capture of Jericho,² and by the early sources of the Book of Samuel in connexion with the Philistine wars.³ Practically all of these allusions associate the ark with war, doubtless because Jahweh, whatever else he was, was also a war-god.⁴ But it is more important to note the very intimate association of Jahweh with the ark. Its presence in battle is believed to guarantee His presence, its capture is His capture, or at any rate His defeat, and the glory departed from Israel when the ark of God was taken.⁵ The intimacy of association between Jahweh and the ark is so close that some have argued for their absolute identity, the ark being the visible form in or by which Jahweh manifested His presence. Some colour, it must be admitted, is lent to the argument by the words of Numbers, which, taken literally, assert that "when the ark set forward, Moses said, 'Rise, Jahweh.'"⁶ But this looks like hypercriticism. The words may be fairly and reasonably held to imply no more than that in some very definite way Jahweh was associated with the ark, whether in it, as some have maintained, or enthroned upon it as an invisible presence. A certain inevitable materialism clings, if you like, to the conception of Deity which it involves, but not the sort of materialism categorically condemned in the second commandment. The ark and the serpent-staff beside it would represent, as it were, the throne and sceptre of Jahweh.

Another important problem, however, is raised by the

¹ Josh. iii.

² Josh. vi.

³ 1 Sam. iv.

⁴ Cf. Exod. xv. 3; Ps. xxiv. 8.

⁵ 1 Sam. iv. 18, 19, 21.

tradition that the ark contained the tablets on which the Decalogue is said to have been written. If this tradition is sound and the ark is Mosaic, the Mosaic origin of the Decalogue is *ipso facto* settled. But there is no secure evidence for the tradition. It is not found in the old prophetic sources, but in Deuteronomic passages, which were followed naturally by P. In Deuteronomy x. 1-5, in accordance with Jahweh's instructions, Moses "put the tablets in the ark" which he had made (ver. 5); and in the heavily redacted chapter describing the dedication of Solomon's temple, it is said¹ that there were in the ark "the two tablets of stone which Moses put there at Horeb, even the tablets of the covenant"² which Jahweh made with the children of Israel when they came out of the land of Egypt." Similarly in P, in accordance with Jahweh's instructions, Moses is said to have put "the testimony" (תְּעֻדָה)—that is, the affirmation of Jahweh's will as expressed in the Decalogue—into the ark.³ This is not the place to discuss whether these stone tablets represent the transformation of an older tradition of a stone fetish contained within the ark: we are simply examining the evidence for the tradition that the Decalogue was deposited in the ark, and it is sufficient here to point out that there is no evidence in the oldest sources. JE records that Moses received the two tablets of stone,⁴ but not that he put them in the ark. Of course we must reckon with the possibility, perhaps even probability, that D's statement to this effect rests on the authority of a passage in JE which has been sacrificed to editorial expediency; but no argument can be safely built on so precarious a basis.

¹ 1 Kings viii. 9.

² So LXX: πλάκες τῆς διαθήκης. The isolated appearance of תְּעֻדָה, which may almost be said to necessitate תְּרַבִּי, not found in MT, confirms LXX. The presence of various redactional efforts is very evident.

³ Exod. xxv. 16, 21, xl. 20.

⁴ Exod. xxxi. 18b, xxxii. 15 f.

More promising in this connexion is the phrase *The ark of the covenant of Jahweh*. As the Decalogue is the most succinct embodiment of the terms of the covenant (according to Deut.) the two tablets of stone on which it was said to be engraved are called "the tablets of the covenant"¹; and the ark which is said to have contained them is described as "the ark of the covenant of Jahweh"² (in P "the ark of the testimony"³). Now, if this were an ancient phrase, it would go a long way to support the contention that the Decalogue had been deposited in the ark. In point of fact, the phrase occurs in very early sources, but in practically every case it can be proved, either from the grammar or from a comparison with the Septuagint, that the *covenant* has been intruded. In Joshua iii. 11 אֲרוֹן הַבְּרִית אֲדֹן כָּל-הָאָרֶץ (the ark of the covenant of the Lord of all the earth) the intolerable grammar at once arouses suspicion, which is confirmed by the almost certainly original phrase two verses further on where יהוה appears instead of הַבְּרִית (the ark of Jahweh, the Lord of all the earth). Equally intolerable is the grammar of verse 14, where the priests bear הָאֲרוֹן הַבְּרִית, and in verse 17 הָאֲרוֹן בְּרִית-יְהוָה. In two consecutive verses of 1 Samuel iv. *covenant* twice appears in the Hebrew text, neither time supported by LXX: in verse 3 אֲרוֹן בְּרִית הוּא appears as τὸ θεοῦ ἡμῶν, and in verse 4 אֲרוֹן בְּרִית-יְהוָה as τὸ θεοῦ Κυρίου. In view of the later temptation to intrude the covenant idea, there is every probability that the Greek has preserved the original text. The textual facts therefore justify us in regarding the phrase "the ark of the covenant of Jahweh" as due to Deuteronomic redaction.⁴ Thus, if the original phrase was simply

¹ Deut. ix. 9, 11, 15; cf. 1 Kings viii. 9 (LXX). ² Deut. x. 8.

³ Exod. xxv. 22.

⁴ The temptation of later writers to play upon the covenant idea, and to introduce the word where it is lacking in their sources, is well illustrated

the ark of Jahweh or *the ark of God*, it furnishes no support for the view that the Decalogue was deposited in the ark. Considering the ancient habit of depositing sacred documents in sacred places, it is not absolutely inconceivable that the tablets, if they ever existed, may have been deposited in the ark; but against this probability is the fact that the two versions of the Decalogue (e.g. in the fourth commandment) are not entirely harmonious. It is difficult to believe that there could have been any discrepancies in the account of so important and well preserved a monument which was still accessible as late as the days of Solomon. All this in no way militates against a Mosaic origin for the Decalogue, which may be established or at least rendered highly probable on other grounds; but it militates against the view that it was written on stone tablets and carefully preserved for the aftertime. Rather it makes in favour of the view that the commandments, which may have formed a sort of catechism for the early worshippers of Jahweh, were, like the early poems, transmitted orally.

It used to be maintained that an allusion to "the testimony" (הַעֲדוּת) in the story of the coronation of Joash attested the existence of the Decalogue for the latter half of the ninth century B.C.¹ But, as the word was also used to signify the Law as an attestation of the divine will, it was more frequently interpreted in this passage as a law-book, conceived, perhaps, as laid upon the young king's head or shoulders in token of his obligation of submission to the divine will. But this is by no means obvious in the brief words of the Hebrew; besides, nowhere else is there any mention of such a coronation custom; and Well-

in Elijah's complaint that "the children of Israel have forsaken *Thy covenant* בְּרִיתְךָ," where LXX reads, no doubt correctly, only *σε* (Thee). 1 Kings xix. 10 (cf. 14).

¹ 2 Kings xi. 12.

hausen's conjecture תַּצְעָרוֹת *the bracelets* is as good as certain.¹ This emendation would bring the passage exactly into line with 2 Samuel i. 10, where the bracelet (or bracelets) and crown (הַנֶּזֶר) also appear together as insignia of royalty. With this emendation all possible reference to the Decalogue disappears.

Does Hosea imply the Decalogue.

A very definite allusion to the Decalogue has been detected by some scholars in Hosea's² charge against his people that there is "no knowledge of God in the land—nothing but perjury, murder, theft, and adultery." This, especially as it is part of Jahweh's legitimate "controversy" with Israel, may plausibly be held to point to an ancient covenant law, ignored and transgressed; but this view does not seem absolutely necessary. By those who believe that they have other reasons for regarding the Decalogue as late, such a passage might fairly be taken as preparing the way for it; and, after all, we are not compelled by the introduction to Hosea's charge to postulate as its background any special covenant revelation to Israel. For the knowledge which is lacking in the land is the "knowledge of God," not specially of *Jahweh*, and with this agree the general terms of the charge. The sins denounced—as by Amos in chapters i. and ii. where he lashes the foreign nations—are transgressions of laws fundamental to human society and universally obligatory. No argument either for or against the existence of the Decalogue in Hosea's time should be drawn from the passage in question. There may, however, be an allusion to the Decalogue concealed beneath the very difficult words of vi. 5.

הַצְבֹּתִי בְּנִבְיָאִים הֲרָגְתִּים בְּאִמְרֵי־פִי

¹ In Sam. the word appears as תַּצְעָרָה, which has, with much plausibility been altered to תַּצְעָרוֹת.

² iv. 1 f.

rendered, "I have hewn them by the prophets, I have slain them by the words of my mouth." The meaning of these words, which are usually referred to the deadly judgments announced by the prophets, is anything but obvious: the first clause in particular is so obscure that Wellhausen and Nowack, following him, leave the verb untranslated. A brilliant emendation of Klostermann's ¹ reads בָּאֲבָנִים הוֹרִיתִים "I have hewn it *on stones*, I have taught them (given them a torah) by the words of my mouth"—the thing taught being verse 6, that "I desire love and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings," which might be not unfairly regarded as a transfigured summary of the Decalogue. If this clever suggestion be accepted, not only the Decalogue but the stone tablets on which it was written would be familiar to Hosea's contemporaries. But familiar as facts or as tradition? The reference, definite as it is, need imply no more than that Hosea was acquainted with the traditions underlying JE, whether in their present literary form, or, more probably, not; and Hosea's knowledge of these traditions is otherwise abundantly attested.² Doubtless the utterance would gain immensely in force, if he could point to tablets with the Decalogue inscribed upon them; but—apart from the fact that according to 1 Kings viii. 9 they were not exposed in public, but deposited in the ark (unless indeed we assume that there were replicas in public places, sanctuaries, or elsewhere)—the prophet's words do not necessarily do more than repeat, without essentially confirming, the tradition.

Conclusion.

There is nothing, therefore, in the original and proper use of the ephod, teraphim, Urim, Thummim, ark, or ser-

¹ *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, 1905, 474 f., cited by Sellin. *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus*, p. 37, note 1. ² Cf. xii. 4 f., 13.

pent-staff to suggest image-worship. There is good reason to believe that the official worship of Jahweh in the time of the Judges at Shiloh, and in the time of the monarchy at Jerusalem, was imageless, and that an early protest was delivered against the calf-worship. There is therefore no adequate reason for denying, and there is some ground for affirming, that the prohibition of images enjoined by the second commandment goes back to Moses. The inwardness of the tenth commandment is, as we saw, no more incompatible with such an origin than the special recognition of the seventh day demanded by the fourth commandment. And the conclusion of the whole matter is that, whether we consider the religious or the ethical contents of the Decalogue, there is no good reason for doubting the tradition which associates it with the name of Moses.

J. E. McFADYEN.

THE ABUSE OF LAUGHTER.

THE opening paragraphs of the eleventh chapter of the Apocalypse describe, by way of allegory or parable, the mission of two prophets or witnesses for God in the Great City, how they do their work, how they are finally martyred, and then raised to heaven, after which retribution falls upon their obstinate generation. It is a grim, obscure picture. But the tenth verse contains a striking touch, which speaks for itself. The corpses of the two men lie in the streets. *For three days and a half, men from all peoples and tribes and tongues and nations look at their corpses, refusing to let their corpses be buried; and the dwellers on earth will gloat over them and rejoice, sending presents to congratulate one another—for these two prophets were a torment to the dwellers on earth.* That is, these con-

temporaries expressed their relief in Oriental fashion ¹ by sending gifts to each other in honour of the auspicious occasion. They were demonstrative in their joy. They made merry (*εὐφραίνονται*). We can overhear the ring of unholy delight as they laughed in the streets; these citizens were positively thankful to get rid of the prophets who had been so uncomfortable a reminder of God and goodness. They laughed aloud in their delight at the murder.

Few things reveal the corruption of human nature like the way in which men abuse or pervert the gifts of God. We have a dreadful power of spoiling the best things in life; high powers may be degraded to a base use, noble faculties prostituted, lovely instincts twisted into morbid shapes, and lawful tastes either turned to unlawful objects or indulged in ways that are illegitimate. Here as elsewhere the worst thing in the world is the corruption of what is best.

God has bestowed on man two supreme gifts, the faculty of sorrow and the faculty of laughter. He who made the eyes capable of shedding tears has also provided joy that brightens the eyes and fills the lips. Each is the expression of an inward mood, and both can be abused. We know how the faculty of grief is capable of perversion, when we see people shedding tears over trivial disappointments, and little concerned for the deeper losses of the moral and the spiritual life. The tears of wounded pride or of vexation over some petty trouble are more common than the tears of moral penitence or of noble shame ²

¹ Like the Jews in Persia, to celebrate the downfall of their enemies at Shushan (Esther ix. 19): "A good day, and of sending portions one to another."

² "Many live—as I have often told you and tell you now with tears—many live as enemies of the cross of Christ" (Phil. iii. 18). "I wrote to you in sore distress and misery of heart, with many a tear" (2 Cor. ii. 4).

over unworthy members of our Church. Sometimes tears are not shed, when they should be, for unselfish reasons; *men are not grieved for the affliction of Joseph*. But perhaps it is true upon the whole to say that laughter is more capable of abuse than tears. "In laughter," a modern novelist observes, "there are more dreadful phases than in tears." The vein of mirth is in all natures, and sometimes it is not very far from tears; it ranges from the quiet sense of humour which is a mark of sanity, up through innocent amusement and clean wit to the laughter of cheerfulness and good spirits which rejoices at some happiness for ourselves or other people. Then we laugh, and we are meant to laugh, at pretensions and affectations. We try to laugh people out of some fear or folly. And we should have grace to laugh now and then at ourselves, if we are sensible and honest. The uses of merriment and humour are manifold. But the range of the perversions of laughter is equally wide. The man who can laugh at anything or at any time is worse than the man who can laugh at nothing; but even apart from this, even apart from the laughter of hysteria or insanity, we come across the laughter of frivolity—noisy and useless, like *the crackling of thorns under a pot*, the giggle and the titter, the laughter that bubbles from silly and shallow natures, the gaiety which is gained at the expense of kindness, the jesting to which truth and dignity are sacrificed, the amusement of one at the humiliation of another,¹ and this malign rejoicing over the defeat of justice and goodness. The climax on the one side is:

*When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion,
We were like unto them that dream.
Then was our mouth filled with laughter—*

or, *It is meet that we should make merry and be glad, for this*

¹ As in Ps. lxxx. 6: "Our enemies laugh to themselves," at our plight.

my son was dead and is alive again, he was lost and is found. The climax on the other side is the ghastly mirth of these citizens over the corpses of the two witnesses. *They made merry.* That was the end to which they perverted their divine faculty of laughter. It was worse than empty mirth; it was evil. It is echoed in the *Te Deums* sung by the Roman Church after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and in the public rejoicings held by several German cities over the sinking of the *Lusitania*. History, mediæval and modern, can furnish parallels to this verse of the Apocalypse.

(a) There is the laughter of ridicule. Sometimes ridicule is justified, when it is the exultant scorn of truth over the foiled pretensions of those who hate and thwart righteousness. In the Old Testament, where laughter is seldom far from scorn, several notable instances ¹ of this are to be found. But ridicule easily slips into incredulity, as in the laughter of Abraham and Sarah at the prediction of Isaac's birth, or the laughter of the friends of Jairus, who thought they knew better than Jesus did and laughed derisively to think of His discomfiture when He saw the dead body of the girl. This is laughter poisoned by sneering.

(b) Then there is the laughter of cruelty, which can be overheard early in life, when children mock at deformed people or at foreigners, and which, in older people, who ought to know better, leads to malicious laughter at mishaps to others. We may laugh at what is a serious matter to our neighbour, and laugh with a note of hard contempt in our voice, which is irreligious as well as rude. Humour ought always to be good humour, in both senses of the term "good." It is unlawful and ugly when the unfortunate are made a laughing-stock ² or when purity is derided.

E.g. Job xxii. 19 and Isa. xxxvii. 22.

² Job xii. 4: "The just upright man is laughed to scorn."

(c) A third abuse of laughter is connected with irreverence, the spirit which cannot see anything except the ludicrous side of poverty or drunkenness, for example, and which, on other lines, will persist in discovering food for amusement in what others cherish as holy and noble. Even good taste should forbid the attempt to raise a laugh over sacred subjects, and yet this is one of the temptations which beset conversation even in refined circles. It was against such treatment of the Bible that Sir Walter Scott raised his lofty protest in the lines—

Within this awful volume lies
The mystery of mysteries :
Happiest they of human race
To whom God has granted grace
To read, to fear, to hope, to pray,
To lift the latch and force the way :
And better had they ne'er been born
Who read to doubt or read to scorn.

It is said that a Comic Life of Jesus was circulated during last century on the boulevards at Paris. We may shudder at such profanity, but we ought to recollect that in less obvious ways it is possible to throw ridicule upon the Bible by innuendoes and silly jokes. There is humour in the Bible,¹ and yet it may be looked for wrongly. Even the tendency to expect humour in its pages has a note of the irrelevant, if of nothing worse. Stevenson was characteristically frank in reporting a rebuke once given to him on this very temptation by his friend, Professor Fleeming Jenkin. "I remember taking his advice upon some point of conduct. 'Now,' he said, 'how do you suppose Christ would have advised you?' And when I had answered that He would not have counselled me anything unkind

¹ Apart from the Lucan beatitude and woe (Luke vi. 21, 25), however, laughter is only twice mentioned in the New Testament, and in both places it is the wrong laughter (Mark v. 40 and parallels, James iv. 9).

or cowardly, 'No,' he said, with one of his shrewd strokes at the weakness of his hearer, 'nor anything amusing.'” It was a shrewd stroke, which more than Stevenson need for a similar weakness.

(d) But the supreme abuse of laughter is this malicious expression (or at any rate feeling) of relief at getting rid of good counsellors and shaking off the warnings of God, this self-congratulation at the silencing of those who have shamed us by their better lives. When life is going wrong or falling away from the true standard, it resents any allusion to the decline and fall. Men and women will sometimes have very little scruple about committing flagrant offences, but they hotly resent any exposure of these, and they are irritated at the very presence of those who by word or example are a standing rebuke to them. They welcome everything to the discredit of such neighbours. They want to have them put away, and when they cannot or dare not do this for themselves, they rejoice when it is done, when the reputation of such witnesses for God is killed or lowered by scandal. It is sometimes a positive pleasure to feel that they are no longer exposed to this uncomfortable witness against themselves, and the sense of genuine relief, even although they may be too polite to express it in words or laughter, or at least to laugh openly, is at bottom as corrupting and diabolic as the mirth of these impenitent citizens in the Great City. It voices a hatred of the good and of all who venture to represent it. The classical description of this mood is given by Bunyan in his account of the jury who tried Faithful in the town of Vanity Fair. Their names were: “Mr. Blindman, Mr. No-Good, Mr. Malice, Mr. Love-Lust, Mr. Live-Loose, Mr. Heady, Mr. High-Mind, Mr. Enmity, Mr. Lyar, Mr. Cruelty, Mr. Hate-Light and Mr. Implacable; who every one gave in his private verdict against him among them-

selves, and afterwards unanimously concluded to bring him in guilty before the Judge. And first among themselves, Mr. Blind-Man the Foreman said, 'I see clearly that this man is an heretick.' Then said Mr. No-Good, 'Away with such a fellow from the earth.' 'Ay,' said Mr. Malice, 'for I hate the very looks of him.' Then said Mr. Love-Lust, 'I could never endure him.' 'Nor I,' said Mr. Live-Loose, 'for he would always be condemning my way.' 'Hang him, hang him,' said Mr. Heady. 'A sorry scrub,' said Mr. High-Mind. 'My heart riseth against him,' said Mr. Enmity. 'He is a rogue,' said Mr. Lyar. 'Hanging is too good for him,' said Mr. Cruelty. 'Let us dispatch him out of the way,' said Mr. Hate-Light. Then said Mr. Implacable, 'Might I have all the world given me, I could not be reconciled to him; therefore let us forthwith bring him in guilty of death.' And so they did."

And so they do. Such is Bunyan's parable of the way in which people will get rid of good influences which make their conscience uneasy. The eye lightens with a gleam of satisfaction when the disturbing factor is removed. Whether men laugh to themselves or aloud, the bad root of their self-congratulation is the same. *They that dwell on the earth rejoice and make merry.* They laugh over the corpses of those whose counsels they mocked in life. The decencies of modern civilization may often prevent this inner feeling from taking the loud, public form in which the Orientals frankly and naïvely expressed their delight; but the feeling is none the less ugly because it is veiled, the inner glow of gratified malice is equally set on fire of hell.

These abuses of laughter are enough to show that it is inadequate to say that laughter is a heavenly thing if it comes from the heart.¹ There are hearts and hearts,

¹ Carlyle, in his essay on "The Opera."

and these citizens of the Great City probably laughed with all their heart as they gazed at the corpses of the two prophets. Hardly anything in our nature is more characteristic than what we choose to laugh at, or the tone in which we laugh. That forms one clue to our inward selves ; if there is anything vulgar or coarse or vain or sour or callous or malicious lying in our hearts, it will be apt to come out in our laughter. We reveal ourselves unconsciously in many ways, but few things are a surer index to our real characters than this. And it may be an index to what is foul or foolish.

Our griefs declare our Fall,
But how much more our joys.

When you hear some men or women laughing, you realize what a fallen creature is. Their very merriment has a note of debasement in it. The way in which they express their humour is a repulsive and ominous sign of moral degradation.

This faculty of making merry is a divine endowment. We are intended to enjoy it as part of our inheritance. When the author of the book of Job ¹ describes the fate of the profane, who forget God and are suddenly swept away—*such is the "joy" of his way* ¹—he adds :

*Behold, God will not cast away a perfect man,
Neither will he help the evildoers ;
He will yet fill thy mouth with laughter,
And thy lips with rejoicing.*

Not with laughter over the collapse of the man's enemies, but with the pure joy of happiness and health restored by God, the delight of being helped back to prosperity. This is perhaps the nearest Old Testament parallel to the eschatological saying of Jesus :

¹ viii. 11-21 ; i.e., "such is all the joy he gets from his course of wrongdoing"! A sarcastic touch.

*Blessed are ye that weep now,
for ye shall laugh.
Woe unto you that laugh now,
for ye shall mourn and weep.*

But now and here there is a time to laugh, and to laugh naturally under life as it is lived before the eyes of God. The exercise of this divine faculty not only touches the happiness of human existence but serves as an aid to soundness of mind and humility of heart. "I lay it upon you," Manning once wrote to Vaughan, "to read the *Critic* and the *School for Scandal*. You would be holier and happier if you would enter into such things with patience and learn to laugh." For laughter is to be more than a ripple on the stream of conversation, which brightens intercourse; it is designed to enter as a vital element into our mental and moral attitude towards life. Faith has its laughter; truth has its laughter; goodness has its laughter. The tragic thing is that folly has her laughter too, and so has vice. Human nature can make merry, whether it is looking upward or downward. This faculty of merriment, which can raise us to the sunlight of God, can also lower us to a laughter like that of the men who made merry over the corpses of these two prophets in the street. For good or evil, we possess this capacity for laughter, and according to the use we make of it we shall be judged by Him who came not only to fulfil but also to purify our joys.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE PARABLE OF THE UNJUST STEWARD.

EVEN now I do not feel quite certain that Canon Fisher has elicited the “perfectly plain meaning” of this difficult passage, and I should like to offer a few comments.

1. He says that the word *διεβλήθη* “at least hints that the accusation was malicious and not necessarily true.” And yet he also says that “the offence of the steward was that he was ruining the estate by excessive rack-renting.” Does not the latter imply the truth of the accusation?

2. It is clear from verse 1 that the parable was addressed to our Lord’s disciples (*αὐτοῖς*). If so, is it possible to apply “make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness” to men who were confessedly poor? Long ago Latham (*Pastor Pastorum*) pointed out that any lesson on the proper use of money would surely be out of the question with men who possessed none.

3. Then, too, what about the context, especially verses 10–12? Are not these verses the true application of verses 1–8?

4. Some writers suggest a change of punctuation in verse 9 as follows:—

“And I, do I say unto you, make to yourselves friends, etc.?
[No, I do not, for] he that is faithful, etc.”

It is argued that without such a change of punctuation the words of Christ in verses 10–12 are entirely inconsequent, but that with it they give the reason why He does *not* say what is mentioned in verse 9.

5. It seems to me that the preceding and following context needs an application to the disciples of the sin of the Pharisees in murmuring against Christ for receiving and welcoming outcasts. Our Lord wished His disciples to do what He had been doing, imitating His friendliness while

avoiding the indifference of the Pharisees as represented by the Scribes, the Elder Brother and Dives. But how to get this out of the language with proper regard to the exegesis of every word and verse is a real difficulty.

6. It is tempting to take "mammon of unrighteousness" as descriptive of the outcasts themselves, and to understand Christ to mean: "Make friends of these poor and despised ones, so that when you come to die they may be above, ready to welcome you into everlasting habitations." But the references to "mammon" in verses 11 and 13 seem to forbid this.

7. The true rendering and meaning of verse 8 appear to be: "The children of this present world are shrewder towards their own people than the children of the heavenly kingdom are towards their spiritual relatives."

8. But I feel sure that somehow or other we are to find the true interpretation by means of a careful consideration of the entire context, especially by remembering that the two chapters, xv. and xvi., deal with one subject. Chapter xv. gives our Lord's *apologia* in answer to the murmurings, and then chapter xvi. gives two applications of this attitude, the one to the disciples, and the other to the Pharisees as represented by the callous rich man.

W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS.

THE REFERENCES TO PERSECUTION IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

IN any consideration of the Epistle to the Hebrews the questions of date, destination and authorship are so interconnected that the determination of one goes a long way to the settlement of the others. In this article we are occupied with a single point—the bearing of the allusions

to persecution on the question of the community to which the Epistle was addressed.

At the present time there is a general tendency to consider that the Epistle was sent to the Church of Rome and not to the Church of Jerusalem. The main argument for this is the references to the persecution endured by the recipients of the Epistle. It is urged that these point to the Church of Rome, which, as is well known, suffered grievous persecution, and would be out of place in a message addressed to the Church of Jerusalem, which suffered no persecution at all.

Our simplest course, therefore, will be to examine the statements in the Epistle, taking them in their obvious meaning, without any attempt to make them agree with any theory. We shall then be in a position to determine how far these statements support the reference to Jerusalem or Rome.

In x. 32-36 the Author says his readers have endured a great fight of afflictions; partly, while they were made a gazing-stock both by reproaches and afflictions; and partly, while they became companions of them that were so used. He adds that they took joyfully the spoiling of their goods. He urges them not to cast away their confidence and warns them of the need for courage and endurance. In xii. 3, 4 his readers are directed to the example of our Lord, who endured so great contradiction of sinners against Himself, and are reminded that they have not yet resisted unto blood. In xiii. 13, 14 they are bidden to go forth unto Jesus without the camp, bearing His reproach, and are reminded that on earth they have no abiding city.

It would seem (1) that the afflictions of the Christians addressed were very real and were trying their faith to the uttermost, (2) that these afflictions were incurred for the name of Christ, and (3) could have been avoided by deny-

ing that name. These persecutions consisted (4) in reproaches and contumely, and (5) in the loss of goods and property, but (6) did not extend to actual loss of life. This last point is emphasised by the Author as showing that, though their sufferings were great, they might have been even worse.

We will now consider how far these statements agree with the position of Christians at Rome. If we regard the Epistle as intended for that Church, there are only two persecutions to which the Author could refer—those under Claudius and Nero. The late Dr. A. B. Davidson considered that the statements in the Epistle are most simply and satisfactorily explained if they are understood as referring to the persecution of Claudius. Our only authority for this persecution is a statement of Suetonius that Claudius expelled the Jews from Rome, as they were continually making riots at the instigation of Chrestus. There are, however, many objections to the identification. (1) It is not quite certain that Chrestus is a mistake for Christus. The person referred to may actually have been a Jewish demagogue, named Chrestus. (2) Even if we assume that Suetonius has confused Chrestus with Christus, it is still uncertain whether the reference is to our Lord or to some false Messiah. (3) Our uncertainty is increased by the fact that the edict made no distinction between Christians and other Jews. (4) The Jews expelled from Rome could not have escaped banishment by denying our Lord, which was the very essence of the temptation of those addressed in the Epistle. (5) There is no hint in Suetonius of any definite persecution, and the Jews were soon afterwards allowed to return to Rome.

Accordingly most scholars consider that the persecution of Nero is the one referred to and here there is no uncertainty as to the actual facts. Tacitus tells us that Nero,

in order to divert from himself the suspicion of setting fire to Rome, seized a vast multitude of Christians. Some were dressed in skins of wild beasts and torn in pieces by dogs, others crucified, others set on fire to light the imperial gardens at night. At last their sufferings excited pity even in those who at first were hostile to them. It is thought the phrase "made a gazing-stock" would exactly describe the public exhibition of the Christians by the inhuman emperor. Even if we granted this, the account in Tacitus would be quite inconsistent in other respects with the statements in the Epistle. The writer could not have asserted of those who suffered such terrible deaths that they had not resisted unto blood; an attitude so unsympathetic and unfair would have deprived his exhortation of any effect. In reality, however, the phrase "made a gazing-stock" does not of necessity convey so precise a meaning. In 1 Cor. iv. 9 St. Paul uses it of himself and his companions ("We have been made a gazing-stock to the world, and to angels, and to men"), where the allusion is to the toils and reproaches incurred in his ministerial career. The language used in the Epistle to the Hebrews ("Ye were made a gazing-stock both by reproaches and afflictions") is strikingly similar. It would be an exceedingly mild description of the Neronian persecution.

It would seem, then, that the statements in the Epistle do not support its destination to Rome. It remains to consider how far they agree with the position of the Christians in Jerusalem. It is maintained that the Church of Jerusalem is excluded by the fact that the Christians in that city suffered no persecution. Here we have an assertion which may be tested like any other, and fortunately we have abundant evidence in the New Testament with which to compare it.

In Acts v. 40, 41 we read that Peter and John were

beaten and that they rejoiced to suffer shame for the sake of Christ. A little later we are told that St. Stephen was stoned, and that the persecution was so bitter that the Christians in Jerusalem, with the exception of the apostles, were forced to leave the city. Later still St. James was slain and St. Peter imprisoned. At the same time the narrative in the Acts suggests that the persecution was confined to stripes and imprisonment, and only in rare and isolated instances extended to loss of life. This agrees with the consistent representation that the persecution of the Christians was entirely due to the Jews, for the Jewish authorities no longer possessed the power of life and death. Outside the period covered by the Acts the position of affairs under later procurators would give the Jews many opportunities of persecution. In addition the approach of the Jewish war would deepen the cleavage between the Christians at Jerusalem and their Jewish brethren. The present war with Germany will enable us to appreciate the "reproaches" that would be made against those Jews who did not side with their countrymen in the life and death struggle with Rome.

The statement in the Acts that the Christians at Jerusalem were scattered throughout Judaea and Samaria is illustrated and supported by our Lord's advice to His followers (Matt. x. 23): "When they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another: for verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come." It is a curious coincidence that in the Epistle (xiii. 13, 14) the reminder that the readers have here no continuing city is connected with bearing the reproach of Christ. Such scattering throughout Judaea and Samaria would in many cases involve the loss of goods and property, a loss which the recipients of the Epistle had endured with cheerful equanimity.

Accordingly we learn from the narrative of the Acts that the persecutions of the Christians at Jerusalem consisted (1) in reproaches and contumely, (2) in expulsion from home, involving the loss of goods and property, but (3) only in isolated instances of actual loss of life.

It will be remembered that this was the exact position of the Christians to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews was addressed.

H. H. B. AYLES.

"BLESSED ARE THE POOR IN SPIRIT."

THE shaping of character in accordance with the will of God as manifested in Christ Jesus is the highest duty and privilege of man. Such at least, described in whatever formula, has come to be the belief of our time. And glorious is the test to which it has recently come to be put in the Providence of God.

The object of this paper is to consider one feature of the character manifested in a single word of Jesus, the first of those words of singular emphasis, the Beatitudes—*Blessed are the poor in spirit*. It is harder to understand than the other Beatitudes, and probably it is misinterpreted with widespread and detrimental results. If this be so, it is a case where, if exposition is lost, all is lost. For what loss is greater than that of one of the radii of the Christian character as delineated by the Master? If He uttered a blessing at the outset of His Ministry on *Poverty in Spirit* as a foundation, or the foundation, of the Christian character, the character manifested by Himself, it behoves us to know first of all what He meant, and then to act accordingly. From the treatment of this word, of all others, the hypothesis of oriental exaggeration or of anything

else to be taken *cum grano* is totally excluded. To espouse such hypothesis on such an occasion would be to write or preach oneself a mountebank. The first Beatitude was carefully weighed both by the Author and by those who reported it.

Naturally we begin by observing the difference between the first sentence of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew) and that of the Sermon in the level place (Luke):

“Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God” (Luke).

“Blessed are the poor in spirit (οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι), for theirs is the kingdom of the heavens” (Matthew).

Various explanations of the diversity have been given. One is that Luke reports a direct address to the poor, and that this is what Jesus gave, while Matthew, writing at a later age of the Church, in which many wealthy adherents might resent the teaching of Luke as excluding them unless it was modified by the addition of *in spirit*, has sought to meet the case by implying that the poverty was spiritual not material. Opportunism could no further go. Matthew, forsooth, knew by experience the danger of alienating the best supporters of the congregation! He knew the importance of the words (which, however, are in Luke and not in Matthew): “Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness,” and included with them boldly the mammon of righteousness! On these, however, be it said that never was a more complete travesty of the Christian morality perpetrated than this interpretation, which is probably universal. The true meaning is: “Make to *yourselves* friends *outside of* (ἐκ) the mammon of unrighteousness.” For a little consideration will show that “friendship” based upon cash is the last piece of humbug that we can imagine the Holy One of God to have prescribed. We do not now pause to show the copious instances in Greek

where *ἐκ* meant *outside of*, but we may leave the opportunists to reconcile the false with the morally true, the sham with the real, the modern with the ancient, at their leisure. It is certain that on reflection they will see the difference between a subterfuge, even if attributed to so high and so venerable an authority as Matthew, and the true exegesis. Higher criticism is a most valuable study, but not when it is based upon conditions assumed from those of a modern congregational system.

The question before us is different in kind—whether there was and is such a Christian virtue as *poverty in spirit* at all. That certain devout persons have aimed at it and have seemed to possess it is not a proof that it was admitted by Jesus and singled out for His first blessing. Let us admit that dispositions, features of character, virtues, can never be precisely named. Terms fail us to describe even expressions of the face: a poet is more likely to succeed than a scientist. Terms only partially succeed in describing colours: with the Romans and the Greeks we know that they failed still more. How can we expect ever to describe character by terms? But those who aim at *poverty in spirit* would find it hard to distinguish it from *meekness*, which carries its own Beatitude, with its own promise, which is quite distinct from that of *poverty in spirit*, as distinct as inheritance of the kingdom of heaven is from that of the earth.

Has, then, St. Paul, for instance, thrown light upon *poverty in spirit*? “Let the word of Christ dwell in you *richly* in all wisdom” (Col. iii. 16) is no abated or restricted exhortation. “The unsearchable *riches* of Christ” (Eph. iii. 8), “the *riches* of his grace” (Eph. i. 8), the “renewing of holy *spirit* which He *poured out upon us richly* through Jesus Christ,” show that he was a believer in riches in spirit, not in poverty in it. And this is true whatever is the meaning

of *spirit*, about which there is much more to be said than can be contained in a paper.

If the question were asked, on what occasion Jesus exemplified in His own person the presence of *poverty in spirit*, the answer would not be easily found. But can we suppose that one who possessed this negative or almost negative virtue (if the term virtue may be allowed) would ever have undertaken such an action as the cleansing of the Temple? or the two “miracles” that were clearly destructive of property that was not His own? or that He would ever have said to the Jews, “Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do”? (John viii. 44).

In view of these facts another interpretation has been tried—those who *have been* poor in spirit—but this, too, is a somewhat sorry expedient, if only because if applied to the other Beatitudes it evacuates them of meaning. How should we like to say “Blessed are those who *have been* pure in heart, meek, merciful”?

The false opinion about this beggarliness in spirit—for if we are to press the meaning of *poor* it comes only to beggarly—has in all times injured the Church. It fails to recognise that chivalry and high ambition carry any blessing from the Lord of life and glory: it seems to forget the gallant men who in the service of their king and country sacrifice their lives in Polar exploration, in the coal-pit, at the shipwreck: it shuts out manly virtue which is sportsmanship at its best (I say nothing of the heroism of the trenches and the battles which was revealed long after this was written). But for all these qualities room must be found in the blessing of Jesus and the praise of God, “Well done, good and faithful servant!”

Rejecting, therefore, *poverty in spirit* as an unworthy travesty, because a non-entity, we look for a passage of

the Old Testament where both expressions occur, *the poor*, and *spirit*. And we have it in Isaiah lxi. 1. The first duty of the Christ in His Ministry is recognised by Him as scriptural, "to preach the Gospel to the poor." And Jesus was proved Christ by performing that duty: "because of which (οὗ ἐνεκεν) the Lord anointed me to preach the Gospel *to the poor*" (Isa. lxi. 1). The Saviour of the world was such by virtue of the fact that He first set up the standard of duty performed. And this He could do only by fulfilling the prophecies concerning THE MAN. Space does not permit me to show that *spirit* throughout the New Testament means the Messianic meaning or breath of the Old. Such is the plain fact.

Clearly, then, *Blessed in spirit* means *Blessed by the scripture* of Isaiah lxi. So far from saying "Blessed are the spiritually poor" (which would be οἱ πνεύματι πτωχοί), Matthew says "Blessed are the poor, by the spirit." i.e. "Blessed are the poor—even so saith the spirit." There is a parallel to this in Revelation xiv. 13, "And I heard a voice from heaven saying, Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth. Yea, saith the spirit." In this case the Scripture is probably that of—

Habakkuk i. 12, "Art not Thou from the beginning, *O Lord* God, my holy one? And [so] *we* shall not die."

The illustration is conjectural, as are all illustrations. But in any case the parallel is Luke xx. 38, "He is not the God of the dead, but of the living: for all (i.e. the three patriarchs mentioned and *all the patriarchs* 4 Macc. xvi. 25) live unto Him." (Matthew xxii. 32 stops at *the living*.) This is based upon 4 Maccabees vii. 17, . . . to God they do not die, for they are like our patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but they live to God" (ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ). Jesus, then, here assumes a known truth and does not reveal a new one. The author of the Apocalypse in Revelation

xiv. 13 does the same. For that remarkable fourth book, "The Martyrdom of the Maccabees," or "The Triumph of Reason," was scripture. And one can see at a glance that when for instance in Revelation ii. 7, etc., we read "what the Spirit saith unto the Churches," the substance is taken in every case from the Old Testament and Apocrypha.

Thus the first Beatitude struck a note from Scripture, and the fact is marked by Matthew. Luke did not mark it as *by the Spirit*, but he knew it. For it is he who records the lesson drawn at Nazareth from the same scripture—

Isaiah lxi. 1, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me (or *us*) because He hath anointed Me to preach the Gospel to *the poor*. . . ."

Here the Spirit, in the original Isaiah, is upon some person whose identity is still much disputed—whether it was the prophet Isaiah, or Messias, or another.¹ But this question does not really affect the other, which concerns the relation of the Spirit to the Reader at Nazareth. If He was to preach and to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, as all admit, then the Spirit was *upon Him*. Let us only observe here how entirely this passage in Luke overthrows the *Filioque*—proceeding from the Father *and* the Son—that article, or rather that interpolation, of the "Nicene" creed, which alone of all is devoid of all Scriptural support and in 800 A.D. was expunged by Pope Leo III and remained expunged at Rome for half a century. It needs to be expunged again by authority. Every one who cares for orthodoxy and for the union of East and West will expunge it.

The Spirit is the true interpretation of prophecy. Jesus here implies that the Messianic breath or meaning of pro-

¹ I have tried to show that the original speaker is the water of "Silvan's brook" itself: *Jona Jopatur: Eine Studie. J. of Th. Studies* No. 50, Jan. 1912.

phcey, and the faculty of discerning it, is upon Him. He had come to Nazareth "full of the Spirit" after the Baptism and the contemplation and above all the Resolution of the forty days in the wilderness. He had resolved "to do Thy will, O God," to be THE MAN foreshadowed in Holy Writ. He "opened the book and found the place" intentionally. It was not already a Messianic passage in the usual sense (see Edersheim, *Life, etc.*, Appendix IX. 730). He made it so by His own choice: "To-day hath been fulfilled this scripture in your ears." The faculty of the Prophet and Saviour and Man was already upon Him. He declared Himself there and then the Prophet (Luke iv. 24) whose function and high duty it was to find in fulfilment of prophecy the duty of THE MAN and to set up the standard of duty for all time and eternity. "Was it not the Christ's own duty (ἔδει) to suffer?" (Luke xxiv. 26).

E. C. SELWYN.

THE MINISTRY OF RECONCILIATION.

A STUDY OF 2 CORINTHIANS III—V.

IN the First Epistle to the Corinthians the Apostle Paul had spoken of himself as counting it "a very small thing to be put on trial" by his readers; in truth, to the man who awaits his sentence from the judgment-seat of Christ all human estimates of his worth are trifling (1 Cor. iv. 1-5). And yet Paul suffered keenly from the censures and slights to which he was subjected at Corinth. That city he regards as a touchstone for his ministry: "the seal of my apostleship," he writes, "are ye in the Lord" (1 Cor. ix. 2); "you are our commendatory letter, recognised and read by all men" (2 Cor. iii. 1). If the Corinthian Church relapses, the seal is gone, the letter is cancelled, and every one may read Paul's failure and the futility of his vocation. Or if, remaining Christian, this community should disown his fatherhood and put its apostle aside in favour of some other, a damaging blow would be struck at his authority; alienation at this conspicuous centre of the Pauline mission would weaken its influence everywhere and would arrest, if not altogether block, its further progress. One can understand therefore the anxiety with which Paul awaited, in the period antecedent to the writing of this letter, the return from Corinth of Titus, who carried an ultimatum from him to his unruly children there (see 2 Cor. ii. 1-9, vii. 5-16; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 14-21, 2 Cor. xiii. 1-10). The distress caused to this sensitive man by the fractiousness of the Corinthians probably contributed, with the attack on his life at Ephesus (Acts xix.) and the continued strain of the legalist controversy working

upon his chronic malady (2 Cor. xii. 7-10), to the paroxysm of illness from which he has just recovered (i. 8-10, iv. 7-11, v. 1-8). This train of experience left a deep mark on Paul's spirit, traceable throughout the early chapters of Second Corinthians.

The Christians of Corinth have been virtually calling their Apostle into court (see 1 Cor. iv. 3, ix. 3, 2 Cor. xiii. 3). Half ironically he had challenged them, "as men of sense," to "judge what he was saying" (1 Cor. x. 15)—a permission they were quite ready to take, and which they extended freely to Paul's doings as well as his sayings; his physical appearance and bearing, his style of speech—everything about him was canvassed and criticised unsparingly (2 Cor. x. 7-11, xi. 7, 16, xii. 11-16, etc.); on various points he was compared to his disparagement with other missionaries. Though he blushes to do it and feels that he is a sort of "fool" in writing so much about himself, he is compelled to make his *apologia* (x. 16-23, xii. 11 ff.): we are thankful for the compulsion which has drawn from the Apostle his deepest emotions and the full disclosure of his principles and aims. Paul must make these clever but contentious people understand him; he must dispel the cloud of mistrust thrown about his character. He sets himself to do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his children in Christ whose faith was bound to suffer from the success of his detractors (see i. 6, 12-14, 21-24, iv. 15, xii. 15); and for the sake of the Gospel, which would be sorely hindered by discredit falling on its most effective propagator (1 Cor. ix. 23, xv. 10 f., Phil. i. 16; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 8-10).

The situation, while imposing on Paul an unwelcome self-defence, has thrown him back upon the fundamentals of his experience. He puts his work to a searching examination. He has been obliged to reconsider his position in the altered light. His relations to his Heavenly Master and to his

fellow-men, tested by recent occurrences, he has carefully reviewed, looking afresh into the warrant and the scope of his ministry, under a sense of responsibility toward God which wholly excludes insincerity and pride (2 Cor. i. 12, 23, ii. 17, xii. 19). This vein of self-scrutiny and vindication pervades the whole Second Epistle to the Corinthians (excepting only the parenthesis of chaps. viii. and ix. relative to the business of "the collection"); here lies the thread of its continuity, and the main explanation of the writer's harking back in the last section of the letter to the dissensions which seemed to have been happily dismissed in chapter vii.

Up to the end of chapter ii. Paul's apology deals with the incidents arising from Titus' mission to Corinth on his behalf: to this he reverts in chapter vii. The changes of plan in regard to his own lately intended visit to that city, wearing as he admits an appearance of vacillation (i. 15-ii. 2); the sorrowful letter of discipline carried by Titus, and its salutary effect (ii. 2-11); the advance of the Gospel at Troas and elsewhere during the Apostle's present journey (i. 12-17): these are the topics leading up to the broader consideration of the Apostolic ministry which opens out in chapter iii.

The readers furnish Paul with the starting-point for the survey he designs to make; their reproaches force him to insist on his credentials (cf. xii. 11, etc.). He overhears some of them whispering, as they listen to the letter: "Ah, there he is, singing his own praises again, writing for himself another epistle of commendation!"—"No," he retorts; "we have in *you* all the commendation we require; and we carry that letter written on our heart, where every one may read it.—Our letter? say, rather, *Christ's* letter of credit, to which we are instrumental,—a plain certificate of His saviourship (cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11). That epistle is inscribed by the Spirit of the living God, on hearts of flesh, more

durable as they are more delicate than the slabs of the Mosaic law (iii. 1-3)." The allusion made in verse 1 to "certain persons" bearing "commendatory letters" addressed to Corinth, with whom the writer contrasts himself, is premonitory of the denunciations we find in chaps. x. and xi. directed against interlopers who sought to seduce this Church from its allegiance. For the present the troublers may stand aside; the Apostle is concerned with the charge Christ has committed to him, to which the Church of God in Corinth supplies so precious a *testamur*.

The unmistakable attestation of Christ and the Gospel thus furnished, according with the witness of his own conscience (i. 12-22), sustains St. Paul in the "confidence toward God" with which he writes (ver. 4; cf. i. 15). Respecting the Corinthian Church he is now better assured than ever that it will not disown its Apostle nor discredit the Gospel it has received (vii. 16; cf. Gal. iv. 10); in this assurance Paul unbosoms himself, and imparts his most intimate thoughts about the trust that he and his companions bear. "We," he said to the Corinthians a moment before, "are your vaunt, even as you are ours" (i. 14): he would have them understand the grounds, and the greatness, of that holy pride in the Gospel-ministry belonging to the people who have received through it the supreme gifts of God. So he proceeds to expatiate on the grandeur of his vocation, first deprecating the appearance of assumption by his disclaimer of all self-derived qualifications: whatever competence the ministers of Christ possess is wholly God-given; in *God* their efficiency has its source and spring (ver. 5; cf. v. 18; 1 Cor. iii. 5-9).

I. THE GLORY OF THE NEW COVENANT (iii. 6-iv. 6).

The distinction of the New Ministry lies in "the life-giving Spirit" which breathes through it (ver. 6). *Breath*

(or *spirit*) and *life* are correlatives,—the former the animating principle of the latter (Gen. ii. 7). Man lives, in truth, only by the breath of the living God (see Matt. iv. 4). Now “spirit,” the vital element of our existence, which, inflowing, reaches the central self and blends with the currents of our being, is the antithesis of “letter”—the legal formula engraved for example on the Sinaitic “tables” (vers. 3, 7)—which operates on the man from without by way of prescription and restraint (cf. Jer. xxxi. 31–33). “Spirit” is free, plastic, organic in its action; “letter” is stiff, stereotyped, mechanical. “The letter kills”—*how* Paul has shown, from bitter experience, in Romans vii. 7–24; “the Spirit makes alive”: the former sentence states (broadly speaking) the method and the effect of the Old Covenant; the latter, those of the New. There were features of glory attending the ministry of Moses, harsh though its form and deadly though its issue proved; the administration of life, through Christ and His servants, is an incomparably more glorious thing (vers. 7–11). In verse 9, *life* and *death*, as the outcome of the contrasted ministries, have their synonyms in *righteousness* and *condemnation*; since, as Paul shows abundantly in the companion Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, the written law of God, where it addresses itself to the man from the outside in the shape of compulsion, provokes a disobedience which brings down judgment on the offender’s head; whereas the Spirit, awakening the man’s proper life and stirring the affections, puts his soul in tune with righteousness. *Spirit, righteousness, life*, are the accompaniments of the New Covenant ministry—the instrument, product, and goal of its working—as *letter, condemnation, death* characterised the Mosaic régime (cf. Romans vii. 4–6).

The fading glow seen on Moses’ face as he descended from the Mount of the Law-giving, symbolised the glory, real but

transient, attaching to the legal dispensation (vers. 7-13) : the glory of the new order will prove enduring as it is intrinsic (ver. 11). "Such," at any rate, is the "hope" of its ministers, who in this expectation express themselves with perfect "frankness"—without the least reserve or artifice (ver. 12, iv. 2, vi. 11, 12 ; cf. ii. 17, xii. 16, etc.)—whereas Moses must needs use "a veil over his face" to hide the evanescence of the passing and comparatively superficial glory of the law which he dispensed (vers. 12, 13). The reference to Moses' shining but veiled face serves, in the fanciful Rabbinic manner, to point the contrast between the pre-Christian and Christian systems of religion. Another turn of application is given to the parable of the Law-giver's Veiled Countenance, when in vers. 14-16 Paul sees "the same veil resting till this day on the heart" of Judaism as it "reads the old covenant," the supersession of which by Jesus Christ it fails to recognise. Until Israel "turns to the Lord" and the light of His face reaches the people's heart, the obscuration of that veil must continue.

From the dim region where slaves of the letter pore over the darkened page of Scripture, the minister of the New Covenant points us, in vers. 17, 18, to the realm of which Christ is Lord, where the clear light shines and the fresh winds blow. Christ and the Spirit are one ; and for those who breathe this air, who serve Christ in His own spirit, authority and liberty are reconciled. There is "liberty of speech" for the preachers (ver. 12), liberty of will and action for the practisers (ver. 17), of the life inspired by Christ's Spirit,—for all who enter into the covenant God has made with mankind in Him (cf. Gal. iii. 23-iv. 7, iv. 31-v. 1). Thus the glory investing the ministration of the New Covenant dimmed by no veil on the face either of ministrant or beholder, is communicative and infectious (ver. 18). He who gazes on it is suffused with it, absorbed in it ; he

becomes himself also "light in the Lord" (cf. Eph. v. 8, 9): in other words, he is "conformed to the image of God's Son" (Rom. viii. 29, 30), which he contemplates in the mirror of the Gospel. The transformation is an interior, and (in the deepest sense of the word) a natural process; it proceeds "even as from the Lord of the Spirit," as it must needs be under "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" (Rom. viii. 29) and in Christ's spiritual realm.¹

The glory of the New Dispensation, with which its ministry is permanently clothed, St. Paul has traced to the Spirit breathing through it and imparted by it. By the end of the third chapter we perceive this glory as streaming from the person of Christ, "who is the image of God" (iv. 5). There Paul first beheld the Divine splendour, on the Damascus road: the very countenance of God, made visible in the lineaments of Christ, shone into his gloomy heart. The vision evoked in him a new creation (cf. v. 17), fresh and wonderful as when the Almighty said at the world's beginning, "Let there be light!" (ver. 6). Through that transfiguring experience Saul of Tarsus had become a "minister

¹ The unique phrase "from the Lord of the Spirit," which concludes iv. 18, must be read in the strict order of the words, the second genitive being that of *characteristic*. There is no need either to tamper with the grammar or to quarrel with the text of the expression. The thought of *spirit* in contrast with *letter*, as the determining principle of the new order, dominates the paragraph from verse 6 onwards. "Spirit," in fact, is the characteristic of Christianity, of the realm (that is to say) where Christ rules. So that while the Spirit is "the Spirit of the Lord" (ver. 17, and *passim*), issuing from Him and executing His behests, the Lord is also "Lord of the Spirit," since He rules by this means, and after this fashion. If the two are one (ver. 17), their relation wears this double aspect. The reversal in the order of the correlative terms resembles that we find in St. James' "Lord of glory" (ii. 1), compared with the familiar "glory of the Lord"; and "Lord of the Spirit" is the complement of the Pauline expression "law of the Spirit." Here, as in Romans viii. 2, "freedom" and "life" are identified with the world-régime inaugurated by the Spirit of God under the Redeemer's lordship. Romans vii. 6, where the "new order of the Spirit" is contrasted with the "old order of the letter," supplies a parallel example of *πνεύματος* as *genitive of characteristic* or *ruling influence*.

of the new covenant of the Spirit that giveth life." He stepped into the world's new day, whose sun is the risen Christ; "the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ" bathed his soul, and flooded the universe about him. The bearer of the light has himself first become radiant, luminous with it. His being is kindled by the fire of God, which touched him in the love of Christ; and his whole self is consumed to give the illumination which constitutes his ministry. In this identification of man and message lies, once more, the distinction of the New Ministry: upon it there rests the unfading, communicable radiance of the enlightened and open heart, while the spokesman of the Old Covenant possessed only the waning, veiled, and uncommunicated brightness of the glowing face. Thus the Apostle restates subjectively, in terms of personal experience, the fact which he affirmed objectively in terms of history and world-revelation, when at the outset he declared: "God has qualified us to be ministers of a new covenant,—a covenant of the Spirit that giveth life."

II. THE EARTHEN VESSEL HOLDING THE HEAVENLY TREASURE (iv. 7—v. 13).

With the 7th verse of the fourth chapter, the writer turns to consider himself ¹ the carrier of the world-light, the messenger of the New Covenant. He gives us hints of the discipline which has gone to purify the flame burning in his soul, and to give it intensity and strength. What a contrast in this man between grandeur and insignificance, impotence and power! what a paradox is the personality

¹ While the writer uses the *plural* through this context, as in similar connexions elsewhere (1 Cor. iv. 1-13, xv. 11-15, Gal. i. 8, ii. 5, etc.), because his experience was representative and he speaks for his order and vocation, the details, as every reader would feel, are intensely personal. Through the "we" of these touching confessions and appeals the "I Paul" transpires in every line.

of St. Paul! He tells you of his frail physique, his mean appearance, his distressed circumstances, his shattered health, his moribund condition (vers. 7-12; cf. vi. 4-10, x. 1, 10, xi. 23-xii. 10, 1 Cor. iv. 9-12). A naturally proud, high-tempered man, he has drunk the cup of humiliation to its dregs; he has known years of crucifixion. Yet nothing can daunt nor weary out this despised and hunted emissary of Christ—"the abortion" as his countrymen called him, "the scum of society" (1 Cor. iv. 13, xv. 8); for he sees always the invisible (ver. 18); the Voice has said, "My grace is enough for thee." It is enough: he is utterly content, and "more than a conqueror." For he has discovered that in these very weaknesses lie the conditions of the strength his ministry requires (xii. 9, 10); *death* must work in Christ's apostle, even as first in Him, that life may be infused into others (vers. 10-14; cf. xii. 15, xiii. 3, 4; also John xii. 23-26). This sort of discipline is a factor in the making of the perfect Gospel-minister; in some shape or other it comes to every servant of Christ of whom his Master thinks that much is to be made. Paul is reconciled to his martyr-life by the profit accruing to the Church (cf. Col. i. 24), by the manifest gain it brings to his fellow-men; but still more through the fact that his contemptible infirmity enhances the power of God which makes him its instrument and saves him from appropriating the least fraction of the glory of the work of salvation (vers. 7, 15; cf. xii. 9; also 1 Cor. iii. 21—in verbal contradiction with 2 Cor. i. 14). Yet this great soul has its ambitions: while censure and disesteem are painful to St. Paul, he prizes appreciation, recognition, the due meed of "glory" (cf. Rom. ii. 7), as every man must who serves his kind in love to them, and realises the faculties God has given him for this end. But he rejoices to have his day of honour postponed until "the manifestation of the sons of God." He looks for it *yonder*,

not here, and reckons the worst he endures as a "momentary feather-weight of affliction" in prospect of the "overwhelming, everlasting glory," which is growing out of it like the harvest from the buried seed (ver. 17; cf. Rom. viii. 17, 18).

Even the lingering dread of dissolution, which up to this time haunted the Apostle's mind, the fear of dying before the Lord's return, is at last removed: so we gather from the opening sentences of chapter v. Paul has been lately at death's door (i. 9, iv. 9-14)—whether through the fierce assault made on him in Ephesus, or through a subsequent attack of sickness, or (as we surmise) from both causes concurrently. He had given himself up; his life and work seemed coming to an untimely end. To be preaching, travelling, writing again, was like a resurrection! (i. 8-10, iv. 11). Fronting the gates of Hades as though on the point of entering, Paul has looked in with a more penetrating glance than heretofore; and the gloom of death has been dispelled by a further revelation, to which our Lord's teaching had surely helped him (cf. Luke xvi. 23, John xiv. 2). He shrank from the un-housed, unclad condition in which he seems to have imagined the dead must await the resurrection-call: to the thought of wandering forth from the body a naked spirit, he could not reconcile himself. Now he understands that no such dreary interval is to be apprehended,—that "an eternal home" is in preparation to replace "the earthly tabernacle" on its "dissolution"; in the act of "stripping off" the mortal vesture, the saint will find himself "putting on over it" his robe of immortality (vers. 1-4; cf. Phil. iii. 21). Departure from the body will be for Paul no exile from the fellowship he now enjoys, but a "going home!" no exclusion, no forfeiture of the happiness attending the Lord's return, but an earlier admittance to that blissful company (vers. 6-9; cf. Phil. i. 21-23;

and earlier, 1 Thess. iv. 13-18, 1 Cor. xv. 23, 51-55). His last personal care is now removed.

So the brave Apostle emerges from the sea of his recent troubles. He has risen as from his dying bed with a revived courage, but also with a deepened awe upon his spirit. In anticipation he has stood "before the tribunal of Christ"; and he has felt that, however blameless in relation to the Corinthians or toward others who censured him, he must tremble beneath those searching eyes (vers. 8-11). The transcendent glory of the ministry of the Spirit, which is his, involves a corresponding responsibility, the gravest a human soul can bear.—Such premonitions of the judgment seat, such visitings of holy fear, the modern ministry needs, to cleanse and exalt it.—The chastening he has received gives a keener insistence, an added solemnity and sincerity to Paul's appeals (vers. 11, 12). The pains he takes to set himself right with the Corinthians are due solely to his desire that they in the interests of the truth of God (see i. 17-22) should stand confidently upon his side; to God and to Christ alone is he answerable for his charge in the Gospel. If men have deemed him in its prosecution at times "beside himself," God must answer for him (ver. 13).

III. GOD'S AMBASSADORS OF PEACE (v. 14-21).

Through the vein of meditation and self-scrutiny above pursued, we are led into the heart of the Apostle's present theme, which unfolds itself in vers. 14-21. This paragraph sets forth the essential matter of the Gospel-ministry, the purport of the message the delivery of which has so exercised the writer,—that which is at once the transporting glory and the overwhelming burden of Paul's life. He supplies the key to the mystery which perplexed men as they watched him, observing his varying moods of cool sense and mystic rapture as they studied the strange blend of

philosopher and fanatic he presented to the world (ver. 13). Place yourself at Paul's standpoint, and the psychology of his case is simple enough. He is ruled by one great passion; he has come to a fixed judgment, which determines his course at every point (ver. 14). But in disclosing the secret of his career, in explaining the nature of his mission as a minister of the New Covenant, the Apostle reveals not a single man's soul so much as the soul of the Christian ministry for all time. It is worth our while to put our hearts beside that of the Apostle whose warm pulsations we feel in these mighty words, and to ask whether the two beat in unison; whether the Pauline passion is in our breast; whether the ideas, motives, sympathies which constituted what St. Paul called "my gospel," do truly live and operate in ourselves under the changed mental conditions of this modern age.

The minister of the Covenant of the Spirit raises our conceptions of his office to the highest point, when he describes himself and his fellow-ministers as "ambassadors on Christ's behalf" (ver. 20). *Christ* is the ambassador of the peace effected through His cross (see Eph. ii. 14-18), Himself negotiating and administering the New Covenant, at once "our advocate with the Father" and the Father's advocate with us (1 John ii. 1, 1 Tim. ii. 5, John xvii.). The Apostles represent and speak for Him (see John xx. 21): not, however, as third parties coming between Christ and the world or going to and fro, rather as Christ's own limbs and voices, instruments through which He livingly operates on earth (xiii. 3; John xv. 1-8). The Christian personality—which is to say, the proper human personality—is no self-enclosed, self-complete entity; it consists of *Ego + Christus*—Christ *for* us as the medium of fellowship with God and with humanity, then Christ *in* us as the spring of individual life and action. It is no rhetorical extravagance, but to the

Apostle's consciousness the most assured of facts, when he writes : " I "—the old separate, self-centred ego—" live no longer ; it is Christ that lives in me ! " (Gal. ii. 20). " The love of Christ " to the world He redeemed has got hold of this man (ver. 14) and makes him its vehicle ; that world-passion of the Redeemer " constrains " His ministers, as the sap flowing through the vine constrains its branches into fruit. The world-heart of Jesus, which expiated in death the sin of the race (vers. 14, 21), lives in His apostle, in every Christian soul feeling and " judging " as Jesus did. Upon this footing the writer's ambassadorship stands ; in this sense the status and *modus operandi* of the ministry of Reconciliation must be understood.

But since " there was *God* in Christ reconciling a world to Himself," and since Christ lives on in His agents, then God Himself is at work in the apostolic ministry (1 Cor. iv. 4-6, etc.). " *God* gave us the ministry of reconciliation," Paul declares ; " *God* lodged in us the word of reconciliation " (vers. 18, 19) : " all things "—the whole existence and operation of Christianity—" are of God." Paul's career was that of a man who knows his calling to be grounded in the Eternal Purpose, who regards himself as a vehicle of God's redeeming grace towards mankind (see Gal. i. 15, 16, Eph. iii. 1-13). This well-founded consciousness explains its supernatural energy and its immense effect. The rendering of the second clause of verse 20, " as though God did beseech you through us," falls short of the writer's meaning ; *as though* suggests a kind of make-believe, where Paul is insisting on a veritable fact.¹ He really says, " Since God is

¹ Ως with the genitive absolute is not a form of hypothesis, but of assumption. Hence it presents the matter subjectively (*understanding that, in view of the fact that God beseeches through us*)—" either as the belief of the writer (2 Cor. v. 20, 2 Pet. i. 3) ; or as some one else's erroneous opinion (1 Cor. iv. 18, 1 Pet. iv. 12) " ; Thayer-Grimm's *N.T. Lexicon*, s.v. In the two latter examples " as though " is appropriate ; here, as in 2 Pet. i. 3, it is misleading.

beseeching through us ” (*how, or through whom, if not thus ?*) —God who made peace with the world in Christ and publishes Christ’s peace by the mouth of these messengers. Ever since, and to this day, God’s fatherly love toward mankind, and His grace manifested in the Cross, have been voiced in chief by the Christian ministry. Wherever that ministry has been true to its covenant—devoted with a single mind to the word of reconciliation and inspired by the Spirit that giveth life—God has made Himself heard in it unto salvation. So the love of God incarnated in Christ created the Christian ministry, as the endowment of the Holy Spirit qualifies it (iii. 5, 6). Christ in His love to all men, bent on getting the race reconciled to God and seeking means to convey the Divine overtures, has seized on Paul and his companions for the purpose (vers. 14, 18, 20). “The love of Christ ” is, for St. Paul’s experience, the driving force of life. The entire work of reconciliation set forth in the paragraph before us issues from this spring. For himself, Paul has come to the conclusion, that the sacrificial death of his Lord, endured “for all ” and crowned by His resurrection, constitutes Him the rightful Lord of mankind (vers. 14, 15 ; cf. Rom. xiv. 9). All human hearts belong to Jesus ; all lives should be laid at His feet (cf. Phil. ii. 6–11 ; Rev. i. 5, 6, etc.). Hence the world-scope of the Christian ministry, which the Apostle was the first to realise in its practical import.

Hence too its strictly spiritual character, its renunciation of political aims and methods (ver. 16), such as the terms “ambassador,” “reconciliation,” “kingdom of God ” or “of Christ,” might suggest and had in fact suggested to prejudiced hearers of the Apostles’ preaching (see Acts xvii. 5–8). “The Israel of God ” has done with the old carnal Messiah ;¹ for the new faith he is replaced by a Christ

¹ The “ Χριστὸς known κατὰ σάρκα ” is the Χριστὸς of Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα,

crucified, who rules in the rights of redeeming love and under the covenant of the Spirit. And the new "Christ" means a new world: "the old things"—of religion, life, the world of Judaism and the nations one knew in former days—all has vanished; they died with the death of Jesus, and a transformed universe appears in their stead (ver. 17; cf. Gal. vi. 14-16). The "new man" finds himself in a "new creation"; he "knows henceforth no one after the flesh"—views no human being from the mere standpoint of time and sense (cf. iv. 18), for he sees in each a "brother for whom Christ died," a subject for Christ's redemption. The whole order of life, as the Christian apprehends it, proceeds "from God," whose purpose toward the world, embodied in Christ, lies in its reconciliation to Himself (ver. 18). Thus we are brought back after the digression of vers. 16, 17, to the cardinal point of the Apostle's contention. The minister of the New Covenant is an ambassador of the Heavenly Kingdom; his business is to establish the claims which the death of the Redeemer gives Him upon mankind. The Christian ministry stands fundamentally for *the Atonement*.

Here a digression is necessary on our own part. There lies in the message of Atonement a tremendous assumption, which St. Paul made good for his own world and which the servant of Christ has to maintain to-day in face of a world inclined to contradict or make light of it,—the assumption of *sin*. The Christian revelation proceeds upon the fact that mankind has got somehow across with God, that the race is culpably wrong in relation to its Maker and needs

The words of ver. 16 suggested to the readers *the national Messiah* of Jewish expectation. This "Christ" Saul of Tarsus had recognised in the old days. His conversion was a renouncement of Jewish Messianism, and with that a transformation of his whole outlook upon life. The question as to whether or not he had seen the Redeemer in the days of His flesh, is irrelevant. *Κατὰ σάρκα* necessarily carries the like sense in both clauses of v. 16. Besides, Paul would surely have used the name *Jesus*, not *Christ*, if he were thinking of the historical person; cf. 1 Cor. ix. 1, 1 Thess. iv. 14, etc.

to be set right. There is the dark background to the glory of the Gospel—the damning, ubiquitous fact of human sin. This was constantly present to the Apostle's thoughts; he has wrestled with the horror of sin first in his own nature. It was the consciousness of this hateful reality, meeting and mocking Him everywhere in God's world, which caused the anguish of the Redeemer and which finally crushed His soul in death.

Our world of to-day had come to take sin lightly, to explain it away as a vanishing residuum of primitive animality, or a spectre of the Dark Ages raised by priestcraft and disappearing before the daylight of Science. "The modern man," we were told shortly before the Great War, "is not worrying about his sins." His complacency has been rudely shocked: the value of culture as a guarantee for human well-being is discounted, and the Golden Age no longer appears to be coming along the path of science and secular civilisation. The keen Frenchman may be right who said the other day, "The Boches are going to save the world, by showing the world what evil is like!" For the modern world had forgotten its "natural face" seen in the old "glass" of Scripture; it was glozing over its sin in a hundred forms of self-deception. On whatever particular shoulders the guilt of the present war must be laid, it is the outstanding human phenomenon of the twentieth century, the visible fruit and wages of world-sin. It is adding a new and terrific commentary on the indictment of sin contained in the first chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

The Apostle Paul had measured the sin of the world, so far as a man may, in the light of the revealed law of God and of the cross of Jesus Christ. At the bottom he discerned in it, as Jesus did, enmity and insubordination toward God (Rom. viii. 7), disloyalty to the throne of the Universe, and a consequent perversion of nature which

without the remedy of the Gospel is as hopeless as it is disastrous. Hence the Apostle's grief for his compatriots, and for his fellow-men at large, the "unceasing sorrow of heart" felt by the lover of his kind distressed not only by the miseries brought on men by their misdoing, but still more by the shame and guilt of it all as sin against God. A chief test, one must suppose, of the minister of Christ lies in his sensibility in this respect. If he lose Christ's jealousy for the honour of God outraged by the sin of the world, if he does not bear in his bosom the iniquities of the world he knows—if he has only pity for wickedness without indignation, or a harsh censoriousness toward transgressors without compassion, in either case he is disabled for the ministry of Reconciliation; for he fails to see where the quarrel lies, and to grasp its extent and bearing.

Yet the Apostle was far from seeing in the world he appealed to mere sin and moral ruin. It was an exaggeration, which put a weapon into the enemy's hand, when Christian teachers of a later age spoke of human nature as "a mass of perdition" fallen into "total depravity" and described the virtues of the heathen as "splendid sins." This was not the language of Paul, nor of Paul's Master. The Apostle claimed man's "reason" for "God's law," though "with his flesh he served sin's law" (Rom. vii. 14-25); he found men here and there who "did by nature the things contained in the law" and were as "a law to themselves"—men "on whose heart the work of the law was inscribed" (Rom. ii. 12-16). He would have Christian people judge with discretion; they must learn to appraise every form of moral worth and to prize the least fraction of goodness, even in the bad, "taking account of whatsoever is true, pure, righteous, lovable" in the world about them (Phil. iv. 8); they are in charity "to believe, to hope all things," and to give their fellows generous credit for the best that is in them. In those

who seemed the worst a remnant of conscience might be detected; fragments gleam out of the broken mirror in which once God's image shone (Rom. i. 19); yearnings for God betray themselves in the godless, which prove them redeemable. Otherwise what use to cry, "Be reconciled to God," where nothing responded to the call, where absolutely nothing existed but antipathy or disbelief? God's ambassador goes into the camp of the enemies, of whom he has himself been one, feeling that they need to be reconciled and confident at the same time that they *can* be reconciled. The bulk of men are far from being intransigents towards the kingdom of God.

Here a question arises intimately affecting the ministry of Reconciliation, and determining its attitude and its methods. *Where* after all does the estrangement lie? *in what* does it consist? Is it to be found simply and solely in the ill disposition of men, in their mistrust and misliking towards God? Or is there another side to the situation—a reaction against sin to be reckoned with *in Him*. When St. Paul writes, "Being enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son" (Rom. v. 10), does he intend to say that we men were induced by the death of Christ to lay aside our hostility and to think and feel differently about God? or also—or rather—that *He* was pleased to forgo His resentment toward us and to take us into favour on Christ's account? ¹ Now, as a matter of exegesis, there

¹ Why, it is sometimes asked, if the Atonement has relation to anger against sin on God's part, do the New Testament writers always speak of *man*, not *God*, as the reconciled party, never using the verb in the passive with "God" for its subject? This is one of the proprieties of New Testament grammar. One hardly speaks of the *judge* as being "reconciled" to the culprit he pardons or the *king* as "reconciled" to the rebel he restores to favour, however great the anger which preceded the act of grace. God is sovereign in the whole work of salvation; the initiative, the overtures and activities of reconciliation, are His at every point. It could not occur to St. Paul or St. John to put Him in the *passive* in this connexion; it is "we" who "receive the atonement" (Rom. v. 11). The desiderated

seems to be no reasonable doubt that the latter was the thought in the Apostle's mind. You may say, if you like, that Paul's ideas, and John's, about "the anger of God" were Judaistic and a remnant of the Old Covenant with its harsh and narrow religious conceptions, that the loving Father whom Jesus revealed is infinitely above anger and the disposition to punish His foolish, wayward children; the modern man may flatter himself that he has got into a loftier and more magnanimous way of thinking about the Divine than the Apostles who believed they "had the mind of Christ"; but one cannot surely miss the evidence as to their authoritative teaching, or set aside the plain sense of their words. God's "reconciling the world unto Himself in Christ" did not signify, to St. Paul's mind, His persuading the world to be at peace with Him; but His meeting the world, notwithstanding His just and necessary displeasure, in forgiveness, His holding out the hand of reconciliation and opening to us all the gate of peace. The appended clause, "not imputing their trespasses unto them," makes it clear, if there were any doubt, that the "reconciliation" is before everything the act of God's grace toward sinners; it is the withholding of chastisement, the putting away of anger, the exercise of mercy and the free forthgoing of fatherly love to the alienated children.

I for one entirely sympathise with Paul's convictions in this grave matter. I should not care to be reconciled to a God who did not care enough about me to be grieved with me when I sin, and to chastise me for it. There would be no heart in Him to be reconciled to! Holy anger is the other side to holy love; and love is not holy without

construction is met with, however, in 2 Maccabees i. 5, etc., also in Josephus, and the 1st Epistle of Clement 48. 1: see Thayer-Grimm's *N.T. Lexicon*, s.v. καταλλάσσω. The object of reconciliation, in N.T. language, is always *the sinner*; cf. Matt. v. 24. God is the Reconciler, as He is the Justifier, of the ungodly; man only the reconciled, the justified.

the potentiality of anger. A God who is above ethical discrimination, too exalted and dispassionate to burn against iniquity, is a God above reverence and out of touch with the human conscience,—the vague Infinitude, the featureless Absolute of Pantheism, in place of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Any atonement worth the name must deal first with God's inevitable condemnation of sin, with the resentment awakened by man's transgression in the Eternal Righteousness.

“For the wrath of God,” says our Apostle, “is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men”—not “the wrath to come,” but that which now is. God's retributive anger is immanent, as Paul shows in the sequel to Romans i. 18, throughout conscience, society, and history, in the awful Nemesis which works hiddenly but irresistibly everywhere in the moral world. Men are sensible of this so soon as they become aware of the deeper things of life; and had the Apostle known the Attic tragedians, he might easily have quoted to the Corinthians “certain of their own poets” in proof. The instinctive demand of the penitent is for something, Some One, to stand between him and that consuming fear. Christ's atonement meets this extreme necessity. Here lies the wonder and the soul-shaking power of the Gospel: “through this Man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins; and from all things every one that believes is justified in Him.” This announcement the ministry of Reconciliation has to convey to a world suffering from many causes, but most of all from the displeasure of Almighty God against its sin. The tidings is the dayspring from on high to those sitting in the shadow of death; it is the opening of the prison-doors to them that are bound. Just so far as one has realised the misery and mischief resulting from the world's quarrel with God, so far as there comes home to one the retributive import of moral

law and the severity of the Divine judgments against unrighteousness operating throughout nature and life, just in that degree does one apprehend the infinite boon of the Gospel, the unspeakable value of the gift of peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

It was a gospel of propitiation that Paul preached to a world labouring under God's felt displeasure, whose sky was dark with the thunder-clouds of His wrath. It was also a gospel of *substitution*, the good-news of an adequate vicarious sacrifice rendered for sin. One cannot express better by a single word what the Apostle gives his readers to understand, when at the end of the fifth chapter he declares that "He was made sin for us who knew no sin, so that we might be made the righteousness of God [might be identified with the Divine righteousness] in Him"; or when, further back, he writes, "Christ died for all" in such wise that "all died" in Him. The modern mind is said, by many who profess to speak for it, to spurn at this also; most of us, probably, have stumbled once and again at this offence of the Cross,—at the affront it gives to our independence, our sense of insulated, self-complete personality. And yet there are reasons why modern sentiment, in its latest phase, should appreciate the doctrine of vicarious atonement and extend a new welcome to the representative office of Jesus Christ, which carries with it His right to "taste death for every man." The twentieth century is in vehement reaction against the overdone individualism of the nineteenth, with its *laissez-faire* programme and its cry of "Every man for himself." A resurrection is taking place of the communal conscience; a fresh realisation seems to be coming to us, quickened by the present world-war, of the collective spirit of humanity and its claim to determine individual action. That "none of us liveth to himself, or dieth to himself," is a truth much more generally obvious

and applied in a larger and more various way than it was a generation or two back. Upon this line the modern mind is reverting to the Bible. The new Humanitarianism, with its insistence upon corporate rights and duties and its passion for social service, is more evangelical than perhaps it knows.

For it was, indeed, the higher nature of the race, the world's better self and primordial life, which took expression in Jesus Christ,¹ who is "the Second Man, the Lord from heaven." The truer spirit of mankind met in Him the Spirit of God and gave it perfect satisfaction—"My Son," said the Eternal Father in delight over the Incarnate, "in whom I am well pleased!" That good-pleasure of the Holy Father in man's Redeemer culminated at the death of the cross, even when in desolation He cried out, "My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" In His all-comprehending love and righteousness Jesus Christ embraced mankind, uniting Himself unreservedly to a world of sinners; He flung His arms about His guilty brethren and carried them with Him back to the Father. Jesus bore on His wide heart the sin of the world: He identified Himself with it all making what was the world's His and what was His the world's (ver. 21). The shame and loathsomeness of that sin, thus attached to Him but never tainting Him, He felt with the repugnance of utter purity; its guilt He fathomed and estimated as God only could,—He a man in every fibre of His flesh, in every affection of His soul. In this twofold yet single consciousness, with perfect intelligent consent, our Lord met the death our sins laid upon Him, realising at once the import of death as God's judgment upon sin, and man's ignorance and malignity in its infliction

¹ See John i. 4, 15, 16, viii. 55, 56; 1 Cor. viii. 6, x. 4, Col. i. 17, 18, Rev. xxii. 17, for our Lord's fundamental relations to humanity and world-history.

upon Himself. Jesus Christ, the Heart of hearts, died pierced by "death's" venomous "sting," which is *sin* (1 Cor. xv. 56).

As in some national crisis or great movement of thought a single hero—a Washington, a Wesley, a Socrates—gathers into himself and impersonates the higher character of a people or an epoch and by his action decides its destiny, so, but in a sense infinitely more vital and effective, the God-man on Calvary at the world's supreme crisis "put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself." It is not that the spectacle simply brought about a change in us, awakening remorse at the wrong and hurt our sin has done to the Blessed One and wonder at the love which consented to the wrong without complaint. Such compunction, such astonishment, the Cross is calculated to produce, and has produced all the world over. This is a vital factor in salvation. But if we were led to suppose that the crucifixion of the Son of God had no other design than to work upon men's feelings in this way—that the operation of the Atonement is purely subjective manwards without real necessity in the righteousness of God and in the nature of things for the sacrifice on the Redeemer's part—the main ground of the solemn and profound emotions it has stirred in the human breast would be removed. By excluding the notion of any demand for propitiation in the Divine nature and the Divine order of the world and discovering the efficacy of the Cross solely in its effects on our own sensibility, we arrive at a theatrical rather than an "ethical" theory of the Atonement. The "subjective" interpretation in the end stultifies itself.

The death of the Redeemer has, in point of fact, removed the insurmountable obstacle presented by their guilt, which barred the access of worshippers to God. (The Epistle to the Hebrews is devoted to the elucidation of this experience.) Whether our theories account for the fact or fail to do so,

it is the most notable fact in the spiritual history of mankind, that since the death of Jesus Christ men all over the world are able to say as never before : “ We have peace with God ; we have access in one Spirit to the Father.” Our Lord has effected once for all what most needed to be done, and what sinful men could not in the least do for themselves nor for each other, but what He had the perfect right and the ready will to do as Prince and Priest of the race, the embodiment of all that man was meant to be and had failed to be toward God : He has made amends for His misdoing brothers ; He has offered a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. One heart beat for all the world in the breast of Jesus ; one heart bled for all the world in the shedding of His blood upon the cross. Why should we be ashamed of the gospel of brotherly atonement before modern intelligence and the twentieth century, any more than the Apostle Paul in the face of Rome and the first century of the Christian era ?

GEORGE G. FINDLAY.

THE MOSAIC ORIGIN OF THE DECALOGUE.

V.

THE RELATION OF THE DECALOGUE TO PROPHECY.

WE have now to answer more explicitly those who argue that the Decalogue is prophetic and who regard it as a summary of prophetic teaching. The religio-historical interest of the Decalogue, we are told, lies not in its special precepts, which are mostly negative and in some cases rudimentary enough, but in the selection of these precepts—ethical rather than ritual—as a summary statement of Israel's duties. True religion, it would seem to say, is not a matter of cult, but of morals. For this reason Professor Badè, of Berkeley, California, puts it late. "For it was the prophets of the eighth century B.C.," he says, "who shifted the emphasis from the ritual to the ethical in Israel's religion."¹ Here we are face to face with the fundamental problem of Hebrew religious history: when, from whom, did the distinctive thing we call Hebrew religion (as opposed to its cultic developments in Judaism) get its start—from Moses or the prophets?

But, stated thus, is the question quite fair to the facts of the Decalogue? Is it true that it emphasises the ethical to the absolute exclusion of the ritual aspect of religion, and that therefore it is prophetic in spirit, and probably therefore prophetic in origin? Is it even true, as this theory implies, that the prophetic temper is utterly and irreconcilably hostile to the cult? The answer to the last question would certainly be given by many scholars in the negative, but it may be doubted whether the data are sufficiently extensive and unambiguous to justify us in being dogmatic on this point; in any case, this would demand a separate

¹ *The Decalogue, a Problem in Ethical Development* (1914), p. 5.

discussion. Suffice it here to point out that the Decalogue is not so utterly hostile to the cultic aspect of religion as the scholars who plead for a "prophetic" origin suppose. It is usually admitted willingly enough that the fourth commandment makes a concession, though relatively a small one, to the cult. No doubt if we regard the command to keep the Sabbath holy as exhaustively interpreted by the explanatory addition, that on that day there is to be rest for all, including cattle, man-servants and maid-servants, this commandment too would be strictly ethical rather than cultic. But if the original injunction was simply to keep the day holy, that would almost certainly imply some recognition, whether simple or elaborate, of the cult. To concede this point, which, it would seem, must be conceded, is, in effect, to destroy the absolute antithesis supposed to exist between the ethical and the cultic, and to admit that the Decalogue, whatever its origin, recognises both. But the cultic is just as really, though implicitly, recognised by the other three religious commandments. To a modern man they may seem vaguely religious, to an ancient man they would be definitely cultic. Negative in form, they involve positive religious duties in the narrower sense of that word. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" implies not only the deliberate rejection of other gods, but the positive recognition of Jahweh. But how was this recognition to be effected? Not only by a moral service, but almost certainly—as we see from the comparative study of Semitic religion—in ways analogous to the worship accorded by their worshippers to other Semitic gods. Not of course identical—the proper worship of Jahweh could never become an immorality, as did the Baal worship ¹—but analogous. That other than ethical

¹ Num. xxv. 1-5. Cf. Herodotus, i. 199. Immorality was a *profanation* of Jahweh's holy name, Amos ii. 7.

aspects of religion, whether prominent in the Decalogue or not, were recognised by Moses, is made certain by his practically indubitable approval and use of the ephod, the Urim and Thummim; and one tradition, as we have seen, traced the consecration of the priestly tribe of Levi to him.

Just as, however, in the prophets, even if it can be proved that they recognised the cult, the supreme emphasis falls upon morality, so also in the Decalogue the ethical interest is predominant, not indeed as against the religious, but as against the cultic. The simple juxtaposition of the religious and the ethical is of the deepest significance, suggesting as it does that the obligations of the man or the people who worship Jahweh are moral obligations. Negatively it says what the prophets say positively that the service of God can never be unrelated to, but must always express itself in, service of the neighbour. There is the same intimate connexion between the two tablets as between the two halves of the Lord's Prayer. It is not so much that the things of God come first, and after a petition for the triumph of His cause we may then petition for our own affairs. Rather the kingdom comes in part through the practice of loving forgiveness between man and man, the will of God is done by men who fear and shun temptation. The last three petitions are but the translation, in terms of human life, of conditions which the first three regard from the standpoint of God. So in the Decalogue the moral life is the issue and expression of the religious attitude. It is thoroughly in harmony with this outlook upon human duty that Jesus on one occasion answered a definitely religious question by pointing to the ethical commandments, the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth.¹ In this sense the Decalogue may be characterised as prophetic—in its assertion of social morality as an indispen-

¹ Luke xviii. 18-20.

sable expression of true religion. But its attitude to the cult is much more friendly than the normal attitude of prophecy, which reduces cultic fidelity to a place of relative—some would say absolute—unimportance.

But from all this it does not follow that the Decalogue is a summary of prophetic teaching, it may just as readily be an anticipation; and the passages already quoted, especially Amos v. 24 f., Micah vi. 6–8 and Jeremiah vii. 21–23, where Jahweh is represented as making a moral rather than a ritual demand, all point more or less explicitly back to the wilderness period as the time when that demand was first formulated, and suggest just some such summary of duty as the Decalogue, if not the Decalogue itself. Now in making this demand upon their contemporaries, were the prophets right or wrong in carrying back their appeal to the great days of the past? It is surely manifest that they could not with any propriety have blamed the people for their failure to conform to a view of religion which they themselves were presenting for the first time: the answer of a people so accused would have been simple and easy.

The occasional emergence of very high moral standards in the earlier sources, though they can hardly be said to prevail there, are evidence that they were not being presented by the prophets for the first time. With regard to sexual matters, which furnish a very good test of moral attainment, the standard is in one or two passages conspicuously high. The transgression of it is frequently called נְבִלָה *folly*, insensitiveness to moral and religious claims—a word which in this connexion has almost the value of a technical term: sexual licence is “folly in Israel.”¹ The words of Tamar, “No such thing ought to be done in Israel,”² are very significant; and very splendid are the words with which Joseph repels the woman of

¹ Cf. 2 Sam. xiii. 12 f.

² *Loc. cit.*

Egypt, "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?"¹ The peculiar greatness of these words lies in the fact that the woman belongs to an alien people: so that the standard of morality—at any rate by the time this was written—must have passed beyond the tribal stage. If it be maintained that this universal morality, as we may call it, betrays the presence of a narrator belonging to the prophetic or immediately pre-prophetic period, it could be answered (i) that this is simply a dogmatic assumption, based on a rigidly evolutionary scheme, and (ii) that, even on this assumption, such a morality must have been preceded by high standards—whether commonly adopted or not—of tribal morality. In proof of the low moral standards—to say nothing of attainments—of the early times, it has been maintained that David's adultery with Bathsheba is treated by Nathan in his parable as nothing more than a species of theft: the rich man has taken something belonging to the poor man,² the wife is simply property. We can no longer appeal to the fifty-first Psalm in proof of David's sense of the tragic heinousness of his sin. But we do not need; the whole narrative is alive with a feeling of the shame and horror of the sin: and when we consider the licence which Oriental despots permitted themselves, we are compelled by the narrative, which must be very early, to admit that already in Israel there was a high ethical standard and a keenly sensitive conscience.

Here, then, is the problem presented by the early history: whence came these higher standards? and why should we reject the testimony of the prophets, who had the best right to know, when they tell us, or at least imply, that they came from the first and greatest prophet of them

¹ Gen. xxxix. 9.

² 2 Sam. xii. 1-6.

all? The history of Hebrew religion remains a riddle unless there be some such great and commanding figure at the start, as the traditions maintain; and, as some one has said, if tradition had not left us with a Moses, we should have been obliged to postulate such a man, in order to render intelligible the subsequent course of Hebrew religious history.

Again, it is worth while to point out that the Decalogue is not by any means a summary of prophetic teaching, or an adequate embodiment of the prophetic spirit, as is claimed by those who argue for a prophetic origin. The prophets spent much of their strength in protecting the interests of the weak and oppressed—the poor, the fatherless, the widow¹: of this the Decalogue, in its original form, says nothing. It is prophetic only in stressing the ethical as against the cultic features of religion, but much that bulks so largely in prophecy as to be distinctive of it is not found in the Decalogue at all.

VI.

THE DECALOGUE AND INDIVIDUALISM.

From one other point of view the Decalogue has been relegated to the prophetic period. The “thou” addressed throughout, it is argued, is the individual; and the individual was not discovered till comparatively late in the development of Hebrew experience—about the time of Jeremiah. Two questions are here involved: (i) who is addressed in the Decalogue? (ii) when did individualism originate?

(i) The last six commandments at any rate would seem to be addressed to the individual: the ninth and tenth definitely imply the individual and his *neighbour*, and in

¹ Amos, *passim*; Isa. iii. 14 f.; Mic. iii. 1–3, etc.

the sixth and eighth the individual reference is just as clear. The promise of length of days, however, in the fifth commandment is apparently intended for the nation, considering the national implications of the frequent (Deuteronomic) phrase, "the land which Jahweh thy God is about to give thee." This, however, is no part of the original commandment; and when the additional words are withdrawn, there can be no question of the individual destination of the commandment in its ultimate form. There is the further important point that here the woman is singled out for honour no less than the man, implying that she too is a separate individuality, and not a mere item in her husband's property, part of his "house," as is suggested in the expansion of the tenth commandment. Considering the marriage imagery to which currency was given by Hosca, the seventh commandment might conceivably be addressed to the nation, whose apostasy to the Baal might be regarded as adultery; ¹ but standing as it does between the sixth and the eighth commandments there can be practically no doubt that it too is addressed to the individual. We may therefore roundly say that the individual reference of all the commandments touching *probitas* is indubitable.

But a national reference might easily be claimed for the first four relating to *pietas*. It is Israel which must have no other god than Jahweh, Israel which must not worship images or profane the holy Name, Israel which must keep the holy Sabbath. This is especially clear if we take the preface into account, where the national address is unambiguous: "I am Jahweh thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondmen." If the preface be integral to the Decalogue, there would be

¹ נָאִי is commoner in this sense, but נָאִי is several times found. Cf. Jer. iii. 8; Ezek. xxiii. 37, etc.

at least an apparent, though not perhaps an insuperable, discrepancy between the object of its appeal and the individual addressed in the last six commandments. The preface, however, is probably not integral—not so much for this reason as for the other, that it is of a totally different nature from the Decalogue proper, which consists of categorical prohibitions or commands, while it is an affirmation. It is certainly a sublime introduction, resting as it does the whole scheme of Israel's duty upon the fact of redemption: a worshipful and moral life is Israel's reasonable response to the redemption wrought out for her by Jahweh. She must love and serve Him and man because He first loved her; and if the preface be not integral, it is a work of inspired genius. But even when it is withdrawn, there is left the seeming national reference of the first four commandments side by side with the individual reference of the last six.

Probably, however, the sharply drawn distinction between the individual and the national reference is a figment of the modern analytic mind, which would not have had much reality for an ancient man. Jahweh was the national God, but the individual, as a member of the nation, sustained a thoroughly real, though mediated, relation to Him. Broadly speaking, it is true, no doubt, that in early times the nation is Jahweh's son,¹ while later the individuals are His sons;² but in practice the two ideas may have blended, and there is really nothing to hinder the first four commandments, though national in form, from being addressed, like the last six, to the individual. Though there is such a thing as national responsibility and guilt, it is individuals, after all, who transgress, and a community consisting of individuals which is appealed to. This point, which is really obvious when we disabuse our minds

¹ Exod. iv. 22 f.

² Deut. xiv. 1; Isa. i. 2.

of critical abstractions, is supported by the early history. Some Israelites associated themselves with the worship of the Baal of Peor; ¹ in other words, some kept the first commandment, others did not. Some worshipped the golden calf: the tribe of Levi, on one view of Exodus xxxii. 25-29, repudiated it; that is, some kept the second commandment, others did not. Again, the son of a certain Israelitish woman who had married an Egyptian is said to have blasphemed the holy Name, and paid the penalty with his life,² as did also the man found gathering sticks on the Sabbath day.³ These breaches of the third and fourth commandments by individuals, though related only by P, who may have invented them in order to support the stringent views of later times upon quasi-historical precedent, yet illustrate well enough the inevitably individual application of commandments formally addressed to the nation.

We are therefore justified in regarding the Decalogue, in its entirety, as addressed to the individual—apparently, in the first instance, the adult male. This is suggested by the seventh commandment and confirmed by the fifth, on which Professor Badè has the following interesting comment: “The power of the Israelite father over his family was so unrestrained that a commandment in his interest addressed to children still under his authority would have been a piece of supererogation. On the whole they needed protection against arbitrary exercise of paternal power much more than counsels of respect, for custom, approved by divine sanction, gave him the right to put to death a son who was a drunkard or a spendthrift (Deut. xxi. 18-21. The transfer of authority to a court is in appearance only, since parental complaint is all that is necessary to invoke the death penalty). . . . Let us suppose, however, that

¹ Num. xxv. 1-5.

² Lev. xxiv. 10-23.

³ Num. xv. 32-36.

the fifth commandment is addressed to male heads of households only. Then it acquires quite a different significance, for the father and mother in question in that case were the *aged parents* of sons who had founded their own households and were beyond parental control.”¹

(ii) The other question involved is the date of the rise of individualism. Is the recognition by the Decalogue of the individual as a religious unit inconsistent with an early origin? It is now a commonplace that, generally speaking, the religious unit in pre-exilic times was the nation; but when this truth is pressed to the complete disappearance of the religious importance of the individual, an emphatic protest is due, and there are signs in many quarters that a reaction against so extreme a view is setting in. It is undeniable that in early times the individual had not completely come to his own. When Achan sins, not only he but his sons and daughters are involved in his doom.² When the famine comes in the days of David, it is interpreted as due to the sin of “Saul and his house,”³ because *he* put to death the Gibeonites,⁴ and seven innocent sons are sacrificed to atone for his crime.⁵ It is this view of the solidarity of the individual with his family, clan, tribe or nation, as the case may be, that underlies the expansion in the second commandment, which represents Jahweh as visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children. To regard this as an anticipation of the doc-

¹ *The Decalogue, a Problem in Ethical Development*, p. 13.

² Josh. vii. 24. It is interesting to note in ver. 25 the combination of this view with the later view that only the culprit should suffer (Deut. xxiv. 16; 2 Kings xiv. 5 f.), “All Israel stoned *him* with stones; and they burned *them* with fire, and stoned *them* with stones.” That Achan’s sin doomed his family as well in the older form of the story is made clear by the terms of ver. 15, “He that is taken with the devoted thing shall be burnt with fire, *he and all that he hath*.”

³ Not “his bloody house” בֵּית הַדָּמִים, which is impossible grammar but בֵּיתָה דָּמִים (on) his house (rests) blood.

⁴ 2 Sam. xxi. 1.

⁵ Vers. 8 f.

trine of heredity is to modernise, in a thoroughly unhistorical spirit, an ancient view of the world, which was soon to be challenged, as we see, by the Old Testament itself—by Deuteronomy,¹ by Jeremiah,² by Ezekiel.³

But, when we have said all this, it has also to be said that even by very early sources the individual with his place, rights and duties, is recognised.⁴ The reasons for the prominence of the nation and the relatively infrequent emergence of the individual in pre-exilic literature are not far to seek. In the songs and in the histories it is the nation that is the theme—what Jahweh did for Israel, what they did through Him. The story of the Exodus, the wanderings, the settlement, the monarchy, is a national story. Again it is the nation that the prophets address, and the nation, as a whole, that is the object of threat or promise. But even that is only true with certain qualifications. Amos sharply distinguishes between the wealthy oppressors and their poor victims; and while at one time he can threaten the whole people as involved in a common doom,⁵ at another he can pronounce a separate doom upon a supercilious priest.⁶ It may be true to say that the individual sustained no relation to Jahweh except through the nation, but it is equally true that through the nation he sustained a relation to Jahweh as real as did the nation itself. How otherwise are we to explain the prophetic personalities? Surely here we have proof positive—in

¹ xxiv. 16.

² xxxi. 29 f.

³ xviii. 2-4.

⁴ This is suggestively discussed by Sellin, *Beiträge*, i. pp. 139-237; also, *Sozialismus und Individualismus im Alten Testament*, pp. 14 ff. J. M. P. Smith, *The Prophet and his Problems*, ch. vii.—a reprint of his article on "The Rise of Individualism among the Hebrews," in *The American Journal of Theology*, vol. x. (1906), pp. 251-266.

⁵ E.g. vi. 14.

⁶ vii. 17. Here, however, it is interesting to note that the ancient view is still represented in the solidarity of the family. Amaziah's wife, sons and daughters are involved in his doom.

men who can say "Jahweh took *me* from behind the flock,"¹ "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne"²—that the individual might be the religious unit as well as the nation; for what was true of the prophets *par excellence* must have been felt to be true, in a humbler but no less real measure, of every member of the people. Proof of this is found in abundance in the early sources of the historical books. The individual can sacrifice, like Elkanah,³ can vow like Hannah,⁴ can pray like Samson⁵ and Jacob.⁶ The beautiful story of the journey of Abraham's servant in quest of a wife for Isaac is full of personal religion.⁷ The patriarchal figures, whatever may be their historical origin, are certainly treated by the narrators, and must have been accepted by their readers, as individuals. The story of Adam and the fall, whatever its ultimate background, is a shining witness to the power and clearness with which personal religion was apprehended in pre-prophetic times. In very early sources, too, the law of individual retribution is distinctly laid down. On two occasions complementary assertions of this law are put into the mouth of David. To Saul he says, "Jahweh will render to every man his righteousness and his faithfulness";⁸ and in connexion with Joab's slaying of Abner he says, "Jahweh reward the evil-doer according to his wickedness."⁹

In discussing the complicated problem of the speaker in the Psalms, Kittel,¹⁰ pleading for the recognition of individual psalms in the Psalter, points out that a conspectus of Babylonian and Egyptian poetry has established the high antiquity of the individual song. More relevant to the present discussion is the fact that in the Book of the

¹ Amos vii. 15.² Isa. vi. 1.³ 1 Sam. i. 3.⁴ 1 Sam. i. 11.⁵ Jud. v. 18.⁶ Gen. xxxii. 9-11.⁷ Gen. xxiv.⁸ 1 Sam. xxvi. 23.⁹ 2 Sam. iii. 39.¹⁰ *Kommentar zum Alten Testament, Die Psalmen*, p. xxxx.

Covenant (Exod. xx. 23–xxiii. 19), which must be early, and may well be as old as the period of the Judges, the individual is recognised throughout: no distinction is drawn between man and woman,¹ and even the rights of a slave are in a measure recognised—in certain cases of bodily injury inflicted by the master, the slave, whether man or woman, being set at liberty.² After all, the legislation which is to hold society together by obliging its members to respect each other's rights must be addressed to the individual.

From all this it is clear that the attempt to make out a late date for the Decalogue on the basis of its appeal to the individual, falls to the ground. Such individualism as is implied in the Decalogue is in no way inconsistent with a Mosaic origin.

J. E. McFADYEN.

¹ Cf. xxi. 26–32.

² xxi. 26 f.

*THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY IN THE APOSTOLIC
CHURCH : A NEW THEORY.*

THE subject of this article recalls a famous discussion which took place in the pages of the EXPOSITOR in 1887, nearly thirty years ago, in which some of the most distinguished scholars and theologians of the day took part. Of these the majority are happily still with us, and Sanday, Harnack, Gore, and Rendel Harris are names to conjure with in the world of learning to-day. Salmon, with his versatile genius, has passed to his rest, and W. Milligan has departed, but his mantle is worthily worn by another bearer of the name in the person of Dr. George Milligan, the Glasgow Regius Professor of Divinity. The Editor who so wisely guided the discussion is still at the helm, and time (if he will allow me to say so) has only enhanced his unique sense of direction and the discretion which make the EXPOSITOR the manifest power it has proved to be in the critical and theological spheres. There are few things even in the rich pages of the EXPOSITOR of the past the study of which brings more ample reward than this series of articles. They lead the mind back to a decade in the last century when the subject of the origin and nature of the Christian Ministry was the burning question of the day. In 1880, Hatch had delivered his Bampton Lectures on "The Organization of the Early Church" which brought him perhaps more notoriety than fame, and in 1883 these were translated into German by Harnack, who added to the lectures some valuable excursions of his own. In 1888 the present Bishop of Oxford published his well-known volume on *The Ministry of the Christian Church*. But much the most important and significant event of the decade in connexion with our subject was the discovery of a MS. of the *Didaché* in the

Jerusalem Monastery at Constantinople, and its publication by its discoverer, Bryennios, the Metropolitan of Nicomedia, in 1883. In the following year Harnack published a masterly edition of the MS. and the effect of the discovery and of its publication was instantaneous. It was hailed as a most important find and it immediately began to exercise considerable influence upon opinion as to the true history of the origin of the Christian ministry and to produce a marked change in the views hitherto held by prominent scholars with reference to this particular subject. Its effect is clearly discernible in the articles contributed in the course of the discussion in the *EXPOSITOR*. Sanday, who opened the discussion, speaks of the work in the following terms: "The *Didaché* is the master-key which alone fits all the wards of an historical problem, and it seems destined to throw a flood of light on the institutions of primitive Christianity, and on none more than the Ministry." In a note he adds that its value as a witness to facts is a distinct question from its value as a religious treatise, but that even in the former aspect we must beware of assuming that every usage described in it is of universal application. The one distinctive and significant point which the *Didaché* seemed to reveal was that "spiritual" functions as such belonged in the first instance to the apostles, prophets, and teachers, i.e. to the charismatic type of official, and that these functions included not only the preaching of the Word but also the administration of the Sacraments. To quote Sanday again: "It gives us a glimpse of these figures—apostle, prophet, teacher—we can hardly think much more than a generation later than the Epistles to the Corinthians, moving about from Church to Church, highly honoured wherever they went, pledged to poverty . . . preaching the Word, conducting the Sunday services, especially the Eucharist, where the prophet alone is not

bound to follow any set form." The conclusion that he drew from the contents of the *Didaché* was that "bishops or presbyters" did not primarily exercise "spiritual" functions and that the Christian Church services were normally conducted by the prophets and teachers. It was only in the second line that this was done by the bishops and deacons. He also maintained that there is only very slight evidence before the Ignatian Epistles that bishops or presbyters were strictly "religious" officers and that there is no hint in the New Testament or in the Apostolic Fathers prior to the *Didaché* which connects these officers with the actual performance of Church services. The eventual assumption of directly "spiritual" work by the more regular and permanent Ministry he ascribed to the progress of time and the change of conditions which would throw the Church back on the more ordinary resources. Those hitherto employed in dispensing alms, organising hospitality, keeping the rolls of Church membership, conducting correspondence with foreign Churches, and representing the Church in its contact with the world would be called upon to devote themselves more regularly and more permanently to a still higher function, the direct approach to God in worship and thanksgiving. Harnack also in his edition of the *Didaché* expressed the opinion that there were originally two forms or classes of Ministry in the Church. Apostles, prophets, and teachers belonged to the one; bishops, presbyters, and deacons to the other. The work of teaching, exhorting, preaching the Word of God, and leading in public worship fell at least primarily to the first; administration in all its branches fell to the second. A hasty study of his article in the *EXPOSITOR* (Series III. vol. v. 342 ff.), written three years later, would lead one to suppose that he had moved somewhat from this position, for he writes here: "Bishops are originally the directors of the

worship, the officers *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. They are called overseers inasmuch as they direct or superintend the assembly met for worship. Out of this function all others have necessarily developed, such as (1) the administration of the gifts generally, (2) the administration of the property of the congregation, (3) the charge of the poor and needy, (4) the care of visitors and strangers, (5) the representation of the Church to those without. In performing these services in connexion with worship they necessarily and in increasing measure had to proclaim the Word of God and edify the Church. So began they, as the *Didaché* says, 'to perform the service of prophets and teachers.' His language in the *Texte und Untersuchungen*, ii. 2. 144 note (1884) with reference to the Epistle of Clement and its description of the functions of "bishops and deacons" is still more definite. "Beyond a doubt the *προσφέρειν δῶρα τῷ θεῷ* in the sense of offering sacrifices (*Opferdarbringung*) appears as the most important function of the *Episcopus*." A closer acquaintance with these passages, however, reveals the fact that there is no substantial change between the view expressed here and the position maintained in his edition of the *Didaché*. When he speaks of bishops as having been "originally directors of the worship of the Church" he evidently does not use the term "director" in the sense of the actual performance of Divine Service, as we should, but rather with the idea of the organising of the services of the Church, securing decency and order in them, and taking charge of the material contributions of the congregation. Out of this secular employment there grew their further duties as administrators and superintendents of the public activities of the Church in general, and it was only as the final phase in the development that they became "religious" officials in the strict sense of the word. In his work on *The Constitution and Law of the Church*, published in 1909,

when he had begun to hold sounder views with reference to the authorship and date of the Acts of the Apostles, Harnack still clings to his earlier opinion that bishops were originally higher administrative officials, but admits that they may possibly, on the strength of Acts xx. 28, have had supervision of souls, a somewhat significant concession.

Bishop Gore's share in the discussion was a well-timed protest against the contention of Sanday and Harnack that "bishops and deacons" were at any time in their history merely secular officers. He points out that the earliest use of the term ἐπίσκοπος (Acts xx. 28; 1 St. Peter ii. 25; v. 4) suggests "pastoral" functions, i.e. functions of a spiritual order.

Two of the articles in the series in the EXPOSITOR stood rather outside the general current of the discussion and are perhaps for that reason all the more noteworthy, viz., that of Dr. Rendel Harris, who argued that Montanism was not a heretical product but represented the true spirit of primitive Christianity, and that it was the climax of the movement which opposed the transference of the ministerial functions properly so called from the prophetic to the episcopal order, a transference the early beginnings of which we trace in the *Didaché*; and that of the Rev. John Macpherson, who claimed that there was only one office in the apostolic Church, that of "presbyter," and that the titles of "bishop" and "deacon" only describe functions of the "presbyter" according as he performed duties of a comparatively higher or lower order.

The general result of the discussion was to strengthen the impression that the permanent Ministry of the Church, consisting of "bishops or presbyters" and "deacons," was established primarily for administrative purposes, while the more strictly defined "religious" duties remained in the hands of the charismatic type of Ministry, represented

by the apostle, prophet, or teacher. Hatch in his Bampton Lectures had contended strongly that the most important corporate functions of the earliest Christian communities were the care of the sick and poor, and that they were, therefore, benevolent societies after the analogy of heathen clubs and societies. He claimed also to have discovered in inscriptions proofs of unquestionable character that the finance officers of these societies were designated "bishops," and on this ground proceeded to argue that the primary duties of a Christian bishop were the care of the poor, hospitality, and the management of the common funds, and, therefore, that the bishop in the Christian Church derived both his title and his functions from its heathen counterpart. Sanday was somewhat doubtful whether Hatch had satisfactorily established the relationship of the Christian bishop to the financial administrators of pagan societies, but, mainly on the strength of the newly discovered *Didaché*, accepted his main conclusion that bishops, presbyters, and deacons were originally more concerned with administration than with worship, whereas Harnack had cordially welcomed Hatch's Lectures as a whole, translated them into German, and professed to find in the *Didaché* a complete confirmation of Hatch's views.

Opinion upon this particular point during the thirty years that have elapsed since the subject was discussed in the EXPOSITOR has moved on the whole away from the position then assumed by Sanday and Harnack, and the tendency has undoubtedly been to ascribe to the local and permanent Ministry from the beginning of its history a greater share in strictly "spiritual" functions than was allowed by these two great scholars. One reason for this is that the *Didaché* has with the process of time and closer study of its contents tended to decline in value as evidence for the historical conditions of the Church in its early days.

There is now a strong current of opinion in favour of the view that it does not represent primitive Christianity as a whole but only some isolated and exceptional type of community, possibly a Palestinian community, which was remote from the main stream of the Church's life. It is true that the writers of the articles on the *Didaché* in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* and *Dictionary of the Apostolic Age*, viz., Vernon Bartlet and Hugh Watt, are strong advocates of its unique importance; but against their view we have to set the opinions of scholars like C. H. Turner and Armitage Robinson. Mr. Turner in his *Studies in Early Church History* (p. 31) writes: "The 'Teaching' represents a line of thought of a quite unique and comparatively alien cast," and he dates the document between 80 and 100 A.D., while Dr. Armitage Robinson describes it as "written well on in the course of the second century and containing a fancy sketch of what the writer supposed to be the state of things about a hundred years before his own time. He contributes almost nothing except doubtful exegesis to advance our knowledge of the early Christian Ministry." (*Journal of Theological Studies*, xiii. pp. 339-356). A further reason for the tendency described above is that considerable doubt has been thrown upon the validity of the evidence of inscriptions upon which Hatch based his main contention, and more especially by Loenning (*Gemeindeverfassung des Urchristentums*, pp. 21 ff.), who has examined these inscriptions afresh and has come to the conclusion that the statement that "bishops" were finance officers of pagan guilds and clubs is not tenable.

The more particular purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a theory of the origin of the Christian Ministry and of the primary functions of a bishop or presbyter which forms a striking instance of this reactionary movement and entirely reverses the process of development as outlined by Hatch,

Sanday, and Harnack. It assigns to these officers from the first a definitely religious or spiritual status. The theory is found in the very remarkable work of a Canadian scholar and theologian, *The People of God*, by the Rev. H. F. Hamilton, D.D., published in two volumes in 1912, in the second volume of which it is set forth with much persuasiveness and admirable temper. The position advocated in the book with regard to this particular point is not entirely novel and has been hinted at by previous writers, but nowhere has it been so carefully thought out or so adequately treated as by Dr. Hamilton. It deserves, therefore, a somewhat lengthy notice as a substantial contribution towards the solution of a much-disputed problem. His main proposition may be summed up thus. Presbyters and bishops grew out of the need of having a president at the Eucharist, and any further functions that may have attached to them later arose out of their position as Eucharistic Presidents. The deacons were the bishops' assistants, and were primarily appointed to help the latter at the celebration of the Eucharist.

Beginning with the history of the primitive Church of Jerusalem, he finds in the appointment of the "Seven," who were called into existence by the pressure of circumstances and by needs peculiar to Christianity a ground for the supposition that any Christian officers instituted later were created from the same motive; i.e., a desire to meet some pressing need. The next step in the process was the appointment of "elders" in the community at Jerusalem. The name was doubtless of Jewish origin, but the identity of name merely shows that there was a sufficient resemblance in the general position of Jewish and Christian elders within their respective spheres as to suggest the use of the name "presbyter or elder" for Christian officials. Now any Christian officer must have

been brought into existence to satisfy a want which was felt by Christians alone. They were not administrators of justice, because in the case of the early Christians, who were Jews as well, this function was exercised by officials connected with the Synagogue. Their appointment was not required for the work of preaching or evangelising, because this was performed by so many Christians that there was no need of special officers for the purpose. Neither were they required as leaders in public worship, for the Christians of Jerusalem worshipped in the Temple. It is possible that the care of the common fund fell at first to their lot, but after the breakdown of the "community of goods" there was hardly need of special officers for this particular purpose. The one distinctive need and service which was exclusively Christian was the Eucharistic feast, which, in contrast to the public worship in the Temple, was held from "house to house." This rite was peculiar to the Christian society; and since one man and one only could preside, this was very likely to lead to a recognised order of officers. The Eucharist was the one definite corporate act of the Infant Church and probably took place at the end of a "common meal," the agapé, and with it were associated the "community of goods" and the distribution of meals in the common assembly. It involved a president who was probably the same person who presided at the common meal. This office would at first be occupied by one of the apostles, or by the head of the house in which the meal was held. It was not every householder, however, that was in a position to entertain the large groups that would of necessity be formed by the "community of goods" movement, and thus there would be brought into existence a comparatively small group of individuals who would be accustomed to preside at the Eucharist. For a time—in the earliest days—the apostles alone would

preside, because they had in the beginning been entrusted with this rite peculiar to the Messianic Israel : the "Twelve" alone knew of its institution. But in process of time and through the pressure of circumstances others must have shared in the privilege. The procedure of appointment of these was probably the same as in the case of the "Seven," i.e., certain individuals were set aside to assist in the work. They would be naturally men of age and discretion, and Christlike, which explains why the term "elder" was borrowed from the Synagogue. They first appear upon the scene in Acts xi. 30, when, owing to the persecution which followed the death of St. Stephen, others besides apostles must have been accustomed to celebrate the Eucharist. Even if there were no laying on of hands, as in the case of the "Seven," yet a certain individual who presided on one occasion would be selected on another also, and thus a definite group of men, from among whom the presidents would come, would be formed, and in course of time would form a class under apostolic sanction. This study of Church life in Jerusalem leads Dr. Hamilton as far as the assumption that it is not impossible that presbyters arose out of the need of having a president at the Eucharist, whether a direct institution of the apostles like the "Seven," or whether they simply developed out of the original group of presidents of the "common meal." In any case they formed a fairly distinct class of officers, and would, therefore, probably secure apostolic sanction and recognition.

He then proceeds to examine how far this assumption is supported by what we know from the New Testament concerning the organisation of the *Pauline Churches*. Recognising the existence of two types of Ministry, the charismatic and the permanent, he compares the difference between prophet and presbyter to that between a distinguished novelist or poet and a Secretary of State, the

position of the former being due to peculiar gifts and abilities, and that of the latter to his work or office. The practical identity of bishop and presbyter is taken for granted all through this portion of the argument, and Dr. Hamilton emphasises the point that it is not the source of the title that is the fundamental question but the work which called the office into existence. Some work of a public character had to be discharged, some officials had to be appointed to discharge it, and some title had to be borrowed or invented for these officers. The position occupied by "bishops" and "presbyters" in other organisations were so analogous to that occupied by Christian officials that the adoption of these names naturally suggested itself, and yet the work to be discharged in the Christian Churches differed substantially from that performed by the officials of those societies whose titles were borrowed and utilised.

"Bishops and deacons" are first met with historically in Philippians i. 1, where the names refer to the officials of a local Church, but from that time, or soon after, onwards they are universal in the Church. *Therefore in the period 59-61 A.D. some Churches were accustomed to perform in a corporate capacity some work or works of a sufficiently important character and with sufficient frequency as to call into existence a set of public officials.* Further, the existence of two grades of officers bespeaks a fairly well-developed organisation. The fact that both grades are always mentioned together and in the same order, and that the qualifications demanded of candidates are much the same in both cases, implies that they were employed in much the same kind of work. Yet some essential difference between the functions of the two orders is required to explain their continued existence side by side, which means that the bishop must have been the superior officer and the deacon his subordinate.

Dr. Hamilton then adopts the method of exclusion to show that the only possible function that could be discharged by the local Ministry of "bishops and deacons" was that of presiding at the Eucharist.

There were, he tells us, *six* possible spheres of corporate activity in the Church which might have demanded the services of these officials.

1. Legislative and executive work.
2. The administration of Finance.
3. The administration of Justice and Discipline.
4. Pastoral oversight.
5. The conduct of meetings for edification and prayer.
6. The conduct of meetings for the celebration of the Eucharist.

Taking the Church of Corinth as the type, he proceeds to demonstrate that :

1. There was no regular legislative assembly in that Church. Every question of importance is referred to the Apostle himself, and when need arose for officers to deal with legislative or executive work this was met by officers appointed to deal with earlier needs.

2. There was no permanent financial organisation in existence until after the date of the Epistles to the Corinthians. There is no proof that there was a common Church fund at Corinth towards the support of the apostles, the relief of the poor, or the expenses in connexion with public meetings. The "collection for the saints" was organised by delegates sent expressly by St. Paul for that purpose.

3. There was no judicial system in the Corinthian Church. (Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 1-8.) In the case of the incestuous offender (1 Cor. v. 3-5) sentence was passed by the whole Church, and in that of the other offender (if other) (2 Cor. ii. 6) the penalty was inflicted by the majority.

4. In the matter of Pastoral work this was principally

done by those who possessed the charismatic gifts and who were thus specially adapted for it, and not necessarily by bishops and presbyters except as a secondary and incidental duty. It was not the *raison d'être* of their office.

5. There was no special ministry appointed by public authority to preach and pray. (Cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 26, 31.) Any Christian might do so, and St. Paul's words here presuppose the absence of any presiding official to check the proceedings.

Dr. Hamilton, therefore, concludes that at the date of the Epistles to Corinth the Pauline Churches possessed no special officers for legislative, executive, judicial, financial, or pastoral duties or for presiding at ordinary meetings for prayer and edification, and that the few cases of corporate action by local Churches were isolated instances and dealt with by the whole Church or by individuals authorised to execute the particular work in hand without holding permanent office. Thus the only sphere left which called for the appointment of the officials known to have existed in the Church at that period was the celebration of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

He also contends that this theory accounts fully for the existence of the *two* offices of "bishop" and "deacon." He has previously shown that both orders must have been engaged in the same kind of duty, and he considers it most improbable that they could *both* have been engaged in financial, or *both* in judicial duties. It was the religious side of the Church's work that was the absorbing interest, seeing that Churches were not primarily businesses or debating societies, judicial courts or mutual benefit societies, but fellowships established for the practice of the common religion and for the worship of the one God.

The next step in the argument is based on *the character of the Eucharist itself*. It was essentially a social ordinance,

demanding the presence of all the members of the corporate Church, and yet only one breaks bread and blesses, and this at once would give rise to a differentiation of functions, —one individual presides and is distinguished from those who partake only. The custom of always selecting the same individual or one of a definite number of individuals to preside would gradually lead to the establishment of a permanent organisation.

In the matter of qualifications required in a president there would be no need for any particular physical or mental qualifications or of special spiritual gifts, as in the case of the apostle or prophet, or indeed for any qualities which all Christians did not possess much in the same degree. Those who were most respected or influential or most Christ-like in their lives would naturally commend themselves for office. The possession of high spiritual gifts would constitute an undoubted advantage, but not necessarily a right. Many prophets would perhaps bear office, but not because they were prophets but because of their general fitness. Thus a small group of men would soon be formed within each Church from whom all would naturally expect the president to come. Dr. Hamilton can only find one definite instance of a president at the Eucharist in the New Testament, viz., St. Paul at Troas (Acts xx. 11), but he ascribes the silence of the New Testament on this point to the fact that there was no serious dispute in connexion with the system, and that it gained the general consent and approval of all. It is found, moreover, in its fully developed form in the Epistle of Clement, where two groups of men, "bishops and deacons," are closely connected with the Eucharist and are designated "they who offered the gifts," and again in the *Didaché*, where the same two orders are associated with the weekly Communion. We must, therefore, he tells us, read the future back into the past

and see in the days of Clement and of the *Didaché* the full growth of a plant which had its beginnings in the period of the Pauline Churches.

The origin of *deacons* is explained by the growth of the community, which would ultimately call for assistants (1) for the general discharge of the affairs of the Church, and (2) for the distribution of the elements at the Eucharist. No assistance would be required for the *breaking* of the bread, which could be done as easily for five hundred as for five, and this remained, therefore, in the hands of the presidents as their exclusive function. Bishops would also in time become very responsible for the moral and religious oversight of the community (cf. Acts xx. 17-35; 1 Peter v. 1-5); but the point of vital interest to them was not the financial and judicial administration of the Churches but their whole moral and spiritual life. (Cf. James v. 14; Rev. v. 8, 9.) The qualifications required of bishops and presbyters in the Pastoral Epistles also point to the same direction. They are just those which would be required in presidents at the Eucharist. The most Christ-like and the most typical Christians among the brethren were to be selected, and if they have capacities for teaching, organisation, or control of men so much the better, but there is no trace of any qualifications for the oversight of the secular affairs of the Church.

Finally, the Eucharist was common to every Christian Church and presidents were, therefore, appointed in every Church. Thus under one title or another we find traces of them over the widest area. They are mentioned in the Catholic Epistles in James i. 1; v. 14; 1 Peter i. 1; v. 1; in Acts xi. 30; xv. 2; xiv. 23; xxi. 18; in the Pauline Epistles in Romans xii. 8; Ephesians iv. 11; 1 Thessalonians v. 12; 1 Timothy iii. 1; in the Epistle to the Hebrews xiii. 7; xiii. 24, and in Revelation iv. 10; v. 5. Thus

the same conditions and the same needs called everywhere for the same set of officials. The one need common to all was the president at the Eucharist.

This, then, is the theory for which Dr. Hamilton advances the following claims :—

1. It gives us the only possible explanation of the existence of the two orders of "bishops and deacons" at Philippi in 59-61 A.D.

2. It gives a clear and consistent explanation of all the known facts both with regard to the development of the organisation of the Churches and the position which bishops and presbyters occupied in primitive Christianity.

3. A study of the early Church at Jerusalem shows that in the presidents at the Eucharist we have the best cause that can be assigned for the origin of the presbyterate.

The most significant features of the theory, it will be seen, are :—

1. It frankly abandons the traditional view that the particular form of the Christian Ministry which ultimately prevailed was of Divine appointment. Dr. Hamilton lays frequent stress on the fact that the Ministry was established to meet the particular needs of the Christian Church, and not in accordance with any preconceived system or plan.

2. It presupposes the practical identity of bishop and presbyter, which is still a much-disputed point.

3. It confines the basis of the permanent Ministry not only to the general religious needs of the Church, but also to one special rite or ordinance, the Eucharist.

Dr. Hamilton has marshalled his arguments in support of his theory with consummate ability and with remarkable fairness. There is no attempt to place undue stress on any debateable point, and the chapters in the second volume in which the theory is worked out are as delightful to read as any portion of the book. And yet I should hesitate to

pronounce that he has succeeded in firmly establishing his particular point. In the space still left at my disposal I can only mention what I consider to be the weak links in his chain of argument.

1. He has, it appears to me, made a dangerous admission when he concedes that it is possible that the "elders" in the Church of Jerusalem may have been appointed to take care of the common funds of the Church. If this is true he gives away his whole case because it bases the origin of the permanent Ministry of the Church on a secular and not on a religious ground, which was exactly what he set out to disprove.

2. He has not sufficiently realised the possibility that the extraordinary weight and importance attached by the early Church to the charismata might have led to the exclusive appointment of men of the "prophetic" type to be presidents at the Eucharist, which would explain the condition of affairs set forth in the *Didaché*, where the highest spiritual functions are in the hands of prophets and teachers, and only secondarily associated with the bishops and deacons.

3. He has not grappled seriously with the difficulty arising from the fact that there were in the Church of Corinth apparently no officers to check disorders and irregularities at the celebration of the Eucharist. He acknowledges that there is a difficulty here, but his attempt to remove it by pleading the rudimentary state of the position of the Eucharistic presidents at Corinth, or by shifting the blame from their shoulders, is a lame one.

In spite of these blemishes the theory has its attractions and is to be welcomed as a serious attempt to explain the origin of the Ministry of the Christian Church as based on a purely religious ground, which, without necessarily confining that ground to one particular Christian service

like that of the Eucharist, I firmly believe to be the correct interpretation of the facts as they are known to us in the New Testament.

MAURICE JONES.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF THE STATE.

THERE are two *loci classici* in the Pauline Epistles on the subject of the heathen government; they are 1 Corinthians vi. 1-5, where the Apostle rebukes the Corinthians for taking their disputes before the secular courts, and Romans xiii. 1-7, where he impresses upon his readers the divine appointment and authority of the civil magistrate: and it is only by a careful examination and comparison of these two passages that an adequate view of the Apostle's doctrine of the State can be obtained.

At the outset we are faced with a preliminary question of exegesis. Who are *τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ* mentioned in 1 Corinthians vi. 4? A large number of commentators support the rendering of the A.V. and R.V. marg., which represents the people so named as Christians of humble rank. On this view *καθίζετε* is an imperative, and the meaning roughly this: "If secular matters *do* come up among you for settlement, appoint the most obscure and insignificant Christians to decide them." "Let the insignificant decide what is insignificant" (Robertson, *I.C. Commentary*, p. 113). Another interpretation, which takes a similar view of the syntax of *καθίζετε* and of the meaning of *τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους*, but punctuates differently, is that of Findlay (*Expositor's Gk. Test.*, following Hofmann), and renders: "Well then, for secular tribunals—if you have men that are made of no account in the church, set

these on the bench"—the remark being meant as a covert rebuke of the Church's pride. Yet a third alternative is to take τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους as designating the civil courts, those who are called τῶν ἀδίκων in ver. 1, and to regard καθίζετε as indicative (either categorical or interrogative). So the R.V. text: "Do ye set them to judge who are of no account in the church?" i.e., the heathen judges. This is the view taken also by Tischendorf, Westcott and Hort, Meyer, Heinrici, and Moffatt.

As regards the second of these three alternatives, the meaning seems to be far-fetched and unlikely, and further involves the awkward grammatical difficulty of taking βιωτικά . . . κριτήρια as a nom. or accus. pendens. The *I.C.C.* remarks that the punctuation does not seem to be very probable, and relegates the suggestion to a footnote (p. 114). As between the other two alternatives, the same commentary is "content to leave the question open. The general sense is clear." In view, however, of the importance of the phrase for the problem before us, some attempt to decide the point must be made.¹

That St. Paul should use the phrase τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ of any one is in itself somewhat surprising, but it is surely more likely that he would use it of those whom he had just called ἄδικοι than of those whom he had just called ἄγιοι. That he should use the phrase seriously of any class of *Christians* seems extremely unlikely. He who regarded the Christian as *ipso facto* "a saint," he who a moment later asked why the Church could not produce "a wise man" to settle disputes between Christians (ver. 5), would hardly bid that Church refer its quarrels to the judgment of those whom it set at nought. Nor do we get a

¹ It is perhaps partly on account of the uncertainty of exegesis that Dr. A. J. Carlyle omits the sentence from his very pertinent quotation of the passage in *Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. i. p. 97.

better sense by viewing the words as spoken ironically or *ad hominem*, "those whom you do despise, though you ought not to" (*contemptos* as against *contemptibiles*). The weakness of the Corinthian Church at this time was not so much snobbery as party-strife and 'cliquishness.' And what, after all, does the objection to taking *τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους* as referring to the heathen courts really amount to? Findlay says: "The position of *καθίζετε* and the strain put upon its meaning speak against this view—the Cor. Christians did not appoint the city magistrates: also the unlikelihood of Paul's using language calculated to excite contempt towards heathen rulers. (*Expos. Gk. Test.* p. 815). So, too, Robertson: "It is evident that *καθίζετε* is a word which is more suitable for constituting simple Christians as arbitrators than for adopting heathen magistrates, already appointed, as judges of Christians" . . . "It does seem improbable that St. Paul would call heathen magistrates 'those who, in the Church, are held of no account' " (*I.C.C.* p. 114 and footnote). If the point about *καθίζετε* stood by itself, it might be allowed to sway the decision, though it would be exceedingly slender evidence on which to decide. Taken, however, in conjunction with the probable meaning of *τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους*, it loses what little weight it might otherwise possess. Paul, it is said, would not use so disparaging a term of the heathen magistrates; but he has already in ver. 1 spoken of them as *ἄδικοι*, which is clearly a term of disparagement. Robertson attempts to parry the force of this similarity of language by detecting a difference in the connotation of the two terms. "He has, it is true," he says, "spoken of the heathen in general (not the magistrates in particular) as *ἄδικοι*, but here he is speaking of those who preside in the heathen tribunals" (*I.C.C.* p. 114). But surely the reference of the two terms cannot be differentiated in this way. It is

perfectly true to point out (as Bachmann ¹ and Robertson ² both do) that the term ἄδικοι is used, not because the heathen tribunals were bad of their kind, but because they formed a part of the non-christian world, which was, in Christian terminology, unrighteous: the heathen judges are called ἄδικοι simply because they were heathen. But it is certainly the judges, and not the heathen world generally, who are referred to in ver. 1; otherwise the words would have no sense. And exactly the same curious mixture of generality and speciality occurs in the choice of the term τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ in ver. 4. Both this term and the term ἄδικοι refer specifically to the heathen tribunals, but express generic qualities shared by these tribunals with all heathen things.

If we can assume, then, that St. Paul, in 1 Corinthians vi. designates the heathen courts not only by the term τῶν ἀδίκων but also by the words τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, we have before us the problem as to how these terms are to be harmonised with, or related to, the apparently very different language of Romans xiii., where he describes the civil magistrate as ordained by God for the infliction of God's wrath upon the evildoer, and as wielding the sword for that purpose. Is each passage written so entirely to meet a particular situation that the Apostle has slipped into an irreconcilable contradiction? Or is there a deeper unity in which the conflicting expressions will be seen to harmonise? It is possible to arrive at a harmonistic solution too easily. Thus Dr. Robertson says (*I.C.C.* p. 110): "The Apostle's principles with regard to secular

¹ "Geradeso bezeichnet *oi ἄδικοι* nicht die einzelnen Richter, ja nicht einmal den ausserchristlichen Richterstand als Ganzes, sondern die gesamte ausserchristliche Welt, in der die Rechtsorganisation nur eine Teilerscheinung ihres Gesamtlebens bildet" (*Comm. on 1 Cor.* p. 232).

² "The term reflects, not on the Roman tribunals, but on the Pagan world to which they belonged" (*I.C.C.* p. 110).

and heathen magistrates are perfectly consistent. In Romans xiii. he inculcates the attitude of a good citizen, which is not only obedience to law, but the recognition of the magistrate as God's minister. . . . But to *invoke* the courts to decide disputes *between Christians* was quite another matter; and he lays it down here that to do so is a confession of the failure of that justice which ought to reign in a Christian society." This is, of course, true; but might it not be asked: If the heathen magistrate is the divinely commissioned settler of disputes, why should not be as acceptable a judge of Christian disputes as the Christian "wise man," whom the Apostle commends as arbitrator? His words certainly seem to call for further elucidation.

The question has to be considered in the light of St. Paul's general view of the character and status of the heathen world. He uniformly describes the pre-Christian or unchristian state as unrighteous (*ἔθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην*, Rom. ix. 30) and sinful (*ἔτι ἐστὲ ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν*, 1 Cor. xv. 17; cf. 2 Cor. vi. 14).¹ They were dead in trespasses and sins (Col. ii. 13; Eph. ii. 1, 5), disobedient to God (Rom. xi. 30; Col. iii. 6; Eph. ii. 2; v. 6), estranged and hostile to Him in evil works (Col. i. 21). At the same time Paul regarded them as the offspring of God (Acts, xvii. 28, 29) and the objects of His care (*ib.* 25): God had granted them, in the wonderful bounty of Nature, a certain knowledge of Himself (Acts xiv. 17; Rom. i. 19, 20), purposing that they should feel after Him and perchance find Him (Acts xvii. 27): these divine demands had met with a certain response—Paul had found the Athenians "very religious" (*δεισιδαιμονεστέρους*, Acts xvii. 22), en-

I omit the strong phrase in Galatians ii. 16, *ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί*, as Paul seems here to be borrowing for the moment a definitely Jewish style of language.

gaged in the genuine, if ignorant, worship of the Unknown God (Acts xvii. 23). By the light of Nature, by the Law written on their hearts, some of them at least had performed some of the duties enjoined by God, as their conscience testified (Rom. ii. 14, 15, 26).

While in the fierce light of Christianity such men would often appear in very dark colours, they nevertheless had their own elementary moral code, and made their own distinctions between right and wrong. God was in touch with them, though they knew Him very imperfectly. The Gentile ethic, at its best, did not as a rule contradict the Christian ethic, but simply lagged far behind it. Crude as the Gentile's sense of duty was, from the Christian point of view, it comprised among its nobler elements a sense of responsibility for the peace and wellbeing of society, and a determination to uphold that peace and wellbeing by the only means that seemed possible to Pagan minds, viz., by the power of the sword. In this they were the ministers of Him who accepts and uses for good all service honestly rendered from a sense of duty. Like the Assyrian of old—but with better motives and to better effect—the Imperial Government thus became the rod of God's "anger" (Isa. x. 5). Into St. Paul's conception of the *ὀργὴ Θεοῦ* we cannot enter fully here, but he seems to have regarded it as the reaction which God displays to the sin of one who stands in a sub-Christian or non-Christian relation to Him. In Romans xii. 19 the wrath of God is the power that deals with the Christian's enemy, and renders retaliation on the Christian's part not only needless, but obstructive (*δότε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ*).¹ In Romans xii. 4 the heathen magistrate is described as "God's servant, an avenger for (the infliction of His)

¹ The Commentators seem agreed that it is the wrath of God, not of man, that is referred to in this verse (Sanday and Headlam, and Denny : also Moffatt's trans.).

wrath upon him who does evil." The grosser forms of human sin—such as a Christian was never supposed to commit—were to be checked by visitations of God's wrath, in the form of the chastisement of the offender by a fellow-Gentile.¹

The laws and magistracies of heathen society, therefore, constituted, in the mind of the Christian thinker, a divinely ordained system of checks, to be exercised *by Pagans on Pagans for the purpose of repressing evil*. The system was conceived of as divinely ordained, not because it expressed the full and final policy of God for the conquest of human sin—it could not do that, for its agents had no knowledge of the saving love of God and the power of self-sacrifice as a moralising force, whether exhibited in the Cross of Christ or the lives of His followers—but because it represented, in spite of all crudity of method, the earnest and conscientious efforts of men who were doing the best they knew, and from whom the light of Christ was for the present hidden.

If we now turn to the Christian community, we see quite a different *modus operandi* adopted. Like the heathen magistrate, the Christian, too, was anxious to restrain man's wrongdoing, but he looked to other means of accomplishing this object. He expected the same power that had placed him among the saints to effect an identical change in his unconverted fellow-men. In the Cross of Christ, as preached and lived out by Christ's Church, he could see the one true and radical solvent of human sin. He had received the most explicit commands from the most august authority to love his enemies (of course Pagans), and to do them good. "If possible," writes Paul, "as far as lies in your power, be at peace with all men. Avenge not your-

¹ Both Irenaeus (v. 24, 2; Harvey, vol. ii. p. 389) and Origen (*Comm. in Rom.*, book ix. c. 28; Migne, xiv. 1228) have some interesting remarks on the restrictive functions of civil government.

selves, beloved, but rather give place to the Wrath, for it has been written, 'Vengeance is *mine* [i.e., not yours], I will repay,' saith the Lord. But if thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink ; for, by doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head. Be not conquered by evil, but conquer evil with good " (Rom. xii. 18-21). If, as Paul told the Corinthians (1 Cor. vi. 7), it was better to suffer wrong and loss at the hands of a fellow-christian than to have a legal dispute about it, the presumption is that the same preference would have held good when the wrongdoer was a Pagan (cf. also Heb. x. 34, τὴν ἀρπαγὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὑμῶν μετὰ χαρᾶς προσεδέξασθε, and see below under II.).

What then were to be the relations between these two communities, so different in their extent, their moral advancement, their practical methods, and their religious outlook ?

If the foregoing summary of the Pauline theory of the respective characteristics of Church and State be accepted as in the main correct, it will be worth while examining some of the more immediate implications of that theory as we see them exemplified in the life and teaching of the Apostle himself and of the Early Church. In drawing out these implications, we shall need to remember that we are seeking to discover the ideally normal or regular relations of the Church to the State, and so must put aside, as particular and special, such complicating elements as the Jewish State and its relations with Christianity (as seen in its persecution of Paul), the occasional departure of Christian people from approved Christian usage (as seen in the Corinthians' use of the secular courts), and also, for the present at any rate, the later State prohibition of Christianity as a *religio illicita*.

I. Apart from these disturbing factors, there would be nothing, according to the Pauline scheme of things, to bring

the Christian as defendant before the bar of the heathen magistrate. The fact that the Christian pursued a stricter standard of ethics meant that, unless he failed grievously in his Christian duty, he would not be found an offender against the far less strict code of heathen morality. "The rulers are not a terror to good work but to evil. Dost thou wish not to fear the authority? Do good, and thou shalt have praise from it. . . . But if thou dost evil, be afraid." The Christian, however, strictly speaking, never did evil: unless, therefore, he were falsely accused, he would normally never come under the magistrate's jurisdiction.

The strong words of Romans xiii, were doubtless intended, as Dr. A. J. Carlyle points out (*Medieval Political Theory in the West*, i, 93-94), to check a tendency in the early Church to renounce, in the name of Christian liberty, all the usual discipline of common life, all "that mutual subordination of desires and actions which alone makes social life possible." Decrees of the State issued for the sake of the common good, therefore, were to be cheerfully obeyed by the Christian. The great Christian Law of Love to all obviously carried with it the duty of friendly compliance with others' wishes in things not definitely contrary to the Christian faith. The civil laws in general were to be regarded as a divine ordinance, entitled to generous and respectful obedience at the hands of all.

II. Neither would the Christian, under normal conditions, ever come before the civil courts as a plaintiff. The Apostle's own appeal to Caesar, when he was already, through the bitterness of his enemies, in the grip of the Law, constitutes no exception to this general statement. We nowhere read in the New Testament, or even in the Early Fathers, of Christians, on their own initiative, seeking in the Pagan courts for justice against their enemies; though, of course, they were willing to plead, if their enemies took them there.

The early Christian was not concerned to get his wrongs redressed in this way.

If his wrongdoer were a pagan, he submitted meekly, at most endeavouring to reclaim him by persuasive words. Numerous passages in the Fathers and Apologists exemplify this. Aristides, for instance, says: "They (i.e. the Christians) appeal to those who wrong them and make them friendly to themselves; they are eager to do good to their enemies; they are mild and conciliatory" (*Apol.* xv., *Texts and Studies*, i. 1, p. 111). Justin too, after quoting Matthew v. 39, 22, 41, 16, as bearing on the subject *περὶ . . . τοῦ ἀνεξικάκου εἶναι καὶ ὑπερηλικούς πᾶσι καὶ ἀοργήτους*, goes on, "One must not resist; neither has He (God) wished us to be imitators of the bad (*τῶν φαυλῶν*), but He has exhorted us to lead all men from the shame and lust of evil things by patience and mildness" (*Just. Apol.* I. xvi. 1-3). Tertullian (*Corona Militis*, 11) calls the Christian *filius pacis, cui nec litigare conveniet*. Clement of Alexandria also disapproved of Christians going to law when they were wronged (*Strom.* vii. 14, 84-85).

Much less if the wrongdoer were a fellow-Christian, was he to take the case before the heathen magistrates. It was a fault that such disputes should arise in the Church at all; but if they did arise, a respected Christian was to arbitrate. The Church authorities had the power, in extreme cases, of simply declaring a Christian offender to be no longer a member of the Christian community. But in a matter between two of the faithful, the heathen magistrates had, ideally speaking, no *locus standi*; they were "reckoned of no account in the Church"; their function was to uphold a standard of conduct which the members of the Church were supposed to have already far transcended.

III. Nor again—though this is a point on which one can rightly be explicit only with caution—could a Christian,

according to the Pauline scheme, ever become himself a civil magistrate or execute the sentence of such a magistrate. For the civil magistrate naturally went to work in a Pagan fashion; and that fashion, as we have seen, was markedly different from that which the Christian felt his religion constrained him to use. Though he might willingly concede—as, for instance, St. Paul did, with his doctrine of the ὁργὴ Θεοῦ—the relative justification of the sentence of a Pagan magistrate, it would not follow that he could himself pass or execute such a sentence. Athenagoras has an interesting passage bearing on this point. He says that Christians absented themselves from gladiatorial shows because they considered that to see a man put to death “was next door (πλησίον εἶναι) to killing him. He also remarks in the same context, that they could “not endure to see a man put to death, *even justly*” (κἂν δίκαιως, *Athenag. Legatio*, 35). Here we have the obvious admission that an execution might be, in a certain relative sense, just, while at the same time it was regarded as wrong for the Christian even to witness it, and much more so for him to perform it.¹ As a matter of fact, it is not until a much later period that we meet with a case of a Christian performing the functions of the civil magistrate.² We do not mean to assert that the abstention of the Christians from the offices of judge and executioner was either obvious³ or universal or permanent. On this, as on all questions

¹ The same apparent paradox results from a comparison of vii. 26 and viii. 73 of Origen's work *Against Celsus*.

² The quality of the “faith” (ἐπίστευσεν) of Sergius Paulus, the pro-consul of Cyprus (Acts xiii. 7-12) is very problematical. Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts xvii. 34) and Erastus, the city-treasurer of Corinth (Rom. xvi. 23), were not criminal judges in the ordinary sense.

³ Even to Paul—for he persuades King Agrippa to become a Christian (Acts xxvi. 27-29).

touching the application of Christian principles to practical life, the views of Christian people varied : the subject became later a matter of perplexity and discussion. But, doubtless, in the time and circle of the Apostle Paul, careful and consistent thought on the mutual relations of Church and State, as he had outlined them, would have led to no other conclusion, whatever might be the further problems which such a conclusion might open up.

IV. In St. Paul's own time, the Imperial Government had not yet assumed the rôle of regular and permanent persecutor of the Church. The Apostle, therefore, was not called on to face the question as to how persecution would affect the general duty, which he had laid down so emphatically, of obedience to the magistrate's command, or how it would have affected his view as to the divine ordinance of civil government. That it would have modified both of these very materially there can be no doubt. Had the Roman Government forbidden him to preach Christ, he would surely have replied as Peter did to the Sanhedrin, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts v. 29 ; cf. iv. 19, 20) : had it commanded him—as it soon began to command Christian people generally—to offer sacrifice to an idol, or to confess the deity of Caesar, he would surely have preferred disobedience to compliance. The State was the ordinance of God and so was sacred ; but the Christian's loyalty to Christ was more sacred still—it was sacrosanct. How St. Paul would have explained the possibility of a conflict between these two divine ordinances, we do not know. Origen grapples acutely with the problem (*Comm. in Rom.* book ix. c. 26 ; Migne, xiv. 1227). His view is that political power, like any other faculty (e.g., sight, hearing), is God's gift : persecution is the perversion of that gift for an evil purpose ; and he concludes : "Erit autem justum judicium Dei erga eos qui acceptam potestatem secundas impietates

et non secundum divinas temperant leges." And yet from the point of view of the Pagan magistrate's own conscience, it was as necessary for the wellbeing of society that men should sacrifice to the gods of the State, as that they should abstain from theft and murder!

C. J. CADOUX.

*THE ORIGIN OF THE PROLOGUE TO ST.
JOHN'S GOSPEL*

I

IN a recent number of the *Commonwealth*, Professor Scott Holland writes with enthusiasm in praise of the Poet Laureate's new book *The Spirit of Man*. But he says that he has one real regret and one only. He regrets that Dr. Bridges was persuaded to give the opening passage of St. John's Gospel as "In the beginning was mind." The criticism here made, which I quote from that excellent little paper, entitled *Public Opinion* (as I have no access to the *Commonwealth*), raises once more in our minds the question as to the real meaning and the actual genesis of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel. Are we nearer to the actual sense of the words when we say with the Poet Laureate that "in the beginning was Mind," or, as some would say, "in the beginning was Thought," or are we to say with Professor Scott Holland that *Mind* is an inadequate expression, and that the idea must have included speech, expression, the rational word?

It seems evident that there must be other questions to be resolved before we come to the hermeneutical and exegetical problems over which the Professor and the Poet are knocking their heads together. For instance, we want

to know more about this prologue, which is attributed commonly to St. John, and which, in any case, contains theological statements of the highest importance, deserving, if any such statements necessarily deserve, an apostolical authority. Is this prologue an intellectual Athena bursting forth suddenly from the brain of a mystical Zeus ? or is it, like so many other surprising statements of poets, sages and saints which seem to defy evolution and to be as independent of ancestry as Melchizedek, a statement which carries about it, upon close examination, marks of an ancestry in stages and by steps, like most of the religious, intellectual and physical products with which we are acquainted ?

To put it another way. The Church is firmly persuaded, and not without strong supporting reasons, that these opening sentences of the Fourth Gospel are among the most inspired words in the whole of the Christian records. It is not merely that they have resonance, and apparent novelty and depth of meaning, and unexpected views of the world *sub specie æternitatis*. They are so unlike any other evangelical prologues : their *Beginning* is not the "Genesis of Jesus Christ" in Matthew, nor the *Beginning of the Gospel* in Mark ; their glory of the Son of God is not the abrupt formula with which Mark opens, and which he uses his pictorial records to attest : the literary fashion of them does not appear to be made on the lines of some previously successful literary artist, like the elegant Greek of the first verses of St. Luke. Is it any wonder that direct and immediate inspiration has been claimed for these majestic sentences ? Thus Jerome, in his prologue to Matthew, speaks of St. John as *Saturatus revelatione* when he wrote his opening words : and it is possible that the same sense of constraint is involved in the terms in which Jerome describes St. John as setting pen to paper—

in illud proemium caelo veniens
eructavit In principio erat verbum :

but this ought not to be unduly pressed, since Jerome's *eructavit* is really borrowed from the opening of Psalm xlv. :

Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum,

where the language is taken to express the emission of the doctrine of the Logos by St. John, and goes back to the Septuagint, ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν. However that may be, it is certain that the Prologue of St. John is the high-water mark of inspiration for those who read the Scriptures reverently.

It is just at this point that the enquiring mind puts in a protest and asks whether it is not possible that, conceding the inspiration of the words, we might legitimately question the immediateness of the inspiration. Suppose then we go in search of any prior stages of thought that may underlie the famous prologue. To begin with, there is the description of Christ as the Logos. Was that reached immediately, as soon as Philosophy and Religion looked one another fairly in the face in Ephesus or Palestine, or Alexandria? How soon did the term Word of God acquire a metaphysical sense? The question is, perhaps, easier asked than answered. In the Synoptic Gospels the term Word of God is always used of the utterance divine or the record of that utterance. It is that which the sower sows, that which the traditionalist makes void by his tradition, that which the multitudes throng round Jesus to hear. And the curious thing is that in the Fourth Gospel there is a similar usage, after one passes away from the prologue and the doctrine of the Incarnation. Jesus Himself speaks of the readers of a certain Psalm as those to whom the Word of God came, and of His own message (rather than Himself) as the Word of the Father

which He has communicated to His disciples. "I have given them thy word."¹ The suggestion is natural that we should regard the philosophical use of Logos as the latest deposit upon the surface of the narration, a verbal usage which has displaced an earlier meaning and sense. It is the more curious that the Evangelist never reverts to the Logos with which he opens his narrative, in view of the fact that Christ speaks as "Light" and "Life" in various parts of the Gospel, and so identifies Himself (or is identified) with the metaphysic of the prologue.

Is it possible, we ask next, that the Logos may have displaced an earlier metaphysical title as well as that employment of the word which we usually indicate by not writing it in capitals?

All through the rest of the New Testament the Word of God means the Evangelic message, except in one passage in the Apocalypse, where it is a title of the Messiah, and a doubtful place in Hebrews where the "quick and powerful" word of God appears to be explicable by Philonian parallels in a metaphysical sense.

We find, however, that there is occasionally another title given to Jesus Christ. He is called "*the Wisdom of God and the Power of God*," and is said to become the *Wisdom of his people*. "He has become to us Wisdom."² So the question arises whether Sophia may not be an alternative title to Logos and perhaps prior to it.

For instance, in the Gospel of Luke xi. 49 the Wisdom of God is personified and speaks of sending prophets and wise men to be rejected by the scribes and Pharisees.

¹ John xvii. 14, where the sense of λόγος is fixed by the alternative ῥήματα of verse 8.

² 1 Cor. i. 31, where the use of the conjunctions makes it clear that the emphasis is on Wisdom, which should have a capital letter, and be explained by "righteousness, sanctification and redemption." See Moffatt *in loc.*

Apparently this is not meant for a Biblical quotation, and in that sense is not the Word of God; the "Wisdom" that speaks is not the title nor the contents of a book. In the corresponding passage of Matthew (I suppose we must refer the origin to the lost document Q) we have simply "Therefore, behold! I send unto you, etc." So when Tatian made his Harmony, he naturally produced the sentence, "Behold! I, the Wisdom of God, send unto you, etc.," which brings out clearly the involved, personified Wisdom—Christ; and inasmuch as God is personified and speaks through Sophia, when He sends His processional array of prophets and wise men, we have what in Greek looks like a feminine form of the Johannine Logos. The suggestion arises (at present in the form of a pure hypothesis) that *the way to Logos is through Sophia and that the latter is the ancestress of the former*. Now let us try if we can re-write the Johannine prologue, substituting the word Sophia for the word Logos. It now runs as follows—

In the beginning was the Divine Wisdom,
and Wisdom was with God,
and Wisdom was God. •

The same was in the beginning with God :

All things were made by her, and without her was nothing made
that was made :

As soon as we have written down the sentences we are at once struck by their resemblance to the Old Testament : we could almost say that we were transcribing a famous passage in Proverbs :

Prov. viii. 22-30. "The Lord possessed me (Sophia) *in the beginning* of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, *from the beginning* . . . when he prepared the heavens *I was there* : when he set a compass upon the face of the deep . . . then *I was by him*."

It seems clear that we have found the stratum of the

Old Testament upon which the Prologue reposes. This is practically admitted by almost all persons who make Old Testament references to the New: they simply cannot ignore the eighth chapter of Proverbs: but if this be so, and if the Logos is quoted as being and doing just what Sophia is said to be and to do in the Book of Proverbs, then the equation between Logos and Sophia is justified, and we may speak of Christ in the metaphysical sense as the Wisdom of God, and may write out the first draft of the doctrine of the Logos in the form which we have suggested above. In other words, we have in the prologue not an immediate oracle, but a mediated one, in which separate stages can be marked out, and an original ground-form postulated. Now let us examine the Greek of the prologue and compare it with the Greek of the Septuagint in Proverbs. We readily see the principal parallels consist in the collocation of—

{ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος and
κύριος ἐκτίσέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ· πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος . . . ἐθεμελίωσέν
με ἐν ἀρχῇ, (viii. 22)

{ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν and
ἦμην παρ' αὐτῷ (viii. 30)

{ οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ, πρὸς τὸν θεόν and
ἡνίκα ἡτοίμαζεν τὸν οὐρανόν, συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ (viii. 27)

{ cf. also ὁ θεὸς τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐθεμελίωσεν τὴν γῆν (iii. 19)

{ ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶῃ ἦν and
αἱ γὰρ ἐξοδοί μου ἐξοδοὶ ζωῆς (viii. 35)

{ ξύλον ζωῆς ἐστι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀντεχομένοις αὐτῆς (iii. 18)

It is clear from the collocation that John uses πρὸς τὸν θεόν for παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, a usage which recurs in the first epistle in the expression παράκλητον ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα.

This is not to be explained in a mystical manner, as though πρὸς τὸν conveyed some deeper sense than παρὰ τῷ, it means “with God,” as commonly translated: the change

in grammatical form is due to the writer's or the translator's Greek, or if we prefer it, want of Greek ;¹ coupled with the fact of the relative paucity of the prepositions in Semitic, which causes the pleonastic representation of a Semitic pronoun by a variety of Greek pronouns, and to some extent the variations of the pronouns *inter se* for persons who do not know much Greek. It is not necessary to assume an actual reference back to the original Hebrew of Proverbs : the Septuagint text will probably be sufficient to explain the form of the prologue. The restoration of Sophia into the place occupied by the Logos in the prologue will help us to understand better the course of the argument. For example, the statement that "all things were made by her" is a summary of the verses in Proverbs describing Wisdom's activity at the Creation ; while the repetition "and without her nothing was made," shows that we have in the verse a reflection from another passage, where we are told that "in wisdom (or by wisdom) he hath made them *all*" (Ps. civ. 24).

The next step will be to see whether the proposed scheme of evolution for the Johannine prologue will throw light on the remaining clauses of the argument contained in it. Perhaps, however, this will be sufficient for a first statement. So we will merely recapitulate our hypothesis, which is, that the Logos in the prologue to John is a substitute for Sophia in a previously existing composition, and the language of the Prologue to the Gospel depends ultimately upon the eighth chapter of the Book of Proverbs.

¹ Accordingly Euthymius Zigabenus says, πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ἡγουν, παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ, ἵνα τε παραστήσῃ τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ ὅτι ἀχώριστοι πατήρ καὶ υἱός. On the other hand Liddon, *Bampton Lectures* (p. 231) says : "He was not merely παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ but πρὸς τὸν θεόν. This last preposition expresses beyond the fact of co-existence or immanence the more significant fact of perpetuated intercommunion. The Face of the Everlasting Word, if we may dare so to express ourselves, was ever *directed towards* the Face of the Everlasting Father."

If we are right, then Dr. Bridges was right, at least as far as the basal document is concerned, in saying that "in the beginning was *Mind*": for it is *Mind* that is the proper substitute for *Sophia*, and not any particular expression of the rational word, as suggested by Scott Holland in the passage to which we referred at the beginning of this paper.

* * * * *

Our hypothesis that the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is a substitute for a previously existing *Sophia* involves (or almost involves) the consequence that the Prologue is a hymn in honour of *Sophia*, and that it need not be in that sense due to the same authorship as the Gospel itself. The best way to test the hypothesis is to see where it will take us, and what further light it will shed upon the primitive Christian doctrine. Let us then retrace our steps for awhile and see whether the foundations of the argument are secure.

The first thing that needs to be emphasised is that we are obliged to take a different view of the Greek of the Fourth Gospel from that which is commonly taken by New Testament exegetes. They are in the habit of describing the Greek of the Gospel as simple, but correct, and of contrasting it in that respect with the Greek of the Apocalypse. Our position is that the very first verse of the Gospel ought to have undeceived them as to the linguistic accuracy of the writer, and to have marked him as a "barbarian" in the Greek sense." In other words, ἡν πρὸς τὸν θεόν is not Greek at all: and a Greek scholar ought to have felt this at the very first reading. The various subtleties which are read into the expression are self-condemned, in that they can neither be justified by the theological thought of the time when the book was composed, nor can they be made to harmonise with the

assumed simplicity of the writer's diction. When Mr. F. A. Paley, with the dew of Æschylean studies upon him, and in that sense very far removed from the possibility of understanding Hellenistic Greek, began to translate the oracular opening of the Gospel, he said :

"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was *in relation to God*, and the Logos was God."

and then added a note that "the usual translation 'the Word was with God' (from the Latin Vulgate) conveys no clearly intelligible idea." One wonders what was the clearly intelligible idea that was conveyed by the words "The Logos was in relation to God" ?

If Jerome gave us the rendering "apud Deum," he was in any case following the primitive Latin tradition ; when the Old Latin version was revised, the original "sermo" was changed to "verbum," but apparently no one thought of changing "apud" into some other preposition. What other word ought they to have used if the passage was to remain simple and intelligible ? It will not do to lay the burden of unintelligible translation upon the Latin : for even if we assume that the Latin is obscure, we have in the Syriac the rendering—

ܐܠܗܐ ܠܐܠܗܐ (= *l_awath Alaha*)

which was, as any Syriac scholar will admit, the only possible rendering of *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, and in itself capable of equation with *apud Deum*. It is this Syriac rendering that is the key to the understanding of the passage, for (i.) it is the equivalent either of *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* or of *παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*, and (ii.) if we take it in the second of the two senses, we have the exact parallel to the language of the Proverbs, where Wisdom is described as being "with God," in the sense of being seated by God and in attendance upon Him. If the language of the Gospel is to be taken

as unintelligible, the language of the Book of Proverbs must be taken as unintelligible also.

Let us, then, leave Mr. Paley, who in these matters counts for very little, and let us turn to Dr. Westcott, who counts for a very great deal.

The first thing that Westcott says is that "the phrase (*ἢν πρὸς*, Vulgate *erat apud*) is remarkable. It is found also in Matthew xiii. 56; Mark vi. 3; Mark ix. 19; Mark xiv. 49; Luke ix. 41; 1 John i. 2. The idea conveyed by it is not that of simple coexistence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (*εἶναι μετὰ* iii. 26, etc.) or united under a common conception (*εἶναι σύν*, Luke xxii. 56) or (so to speak) in local relation (*εἶναι παρὰ*, xvii. 5), but of being (in some sense) *directed towards* and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed (v. 19)."

The passage quoted is characteristically obscure, but we may try to unravel its meaning. Westcott wants to translate *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* as "in the direction of God"; so much was due to his pedagogic tradition; but this does not satisfy him, so he prefixes a parenthetic "in some sense" before the words "directed towards," and leaves us to find out as best we may what the sense was in which the Logos was polarised *towards* God. When we come to examine the parallel passages by which the remarkable usage of *πρὸς* is to be justified, we notice that Matthew and Luke ought not to be quoted. Matthew xiii. 56 is from Mark vi. 3; and Luke ix. 41 is a repetition of Mark ix. 19. The usage is clearly Marcan; and we have therefore to enquire what Mark meant by saying:

"His sisters are with us."

or

"How long shall I be with you?"

or

“I was daily with you in the Temple”:

surely the sense of these passages is clear enough: we should not improve the rendering by saying:

“His sisters are (in some sense) directed towards us and regulated by that which fixes the relation between them and us.”

The fact that the language is Marcan, taken with the known result of criticism, that Mark's language is, in part at least, Aramaic, encourages us to see how the texts look in the Old Syriac. The Syriac scholar will know without looking that the equivalent is ܠܘܬܢ (=l_ewathan) for *πρὸς ἡμᾶς* and ܠܘܬܟܢ (=l_ewathkōn) for *πρὸς ὑμᾶς*. The Greek then of Mark has carried over a mistranslation of the Syriac ܠܘܬܢ (l_ewath) exactly similar to what occurs in the Prologue to John. We are dealing with what is called “Translation Greek” or “Semitic Greek.” The Marcan and Johannine uses are one and the same. This does not mean that they were incapable of translating the Syriac preposition. St. John has the correct *παρὰ σεαυτῶ* and *παρὰ σοί* in xvii. 5, where the Syriac reader will note the occurrence of ܠܘܬܟܐ (l_ewathak) in the Peshito for both expressions, (though the older Syriac has a rather cumbrous paraphrase).

[Before leaving the linguistic alley into which we have wandered it will not be waste of time or space to remind readers of the New Testament Greek to be on the look out for usages and misunderstandings similar to the series to which we have been drawing attention. For example, the Aramaic idiom for “he went away” is

ܐܠܗ ܠܗ (ezal leh),

answering very nearly to the Old English “he went *him* away”; the second pronoun in the English and the expletive ܐܠܗ (=leh, him *or* to him) in Syriac being without an equivalent and untranslatable in modern English. The early translators of the New Testament documents, however, were at pains to find nothing untranslatable and to leave nothing untranslated. For example, in the interpolated passage Luke xxiv. 12, we are told that Peter

went away from the tomb in amazement at what had occurred ;
in Greek it is

ἀπῆλθεν πρὸς αὐτόν
or *πρὸς ἑαυτόν*,

which evidently stands for a simple Aramaic statement that "Peter went away," and in the first rendering was

ἀπῆλθεν [πρὸς αὐτόν],

where we add brackets to show the redundancy of the translator.

Now we see what happens. The Greek passage goes back into Syriac ; the translator does not see that it is a case of his conventional idiom, and laboriously replaces the redundant word by ܠܘܬܗܗ (lewathéh), and so loses the idiom altogether. As we have pointed out, the words *πρὸς αὐτόν* ought not to have been translated in the first instance, in turning Aramaic discourse into Greek, nor rendered again in the second, in turning a Greek sentence into Syriac.

The whole incident is either derived from the fourth Gospel (John xx. 3-10) or from some closely related document. In the Fourth Gospel, however, we have two disciples visiting the tomb, and not merely Peter : but whether the original story was told of one person or two, it ends up significantly in John with the remark that the two disciples went away *πρὸς αὐτούς*. This time the Lewis Syriac restores the idiom correctly, ܐܘܠܐ ܠܗܘܢ (ezālu lehōn), "they went them away." The Peshito, however, tries to bring more out of the Greek than is really in it, and presents us with "they went away to their 'own' places."]

Now let us return to Sophia. Our supposition that the Logos of the Gospel is a substitute for a primitive Sophia will be confirmed if we can show (i.) that there is any literature, devotional or otherwise, connected with the praises of Sophia :

(ii.) if we find that Jesus, who is equated with the Logos, is also equated with the Wisdom of God :

(iii.) if the praises of Sophia are as notably derived from the Book of Proverbs, as we have seen the prologue of the Gospel to be ; and

(iv.) if the conjunction of Logos and Sophia is intellectually sufficiently close to allow one of them to be interchanged for the other.

With regard to the first and third points, we hardly need to remind ourselves that there is a whole series of Sapiential books, of which the principal representatives, the so-called Wisdom of Solomon, and the Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach, are seen by a very superficial criticism to be pendants to the great hymn in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. If, for example, the Book of Proverbs represents Wisdom as saying,

“I was by Him as one brought up with Him,”

this Attendant-Wisdom or Assessor-Wisdom appears in the prayer of Solomon “Give me Wisdom that sits by Thy throne” (Sap. Sol. ix. 4) and is said to have been :

“With thee and aware of thy works, and present with thee at the world's making” (Sap. Sol. ix. 9);

and a further prayer as follows :

“Despatch her from the Holy Heaven,

Send her from the Throne of Thy Glory ”

(Sap. Sol. ix. 10);

in all of which passages Wisdom is conceived, as we said before, as the Co-Assessor and Attendant of the Creator. The motive for all these rhythms is in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. The ninth chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon is, in fact, a pendant to the eighth of the Proverbs of Solomon : it occupies an intermediate position between Proverbs and John. More than this, it furnishes the transition from Logos to Sophia, by using parallel language for the two personifications. The chapter opens thus :—

“O God of our fathers and Lord of Thy mercy,

Who hast made all things *by Thy Word*,

And hast ordained man *by Thy Wisdom*.

Here the parallel is made between creative word and creative wisdom : the Word and the Wisdom are almost equivalent : the earlier concept, Wisdom, in the Book of Proverbs, by whom all things were made, has attached to it a second concept, the Logos, and what was said of the

former is now said of the latter : we have passed from

“Without her was nothing made,”

to—

“Without Him was nothing made,”

We have crossed from Proverbs to John ; the bridge upon which we crossed is the ninth chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon : so the praises of Sophia become the praises of the Logos.

The chapter closes with another suggestive parallelism between Sophia and the Holy Spirit, as follows :

“Who knoweth Thy counsel
Unless Thou givest Wisdom
And sendest Thy Holy Spirit from on high ? ”

RENDEL HARRIS.

(To be continued,)

*THE ORIGIN OF THE PROLOGUE TO ST.
JOHN'S GOSPEL.*

(Continued.)

WHEN we pass from the so-called Wisdom of Solomon to the Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach, we are confronted with similar phenomena to those which we have already adumbrated. Again we see that the underlying text is the great Chant in Proverbs, and that these so-called Sapiential books are variations of the same theme, that Wisdom is with God, that She is before all things, and that She is involved in the creation of all the works of God.

We are to set over against Proverbs viii. 22—

“The Lord created me in the beginning of His way,
Before His works of old,”

the passage—

“Wisdom has been created before all things,
Intelligence and understanding from Eternity”
(Sir. i. 4);

and—

“The Lord created her Himself,
* * * * *
And shed her forth over all His works”
(Sir. i. 9).

But when we have made these obvious parallels we cannot detach them from the language of the Prologue:—

“In the beginning was the Word.
* * * * *
All things were made by Him.”

The dependence of Sirach in its Sophia doctrine upon Proverbs will be conceded readily enough: whole sentences are, in fact, transferred bodily, e.g.:

Proverbs ix. 10. ἀρχὴ σοφίας φόβος Κυρίου.

Sir. i. 14. ἀρχὴ σοφίας φοβεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν.

Prov. viii. 14. οἱ δὲ ἐμὲ ζητοῦντες εὐρήσουσιν.

Sir. iv. 11. Ἡ σοφία . . . ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῶν ζητούντων αὐτήν.

Prov. viii. 36. οἱ μισοῦντές με ἀγαπῶσιν θάνατον.

Sir. iv, 12. ὁ ἀγαπῶν αὐτήν ἀγαπᾷ ζωὴν.

And so on.

It will not, perhaps, be so readily conceded that the language of the Johannine Prologue is a case of similar dependence; the practical difficulty arises from our insufficient familiarity with the language of the Sapiential books, and from the lack of the clue furnished by the interrelation of *σοφία* and *λόγος*, to which we have drawn attention above.

Jesus, then, is identified with the Wisdom of God and the Word of God successively: first with the Wisdom because the Logos-doctrine is originally a Wisdom-doctrine, and after that with the Word, because the Wisdom becomes the Word.

It cannot, indeed, be unreasonable to suggest a stage in which Jesus was identified with Wisdom, when, as we have shown, he is called the Wisdom of God by St. Paul, who does not present us with the Logos-doctrine, although he does predicate of Christ all that the Fourth Gospel predicates of the Logos. And, as we have shown, the Gospels themselves are in evidence, and perhaps one of the leading Gospel-sources (Q) for identifying Christ with the Wisdom of God. The fact is that Logos and Sophia were originally very near together, almost a pair, although under Gnostic speculation they were moved far apart. The substitution of Logos for Sophia in the primitive Christology was little more than the replacing of a feminine expression by a masculine one in Greek-speaking circles, and the transition was very easy. It appears, then, that we can justify the

evolution of the Johannine prologue from the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and we can show the line of the evolution to have passed through the Sapiential books.

If this be so, we do not need to imitate modern exegetes who speak of the influence of the teaching of Heraclitus upon the Ephesian philosophers or upon the early Ephesian Church. It is doubtful whether there is any need to introduce Heraclitus at all. Certainly we can explain further points in the primitive Christology, without turning aside from the path we have already been taking. A Sapiential student, if we may so describe a person who makes himself acquainted, from the Sapiential books, with the virtues and potencies and privileges of the personified Wisdom of God, will tell us, for example, that Wisdom is a *Holy Spirit* and an *Only-Begotten Spirit* (cf. Sap. Sol. vii. 22, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ, πνεῦμα νοερόν, ἄγιον, μονογενές), where, in the first instance, the meaning of the word μονογενής was simply that She was the only one of her kind; a little lower down this expands itself into the statement that "because She is One, she can All" (μία δὲ οὐσα πάντα δύναται [vii. 27]).

Thus behind the Only-Begotten Son of God to whom John introduces us, we see the Unique Daughter of God, who is His Wisdom, and we ought to understand the Only-Begotten Logos-Son as an evolution from the Only-Begotten Sophia-daughter.

Let us take another instance from the early Christology, not exactly coincident with the Johannine doctrine, but running parallel to it; I mean the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the very lofty opening sentences of this Epistle, we find the statement that the Son of God is the heir of all things, and that by Him the ages (or worlds) were made, and that He is the Radiance of the Divine Glory, and the Reflection of the Divine Being. Now recall

what we said of the identification of Jesus with the Wisdom of God, and see what is said in the Wisdom of Solomon of the Divine Wisdom, that she is the

“Radiance ¹ of the Eternal Light” (vii. 26),
and the

“Spotless Mirror of the Divine Activity,”
and the

“Image of His goodness.”

The statements from the Epistle to the Hebrews can be deduced at once from the Sapiential books: for it was the Wisdom of God that made the worlds, Wisdom that is the Radiance of God (ἀπαύγασμα) and Wisdom that is the imprint of God (χαρακτήρ in Hebrews, εἰκὼν and ἑσοπτρον in the Wisdom of Solomon).

Thus we can see the doctrine that Jesus is the Divine Wisdom underlying the Christology of Hebrews.

* * * * *

Now let us come to consider some of the difficulties in the supposed dependence of Logos on Sophia, and of the Johannine Prologue upon Proverbs.

Up to the present point, the enquiry can be expressed in the simplest terms. The “barbarism” in the opening Greek sentence of the Prologue can almost be made intelligible in English, with Westcott’s commentary to help us: and when the peculiar language is corrected, the dependence of the Prologue upon the Book of Proverbs can be established by an English-Bible student, without any outside help. The Bible, however, cannot be read satisfactorily apart from the Church History (old Church and new Church) in which it is embedded: and the question at once arises as to whether there is corroborative evidence on the side of the Church History and Literature for the assumed transition from Sophia to Logos: if there

¹ Or perhaps *Reflection* (ἀπαύγασμα).

is an evolution of the one from the other, why are there no more traces of the change in the Biblical and semi-Biblical literature, and in the writings of the Early Fathers ? For it must be admitted that the evidence for Sophia in the New Testament is not overwhelming. So we will address ourselves to this point : we want more evidence that Jesus is the Sophia of God, and more evidence that the eighth chapter of Proverbs has been a factor in the production of a primitive Christology.

The earliest Christian books, of which we recover traces as having been current in the period that elapsed between the Death of the Founder of the Faith and the circulation of the canonical Christian Gospels, are mainly two in number ; there was a book called the *Sayings* or *Words of Jesus*, of which fragments occasionally come to light in early papyri or in the citations of early Patristic and other writers ; and there was over against this another volume or collection, which comprised *Quotations*, or as they were called *Testimonies*, or with a more explicit title, *Testimonies against the Jews*, the object of which collection of passages from the Jewish writings was to prove to the Jews from the Old Testament those Christian claims which constitute the doctrine of the New Testament. There need be no doubt as to the antiquity of this anti-Judaic quotation book, for it has survived in a number of more or less modified forms, and its influence may even be detected in the New Testament itself. Amongst the forms in which it has come down to us, one of the most interesting is the three books of *Testimonia adversus Judæos* which are bound up with the writings of Cyprian : of these the first two are easily seen to be the adaptation by Cyprian of an earlier text-book, which he modifies from time to time, and to which he adds matter which can often be confidently credited to himself. The primitive arrange-

ment can clearly be made out: the matter is arranged under headings which are almost always primitive, and the selected proof-texts are those which can be traced in the web of not a few early patristic works.

Now let us look at the second book of Cyprian's *Testimonia*, which contains the Christology, and see how the matter is arranged for the early Jewish objector or enquirer. The book opens with a capitulation as follows:

1. *Christum primogenitum esse et ipsum esse sapientiam Dei, per quem omnia facta sunt.*
2. *Quod Sapientia Dei Christus, et De sacramento concarnationis eius et passionis et calicis et altaris et Apostolorum, qui missi prædicaverunt.*
3. *Quod Christus idem sit et sermo Dei.*
4. *Quod Christus idem manus et brachium Dei.*

And so on.

There is no need to transcribe the rest of the headings under which the citations are grouped. The first two headings appear to stand for a single primitive capitulation, according to which Christ is declared to be the *Wisdom of God*, or, perhaps, the *First-born Wisdom of God*: and this is followed by a third heading which tells us that the same Christ is the *Logos of God* (*sermo* being the primitive translation of *λόγος*).

We may say with confidence that the order of appeal made by the early Christian controversialist to the unconverted Jew proceeded from an article which equated Christ with the Wisdom of God, and continued with a proof that the same Christ is the Word of God. The order of the proof is naturally the order of evolution of the Christology. Now let us see how the teaching is presented from the Scriptures of the Old Testament. It opens with Proverbs viii. 23-31.

“Dominus condidit me initium viarum suarum . . .
cum lætaretur orbe perfecto.”

Then follows a passage from the Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach, which is introduced as being "from the same Solomon in Ecclesiasticus," the writer having confused the Wisdom of Ben Sira with the so-called Wisdom of Solomon: the passage quoted is xxxiv. 3-16. 19 and runs as follows (it is necessary to quote the passage in full for there are important consequences that will result from it).

"Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi ante omnem creaturam.
Ego in caelis feci ut oriretur lumen indidiciens,
et nebula texi omnem terram.
Ego in altis habitavi et thronus meus in columna nubis.
Circum caeli circumivi et in profundum abyssi penetravi,
et in fluctibus maris ambulavi, et in omni terra steti
et in omni populo et in omni gente primatum habui
et omnia excellentium et humilium corda virtute calcavi.
Speres omnis in me: vitæ et virtutis.
Transite ad me, omnes qui concupiscitis me.

The speaker is the Divine Sophia, and the passage in Ben Sira is described as the *Prove of Wisdom* and opens with the statement that "Wisdom will praise herself."

The passage as it stands in the *Testimonia* shows striking variations from the Septuagint and from the Vulgate: for example, the opening words in the Greek LXX are

ἐγὼ ἀπὸ στόματος Ὑψίστου ἐξῆλθον,

and there is nothing to answer to

"ante omnem creaturam."

The Vulgate, however, says definitely—

"primogenita ante omnem creaturam."

The word *primogenita* is necessary to the argument of the *Testimonia*, which tell us that Christ is the Firstborn and the Wisdom of God. And it is still more evident when we notice the coincidence with the language of the Epistle to the Colossians that "Christ is the firstborn of every

creature," which passage is actually quoted a little lower down by the Testimony book. It is not necessary to assume, nor is it likely, that the first draft of the Testimony book quoted New Testament writings at all. The point is that Colossians is itself, in part, a book of Testimonies, and that St. Paul is quoting from Sirach. He has transferred the "Firstborn of every creature" from Sophia to Christ. We shall see this more clearly presently. Meanwhile observe that the difficulty as to the non-occurrence of the Sophia-doctrine in the New Testament is going to be met. It underlies the Pauline Christology as well as the Johannine, and is necessary to its evolution.

The twenty-fourth chapter of Sirach is now seen to be a typical member of a series of *Praises of Wisdom*: but it is equally clear that it is a pendant to the eighth chapter of Proverbs. There can be no doubt as to the origin of the following sentence, when spoken by Sophia :

πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔκτισέν με.

Sir. xxiv. 9 (14).

Returning to the Testimony book, we note that the second section of the proof that Christ is the Wisdom of God is taken again from Solomon in Proverbs; it is the opening of the ninth chapter of Proverbs: "Wisdom hath builded her house," and is treated as predictive of the Sacraments; but this is a deduction from the equation between Christ and Sophia.

The section which follows is the proof that Christ is the Word of God. The chief point is to notice that it opens with—

"Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum" (Ps. xlv. 1);

and its appearance in the Testimony book is a sufficient verification of our previous remark that Jerome was not the first to use the Psalm for Christological ends.

Assuming then that the equation between Christ and Sophia was fundamental in the *Book of Testimonies*, it will be interesting to take a later form of the same collection, that namely which is attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, and which will be found in the *Collectanea* of Zacagni.

Here we shall find many of the Cyprianic Testimonies, but the order of the argument is changed. We begin with the Trinity and with the proof-texts from the Old Testament that Christ is the Word of God. At first sight it looks as if Sophia had disappeared: but as we read on, we suddenly stumble on the expression of 1 Corinthians i. 22, that Christ is the Power of God and the Wisdom of God. And then follows abruptly something which appears to have been broken away from another setting:

“(It says) *in the person of Wisdom, that is to say, of the Son*, when He prepared the Heaven I was there by Him, and I was the One in whom He delighted; every day was I joying before His face.”

It is the very passage with which Cyprian opens the second book of his Testimonies to which we referred above.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and those associated chapters of the Apocryphal Wisdom-books, are fundamental for the primitive Christology, as it was presented in the proof-texts against Judaism. The Book of Testimonies, then, shows clearly that the doctrine that

Christ is the Word of God

reposes on an earlier doctrine that

Christ is the Wisdom of God.

The prologue to the Fourth Gospel is constructed out of the material furnished by the *Praises of Wisdom*, and the very same material is seen to underlie the great Christological passage in the epistle to the Colossians. In both of these great passages we have to translate the language back into an earlier and intermediate form. For instance,

it will have struck the reader of the *Praise of Wisdom* in the twenty-fourth chapter of Sirach that the expression—

“In every people and in every race I had the primacy” (*primatum habui*)—

is something like the expression in Colossians, “that in all things he might have the pre-eminence”; and Cyprian (or one of his forbears) thought so too, for he follows his identification of the Firstborn Wisdom with “Christ the first-born of every creature” (Col. i. 15), and adds the remark: “Item illic: primogenitus a mortuis ut fieret in omnibus ipse primatum tenens.”

(In the Greek the identification is not quite so easy: the text of Sirach is often faulty: as commonly edited we have the sentence—

ἐν παντὶ λαφὲ καὶ ἔθνει ἐκτησάμην (Sir. xxiv. 6)—

which has probably to be corrected to ἡγησάμην, for which there is MS. authority, which would answer exactly to *primatum habui*, and we may then discuss whether this is not also a proper equivalent of *πρωτεύων* in the epistle to the Colossians.)

In any case, we have to go over the Christological passage in Colossians, and underline as probably Sapiential such terms as—

εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου·
 πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως·
 ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα·
 τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἔκτισται·
 ὃς ἐστιν ἀρχή.

and ἐν πάσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων.

RENDEL HARRIS.

(To be continued.)

THE FAITH OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH.

KIRSOPP LAKE in the course of a stimulating discussion on the origin and development of the theology of the Primitive Church, in a recently published volume with the misleading title *The Stewardship of Faith*, propounds a novel theory with regard to the belief which formed the starting point of the first Christian community in Jerusalem. He traces the development of theology in the apostolic age through four stages.

(1) "The first stage was the ministry of Jesus : Christianity (the use of the word is, of course, an anachronism, but it has the excuse of convenience) meant at that time the belief that he was right in announcing the speedy coming of the kingdom and in demanding repentance."

(2) "The second stage was that of the Church in Jerusalem : it added to the belief of the preceding stage [the conviction] that Jesus was the Messiah who should come. It was not otherwise different, though the addition made is, of course, considerable."

(3) "The third stage is the Antiochene mission, which in turn differed from the preceding only in its altered relation to the law and to Judaism."

(4) "The fourth stage is Gentile Christianity, which extended the Christological belief concerning Jesus so far as to regard Him as the centre of a cult. It therefore ascribed a divine nature to him and interpreted Baptism and the commemoration of the Last Supper as the equivalents of the heathen mysteries". . . . "The main points of difference between Gentile and Primitive Christianity are concerned with the development that made the Christ the centre of the worship of the community, and thus necessitated the growth of a high Christology and

the transmutation of the rite of Baptism and the Last Supper into Sacraments with the same soteriological importance as attached to the heathen mysteries."

This scheme of development raises many interesting and vital problems, but I want to confine myself to the investigation of the question, "Is Kirsopp Lake right in his estimate of the faith which formed the starting point of the earliest Christian community in Jerusalem?" That faith is supposed, as we have seen, to consist of three points and three points only (*a*) the acceptance of the statements of Jesus with regard so the imminent approach of the Kingdom; (*b*) the necessity of repentance; (*c*) the belief that Jesus was the Messiah—a belief which however did not carry with it any ascription of Divinity to Him.

I.

If Kirsopp Lake is right, Christianity was launched upon the sea of history with the slenderest possible equipment, not merely in the matter of theology, but even in the matter of faith. It started its career simply with the intention of adding a new emphasis to the old Jewish eschatological *Weltanschauung*, and laying a new stress upon the ethical implications which that *Weltanschauung* involved. The only point (apart from the intensity of its eschatological belief) which differentiated it from Judaism was that it placed the figure of Jesus in the centre of the apocalyptic drama.

Now it is quite conceivable that such a seed of faith might have come to its fruitage in the Book of Revelation, and if the book of Revelation represented the whole of Christianity, or even the best elements in it, there would be a good deal to be said for Lake's position. The starting point which he posits might certainly have led to such a goal. But the Book of Revelation only represents one type of New Testament Christianity, and that by no means the

best or most influential type. There is nothing in the three points which Lake assumes to have constituted the earliest Christian faith which could possibly have eventuated in the great truths which characterise the writings of St. Paul, the Johannine literature and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

But not only was the faith of the earliest Christian community meagre to the last degree in comparison with that of the next generation of believers ; it was radically unsound as well. Subsequent history proved most conclusively that the eschatological beliefs, which according to Lake formed the core and centre of the primitive Christian faith, were a blunder and a mistake. The Parousia did not happen. The end of the world did not come to pass. The great *dénouement* which was to ring the curtain down upon human history was indefinitely postponed. Now if this false eschatology was really, as Lake argues, the foundation upon which the early Church was built, if it was the soul of Christianity at its inception, how was it that Christianity survived its initial blunder ? Why did it not perish, when the main clauses in its creed were proved to be erroneous ? If all that Christianity had to offer the world at the outset was an eschatology which was speedily proved to be false, how are we to explain its success as a missionary religion ?

II.

The answer which Lake suggests to the question is that in the second generation Christianity completely changed its attire, if not its nature. In the Gentile world it was reborn. It developed an eclectic spirit and assimilated all that was best in the current philosophies and religions of the day. Eschatology fell into the background, and the religious ideas of the Greek Mysteries took its place. Christi-

anity as it was developed by St. Paul and in the Johannine writings--the Christianity that conquered the world in the early centuries and at the time of the Reformation regenerated modern Europe—is not original Christianity at all : it is the theology of the Greek Mysteries grafted on to the primitive faith of the Christian Church. In other words—all that is best in Christianity is not part of the original deposit of truth “once for all delivered to the saints,” but an addition of alien origin. It is not the heritage left by Jesus to His disciples that created Christendom : that heritage was completely transformed by the second generation of Christians who introduced into it all the vital elements which succeeded in capturing the allegiance of Europe. The factors which have always counted for most in the Christian religion are not derived from its founder and are not to be found in the faith of His earliest followers : they were extracted by St. Paul and other leaders of the Church from the *Zeitgeist* of the first century. This seems to be the logical conclusion that inevitably follows from Lake’s premises.

If this be so, the greatness of Christianity lies not in its native faith, or in the ideas which it was able to contribute to the spiritual life of the world (since its root principle, being merely eschatological, was false), but in its power of attracting to itself other religious conceptions which gradually superseded and overpowered the rude theological notions which formed the original basis of its faith. In itself, therefore, it is simply a wild olive, incapable of bearing fruit : its sole virtue lies in the fact that it was the stock upon which better stuff could afterwards be grafted. Christianity did not enrich the world from its own capital. If it had had simply its own capital to rely upon, it must have become insolvent within the first generation. It evaded bankruptcy by borrowing loans from the moral currency of

the age, and rather ignobly transferring them to its own capital account. It was the versatility of the Apostle Paul that saved the situation for Christianity. But for the new spiritual capital which he raised in the Gentile world, Christianity could not possibly have met its obligations and must certainly have been 'hammered out of the Exchange.'

But the problem which is raised by such a hypothesis is surely this: "Whence did Christianity obtain its power of adaptability?" If at its beginning it was an eschatology, pure and simple, wherein lay its power of appeal to the Gentile world? If one thing is certain, it is this: the Apostle Paul was not attracted to Christianity merely by its vivid eschatology, or even by its proclamation of the need of repentance. Both those points were already articles of his faith, and it was certainly not because Christianity had sharpened the emphasis upon these conceptions, that it laid its spell upon him; it was rather because his own experience had taught him that something else was needed—something beyond eschatology and beyond the demand for repentance—and because he was convinced that this "something else" was to be found in Christianity, that he broke with Judaism. It was this "something else," which Lake has altogether left out of his calculation, that constituted the essence of Christianity for St. Paul. On Lake's assumption the conversion of St. Paul is an inexplicable mystery. It can only be accounted for by supposing that Paul, before his conversion, endowed the Christian religion with the power of which he was in quest, and credited it with qualities which it had hitherto never possessed. It would be necessary to assume that Paul first of all converted Christianity, and then the Christianity which he had converted afterwards converted him. We shall have in the future—if Lake's theory is right—to speak, not of

the Conversion of St. Paul by Christianity, but of the conversion of Christianity by St. Paul.

III.

But it is time to ask whether the three articles which Lake assumes to have constituted the creed of primitive Christianity are really an exhaustive statement of the faith which dominated the mind and soul of the infant Church in Jerusalem.

That these three articles were powerful elements in the outlook of the first circle of believers is, of course, beyond all question. The only point in dispute is, whether they represent the whole of the faith of the Church, or whether there may not be some other points which Lake has overlooked. There is no denying that eschatology bulked very largely in primitive Christian belief and coloured the vision of the Church, but the question is "Did it monopolise the interests of the first Christians to such an extent that all other ideas were necessarily excluded from their purview ?

This question is more easily asked than answered. Our data are scanty and sometimes open to question, and so our conclusions are mostly guess-work. Christianity entered a tunnel after the Crucifixion from which it does not emerge into the full light of day till the year 50 A.D., when the Epistles of St. Paul and the "We-passages" of Acts illuminate the progress of its history for ten or fifteen years. There are, of course, gleams of light which sometimes penetrate into the tunnel, but they only serve for the most part to make us realize how dense the darkness is. Our main source of information is to be found in the first half of Acts, but this information is inadequate and fragmentary at the best, and it is always open to question whether it is derived from a first-hand source. It is not easy to determine how

far we can regard the speeches which are put into the mouth of Peter in Acts as a trustworthy representation of the theology of the Jerusalem Church. There is a wide difference of opinion too, with regard to chronology. We cannot, for instance, determine with anything like certainty the length of the interval between the Resurrection of Jesus and the Conversion of St. Paul. One school of chronologists estimates it at five years ; another thinks it was not more than eighteen months. This point would be of considerable importance if we could settle it, because it would indicate the period of time during which the primitive type of theology persisted before the transformation began to take place.

More certain evidence is available from the data to be obtained from the Epistles of St. Paul, which, on several occasions refer to the early Christian tradition which Paul received from his predecessors. Here again, however, we have to exercise caution, because it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Paul may have read into the primitive Christian tradition ideas which came into the consciousness of the Christian Church at a later stage in its history.

The synoptic Gospels too, when scientifically used, are capable of giving us no little insight into the conception of Christ, which prevailed in early times. This is specially true of the sources of these Gospels. Q and the Gospel of Mark, when we have eliminated from the latter the Pauline touches which imply the influence of later theology upon the narrative, give us a portrait of the life and teaching of Jesus which bears upon its face the stamp of genuineness.

The critical problems which attach to all our sources for the history of the first twenty years after the Crucifixion, leave, of course, considerable room for differences of opinion

and make it impossible to secure general consent to the deductions which we may draw from them, but they seem to afford us convincing evidence that Lake has omitted some extremely vital points from his statement with regard to the faith of the first Christian community.

IV.

One point that leaps out at us at the very outset of the inquiry is the fact that Lake omits from his formal statement any reference to what all our sources regard as the cardinal article in the faith of the first group of Christians, i.e., the belief in the resurrection of Jesus. He does, of course, admit that such a belief prevailed, but he fails altogether to recognise the significance that attaches to it, and he suggests that the belief itself rested upon insufficient evidence. If there is one thing that is clear in all our sources it is that the belief in the Resurrection was the dominating fact for the early Church. It was this belief that created the Church. The Church sprang into existence, not because Jesus had proclaimed the approaching end of the world, but because it was absolutely convinced that He had risen from the dead. There is no hint in any of our sources that the Church was formed to perpetuate the eschatological teaching of Jesus. All the evidence we possess is unanimous in ascribing the origin of the Church to the belief in the Resurrection. Eschatology was not the rallying point for the first circle of believers. The pivot upon which the whole history of the Church turns is the unshakable conviction that Jesus had risen from the dead. By ignoring or at any rate glossing over this supreme element in the faith of the primitive Church, Lake leaves out of account the one factor which alone can explain the development of Christianity. The belief in the Resurrection was nothing less than revolutionary for

the primitive Church. It altered the whole spiritual outlook of the disciples. It transformed them from a company of baffled and disappointed men into a band of ardent propagandists. It gave them a new message and a new hope. It contained in itself the promise and the potency of all the later forms of Christology. For the disciples henceforth their Master was no longer a dead hero—a great teacher who had gone the way of all flesh. He had burst the bands of death and risen triumphant from the grave—and that victory was the earnest of still greater miracles yet to be achieved, for it made all things possible. It was the Resurrection that vitalised the eschatological beliefs of the early Church, and gave them a new validity and power.

Apart from the belief in the Resurrection, the history of the early Church in Jerusalem becomes a hopeless puzzle. The foundation is too slight to bear the weight of the superstructure which was afterwards erected upon it. Between the crude eschatology which, according to Lake, formed the cradle of Christianity and the creed of later Christendom, there is a great gulf fixed with no bridge to span it—except the influence of extraneous ideas from Gentile thought. But when the belief in the Resurrection is accepted as a capital fact, it forms at once the causeway along which we can pass without let or hindrance from the simple faith of the Jerusalem Christians to the developed doctrine which prevailed in the latter half of the Apostolic Age.

V.

In the second place it is difficult to resist the conclusion that primitive Christianity held to the belief that some relation existed between the person and work of Jesus and the forgiveness of human sin. The evidence is nothing like so overwhelming as it is for the belief in the Resurrection, which

is absolutely incontrovertible, but it is much too strong to be ignored. The exact nexus between Jesus and the forgiveness of sin is left vague and undefined—but still it is there, and is a fact which ought to receive recognition. St. Paul states quite clearly in language which is absolutely unmistakable, “I delivered unto your first of all *that which also I received*, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures.” The phrase “that which also I received” obviously implies that the belief to which St. Paul refers was in existence before his time and formed part of the heritage which he received from the primitive Christian tradition. We have no reason whatever for supposing, that he is antedating a belief which only arose at a later stage in the history of the Church, since the account of his own spiritual development in Romans vii. clearly implies that this belief played a very important part in the process of his own conversion.

The statement of St. Paul is corroborated too by the evidence of the speeches of St. Peter in the opening chapters of Acts. Such utterances as “Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ unto the remission of your sins,” and “In none other is there salvation, for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved,” can scarcely be explained away as the intrusion of later ideas into the narrative, especially when they are in accord with the specific claim of St. Paul. Acts and St. Paul reinforce each other, and their combined evidence is too strong to be easily set aside. Besides, if the speeches of Peter reflect the theology of a later age rather than the beliefs of the primitive Church, why is it that their statements upon this and other points are so *naïve* and crude? The very fact that these speeches suggest an adoptionist explanation of the person of Christ and that they do not contain any reference to the doctrine of the atonement, as it was after-

wards developed, is a very strong point in their favour. If the references to forgiveness in the name of Jesus are the interpolations of later thought, why was so little interpolated? By the time Acts was written the doctrine of the Atonement had found full expression. Why does the writer of Acts interpolate in this half-hearted way? Why does he not go the full length and make Peter speak in the terms of the full-blooded Paulinism of the next generation? Was he artist enough to know just how much he could insert without rousing suspicion in the minds of his contemporaries? The very reserve and even reticence of these speeches in the opening part of Acts seem to stamp them with the mark of primitiveness.

Moreover it must be remembered that these speeches are the chief source from which Lake derives his conclusion as to the prevalence of the eschatological note in the teaching of the early Church. Now if they are valid evidence for eschatology, they are valid evidence also for other points as well. It is not a scientific method of procedure to take part of their statements and pass by the rest, unless some good reason can be shown in justification. And no good reason seems to exist for accepting the testimony of Acts concerning the prevalence of eschatological beliefs and at the same time rejecting its equally clear evidence that forgiveness of sin was regarded as an essential element in the work of Christ.

It is unnecessary to add to the proof which has already been adduced the argument which might be drawn from the implications of the synoptic narrative. But without entering into a critical discussion of the much-debated references of Jesus to the significance of His death, we may content ourselves with asserting that there must have been something in the teaching of Jesus to justify the charge which was brought against Him by the Pharisees, "Why

doth this man thus speak ? He blasphemeth ; who can forgive sins but one, even God ? ”

Now if this argument is sound, it is quite clear that Lake has omitted from his statement a most essential element in the faith of the early Church. If the early Christians really believed that forgiveness is only possible “in the name of Jesus,” and that “there is no other name under heaven wherein we must be saved,” their creed contained, in germ at any rate, all that lies at the heart of the subsequent theological development. Paulinism only makes explicit what was implicit in the faith of the first believers.

VI.

Thirdly, no account of the faith of the primitive Church can be regarded as complete or satisfactory which excludes from its statement any reference to the belief in the power of the Holy Spirit. It is true that Lake makes a brief allusion to Pentecost and the gift of the Spirit which was “especially valued and was regarded [by Christians], as the confirmation of their belief and the assurance of their favoured position in the kingdom,” but he appears to regard this belief as a secondary and subordinate clause in their eschatological creed.

Now there is little doubt that the account of Pentecost in Acts is marred by a very serious misinterpretation of the gift of tongues, which has the affect of transforming a supreme spiritual event into an otiose and pointless miracle. The narrative is completely blurred by this mistake. One thing however is quite clear : Pentecost was not so much a confirmation of eschatological belief as an endowment of spiritual power. “Ye shall receive power when the Holy Spirit is come upon you.” Whatever else Pentecost may have meant to the early Church, it certainly involved a unique spiritual experience, which conferred upon

the disciples the power which was needed to energise them for the conquest of the world. This spiritual experience, which was the outstanding religious event in the history of the early Church, was directly attributed to the action of the Holy Spirit.

But more than this. As Lake himself admits, this outpouring of the Holy Spirit was regarded "as the gift of the exalted Jesus and the fulfilment of eschatological prophecy." "I take it," he says, "that the disciples regarded the Holy Spirit which came upon them as in the same way the Spirit of God and also the Spirit of Jesus." Lake thinks that this identification was "based on psychological experience"—a phrase which may mean anything or nothing. Anyhow whatever may be the origin of the identification, it is a matter of supreme interest that it should have been made at all. To have equated the Risen Jesus with the Holy Spirit was a remarkable achievement for theology at such a primitive stage in its history.

VII.

We are now in a position to face the question whether Lake is right in supposing that the title Messiah, which was applied to Jesus in the primitive Church, was nothing more than a human category and did not involve the conception of Divinity. Now we may frankly admit at the outset of the discussion that the term Messiah was often used by the Jews with a purely human connotation. The evidence of the *Psalms of Solomon* is quite clear upon this point. In their edition of the *Psalms of Solomon*, Ryle and James say in reference to the well-known description of the Messiah in Psalm xvii. : "The Messiah of this Psalm is not Divine. Divinely appointed, divinely raised up, endowed with Divine gifts he is, but he is nothing more than man. Neither of supernatural birth nor of pre-existence in the bosom of

God or among the angels of God do we find any trace. If he is called Lord, the word is only used of him as it might be used of an earthly lord. However high the conception of his moral character and spiritual qualifications, he is man and man only." It is quite clear therefore that the mere use of the term Messiah need not necessarily imply more in the Acts of the Apostles than it does in the *Psalms of Solomon*. The employment of the word in itself settles nothing.

On the other hand, however, we are bound to remember that the term Messiah sometimes carried with it a much loftier connotation. In the *Similitudes of Enoch* the Messiah is represented as a supernatural being—the Son of man who is destined to enjoy universal dominion and execute judgment on men and angels. "And there I saw One who had a head of days [i.e., the Everlasting One] . . . and with Him was another being who had the appearance of a man. And I asked the angel . . . concerning that Son of man, who and whence He was and why He went with the Head of Days? And he answered, 'This is the son of man who hath righteousness, and who revealeth all the treasures of that which is hidden, because the Lord of spirits hath chosen Him, and whose lot hath the pre-eminence before the Lord of spirits for ever.'"

The problem we have to face therefore is this. Was the term Messiah, as it was applied to Jesus by the early Christians, used in the sense which it bears in the *Psalms of Solomon* or in the sense which it bears in the *Similitudes of Enoch*?

At the outset we may notice a small point, which, though it cannot be regarded as conclusive proof, is at any rate very suggestive. In the *similitudes of Enoch*, four titles are bestowed upon the Messiah. "The Anointed One, or the Christ," "The Son of Man," "The Just One," and the

“Elect One.” All these four titles are applied to Jesus at the very earliest stage in the history of Christian Theology. This is a fact which is surely not without its significance.

But the real argument rests not upon a technical point of verbal resemblance, but upon the place which was actually assigned to Jesus in the faith of the first circle of believers. The book of Enoch proves that the category of a Divine Messiah was already in existence and ready for use. It is difficult to see in the light of the book of Enoch what justification Lake has for saying that the ascription of a Divine nature to Jesus was “not a Jewish thought: however exalted the Messiah may have been, he was not divine.” This, of course, is true of the conception in the Psalms of Solomon, but it is not true of the portrayal of the Messiah in the Similitudes of Enoch.

The Primitive Church found two categories in existence for the interpretation of the person of Christ—the category of a human Messiah, and the category of a supernatural Messiah. Is it likely that it selected the inferior category for expressing its faith in Christ? Does not the whole tenour of our evidence point to the fact that from the very first the leaders of the Christian Church recognised that nothing but the highest available category was adequate for the purpose of describing all that they felt towards Christ? Does not their actual faith transcend at many points all human categories? Could their belief in the Resurrection of Jesus and His subsequent exaltation to the right hand of God be reconciled with the conception of a human Messiah? When the faith of the early Church equated the risen Christ with the Holy Spirit, as Lake himself admits it did, can this identification be brought within the limits of a human category? Above all, does not the belief in the connexion between the life and work of Christ and the forgiveness of human sin absolutely trans-

ceed the possibilities that lay within the power of a human Messiah? Every line of argument seems to point conclusively to the fact that the object of the faith and worship of the primitive Christian Church was not a human but a Divine Messiah.

VIII.

The conclusion which we have reached is that Lake's three points, far from giving an exhaustive account of the faith of the Primitive Church, fail altogether to recognise some of the most essential elements in it.

To Lake's three points, which are: (1) the acceptance of the eschatological teaching of Jesus: (2) the insistence upon the necessity of repentance: (3) the belief in Jesus as the Messiah in the human sense of the term—the following additions have to be made: (4) the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus [and His exaltation to heaven: (5) the belief that salvation and the forgiveness of sin were only possible in the name of Jesus: (6) The belief in the Holy Spirit and the equation of the Holy Spirit with the Spirit of Christ: (7) The belief that Jesus was the Messiah, not merely in the human connotation of the term, but in the higher sense in which it is used in the Similitudes of Enoch.

The addition of these four points is not merely a matter of academic or historical interest. It affects our interpretation of the development of theology in the Apostolic age. If these four points are recognised as constituent elements in the faith of the first circle of Christians, it is obvious that all the vital elements in the later theology of the Church are germinally present in a crude form from the earliest beginnings of its history. The real issue at stake between the two theories with regard to the character of the primitive faith of the Church is this. Were the distinctive features of Christianity, as it has been understood

from the time of the apostles, part of the original faith of the first disciples, or were they later additions introduced into Christianity from extraneous sources? Lake's three points would make the latter hypothesis necessary. The addition of the four other points, for which evidence has been adduced, reverses that verdict and makes the first hypothesis the true explanation of the facts.

HERBERT T. ANDREWS.

THE RELIGION WITHOUT A CREED.

THE famous question proposed to philosophers in the eighteenth century, whether there are real *a priori* principles of knowledge, acquires a new opportunity in the twentieth century when it is applied to religious experience. It is pertinent to put the question, at a time when religion is obliged to find expression in all sorts of unconventional forms, whether there are principles of religion which are not the simple product of experience and at the same time are real. If all its truths are derived from facts, religion has no other sanction than tradition; and it is always possible in a given age to demand, as many are now forward to demand, whether this sanction of tradition has ceased to have authority. Religion would then be simply a habit of mind, and like every habit susceptible of being dislodged. On the other hand, principles of religion may be put forward which are not derived from experience, though, like every form of knowledge, they are discovered in experience. Such principles would be described as *a priori* convictions of God and intuitions of the Unseen which owe nothing to facts of history, except in the secondary sense that all truth is enriched by experience. But it remains to be asked whether these supposed *a priori* principles, which are said to be self-evident and independent of demonstration, have also the reality of fact. Do they constitute a real relation between man and the Divine nature, or does the religious consciousness never get beyond the closed circle of its own subjective feelings and ideas and imagine realities where there are none?

There are these two different ways of evaluating religion. The one is that since its principles and institutions are exclusively derived from facts of history, religion is destined

to decay with the diminishing significance of the facts. Christianity is played out, because the facts from which its experience is derived no longer appeal to us. The other way is, that religion is a congenital element of consciousness, instinctive, original and of universal significance. But the indifferent sceptic, while he is quite prepared to indulge our wish to believe in these elemental principles of religion if we choose, has his own opinion of their validity. He knows that they are purely subjective, without substantive reality. And the greatest encouragement he can give is to acknowledge that we may cherish these religious intuitions as a form of intellectual and emotional entertainment, but that if we had more knowledge we should regard them as disused functions of consciousness. He thus impales his victims on the horns of a dilemma, both of whose propositions are abstract and false. We are obliged to recognise either that religion is wholly derivative, or that it is not ; and in either case our religious belief is reduced to a vanishing quantity. There can be no doubt that among many other and more hopeful signs, this neutral attitude of mundane wisdom towards religion is a formidable influence to reckon with, and offers strong temptations to so many whose religious convictions have been weakened or destroyed by the overwhelming events of this war.

In view of this negative and distressing situation, leaders of religious opinion owe a duty to the large majority whose sympathies with tradition and all the institutions of historical religion have been inevitably affected by the common tendency of the time-spirit. It is certain that a great many of this persuasion have a religion which is sufficiently real to them. Although it is a Religion without a Creed, it contains all the big elements which are essential to religious experience, and we may be confident that an intelligent understanding of what it means will go some considerable

way to meet the case of those who have a genuine religious life but who find it difficult or even impossible to bring it into relation with the historical facts of Christianity.

To meet the sceptical criticism that there is no validity in religious intuitions, we are obliged to raise the question whether real, synthetic, *a priori* principles are possible in religion. This simply means that there may or may not be forms or principles which are not derived from experience but are inherent in the very structure of consciousness, and also that these are principles which have the substantive reality of fact, the synthetic quality or the putting together of elements in as real a way as the connexion between the igniting of a fuse and the explosion of gun-powder. Very orthodox persons will probably object to this pagan fashion of discoursing on religion. They want to say that all true religion is vouchsafed by revelation, a veritable gift from heaven to mankind. We heartily admit that it is so ; but we also affirm that the forms or casts of religious experience which are susceptible of receiving such revelations are original to the structure of consciousness, and that if it were not so all revelation, no matter how divine and powerful it might be, would only effect a blank impression on the mind which meant nothing : just as in the problem of knowledge, experience is built up by waves of revelation which develop and fill out the bare undifferentiated significance of the *a priori* categories or forms of knowledge.

If now we wish to articulate a genuine Religion without a Creed, we must keep in closest touch with the real and actual. While such a religion will not be dependent on fact as if it were only a derived product, it will and must have a near affinity for fact. The meaning of the universal quality of its principles, their *a priori* character, precisely consists of its power to adapt itself to facts, and to find itself illustrated and confirmed by facts. The principles of

such a religion, if they are to have universal significance for all time and enduring truth, will have the capacity of seeking out congenital facts and of suggesting and directing their emergence. If our experience follows this rule of procedure, we shall find that what we are pleased to call Religion without a Creed is not out of sympathy with historical religion, but is really a mental suspension of historical elements which, for various mental causes—perhaps pathological—have not yet been assimilated; and that it is a religion which is essentially historical both in character and motive.

There is such a thing, then, as Elemental Religion, and by that we mean the elements of religion which are the most universal and original to mankind. The Hebrew Psalms are the most perfect example of Elemental Religion; and it is because they are so full of it that they are such a priceless treasury of devotion. As a pure experience of God, the Psalms are unsurpassed. They speak the language of experience without doctrinal definition, and the experience is of such quality that it is capable of appealing immediately to the twentieth-century mind as much as to the early Hebrew. All the great elements of religion are these: the sense of God and the knowledge that He knows us through and through—"O God, Thou hast searched me and known me, Thou understandest my thought afar off"; the consciousness of sin and the assurance of pardon, so profoundly analysed in the fifty-first Psalm; and the double perception of God as infinitely transcending all creation and as a Being who has affinity for human life—"Who is like unto the Lord our God who dwelleth on high, who humbleth Himself to behold the things that are in heaven and in the earth!" "He telleth the number of the stars, he calleth them all by their names, he healeth the broken in heart and bindeth up their wounds." The only certain knowledge I have of

God is the knowledge that He knows me through and through. I know Him because He is implicated in the thorough consciousness of myself.

This elemental knowledge of God is not put forward as a substitute for the much more definite revelation of the New Testament : It is not a question of opposition between two forms of religion but of the most practical method in a given case. We are disclosing the broad feature of our age that, in consequence of enormous changes which have overtaken the value of tradition, there is a well-marked type of mind which has a real and one may say quite definite religion, but which cannot bring it into any sort of intelligent relation with historical religion. It is a religion in the air. Yet it has far too much of the real thing in it to be ignored, and it is more than worth while that this type of mind should be encouraged to hold what it has, however imperfect it may be. It is possible that, for a given type of mind and in view of its limited practical needs, such a religion should contain all that is essential in historical religion until at least such time as the type of mind in question is capable of entertaining more definite ideas. One sees this sort of inarticulate religion perhaps more widely illustrated among the troops in the field than anywhere else. Practically all these young men have had a definite Christian training. But they have been affected by the modern attitude of mistrust towards tradition ; and although it is certain that many of them have a distinctively Christian consciousness, they will not hazard to commit themselves to the definite teaching of the Church which to their mind is obsessed by unintelligible mysteries of theological manufacture. There are others whose experience is more vague, but it has stood the sternest test which our times at least can offer : these men have seen things with the eyes of divine understanding, they have seen their own and other

men's souls laid bare, they have seen something of God. Or, we may take a less defined example. Here is a young man, a sportsman, lighthearted and strong. He has no doctrine of any kind and knows of none. But he has a serious sense of life, plays a straight game and can be trusted. He knows himself fairly well, though he does not speak of it. He has ideals and he strives to live up to them. That man has certainly a real religion. He has much yet to learn, but the root of the matter is in him. And who shall say that in the still whisperings of his soul, or in the deep and solemn crises of life, a faint echo of the Name which is above every name may not be secretly confessed? For such a life, lived sincerely and squarely, must inevitably come to think of and eventually to know and love Him who is the perfection of our manhood. Jesus Christ did not come to destroy such elemental knowledge of God, but to bring it to maturity by the demonstration of His own flesh and blood.

There is a simple, practical test which may show with some measure of clearness the strong claims of Elemental Religion in our time. What are the parts of the Bible which we most commonly use for devotional purposes? It will probably be ascertained that the average experience finds its devotional springs, not in the Synoptic Gospels nor in the doctrinal portions of the Epistles, but mainly in the Psalms, the second Isaiah, the mystical and practical passages of the Epistles, and the mystical books of St. John's Gospel and the Revelation. For our own part, we have increasingly found a chapter from the Synoptic Gospels to be disappointment and failure from a devotional point of view. That may seem a curious confession to make; but there is a natural reason for it, and after all the facts must be faced. This is only one of the many more signs of the profound change which has overtaken the religious consciousness of to-day, and it

is a change which must be taken into account. There is no question in mind of comparative disparagement of the Gospels. On the contrary, it is assumed that the devotional reader comes forward with such a reverent belief in the person of Christ that he is anxious to believe everything on record for His sake. But while he reads he stumbles on a miracle, and something in the setting of the narrative turns the edge of his devotional disposition, links up a whole chain of suppressed conclusions already tried and cast and tried again, and awakes his unsuspecting intellect to arms; and before he has reached the middle of his reading the whole setting of the Gospel story loses probability. Then he closes the book, shuts his eyes to all definite historical record, calls up what he knows of the Perfect Man whom he adores and loves, and he finds that his religion is as real as ever. But the reading of the Gospel seemed to disturb rather than help forward his religion. Now let him turn to the Psalms or the second Isaiah, or Ephesians and Colossians (both of which, though doctrinal, are also highly mystical) and the other portions already mentioned, and he is in the atmosphere of pure experience. But most of all in the Psalms and Isaiah he finds Elemental Religion perfectly expressed without any doctrinal expressions to offend his sensitive mind.

It must not be supposed that, in what has been said, the religious experience demanded by our age is being championed as something superior to the New Testament revelation. It is to be hoped that this false impression will not even be suggested. The plea that is being made is in behoof of what we may be obliged to regard as a pathological religious consciousness. For though it may be defended as the weakness of a high form of perfection, there is no doubt that the intelligence which has become so sensitive and over-refined by excessive culture that it has lost the power of

assimilating historical facts which are more than capable of exhausting the significance of all elemental knowledge of the divine nature, has become degenerate. Like children who inherit the blessings of the home and have lost appreciation of the narrow, humble shelter in which they received them, the children of the present generation, with a quite natural but not commendable ingratitude, are imbued with the richness of the Christian experience and have lost the strength to remember the humble manger in which it was born. That may not be a fair analysis of the modern mind, and it would not be wise to insist upon it too much. Besides, there are individual facts of Christianity which are losing significance for us every day and it may be the case that they will never be re-instated. The explanation offered is only preferred in order to show clearly the proper motive of the plea that is being made. No brief is held for the modern mind as such. But we are bound to recognise its existence and to meet it where we can. Meanwhile, let those who have elemental knowledge of God, without creed, without the power to adapt it to historical religion, stick to it for all it is worth and cherish it ; it is God's certain revelation to them. And whatever our own religious profession may be, however orthodox and doctrinal we may like to be, times will come in our lives when stress of experience overpowering our accustomed habitudes of feeling and reflection drives us back on this elemental knowledge of God, and then the most of historical fact that remains to us may only be, not even a face, but perhaps a hem that we can dimly recognise.

R. A. C. MACMILLAN.

*A TRANSFORMATION IN SOCRATIC CRITICISM—
WITH AN ANALOGY.*

THE publication of Professor Burnet's recent volume on Greek Philosophy, preceded as it has been by his edition of the *Phaedo* and by Professor A. E. Taylor's *Varia Socratica*, marks something like a revolution in the treatment of the Socratic question. There has seldom been a greater overturning of philosophical presuppositions than is essayed in these volumes. One of the axioms of philosophical criticism hitherto has been that it is to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon that we turn for the actual Sokrates ; and that the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues is an idealised figure, whom Plato has made the mouthpiece of his own generalisations. This position, fortified by the tradition of centuries, and occupied by every philosophic writer of authority in turn, Professor Burnet and his followers have proceeded to assail in the most startling and vigorous fashion. And the assault is no irresponsible and unpremeditated one. It is the result of long and careful preparation. Professor Burnet informs us, "It is nearly a quarter of a century ago that I found the current views of Sokrates and Plato leading me into a hopeless scepticism and resolved to see what could be done with the hypothesis that Plato really meant what he said. Since then I have edited the whole text of Plato, and an editor necessarily reads his text through minutely many scores of times."¹ And the impressions as to the relative value of Xenophon's and Plato's versions of the teaching of Sokrates, which these years of pondering have produced in Professor Burnet's mind, are stated in no uncertain or halting fashion. "It is quite intelligible that the eighteenth century should have preferred the Sokrates of the

¹ *Greek Philosophy*, Part I, p. 349 note.

Memorabilia to that of the Platonic dialogues; for he comes much nearer the idea then current of what a philosopher ought to be. In other respects it is hard to see what there is to recommend him. It is recognised that Xenophon is far from being a trustworthy historian, and the *Cyropaedia* shows he had a turn for philosophical romance. . . . Above all, it is quite impossible to get anything like a complete picture of Sokrates from the *Memorabilia* alone, and so in practice every writer fills in the outline with as much of the Platonic Sokrates as happens to suit his preconceived ideas of the man." "We cannot be forced to regard the Sokrates of Plato as a fiction unless some really cogent argument can be produced for doing so, and I am not aware that this has ever been done. . . . If Plato's Sokrates is not meant for the real Sokrates, I find it very hard to imagine what he can be meant for."¹

With this abandonment of the traditional idea of the greater verity of Xenophon's picture of Sokrates goes an entirely altered view of the nature of Sokrates' contribution to philosophy. The creed in which we were all brought up was that Sokrates limited himself to definitions of things, seeking for the concepts that lay imbedded in every-day speech; while Plato took these concepts and gave to them a supra-sensible reality, made them "the patterns of things in the heavens." With this account of Sokrates' teaching, Professor Burnet and his school now emphatically join issue. One cannot but admire the boldness with which Dr. Burnet challenges this stronghold of philosophic interpretation. "It seems to me," he says, "a far more serious anachronism to represent Sokrates as seeking for universals (*τὰ καθόλου*), a term not yet invented, than to represent him as seeking for 'forms.' It is worse still to make him talk about 'concepts.' Realism

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 127, 178-9.

is prior to Conceptualism, and I doubt very much whether any one ever 'hypostatized concepts.'"¹ The boldness of the challenge is all the greater that the stronghold is defended in no less a name than that of Aristotle himself, who has hitherto been accepted as the final appeal in this matter. It is indeed on the *locus classicus* in Aristotle, that the issue in this controversy hangs, and it is round it that the field will be most hotly contested.

The well-known passage in the *Metaphysics* runs as follows:—"Sokrates did not make the universals separate nor the definitions. These others separated them, and such they designated ideas of things."² It has been the fashion to take the *οἱ δὲ* of this passage as a kind of *incognito* for Plato—in fact the passage is sometimes quoted as if Plato were mentioned by name—though it may have been matter of wonder why Aristotle should refer to so well-defined a figure as Plato in this cryptic and collective way.

But a much simpler and more natural explanation of the term has now been found in the opening lines of the same section of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle announces that he is going to deal *first* with those "who believe in the ideas themselves without adding that they are of the nature of numbers."³ There are evidently, then, two classes of adherents of the theory of ideas, those who say that the ideas are numbers and those who do not say so. On Aristotle's own testimony, given more than once in the *Metaphysics*, it was Plato who identified the ideas with numbers, and so in this section it is not with Plato but with the other class of adherents of the theory that he is dealing, and it is they who are referred to under the general term *οἱ δὲ*. If this be the true explanation of the reference, it follows that Plato was not the earliest patron of the

¹ Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 317.

² *Met. M.* 1078b. 30.

³ *Met. M.*, 1078b 9.

theory of ideas. While he gave his own peculiar complexion to it, there was an earlier school of thinkers by whom the theory was held. Can we learn anything more as to the identity of this school to whom Aristotle makes this significant allusion? It is here that perhaps the most brilliant stroke of the new hypothesis is seen. It seeks to relate this enigmatic reference of Aristotle to the equally enigmatic figures who appear in the *Sophist* and are called "the friends of ideas"; and it argues that it is between them and Sokrates and not between Plato and Sokrates that the contrast in Met. 1078b. 30 is drawn.¹

What we have on this new reading of the *locus classicus* is not an assertion that Sokrates did not teach any such doctrine of ideas as Plato did; but that in dealing with ideas Sokrates still kept them in close relation to the sensible facts, while the "friends of ideas," as appears also from the *Sophist*, made an absolute cleavage between fact and thought. And so the passage does not prove that Sokrates did not postulate ideas, but that he postulated ideas and sensibles as the reverse sides of one reality.

But it is clear that even on such a reading Aristotle does not assert that the ideas, if held by Sokrates, were held in the sense, hitherto associated with the Platonic dialogues, that there are two parallel orders of reality, a sensible and a spiritual, in intercommunication with one another. For Sokrates the two orders are interpenetrative: the things of sense only exist by the indwelling of the forms. And Professor Burnet attains consistency by maintaining that nothing more is attributed to him in the Platonic dialogues, that all that Sokrates is represented as teaching there is the inherence of the ideas in the sensible realities, giving them thus their true existence. "It is in that sense that Sokrates—the Sokrates of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*

¹ See Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, pp. 83–89.

—does not separate the forms from the world of sensible particulars, and it is just because he denies all reality to the sensible particulars, except what they derive from the partial presence of the forms in them.”¹

This toning down of the high doctrine of the dialogues² may well be regarded as one of the most startling results of the new hypothesis; though Professor Burnet seems to find some warrant for it in the testimony of Sokrates himself in a curious passage, which he cites from the *Meno*.³

The subject is too large to be dealt with in this article, and I do not feel competent to pronounce a decided opinion on Professor Burnet's new estimate of Plato's trustworthiness as a biographer of Sokrates. But there is one criticism I would venture to offer, and that is, that his exalted estimate of Plato has led him to an undue depreciation of Xenophon, and that the one is not necessarily a corollary of the other. It is possible that such a fresh and unfettered consideration of the Socratic question as Professor Burnet and Professor Taylor would have us give to it, might lead us to feel that the Sokrates presented in the pages of Xenophon is hardly the virile and intellectual figure we have always believed Sokrates to be. But Dr. Burnet goes too far when he says, “The ‘irony’ of Sokrates comes entirely from Plato. The Sokrates of the *Memorabilia* has no doubts or difficulties of any kind.”⁴ The play of the ironic faculty is very manifest in Sokrates' conversations with Euthydemus as reported by Xenophon,⁵ and particularly in the discussion on “Justice,” which has much in common

¹ Burnet, op. cit. p. 165.

² This applies of course to the dialogues in dispute such as the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. There are several which Prof. Burnet still regards as peculiarly Plato's own, where his more mathematical views of the universe are developed.

³ *Meno*, 86b. 6.

⁴ Burnet, op. cit. p. 127 note.

⁵ *Mem.* iv. 2-3.

with that in the *Republic*. Dr. Burnet says that the *Cyropaedia* shows that Sokrates had a turn for philosophical romance.¹ The *Cyropaedia* might more fitly be termed an historical romance, and the few philosophical allusions, which it contains, are only such as would naturally be introduced by the disciple of such a system as is unfolded in the *Memorabilia*. Professor Burnet further asks why, if the other Socratic writings of Xenophon, such as the *Æconomicus*, are regarded as unhistorical, an exception should be made in favour of the *Memorabilia*.¹ The answer is obvious—the *Memorabilia* profess to be *Memoirs* of Sokrates, an actual record of his sayings, which the “Complete Householder” does not. Immediately an author throws his writing into the dramatic form of dialogue, as in the case of the *Æconomicus*, he claims a certain independence of historical considerations. Dr. Burnet himself says that he does not regard even the dialogues of Plato as “records of actual conversations.”² Professor Burnet’s inclination to discredit Xenophon’s presentation of Sokrates on his dialectical side, and his suggestion that Xenophon is serving up to us fragments of the Platonic Sokrates,³ are scarcely more substantial in their grounds. It seems to me that the truer course—and one which would serve Professor Burnet’s purpose equally well—is, admitting Xenophon’s limited capacity of philosophical interpretation, to regard his work as a genuine transcript of the impression which Sokrates’ teaching made on his own mind. It was left to another and greater disciple to record the higher flights of his master’s genius.

I have drawn attention to this recent development in

¹ Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 127.

² *Ibid.* p. 149. There are of course dialogues in the text of the *Memorabilia*. But the *Memorabilia* as a whole is a narrative and not a dialogue.

³ Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 149.

Socratic criticism because of its important bearing on a parallel question in the sphere of New Testament criticism, the question of the relation of the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptics. Some years ago in the pursuit of certain studies in the Johannine question I was led to consider the analogy which existed between the customary attitude towards the Platonic dialogues and the modern view of the Fourth Gospel as an idealised account of the Figure, more literally portrayed in the Synoptics ; but it was only to find that the attitude towards Plato was undergoing the transformation which has just been described. It is said that analogies illustrate but do not prove. But it appears to me that if Professor Burnet and Professor Taylor are able to make good their case that Plato is a more literal reporter of Sokrates than we have hitherto supposed, it cannot fail to have an influence on our attitude towards the question of the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel.

The relation of the Synoptics to the Fourth Gospel finds its most striking parallel in that of the *Memorabilia* to the Dialogues of Plato. The difference between the accounts of the teaching of Jesus contained in the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel may be briefly expressed by saying that the one is practical in tone, the other metaphysical. In the first three Gospels Christ's sayings are given in a concrete and aphoristic form. They deal with the chief duties of life, the questions of righteousness and purity and self-sacrifice which arise in our relations with our fellow-men. The Sermon on the Mount may be taken as typical of the message of the Synoptics ; or it may be still more conveniently summarised in the eight Beatitudes with which that sermon opens. "Blessed are the poor in spirit." "Blessed are they that mourn." "Blessed are the meek." "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness." "Blessed are the merciful." "Blessed are

the pure in heart." "Blessed are the peace-makers." "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake." ¹ Christ dwells on the virtues which go to the composition of the life of true goodness, and points to Himself as the embodiment of that life. "Learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls." ²

When we pass to the Fourth Gospel we enter an entirely different atmosphere, or perhaps one should rather say, the same atmosphere with a superadded element of mystic elevation. The discourses of Christ in this Gospel are of a more profound and intricate character. They take the form of excursions into the theological and ontological realms. Christ deals with abstract questions as to the relation of the Father to Himself, the heavenly origination of His Being, conferring a metaphysical value on His Person, which gives it an abiding significance for the world. "If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you of heavenly things? And no man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven." ³ "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." ⁴

It is the same contrast which is illustrated in the relation of the *Memorabilia* to the Platonic Dialogues. These also represent the teaching of one master, and the same distinction exists between the two representations as between those of the Gospels. The *Memorabilia* ⁵ are almost exclusively practical, the Dialogues strongly mystical

¹ Matt. v. 3-10. ² Matt. xi. 29. ³ John iii. 12-13. ⁴ John vi. 51.

⁵ It is interesting to remember that Justin Martyr calls the Gospels τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, the *Memorabilia* of the Apostles.

and metaphysical. The Sokrates of the *Memorabilia* is presented as a public mentor, dealing with matters of everyday concern. There are sections on the choice of friends, the qualifications of a commander, the duties of the statesman, and so forth. The counsels hardly rise above the level of common prudence: there is no appeal beyond the sensible world. In the Dialogues of Plato Sokrates appears in a totally different guise. He still gives counsel as to the affairs of this life, but in a framework of metaphysics entirely lacking in the *Memorabilia*. He leads us from the sensible to the supra-sensible world, from earthly to heavenly things. The Socratic problem is indeed different from that which confronts us in the Gospels in that it is not a question as to the person of Sokrates himself, but as to the truth which he teaches and the relating of that truth to eternal ideas, whence we have the so-called ideal theory of the Dialogues. And if the traditional view of these two versions of Sokrates' teaching be the true one, that the *Memorabilia* is the more authentic as being the more simple and literal, while what we have in the Platonic Dialogues is a philosophical elaboration at the hand of a great disciple, we may find in it strong confirmation of the modern view of the Fourth Gospel, that it also is not to be taken as a literal account of the teaching of Jesus, but as a subsequent development, the passing of the simple ideas of the Gospel through the alembic of a philosophical mind, the universalising of the concrete truths of the earlier tradition. It is obvious that what happened in the case of Sokrates was as likely to happen in the case of any other teacher. If it goes without saying that the *Memorabilia* and the Dialogues cannot both be accurate representations of what Sokrates taught, it follows that no more can the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel be both accepted as literal accounts of the teaching of Jesus: the Fourth Gospel must be regarded

as a free interpretation of the facts presented in the first three.

But this view of the Socratic question, which has held undisputed sway for centuries, has at length been challenged. Serious doubts are now being expressed as to the justifiableness of the impression, which has hitherto prevailed, that Xenophon is a more accurate historian than Plato. It is indeed being boldly asserted that the Platonic Sokrates is the real and original Sokrates ; the Sokrates of Xenophon is but a feeble echo of him. I have set forth the main line of proof advanced by Professor Burnet and his friends for this startling assertion, which consists largely in a new reading of certain passages in Aristotle.¹ I have not volunteered a definite opinion as to the validity of this proof, as there is room for a more thorough canvassing of the evidence than it has yet received. I simply venture to point out that, if their conclusion is ultimately accepted, its influence must be felt in the sphere of New Testament criticism. If what has hitherto been regarded as the altogether unlikely is proved to be true with regard to Sokrates, it may be equally true with regard to Christ, and the Fourth Gospel may turn out to be an authentic representation of what He thought and taught.

If, indeed, we were to apply the analogy in the form it has taken under Professor Burnet's hands, it would have one serious and unwelcome consequence. It would not only give added credibility to the Fourth Gospel, but would cast discredit on the Synoptics. For the same process which reinstates Plato turns Xenophon out of doors. Plato in Professor Burnet's opinion can only

¹ The inquiry of Prof. Burnet and his colleagues takes a wider range than has been indicated in this article, including, for example, an examination of the testimony of Aristophanes' burlesque of Sokrates. But I have confined myself to the argument from Aristotle, as appearing to me the crucial one.

be vindicated as a historian at the expense of Xenophon's reputation. I have tried to show that Professor Burnet's grudge against Xenophon is ill-founded, and that no adequate reason has been shown for not accepting the *Memorabilia* as a *bona-fide* account of the teaching of Sokrates as it appealed to Xenophon's own mind. Admittedly it was a mind differently constituted from that of Plato, less capable of perceiving the higher metaphysical implications of Sokrates' thought, if there were such, yet giving a genuine and straight-forward account of his teaching as it bore on the experience of the practical man. Certainly one would have no hope of persuading theological readers to accept a line of argument which would compel them to regard the Synoptics as a less reliable account of the sayings of Jesus than the Fourth Gospel. The Synoptics bear their authentication on the face of them. We have no use for Professor Burnet's depreciation of the *Memorabilia*, but his vindication of Plato is leading us to see that there may be room for more than one interpretation of the Christ of history : as it was reserved to Plato with his metaphysical insight to give to the world the higher flights of his master's genius, so it may have been reserved to some "beloved disciple" to interpret the larger and diviner elements in the teaching of Jesus.

The modern school consider it impossible that the Fourth Gospel could have been produced by a contemporary of Christ. But now that it is being seriously asserted that the Dialogues of Plato, which we know were written by a contemporary and a disciple of Sokrates, are an actual account of his teaching, it can no longer be considered so inconceivable that the Johannine Christ is a living picture painted by one who saw Him in the flesh. If what has hitherto been regarded as a highly-coloured version of the teaching of Sokrates is now regarded as the true impression

of a contemporary, it makes it more possible to believe that the Fourth Gospel is the work of one who heard Christ for himself, and with an understanding to which his other reporters did not attain. With the exact identity of the author—whether it be John the Apostle, or John the Presbyter—we are not at present concerned.

In this connexion it is interesting to learn from Professor Taylor that there were degrees of intimacy in the relationship between Sokrates and his disciples. In addition to the general audience to which Sokrates discoursed, there was an inner circle to whom he made known the deeper elements of his thought. "Sokrates does, no doubt, find his way into all companies, and contrives to compel all manner of men, high and low, to give account of their spiritual state, but he has also a special circle with whom he is connected in a more intimate manner. He discourses with them, as he does not with the multitude at large, of the deep things of the philosophic life, and of his own intimate experiences, and they regard his passing from them in the prison much as the 'sons of the prophets' did the taking away of Elijah. They are the 'we' in whose name Sokrates talks in the *Phaedo*, the 'we' who are always speaking of 'beauty itself,' 'justice itself,' 'piety itself'. . . . Plato's brother Glaucon is one of them, for all his love of dogs and sport, and this explains why, in the tenth Book of the *Republic*, Sokrates can include him among the 'we' who are 'accustomed' to posit an εἶδος for each class of things which are called by a common name."¹ We may suppose that Xenophon belonged to the outer and more general group of followers, and we have further proof here that there is a place for Xenophon as an interpreter of Sokrates. Plato, on the other hand, being a younger member of the same family as Glaucon, would in course of time be admitted

¹ *Varia Socratica*, pp. 143-4.

to the more select circle, and so be able to speak at first hand of those high metaphysical matters which Sokrates discussed with his chosen friends.¹ I do not mean to suggest that there was anything exactly corresponding to this inner circle among the disciples of Christ, that there were a favoured few to whom He made revelations which were not shared with the whole company of the Twelve. Indeed, the twelve disciples themselves formed the inner circle in Christ's time. But, while most of these were men of average intellectuality and practical instinct, who would lay hold on the teaching of Christ only in so far as it went in the line of Hebrew ideals of life and righteousness, there may have been among Christ's hearers those who, metaphorically speaking, "leaned upon Jesus' breast," who had a spiritual sympathy which enabled them to enter into His deeper intuitions of the divine, and to communicate them to their fellow-men; from one of these frequent hearers of Christ, the Fourth Gospel may have come.

One further point.—It may be said that the Fourth Gospel has an individuality about it, an artistic unity, which makes it impossible to divorce the personality of the author from it, or to think that the personal equation has not entered into his treatment of the historic Jesus. Now it may be observed that the Socratic analogy in the new form it has taken allows for such an assumption. Professor Burnet recognises that the dramatic form of the Platonic Dialogues calls for certain deductions from their verbal accuracy. "To avoid misunderstanding, I should say that I do not regard the dialogues of Plato as records of actual conversations, though I think it probable that there are such embedded in them. I also admit fully that the

¹ Prof. Burnet indeed is not sure that Plato was in the inner circle before Sokrates' death (op. cit. p. 209). But at any rate the supposed higher Socratic tradition would be in his family.

Platonic Sokrates is Sokrates as Plato saw him, and that his image may to some extent, be transfigured by the memory of his martyrdom.”¹ Similarly, while there may be strong reasons for believing that the material used in the Fourth Gospel is historical, we are not under the necessity of denying that it has received a certain dramatic disposition at the hands of the writer. The Fourth Gospel, we may say, is not so much a record as an exposition of the teaching of Jesus under certain great categories of Life and Light and Love, the sublime character of which has given this Gospel its commanding place in our regard. Just as it is the Dialogues of Plato which have made Sokrates a living figure to the ages, so it is the Fourth Gospel which has enthroned Christ in the heart of the world. The essential part which is played by this Gospel in giving the necessary note of universality to the Christian revelation is admitted even by upholders of the critical view, and I cannot close this article more fitly than with the words of one of its most distinguished exponents: “But it is no less true that the Synoptics themselves acquire a new value from the ‘spiritual Gospel’ which follows and completes them. It supplies us with the larger conception of Jesus as the ever-present Lord, and we carry this conception with us, as John himself did, when we contemplate the earthly life. Sayings and incidents that might seem in themselves to signify little, appeal to us with a new meaning. The story that has come down to us out of a remote past connects itself with our own experience and touches us directly with a living power. It is the Fourth Evangelist who has taught us to read this eternal import in the recorded life of Christ. He has lifted it, so to speak, out of the limits of its historical con-

¹ Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 149.

ditions, and made it a present reality to believers in all ages." ¹

JOHN MACASKILL.

THE MOSAIC ORIGIN OF THE DECALOGUE.

VII.

THE UNIQUE DISTINCTION OF THE DECALOGUE.

HAVING sought to establish the Mosaic origin of the Decalogue, alike in its religious and ethical demands, we have now in conclusion to face the question wherein the unique distinction of the Decalogue consists. The very impressive context in which it appears in Exodus with natural accompaniments sublimely stern, its repetition in Deuteronomy where it is definitely made the basis of Jahweh's covenant with Israel, point to the fundamental place it held in Hebrew religious thought. But is it really the marvellous document which these ancient and many modern estimates have assumed it to be? Not indeed all modern estimates, for some have been distinctly depreciatory. There has been a tendency both to underestimate and to overestimate its moral and spiritual content. On the one hand, it has been maintained that its moral laws are among the veriest commonplaces, demonstrably familiar to other peoples ages before Moses, and so obviously indispensable and elementary, if there is to be any sort of human society at all, that to claim them as embodying a special or specially valuable revelation is preposterous, and the sublime physical accompaniments assigned to their origination become a trifle ridiculous. On the other hand, they have been held, with just as much exaggeration, to be a complete sum-

¹ Ernest F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel, its Purpose and Theology*, pp. 372-3.

mary of human duty, the adequate basis alike of all worthy individual and national life. It is partly this exaggerated estimate of its contents that has led some scholars to deny the possibility of an ancient origin, and to assign it to the prophetic period. "If the Ten Commandments really did come from this (i.e. the Mosaic) period," says Budde,¹ "it appears that there existed, even in the earliest times, a conception of God so sublime that hardly anything could have remained for the prophets to do. This of itself should suffice to show the impossibility of the Mosaic origin of the Ten Commandments." This criticism errs in two directions; first—as we have tried to show—in pressing too mechanically an evolutionary view of history, and ignoring the mysterious, original, creative power of a great personality; and again in overestimating the contents of the Decalogue.

The supremely significant thing about the Decalogue is not so much its actual contents, its detailed items, as its spirit. It may be put thus: alike in its religious and its ethical demands there is an inspired concentration upon the things that matter. In its religion there is not a trace of the puerile or superstitious, in its ethics there is no confusion between the great and the trivial things. Its distinctive quality is admirably illustrated by a comparison with the ancient documents which afford the closest analogy to some of its constituent parts. In the Shurpu series of incantation texts to which we have already referred there occur, as we saw, not a few searching questions which indicate an unquestionably lofty moral standard, and the defender of the uniqueness of the Decalogue has no interest in depreciating this or explaining it away. But, on the other hand, fairness obliges him to point out that these high-souled questions occur in a document which presup-

¹ *The Religion of Israel to the Exile*, p. 32.

poses a view of the world and of religion wide as the poles asunder from that which underlies the Decalogue. The petitioner is involved in some sickness or suffering which proves to him that he is in the thrall of some demon or sorcerer. In order to get rid of this ban, which of himself he cannot break, he consults the priest, who is potent to exorcise the evil spirits. This is done partly by magic rites, such as the symbolical burning¹ of an effigy, etc., and partly by magic formulas. A long list of possible causes for the ban is enumerated, in which moral transgressions appear side by side with unwitting lapses from purely conventional standards in matters ceremonial. "The priest having exhausted the category of possible sins or mishaps that have caused the suffering of the petitioner, proceeds to invoke the gods, goddesses, and the powerful spirits to loosen the ban. There is no question of retribution for actual acts of injustice or violence, any more than there is a question of genuine contrition. The enumeration of the causes for the suffering constitutes in fact a part of the incantation. The mention of the real cause in the long list—and the list aims to be exhaustive, so that the exorciser may strike the real cause—goes a long way towards ensuring the departure of the evil spirit. And if, besides striking the real cause, the exorciser is fortunate enough in his enumeration of the various gods, goddesses and spirits to call by name upon the *right* god or spirit, the one who has the power over the demon in question, his object is achieved. Speaking the right words and pronouncing the right name constitute, together with the performance of the correct ceremony and the bringing of the right sacrifice, the conditions upon which depends the

¹ The word *Shurpu* means burning, and the series bears this name because of the prominence given in it to the burning of effigies of demons or sorcerers, in order to get rid of their baneful influence.

success of the priest in the incantation ritual. Hence the striking features of these texts, the enumeration of long lists of causes for misfortune, long lists of powers invoked and a variety of ceremonies prescribed, in the hope that the priest will 'hit it' at one time or the other." ¹

Will any one maintain that there is any real analogy between documents like these, on the one hand, which throw the moral and the ceremonial upon the same level of importance, and, above all, which presuppose a world dominated by gods many and demons many, demons whose power can be broken by properly regulated magic; and the Decalogue, on the other hand, with its sublime simplicity, its severe insistence upon morality as the inevitable issue and indispensable accompaniment of true religion its stern refusal to recognise any supernatural presence but Jahweh's as worthy of the least consideration on the part of Israel? Of gods there may be many, but not for her: of demons there are none. The Decalogue is in truth the product of another world. The only commandment that could with the remotest plausibility be held to come into contact with that world of superstition which the Decalogue as a whole with eloquent silence repudiates, would be the third. It might seem to point to a belief in the magical power of the divine name. Unquestionably to the Semitic mind, the name, whether human or divine, is very intimately associated with the personality, so much so that in later times the name is almost hypostatised. The ancient belief "that a god or demon must come when his name is correctly pronounced in an invocation" ² is illustrated by the grim plague-scene in Amos vi. 10, where the wretched survivor, cowering in a corner of the stricken

¹ M. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 292 f. Cf. J. Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, p. 346.

² *H.D.B.*, ii. 480.

house, when he is asked whether there is any one alive beside him, hurriedly replies, "No! Hush! we must not make mention of the name of Jahweh"—the implication being that the very mention of His name may bring Him upon the scene to inflict some more terrible evil still. But after it is frankly admitted that this conception of the name was accepted, and to a very late period maintained, by the average Hebrew religious mind, it has to be pointed out that the magical use of the name is doubtless just one of the things forbidden in the third commandment under the general category of אִשָּׁה , *emptiness, vanity, nothingness*: "Thou shalt not take up the name of Jahweh thy God *for unreality*." This is no doubt legitimately interpreted to mean "for a frivolous, insincere, or dishonest purpose": in other words, Jahweh's name must not be implicated in conversational trivialities, in dubious commercial transactions, in false swearing. Positively, it is a demand that the sacred name be held in reverence: but the deep hatred manifested throughout the Old Testament for superstitious practices of all kinds, and most summarily expressed in Deuteronomy xviii. 9-11, puts it beyond all doubt that any magical use of the divine name would have been abhorrent to any one who really understood the temper of the Jahweh religion, and that this too is prohibited by implication in the third commandment. This would be one of the "vain things," just as אֱלֹהִים , whatever its derivation, seems to have suggested to the Hebrew ear the idea of gods (אֱלֹהִים) who were no (אֱלֹהִים) gods. It may be confidently affirmed, therefore, that the Decalogue is altogether free from those superstitious conceptions in which the cognate Semitic religions were so rife. The noble code of Hammurapi has a full-blown polytheistic exordium, with its recognition of Anu, Ellil, Ea, etc., in striking contrast to the unbending henotheism of the Decalogue.

The magical implications of the Babylonian document whose ethical contents seemed at first to offer a real analogy to the Decalogue, are equally characteristic of the Egyptian literature with which it may be compared. When it is said that "the Egyptian code of morals, as may be seen from the cxxvth chapter, was the grandest and most comprehensive of those now known to have existed among the nations of antiquity,"¹ it has to be remembered that saturating the so-called Book of the Dead is a belief in the efficacy of magic which, as it was believed to be potent in this world, was potent also for that which is to come. The Book of the Dead is, apart from some hymns to gods, a collection of magic formulas or charms designed to confer specific benefits upon the deceased. "It is difficult for the modern mind to understand how completely the belief in magic penetrated the whole substance of life (i.e. in ancient Egypt) dominating popular custom and constantly appearing in the simplest acts of the daily household routine, as much a matter of course as sleep or the preparation of food. It constituted the very atmosphere in which the men of the early Oriental world lived. Without the saving and salutary influence of such magical agencies constantly invoked, the life of an ancient household in the East was unthinkable. The destructive powers would otherwise have annihilated all. . . . We can still hear the mother's voice as she leans over her babe and casts furtive glances through the open door into the darkness where the powers of evil dwell. . . . The magic of daily life was more and more brought to bear on the hereafter and placed at the service of the dead. . . . The illustrations in the Book of the Dead are an example of the elaboration of magical devices designed to ameliorate the life beyond

¹ Budge, *Book of the Dead* (Translation), p. clxx. ; *Books on Egypt and Chaldaea*, vol. vi. p. lxxxv.

the grave. Indeed, the Book of the Dead itself, as a whole, is but a far-reaching and complex illustration of the increasing dependence on magic in the hereafter.”¹

It may seem ungracious to indicate the magical background of so noble a document as the famous one hundred and twenty-fifth chapter, but it is there, just as surely as in the Shurpu tablet already discussed. This chapter, like some others, is followed by an interesting rubric which gives directions for the performance of certain magical ceremonies. It runs as follows: “This chapter shall be said (by the deceased) after he hath been cleansed and purified, and when he is arrayed in apparel, and is shod with white leather sandals, and his eyes have been painted with antimony, and (his body) hath been anointed with unguent of ānti, and when he offereth oxen, and feathered fowl, and incense, and cakes, and ale, and garden herbs. And, behold, thou shalt draw a representation of this in colour upon a new tile moulded from earth upon which neither a pig nor other animals have trodden. And if (thou) doest this book upon it (in writing, the deceased) shall flourish and his children shall flourish, and (his name) shall never fall into oblivion, and he shall be as one who filleth (i.e. satisfieth) the heart of the king and of his princes. And bread, and cakes, and sweetmeats, and wine, and pieces of flesh shall be given unto him upon the altar of the great god; and he shall not be turned back at any door in Amentet, and he shall be brought in along with the kings of Upper and Lower Egypt, and he shall be in the train of Osiris, continually and regularly for ever.”² With the fine ethical affirmations before the gods of the underworld is blended also the claim that the dead man has kept certain ceremonial requirements—the same equating of the

¹ J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 290–294.

² Budge's translation.

moral and the ceremonial as we find in Babylonian religion, and to some extent in Judaism, but not in prophetic religion, nor, strictly, in the Decalogue.

Further, this famous "negative confession" is frankly polytheistic. It is addressed to forty-two gods, one statement to each god. Perhaps this aspect of its polytheism ought not to be taken too seriously: it is apparently schematic, resting upon the number of administrative districts in Egypt. Nevertheless, it is there; and that is one of the serious distinctions between the Confession and the Decalogue. And again, without in any way depreciating so striking and noble a chapter or the profound interest in the future life displayed by the literature to which it belongs, it is relevant to point out that the religion and ethics of the Decalogue, and of the Old Testament generally, contain more wonderful potentialities of pure disinterestedness, because of their very indifference to the future life. Hebrew morality has undeniably a deeply utilitarian complexion, as is evidenced, for example, in the hortatory addition to the fifth commandment; but it can be said for Israel that for centuries she sought, like the transcendent genius who wrote the book of Job, to solve her problems within the compass of the life that now is, without hope or fear of any life to come; with the result that Hebrew religion, at its best, was distinguished from the beginning by a sense of vital contact with reality, and a fine scorn for the nebulous, the morbid, and all that falls beyond the test of experience. The earth was Jahweh's and the fulness thereof: it was there—in her historical experience—that He had made Himself known, and there she truly found Him. She knew and was persuaded of His fellowship in this world, and with this she was content, until fierce perplexing problems drove her out upon the reaches of the world beyond, to find Him there again.

The Decalogue is superior to the documents with which it may be appropriately compared, as much by reason of its silence as of its speech. In demons, magic, the general paraphernalia of superstition, it has neither part nor lot. Its morality is implicated in religion, but not at all in magic ; and that morality, while not without parallels in early and even earlier documents, has in the Decalogue attained uniquely concentrated expression. Its simple mighty words lay bare the foundations of human society. The task of the centuries was to explicate and deepen those words—a task attacked by the prophets and achieved by Jesus ¹—but, negatively, everything essential had been said. In the Decalogue the interests of life, property, honour are safeguarded ; the grasping anti-social disposition is rebuked : in no less than two commandments the high importance of the family is recognised ; and the whole structure of individual and social morality is rooted in religion. In the Decalogue, as throughout the whole of the Old Testament, the fear of Jahweh is the beginning of all wisdom and morality. With the preface, which has accompanied it at any rate since the seventh or eighth century B.C., the Decalogue lifts morality to heights that are nothing less than sublime, in regarding it as man's natural and reasonable response to the redemptive love of God. The members of (Hebrew) society are to consider one another, because God considered them : morality is a social service joyfully rendered to the God who served society by saving it from oppression and despair. This sublime motive, at once inspiring and transfiguring morality, would differentiate the Decalogue from every code of ethics in the world. But even without the preface, the Decalogue, by its very form, conveys the supreme truth, which every age needs to lay to heart, that the only morality which

¹ Cf. Matt. v. 21 ff.

can be permanently fruitful and secure is that which has the sanction and the inspiration of religion. The Decalogue puts in legal form that which receives prophetic form in the imperishable words : Do justly, love kindness and walk humbly with thy God.¹

Like the Lord's Prayer, the greatness of the Decalogue lies partly in its brevity and simplicity. The originality of the Lord's Prayer has been challenged on the ground that most of the petitions had in some form or other been offered before. But even when that is admitted, the wonder and the glory of the Prayer are none the less ; for it is in the choice of just these petitions—these and not others, these and no more—that its originality largely lies. Other men had said more, much more, and in saying more had really said less. Jesus said enough, because in these petitions He said everything. So with the Decalogue. Its brevity is essentially more impressive than the elaboration of the Babylonian and Egyptian documents with which it may be compared : in particular, the negative confession in the Book of the Dead tends to a somewhat tedious repetition, manifestly in order to secure forty-two declarations to correspond to the forty-two gods. The ten commandments are like sledge-hammer strokes, wielded by the arm of God's mighty man, as he beat into its earliest shape the religion of Israel.

That a unique and determinative work was done for Israel in very early times within the sphere of religion and morals is incontestable. If in this connexion I may quote from my *Historical Narrative of the Old Testament* (p. 91), "two facts more especially prove this. The first is—that, in spite of the tendency for the tribes to go their several ways during the wild and unsettled period of the judges, and to lose sight of their essential unity, that unity was

¹ Mic. vi. 8.

maintained ; but it was only their faith in a common God that maintained it. It was their common faith in Jahweh that held the tribes together, with every temptation to drift apart. How powerfully, then, must the sense of this God have been borne in upon their national consciousness by their great leader Moses ! But still more significant of the unique character of the God they worshipped is the other fact that, after the conquest of Canaan, Israel's religion was not obliterated or absorbed by the religions of the Canaanite peoples, from whose civilisation Israel learned so much. We know, alike from the book of Judges and from the prophets, something of the temptation to which Israel was continually exposed from the native religions, and before which she sometimes fell. But in the long run, it was her religion that triumphed, and theirs that perished ; and nothing but its inherent superiority, nothing but the unique character of Israel's national God, could have saved her religion from being absorbed by the others." Thus the arguments for the possibility of the Mosaic origin of the Decalogue, resting on a detailed examination of the various commandments, are raised to a practical certainty by a broad consideration of the early historical facts.

There is no adequate reason to doubt the tradition which connects the Decalogue with Moses. The fact that all the legislation of the Pentateuch—the Book of the Covenant, Deuteronomy and P—is referred to Moses, surely warrants the inference that some of it is his ; and nothing is so characteristic of the better spirit of the Old Testament as this delight in the ethical aspect of religion, which is the peculiar mark of the Decalogue. There may be a touch of irony, even of grim humour, in the association of the sixth commandment with the name of a man who began his public career by taking the life of another. But this very tale, set as a frontispiece to the story of his life, reveals

him from the beginning as the fiery champion of justice. His blow was dealt in the cause of the oppressed, and at a man who was violently “in the wrong.”¹ The sound of it is heard in the Decalogue, it rings through all the subsequent legislation; and the powerful hand that struck it was the hand of the man who left the mighty impress of his spirit upon the character and the religion of Israel.

JOHN E. McFADYEN.

“AS HAVING AUTHORITY.”

ON one or more Sabbath days at the beginning of the Galilean ministry our Lord taught in the synagogue of Capernaum, and the people were astonished at His teaching. They were, indeed, “increasingly astonished”; such is the cumulative force of the imperfect ἐξεπλήσσοντο (Mark i. 22, Luke iv. 32; cf. Matt. vii. 28). It may mean either that the individual surprise of each hearer grew as he listened, or that the aggregate wonder of the crowd increased as one group after another came within range of the teaching; each group which heard became in turn a group which marvelled. This amazement, says Luke, arose from the fact that Christ’s utterance was authoritative; ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ ἦν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ. Mark supplies a fuller and more explanatory comment: “He taught them as having authority, and not as the scribes.” The same sentence (with the change of “the scribes” to “their scribes”) occurs in Matthew’s epilogue to the Sermon on the Mount. “It came to pass,” so the R.V. renders the passage, “when Jesus ended these words, the multitudes were astonished at His teaching: for He taught them as (one) having authority, and not as their scribes.”

¹ Exod. ii. 13, קָרַע.

What is the meaning of these familiar words? The customary explanation affirms that "The contrast indicated between the teaching of Jesus and that of the scribes consisted in His speaking out of His own conviction of truth, while they cited the authority of others in support of their statements."¹ Again: "The Rabbis were accustomed to quote some authority for what they said. . . . Christ spoke on His own authority."² "The frequenters of the synagogue were chiefly struck by the Lord's tone of authority. There was no appeal to Rabbis greater or older than Himself, His message came direct from God."³ It is needless to multiply quotations; the view here indicated seems to be taken by every commentator. This unanimity increases the diffidence with which one ventures to suggest an alternative interpretation. Of course the statement of facts embodied in the usual explanation is accurate enough in itself. Beyond question, the teaching of the Rabbis was professedly derivative, the teaching of Christ had a unique independence. But, admitting this, the doubt remains whether the particular sentence employed by Mark and Matthew refers primarily to this truth. Do we here touch the real contrast described as rousing the crowd's astonishment? May it not be that, because He taught "with authority," Christ seemed, in the public view, to identify Himself with, rather than to differentiate Himself from, those authorised teachers the scribes? Was not the true source of the popular wonder that He used accustomed methods, yet gave such unaccustomed teaching?

Let us remind ourselves of the actual words. "He taught them as having authority, and not as the scribes." The weakness of the habitual explanation is surely this;

¹ Cary, *The Synoptic Gospels*, p. 68.

² Plummer's *St. Matthew*, on vii. 28.

³ Swete's *St. Mark*, on i. 22.

it implies that the scribes did *not* teach "with authority." That is true in the limited and modern sense mentioned above, which takes "authority" to mean "independence from precedent." But it would have seemed quite grotesquely untrue to the people in the synagogue of Capernaum whose feelings the evangelists depict. To them the scribe appeared the embodiment of authority; in their view, the scribes taught with unique authority, which had been formally granted for the express purpose. "Teaching," a term rather vaguely used among ourselves, signified for the Jews a definite thing done only by definitely accredited persons. No such authorisation was needed by the "preacher," who confined himself to *haggada*, who deduced moral lessons from the historical books of Scripture. But the teacher dealt with *halacha*, interpreted the Law, judged what actions were and what were not consistent with obedience to it. The fact that his decisions were necessarily based on precedent in no way detracted from his authority, but rather enhanced it. A judge of our own High Court is not free to decide a case without regard to precedent. He may be inclined to think that a judgment given in the past was wrong, yet, if it can be shown that the issue now before him is indistinguishable in principle from that leading case, his own judgment has to be shaped accordingly. Yet this does not lessen the authority with which he speaks; other people who know the precedent may think that it does or does not apply; the judge alone is authorised to decide the point. That is a rough analogy to the work of the scribe. In addition to the Law itself, he had before him a vast mass of commentaries, of previous decisions, of written and oral tradition. He alone could speak with authority upon some doubtful case where the bearing of the Law upon conduct seemed uncertain; he alone was the authorised judge of such questions. And

the scribes "were not satisfied with expounding the Law and tradition so as to meet actually occurring cases. They busied themselves in providing for all conceivable cases that might occur."¹ After protracted training they were solemnly appointed to their office. Whether the ceremony of ordaining them by laying-on of hands was in vogue during the time of Christ's earthly ministry, or was introduced at a later time, is uncertain; but "it is at least certain that, at the time of our Lord, no one would have ventured authoritatively to teach without proper Rabbinic authorisation."²

These facts are familiar enough, of course, to students of the New Testament. Yet it has seemed worth while to recall them in order to show how unconvincing is the usual explanation of "He taught as having authority, and not as the scribes." The scribes lacked many things, but authority as teachers was not one of them. We cannot better Westcott's definition of ἐξουσία: "It expresses not simply strength or might to do anything *de facto*, but, under the particular aspect, legitimate power *de jure*."³ And "legitimate power *de jure*" to teach the Law precisely describes the equipment of these Rabbis. If the verse ran "He taught as one unfettered by tradition, and thus not as the scribes," it would express a truth, but not the truth which Mark and Matthew had in mind. They do not say that our Lord's teaching showed independence, but ἐξουσία, a duly-conferred authority, the very opposite of independence. If, on the other hand, translating accurately, we expound the verse to mean: "He taught with the authority of a duly-commissioned teacher, and not as the scribes, who were not duly-commissioned teachers," we make its latter clause glaringly at variance with fact.

¹ Eaton, art. "Scribe," Hastings' *Dict. of Bib.*

² Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus*, ii. 382.

³ *Comm. on St. John's Gospel*, ii. 62.

Yet this rendering is almost necessary, if we are to accept the commentators' explanation.

So there seems room for an alternative suggestion.

Had we visited Capernaum or Jerusalem about the year 29 and asked of what calling was Jesus of Nazareth, we should have been told that He was a teacher. It is unfortunate that this fact should be obscured for the general public by the use in our English Bible of the ambiguous word “master,”¹ instead of “teacher,” as the rendering of διδάσκαλος. And the Fourth Gospel² intimates that διδάσκαλος is the Greek equivalent of Rabbi. They who followed our Lord were not merely His friends but His pupils, His “disciples.” “Teacher” seems to have been their habitual mode of addressing Him; it was no merely ceremonial form of speech, but the word which came instinctively to their lips even at times of acute emotion.³ It was a title conceded to Him by His opponents. Before all else, then, He figured in the public view as a teacher.

Mark gives no details of the teaching in the Capernaum synagogue, but, as he describes its effect upon the hearers in the same words as Matthew uses in epitomising the feeling caused by the Sermon on the Mount, it is a legitimate inference that the two discourses were similar in character. Or, if we believe Matthew's form of the Sermon to be a collection of sayings uttered on different occasions, the identity of comment suggests that a part at least of these sayings were spoken in the synagogue of Capernaum. Let us try to realise the feelings of a Jew who formed

¹ Ambiguous, because it denotes the relationship of employer to employed, as well as that of teacher to pupil.

² John i. 38.

³ “Teacher, carest Thou not that we perish?” in the storm on the lake. Cf. Mary Magdalene's “Rabboni!” at the moment of disclosure on the Resurrection morning.

part of the audience when such teaching was given. His first impression, as he drew near, would be that here was a scribe at work. The Master was seated—the characteristic teaching posture of the scribes—with His disciples at His feet; beyond them was the ring of casual hearers, continually growing. His belief that here was a scribe giving instruction would be strengthened as he drew close enough to hear some phrases of the doctrine. Yes, it was about fasting, and almsgiving, and what was permissible on the Sabbath; matters, all of them, governed by *halacha*, topics about which none but a properly commissioned scribe would dream of teaching. Such, then, must the speaker be; no mere *haggadist*, but an authorised exponent of the Law, one who spoke “with authority.” So the new-comer would settle himself to listen . . . but after a sentence or two his face would show surprise; then he would look extremely bewildered; by the time the close was reached he would be positively amazed; he would have passed through each stage of that “increasing astonishment” which the evangelists so accurately note. On the one hand, this Master seemed to be a scribe, his themes were those which none but those “having authority” were permitted to handle; His sentences were often Rabbinic in form, His illustrations often those which were common in Rabbinic discourses. On the other hand, as became increasingly evident, the whole spirit of His doctrine was dissimilar to that of the scribes; His attitude towards tradition, His view of the relative importance of act and motive, the ethical content of His message—all these were not merely startlingly novel, but in flat contradiction of all that the scribes taught. The form and themes of His address were Rabbinic; its spirit was anti-Rabbinic. Therefore it was that the hearers were increasingly astonished, for “He taught them as one having

authority, yet not as the scribes.” In other words, “He taught like an authorised scribe, yet His teaching differed fundamentally from that of the scribes.”

It may be felt that this interpretation demands a “but” or “yet” between the two clauses of the sentence, in place of “and.” This use of *καί* may be found elsewhere, however, as in Matthew xxiii. 3 : λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσι : “They say and (= yet) do not.”

If this can be accepted as the true meaning of the passage, it seems to lend additional significance to the challenge which the chief priests and scribes brought during the last week of Christ’s ministry. They come to Him while He was walking in the Temple, according to Matthew ; in the account of Mark and Luke they interrupt Him while teaching there. They propound the question : “By what kind of authority¹ doest Thou these things ? Or, who gave Thee this authority ?” By His cleansing of the Temple He had infringed the rights of the chief priests ; by His “teaching with authority” He had trespassed on the prerogative of the scribes. Their hatred of Him did not spring, as some commentators imply, from mere jealousy. In their view it was doubly justified. Not only had Christ explicitly attacked them, but He had done so while usurping, without credentials, their carefully guarded functions. The fact that, while denouncing authorised teaching, He had posed as an authorised teacher was, they thought, one reason of His success with the gullible public. That influence would receive an irrecoverable blow if the people could be shown that He had no real credentials. Therefore “show us Thy Rabbinic commission” was, in effect, their challenge. Our Lord replied by a counter-challenge concerning the Baptist’s mission. John had borne witness of Christ ; they could not accept the one and reject the other.

¹ ἐν πολλῇ ἐξουσίᾳ : thus in all the Synoptists.

Conceivably the scribes might have retorted that John was merely a *haggadist*, a teacher of morals, and had not presumed to pose as a *halachist*; but they were afraid to say a word that might seem to disparage the Baptist, "for all men counted John a prophet."

And if we ask why our Lord allowed Himself to be identified in the public view with the scribes, even though it were only in a secondary way, the answer seems clear. Considering the form of His message, it was extraordinarily important, as well as extraordinarily difficult, to convince people that He was come not to destroy the Law, but to fill it full of new significance. The Sermon on the Mount, for example, might have been misconstrued as an attempt to discredit the Law, whereas it was not the Law but legalism which Christ attacked. That He should be recognised as one definitely equipped to expound the Law was a step which lessened the risk of such misunderstanding, while the claim which it made was justified in the deepest of all ways. So He came before men as an authorised Teacher of the Law, not as an external critic of it; so He taught the people "as having authority, yet not as the scribes."

ANTHONY C. DEANE.

*A PERSONAL REFERENCE TO ST. PAUL IN THE
FOURTH GOSPEL.*

JOHN iii. 32 ff. is a passage of well-known difficulty. "What he hath seen and heard, of that he beareth witness; and no man receiveth his witness. He that hath received his witness hath set his seal to *this*, that God is true. For he whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God: for he giveth not the Spirit by measure. The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand" (R.V.).

Westcott's comment upon it has increased the difficulty: "Christ speaks the words of God, for God giveth not the Spirit by measure, only in a definite degree, to all, but He gives it completely." "The proof of God's truth is found in the absolute fulness of Christ's spiritual endowment." "Completely" was a favourite term of Westcott. Elsewhere he wrote: "As a Revelation the incidents preserved in our Gospels are complete: as a history they are most imperfect." He has increased the difficulty of the passage by this term "completely," because it introduces the idea of a standard according to which this or that is complete. What is this standard? Bishop Gore, expounding and commending Westcott, said: "Every Christian must admit first of all that his ideas of the Being of God, though they are revealed ideas, are symbolic and inadequate. No one could say that more forcibly than St. Paul (*in a mirror, in a riddle*). And the Fathers are always saying it." But St. Paul and the Fathers had the witness of the Resurrection. How then "as a revelation" are "the incidents preserved in our gospels *complete*"? Bishop Gore's "inadequate" makes havoc of Westcott's "complete." For none will maintain that the Resurrection is not designed to reveal the Being of God. But Westcott himself has refuted the idea

of the Resurrection as a Revelation being complete. For he says : " The thought of the Resurrection as a mere outward fact is swallowed up in the thought of the Ascension, which is its spiritual interpretation." Yet he himself interprets the Resurrection as an outward fact. And if a " mere outward " fact is a onesided material outward view, which an inward spiritual interpretation would " absorb," it is astonishing to find that Westcott has to seek this in another outward fact, a " physical elevation " in the Ascension (*Revelation of the Risen Lord*, pp. 24, 180, etc.).

" Completely " is a most equivocal and perplexing term, introducing metaphysics into St. John without necessity. And Westcott did not decide whether the Spirit is given to all completely by God or by Christ (" Messiah "—" as Cyril takes it "—" which has much to recommend it.") However, he agrees that the whole passage of six verses is delivered by the evangelist and is not put into the mouth of the Baptist. In regard to this in the previous paragraph (iii. 16–21) and the Appendix to the Gospel (xxi.), Westcott ventured on the ground of the Higher Criticism, and perhaps here alone. Had he ventured rather more he would have allowed himself to taste more of the writer's atmosphere in 100 A.D., which differed so entirely from that of 30. During that interval the prophetic interpretation of the Scriptures of the Old Testament had grown and abounded. And in this fact is to be found the clue to the passage.

To what did St. John look back ? He looked back to the great overthrow of 70 A.D., a mighty catastrophe which no Jew could deny that Jesus had foretold and suffered death for foretelling. He looked back to the two Gospels of Luke and Matthew since that event, and to the Gospel of Mark which (as perhaps he knew) preceded it, and above all to the writings of St. Paul. All these Gospels and Epistles were, he knew well, based upon the Greek Bible (LXX) :

they interpreted it; they embodied hundreds of quotations from it, and thousands of expressions of it: they were built, or rather they grew, out of its very fibres. In the passage before us he has termed these expressions or interpretations or oracles and their meanings *words of God* (ῥήματα). There were no words of God outside the Bible. Christ delivers them, while He “teaches with authority, and not as do the scribes,” for He elicits their Messianic meaning, their “spirit which giveth life.”

But this is the real difficulty. What and where is this spirit? Is it a *meaning* latent and discoverable in the words of Scripture? For instance, is the meaning of Psalm xxii. solely that of the Crucifixion, so that for the Psalmist who was not crucified it meant nothing? Yet, if it had two meanings, how are they related to each other? Or, on the other hand, is it a *faculty* in Christ who “elicits the meaning”? The evangelist answers with no uncertain voice—though he is indifferent (unless Westcott was wrong) whether his reader takes it to be the voice of the Baptist or his—that it is a faculty in God’s Apostle (ἀπέστειλεν), to whom God imparts it unstintingly and inexhaustibly. He does not dole it out in doses from a standard bottle, or cut it in lengths by the yard-measure; but He gives lavishly of His own faculty in shaping the words which the Son reissues from the eternal mint.

We yield all blessing to the name
Of Him that made them current coin.

Thus does the evangelist answer the Jews of his own time—and those of 29 A.D. were like them—when they pointed to the Scriptures, which they interpreted in the traditional and conventional fashion, leaving no room for Christ to fulfil them with a new actual and overwhelming meaning in obedience to His divine duty. St. John assumes that it will be seen in his Gospel how incessantly Jesus is quoting

and applying and embodying Isaiah and other scriptures. We have hitherto failed to see it, because of the extreme simplicity of the terms and language employed by St. John, and because we have not read Isaiah in LXX. When Clement of Alexandria spoke of the Fourth as the "spiritual Gospel" he was actually correct, though not in the sense that he intended.

And here the words *He that received the witness of Jesus* . . . both receive and throw light upon the position of the writer. Westcott says: "The reference appears to be directly historic, going back to the time when the disciples were first gathered round the Lord." Certainly, historic, and let us omit with him the *hath* before *received*: but may we not go back to Saul rather than "the disciples," who^a at this time were four, so far as St. John has told us? If we do justice to the aorist tenses (*received, sealed*), they seem to indicate St. Paul, whose doctrine John has here developed. [The fact has been set forth by Professor Bacon that St. John represents the developed Pauline doctrine, and it constitutes one of the chief advances in modern theology.] St. Paul received it not only by his "spiritual experience," but by the careful study of scripture for those three years in Arabia which were productive of more of the Argument from Prophecy than even his Epistles shew to us. He found the witness of Jesus (i.e., to Jesus) in countless oracles of the Greek Bible which pointed to Him.

But the witness of Jesus (i.e., to and by Him) included teaching. Saul had asked, and the Jews in 100 A.D. continued to ask, How did this teaching agree with the Bible? The question must inevitably have been put a thousand times. And how, in the language of the contemporary Ignatius, were Christians to be "filtered free" of Judaism which interpreted the Bible one way and they another? Not by metaphysical reasonings on the nature of God, and

the relations of the Father to the Son. The true test was in Scripture itself. What relation did Jesus bear to it? That was the question for those who lived in 100 A.D. as for those who had heard the witness.

Here in 100 was a whole new literature sprung up—the “New Testament,” not yet known by that name. It contained the words of Jesus. Were these the words of God? How were they related to the Old, which they seemed often to subvert? *Ye have heard how it was said . . . but I say unto you. . .* How could a Jew reconcile these words with those of Moses? John iii. 32 provides the answer—The witness of Jesus is the revelation of vision, “that which He hath heard and seen—He that is from heaven, the Coming One.” And His vision is based, as always, upon scripture. Therefore, he that received (as St. Paul did) the witness, set his signature (as St. Paul did—“with my own hand”) to the great fact that God is true (“Let God be [proved] true,” Rom. iii. 4): because he saw that the Father of the Son is the author of scripture. The same truth is declared from another point of view in Revelation xix. 10: “The witness of Jesus (recorded in the New Testament) is the spirit of prophecy” (the true meaning of the Old Testament). Hence the Seer is bidden by his fellow-prophet to “worship God” only, for the New Testament would fail of its purpose if it impaired the sovereignty of God. That sovereignty is both reserved and guaranteed by the Father in having submitted all things to the Son, including the interpretation of scripture.¹

Thus again “spirit” can only be the interpretation of scripture. To limit St. John to a purely metaphysical pre-

¹ John iii. 35, “given all things in his hand” is a Hebraism, *in* for *into*, found occasionally in LXX. (Jer. xxxii. v. 3; Ezek. xxv. 14, xxx. 12) But St. John knew also that “hand” was “spirit”: he therefore suggests *in* (giving) *his spirit*.

sentation of the Christ is false. Westcott's comment, given above, all depends upon the meaning of "spiritual": it is scriptural, whatever else is included in its meaning. One after another, the passages in which the term "spiritual" occurs become illuminated as soon as we substitute "scriptural" for it. The same is true of "spirit" if by "scripture" we understand the breath or inspiration which proves Jesus the Christ. This theme is far too large to develop in a single paper. The part is not the whole, but the Greek proverb wisely said, "Babes, not to know the half is more than all."

But we may here observe that when St. John wrote, "He *giveth* not the Spirit by *measure*" he had read Ephesians iv. 3-13, a passage which contains the three terms *giving* (thrice), *spirit* (twice), *measure* (thrice). *The one spirit* is that faculty of interpreting scripture which so many various minds were exerting to search Christ out of the Greek Bible. The cost of exerting it was also manifold—jealousies, rivalries misgivings, suspicions, self-satisfaction, self-sufficiency, self-dissatisfaction, self-insufficiency. How could these builders of the new church ever agree? How could this crew of scripture-investigators pull together? The question could only be solved if the Apostle lifted it continually to a higher plane. "Ye must be born from above."

There were two main difficulties. First, the supply of the spirit¹ must be maintained in its fulness while directed in the channels of love. Secondly, this infinite supply must be employed with a consciousness of individual finitude. It cannot surprise us if there is confusion between faculty and process, both being termed *spirit*, in this impassioned appeal,

¹ We must certainly understand *of the spirit* after *supply* in Ephesians iv. 16 (see Gal. iii. 5; Phil. i. 19; Col. ii. 19). Lightfoot is most disappointingly vague in saying "of nutriment, etc.": he has never investigated the meaning of *spirit*, which has rendered more texts difficult than any single term in the New Testament.

where the metaphors of building, of weather, and of the human organism are involved together.

The Apostle desired each reader to become a full-grown man (τέλειον). Yet full growth is a measure relative to the individual, whereas the essence of a standard measure is to be common to all. Consequently his expression is a paradox—one inherent in the question. Christ was the full-grown Man, the Adam, the Son of Man : He attained His full stature and so set our standard measure, to which we are to attain, though each can only attain it in his own relative fulness. Thus he makes increase *unto* Christ, *from* whom meanwhile his growth took its origin and his faculty draws its supply.

And yet again, each part of the building, each living stone, has its effect (κατ' ἐνέργειαν, Eph. iv. 16), and this is *in measure*, metrical, proportional. But the use of the term *measure* here is not quite what it was before—"the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ": for there it was open on one side towards infinity, it was employed for a paradox : here it is open towards other men, with whom it was only too likely that comparisons would breed jealousy—

Wishing me like to one more rich in hope. . . .

Desiring this man's art and that man's scope.

Here is the danger of individual insufficiency. St. Paul himself had seen already the danger of individual self-sufficiency and corrected it in 1 Corinthians xii. 14-27, "But ye are the body of Christ and members each in his part" (ἐκ μέρους).

In other words : since each member has his effect, which is in measure, each has his own measure. This statement, however, needed safeguards. St. John safeguards it by saying, "God giveth not the spirit by measure" : i.e., though each one may think himself limited in the interpretation of scripture, the field is not limited, the faculty bestowed

upon the Church is not limited, the manifold order built upon this foundation is not limited, because the foundation is He whom God sent, who speaketh the words of God, with a faculty that is not limited. Trust upon Him, and thou shalt attain to the measure of His fulness ! The insufficiency and the over-sufficiency of the individual find their complement in the sufficiency of Christ (*πληρώματος*). The Messianic meaning of the Bible can rise no higher and ought to sink no lower than "the testimony of Jesus, the spirit of prophecy." He whom God sent delivers the actual words of God, who pours out the spirit not according to man's measure but His own.

But St. Paul had safeguarded himself before : "They measuring themselves by themselves do not understand" the infinite measuring-rod of God, "the measure of the ruler wherewith God imparted to us" (2 Cor. x. 13, *τὸ μέτρον τοῦ κανόνος οὗ ἐμέρισεν ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς μέτρον*—where *μέτρον* adds nothing : *οὗ* is simply for *τούτου ᾧ* as usual). And St. John, thinking of Saul, says the same : the Christ had from the Father an infinite measure of the power to interpret the oracles. This justifies the fact that He reissues the words of Isaiah, fulfilling them and so making them His own.

E. C. SELWYN.

A STUDY OF 1 PETER III. 19 ff.

I HAVE read with keen interest the valuable paper on this subject in your April number by the Archbishop of Dublin, and I should be glad to be permitted to make a few comments on it, especially in view of my own small and elementary effort to elucidate the passage in one of my books.

1. There seems to be no doubt that the general theme of the passage is the acceptableness to God of wrongful suffering and the certainty that such suffering will be followed by reward and glory. Whatever else is in the passage, this is the dominant thought, as verse twenty-two clearly shows.

2. But as there is an obvious antithesis between "flesh" and "spirit" in regard to our Lord, is there not an equally definite antithesis between "put to death" and "quickened"? The reference in "put to death in the flesh" is obviously to His Death. But can *ζωοποιηθεὶς*, "made alive," refer to anything else than the Resurrection? Is the Greek term capable of being interpreted of some spiritual quickening between the Death and the Resurrection? We know that His human spirit was never dead, and so could not be literally "made alive," but may we not associate the passage with Romans, i. 3, 4? Our Lord received by the Resurrection a spiritual Body, and with it an access of spiritual power. While already Son of God before the Resurrection, He was thereby "designated Son of God with power" (*ἐν δυνάμει*), that is, with the gift of power, to exercise it and bestow upon others.

3. If, therefore, the phrase "made alive in the spirit" refers to the Resurrection, then the preaching, whatever it was, occurred after the Resurrection, for evidently the

preaching was subsequent to the quickening. It is this apparent contrast between Death and Resurrection, and then the preaching which followed that seems to me the most natural interpretation of the passage in the light of the context, for thus our Lord's sufferings are shown to be followed by renewed activity and blessing.

4. With regard to the meaning of the preaching after the Resurrection, would it be possible to interpret it of a proclamation by our Lord some time during the forty days by announcing to the invisible world His victory? It has been fairly urged that the condition of our Lord belonged to His state of humiliation until the morning of His Resurrection (Acts ii. 24) and that only after His victorious rising from the dead did He become possessed of the keys of Death and of Hades (Rev. i. 18). On this view we should understand that He descended again and again during the forty days, according to Ephesians iv. 8-10, into the lower parts of the earth and demonstrated before the unseen world that He had completely set at nought the one who had hitherto held sway over the kingdom of death and darkness.

5. Another view favoured by some able writers is that the preaching was a proclamation by our Lord through His Apostle to those who were in the prison house of sin (Isa. xlii. 5-7; xlix. 8, 9; lxi. 1). Of this sinful race the people of the time of Noah were examples. This interpretation has the great advantage of accounting for the reference to Noah. The result of his preaching was only eight souls saved, while the preaching of our Lord in the spiritual quickening following His Resurrection resulted in the marvellous success of three thousand souls in one day. On this view there is a "suppressed apodosis" which makes "the passage intelligible and points the contrast." If it should be thought that "spirits in prison"

cannot fairly refer to the human race in the prison house of sin, it may be pointed out that the LXX of Isaiah xlii. 7, where the reference is undoubtedly to sin, has the exact Greek word, *φυλακή*, of this passage. This interpretation will be found fully discussed in *Expository Discourses on 1 Peter* by Dr. John Brown and a valuable article by Dr. R. G. Balfour (*Expository Times*, vii. 356) summarises and re-states it with great force.

6. My difficulty in regard to the Archbishop's view that the passage refers to the spiritual blessing associated with baptism is the absence of this from the context, and in spite of what Dr. Bernard urges, I cannot at present see what point there would be on this view in telling those Christians to endure suffering.

7. The Archbishop's interpretation of *ἀντίτυπον* is most suggestive and truly satisfying.

8. But I have often wondered whether we might not render *ἐπερώτημα* by "decision." I know that there is not much etymological warrant for it, but in view of the manifest difficulty of "answer" or "interrogation," I have thought that the word may have been intended to express the *surrender* of the soul as it accepts God's salvation.

9. The section in iv. 1-6 seems to be a further explanation and encouragement to endure patiently for Christ's sake, and for this purpose the Apostle introduces a reference to others who had suffered like them. Here, again, the context calls for a strict limitation of the interpretation to that which would carry the practical lesson intended. And if so, does it not mean that "the dead" were dead when the Epistle was written, but not dead when the Gospel was preached to them? They had fallen under human tribunals, because of their testimony to Christ, but the Apostle shows that they were not failures, since God's purposes were accomplished in them. They were not lost

and destroyed, but were still living to God. It is certainly interesting to notice the parallels here with iii. 18 :—

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Flesh.} \\ \text{Spirit.} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Christ put to death} \\ \text{in the flesh.} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Christ quickened in} \\ \text{spirit.} \end{array} \right\}$
	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Christians judged in} \\ \text{the flesh.} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Christians live in} \\ \text{spirit.} \end{array} \right\}$

I do not for a moment pretend to solve every difficulty, but I desire, as far as possible, to adhere strictly to the context and to avoid the introduction of extraneous topics. Thus, any suggestion of the preaching involving probation after Death is difficult to understand in the light of all the rest of the passages in the New Testament, which point the other way. Further, it is difficult to understand why this second offer should be limited to those antediluvian sinners, for it is surely impossible to argue by inference from these to others.

10. The personal application to Christians is the main and most important thought. They are to be like their Master in suffering, in consequent blessing and in resulting glory. As His suffering, so far from putting an end to His influence, really enhanced His power, so shall it be with His followers. Those who suffer on behalf of Christ will find their suffering fruitful in blessings to others and glory to God.

11. This interpretation is, of course, based upon the one, and, as I think, dominant thought that “made alive in the spirit” refers to the Resurrection and that this necessarily involves a preaching subsequent to that event.

W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS.

JEWISH COINS AND MESSIANIC TRADITIONS.

THE types presented by the Jewish coins have exercised hitherto the minds of numismatists, and have not yet found, as it seems, a satisfactory explanation. There is not even complete agreement as to what these types represent, and still less has any explanation been offered which should solve the problem of their choice. The types which I have in view are those found on coins ascribed to Simon the Maccabean, which are also believed to have been the first Jewish coins ever struck. It is still doubtful whether there are really coins struck by the Maccabean Prince of the year 138 B.C., or whether they are coins of Bar Kochba, also named Simon, and belonging to the first half of the second century A.D. I have re-examined the whole problem in the light of certain traditions which, as far as I am aware, have hitherto been entirely overlooked, in relation with this set of types and symbols on the coins with which they have not yet been connected by any one.

It may lead to a more satisfactory result, and, moreover, will lead to a series of investigations of no mean purpose. I am dealing with those coins, as already mentioned before, which, according to Madden and finally Reinach, are commonly ascribed to Simon the Maccabean. It is, however, as already remarked, a moot point among the numismatists whether Simon, whose name appeared in the Legend, was the Maccabean, or whether it was Simon Bar Kochba. There is, however, close similarity between the two sets of coins, even considering them from a palaeographic point

of view. There is no perceptible difference between the letters on those coins, though they are separated from one another by close upon 270 years.

Let us turn now to the types on these coins. These consist on the one side of a stem with three buds (flowers), and on the other a beaded (two-handed) vase or chalice. The opinion of most scholars gravitates to the conclusion that these two represent the budding and flowering rod of Aaron, and the pot or flask of manna. The explanation for the choice of these types is that they represent the Aaronite descent of the ruler who, for the first time had obtained the right of issuing coins of their own. On closer examination this explanation is far from satisfactory. If the reason was to emphasise thereby the priestly origin of Simon, one could understand an emphatic declaration. If the point involved was merely that stress should be laid on the fact that Simon had obtained the High Priesthood pure and simple, such a type might have been selected as the outward symbol of his lawful fitness for the post.

But here it was more the question of his independence as a ruler who had freed the people from the last trace of Greek tutelage. It was to be the symbol of complete freedom. How then is this to be reconciled with the Rod of Aaron and the Flask or Pot of Manna? Surely other types would have been selected more easily recognised by the people, not apparently meaningless symbols like these. And if it was a question of mere ornamental substitutions for the effigies of the rulers of heathen states found on these coins, surely other types could have been found, as was in fact the case on later coins.

Assuming still that the Aaronite origin was to be expressed by these types, it must strike one as very incongruous that of all the vessels of the Temple and the vestments of the

priests, just those should have been selected which of all others had entirely disappeared in the destruction of the Solomonic Temple, and had never been recovered. Why was a symbol chosen of things not seen for generations, and which may have lived only as shadowy memories in the minds of the people? It would have been more appropriate if stress was to have been laid on the Aaronite descent, if, for example, such a conspicuous vestment as the breastplate would have been chosen with the mystical precious stones, or the mitre, or any other emblem seen by the multitude and worn by the High Priest in the sight of the assembly, e.g., on the Day of Atonement and other occasions of public and religious rejoicing. It would have brought home to the people also the fact that they now enjoyed absolute freedom in the performances of such duties and ceremonies. A different reason must therefore be found for the selection of those two types in the first place. It is assumed that they represent respectively the flowering rod of Aaron, or the pot or flask of manna. I fully agree with this. No other satisfactory explanation has hitherto been advanced. Even the later developments, of which more anon, strengthen this interpretation. For the vase or cup of manna has been retained on other coins, and in lieu of the flowering rod another flowering emblem has sometimes been substituted, which has been taken to be a palm leaf.

Not much doubt can therefore be entertained that these types represent indeed the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron. But the meaning attached to these emblems has nothing whatever to do with the Aaronite descent. To the people these emblems conveyed a totally different impression.

It is therefore advisable to inquire into the legends and beliefs which have clustered round these two objects. It will be found that they have been treated with exceptional

veneration. An importance had been assigned to them which by far transcends any of the other objects mentioned in the Bible, and even far above the more important vessels of the temple, such as the candlestick, the golden altar on the table for the shewbread. A cycle of legends has been woven round the pot of manna, to a certain extent also round the budding and flowering rod of Aaron as it is described in contradistinction to the rod of Moses. Both are the result of a special act of creation. Among the ten things created on the close of the sixth day are the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron, and joined with them also the Tables of the Law. So in the "Chapters of the Fathers" v. 1, and in other works to be mentioned presently. (The variation in the chapter of Rabbi Eleazer, according to which their creation took place on the second day, is due, no doubt, to a copyist's error, as Lurya has shown in his commentary on that passage.) Not only do the manna and the rod of Aaron date from the beginning of the creation, but according to legend they will persist through the ages. A special place of honour was assigned to them. They were placed beside, or even inside the Ark in which the Tables of the Law were kept in the Holy of Holies, and a peculiar tradition is found in "Hebrews" ix. 4. It is worth while setting down here the whole verse :

"Having a golden censer and the Ark of the Covenant overlaid roundabout with gold wherein was a golden pot holding the manna and Aaron's rod that budded, and the Tables of the Covenant."

It is clear that, according to this statement, the golden pot of manna and the budding rod of Aaron were in the Ark together with the Tables of the Covenant.

They were considered of special importance. It may be noticed that the Jewish tradition (*v.* below) does not know of a *golden* pot. On the contrary, the opinion is

repeatedly expressed that the pot was of *earthenware*, a substance which kept the manna cool. (This explanation rests, however, on an etymological explanation of the צִנְנֹת, the Hebrew word used in the text for the receptacle in which the manna was to be kept. That word was derived from the new Hebrew root צָנַן, to cool, and thus the pot became one of earthenware. Another reason assigned for the choice of earthenware was that it was designed to keep the manna fresh for generations. From the transaction of Jeremiah (ch. xxxii. 14) it was known that the best vessel used for the purpose of preserving even the frail documents was a pot of earthenware. Hence the choice of such a substance for the pot of manna. Or in the light of the passage in Hebrews in which the pot is described as being golden, is there perhaps a polemical tendency? In any case the tradition is unanimous that the pot of manna and the rod were kept close either to the Ark according to Exodus xvi. 33 and Numbers xvii. 25, M.T., A.V. xvii. 10, or even inside the Ark (Heb. ix. 7) in the Holy of Holies of the Temple.

It is important to follow up now further the other and numerous traditions which have gathered round the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron as far as they have been preserved in the Jewish literature. There is, in the first place, the very explicit statement in the Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim vi. 1, folio 49c, that King Josiah, when he heard the High Priest read to him the chapter in Deuteronomy in which it is said that "The Lord shall bring thee and thy king which thou shalt set over thee unto a nation which thou hast not known, thou nor thy fathers" (Deut. xxviii. 36). He said now that the Levites had learned to rest, they would not be willing afterwards to carry the Ark on their shoulders, and he therefore took the Ark with its Tables, together with the pot of manna and

the rod of Aaron, and hid them in one of the caves of the Temple. The same legend is repeated many times in the Talmud. We find it in the Babylonian Talmud, Tr. Yoma 52B; so also in Tr. Horayoth 12a; Tosefta, ed. Zuckermann, p. 318, Sota ch. xiii., also Jeru. Sota viii. 3 f. 22c. To these parallels in the Talmud and later on in the Midrashic literature, as will be seen, some other details have been added. No less significant is the appearance of this legend of the hiding of the vessels in the ancient Midrash, Mechilta to Exodus xvi. 32, ed. Friedmann, folio 51b, and Yalkut Shimeoni, *ad loc.*, where other elements have been added to which we shall have to refer later on. And then with many variations the legend again occurs in the Tana debe Eliyahu towards the end of chapter xxv., and even in as late a compilation as Bahya's Commentary to the Pentateuch *ad loc.* It is now a remarkable feature that Jeremiah is not connected in any way directly with the hiding of these vessels throughout the whole of the Jewish literature. On the contrary, he is brought into connexion in a different manner with the pot of manna. That pot has been kept, according to the Biblical words, to be a sign, and the time came when, as it is told, Jeremiah rebuked the people for their neglect of reading the law. And to this the people replied, "If we should give our time to the study of the law, who will feed us?" Then Jeremiah produced the pot of manna from the Temple, and holding it up to the people he said, "Here you have the bread on which your fathers have been fed for forty years in the wilderness, and he who fed them for so long will be sure to feed you too." There is now another set of writings, in which also the hiding of the sacred vessels is told. It occurs first in 11 Maccabees ch. ii. 4-8:—

(4) "It was also contained in the same writing, that the prophet, being warned of God, commanded the tabernacle

and the ark to go with him as he went forth into the mountain, where Moses climbed up, and saw the heritage of God."

(5) "And when Jeremy came thither, he found an hollow cave, wherein he laid the tabernacle, and the ark, and the altar of incense."

We find it afterwards in the Apocalypse of Baruch, ed. Charles, ch. vi. vv. 7, 8, more fully developed. It runs as follows:—

(7) "And I saw him (the angel) descend into the Holy of Holies and take from thence the veil, and the holy ephod, and the mercy seat, and the two tables, and the holy raiment of the priests, and the altar of incense, and the forty-eight precious stones, wherewith the priest was adorned, and all the holy vessels of the tabernacle."

(8) "And he spake to the earth with a loud voice, "Earth, earth, earth, hear the word of the mighty God and receive what I commit to thee, and guard them until the last times, so that when thou art ordered thou mayest restore them, so that strangers may not get possession of them."

It will be noticed that the prophet Jeremiah is no longer mentioned. His place is taken by an angel, the vessels are not in a cave in the mountain, but somewhere in a place in the earth not clearly described, as they had to be kept "until the last times."

In the *Paraleipomena*, or the rest of the words of Baruch, ed. J. R. Harris, chapter iii., we have again the same legend, but here it is Jeremiah who takes not all the holy vessels, but more, in conformity with 2 Maccabees, the tabernacle (the ark?), and the altar of incense, but none of the other vessels are there mentioned. In the other versions to that text to which I have drawn attention as far back as 1881 in my *Studies on the Legend of Hori, the Maker of Circles* (*Monatschrift für Gesch. u. Wiss. d. Judent.*, 1881-82, p. 139 f., sep. ed., p. 79 f., and esp. p. 83). The objects

hidden by Jeremiah were the ark, the altar of incense, the table and the candlestick. I have discussed in those Studies the connexion of this legend with the Jewish and other parallels, and I have given the Jewish sources for the Paraleipomena. Harris, Charles, as well as Rothstein in Kautzsch's *Pseudepigraphen*, have entirely ignored these researches. Had they taken notice of them they might perhaps have come to different conclusions. This by the way. I have shown there that this legend is found also in the Greek Chronicle of Dorotheos of Monembazia, a late Greek writer (ed. Venice, pp. 102–109), and in my history of the Roumanian popular literature, Bucharest, 1883, pp. 340 f., attention has also been drawn to the old Slavonic versions published by Tikonravov (*Pamyatniki*, etc.), vol. i. pp. 273–298, as well as to the Greek text in Menaëa, and the Roumanian *Vitae Sanctorum* of 1682 from old MSS. of the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Moreover, I have found the very same story embodied in a Roumanian chronograph, written about 1636, which, as well as the Roumanian *Vitae Sanct.*, rests directly on Greek sources. In all these the number of vessels hidden by Jeremiah is precisely the same as in the Paraleipomena. This seems to be the most correct version of the passage in question. Here, then, we have a second tradition about the hiding of the sacred vessels, which, however, presupposed the existence of the other mentioned in Jewish literature. If the vessels hidden by Jeremiah in the Apocryphal literature are carefully examined it will be found that the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron are not mentioned among those which were hidden by him. The authors of these later writings must have been aware of the older legend that those two things and possibly also the Ark had been hidden long before by King Josiah, that they had practically disappeared long before the destruction of the

temple, that Jeremiah only took those vessels which had remained inside up to the time of the storming of the town by the Babylonian hosts. Moreover, the vessels hidden by Jeremiah were afterwards more or less replaced by other similar vessels made after the return, when the temple was rebuilt. But the manna and the rod of Aaron and possibly the Ark could not be replaced, and, according to Josephus' (*Wars*, v. 5, 5, 219), the place in the Holy of Holies in the Temple of Herod was empty, and no doubt it was also empty before. The Jewish tradition had persisted down to a very late date that the Ark, and with it, no doubt, the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron, were lying somewhere within the precincts of the temple and not in a cave in a mountain as in 2 Maccabees, and not in any place in the earth outside the temple, and possibly outside of Jerusalem (*Apocalypse of Baruch* and *Paraleipomena*), but they were lying inside the temple. This Jewish tradition is found in the *Jer. Tal. Shekalim*, chapter vi. It is said that the place where these vessels were hidden was somewhere under the floor of the cell in which the wood was kept for the altar. Once upon a time, we are told, a priest who, through a blemish, could not take part in the service, was chopping wood in that place, when he noticed that one of the flagstones in the floor seemed different from the rest. So he went and told his friends what he had seen. No sooner had he mentioned the fact than he dropped down dead, and they all understood that that stone was covering the entrance to the hiding place. Another version tells that he was sitting there, and whilst chopping the wood and examining it that it should be free of worms, the axe dropped and struck a stone on the floor. Instantly fire came out and burned him, and thus they understood that he must have struck the entrance to the hiding place of the sacred vessels (*Jeru. Shekalim*, vi. 1. *B. Joma*

54a). Whatever the date of the 2nd Book of Maccabees or the Books of Baruch may be, this legend must be older than that date, as otherwise they could not very well have omitted to mention that Jeremiah hid also the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron. The author of "Hebrews" ix. 4 knew that these had been in the temple, and if not for the legend of Josiah, there is no reason why Jeremiah should not have been credited with hiding these two when he was hiding all the other vessels of the temple carefully enumerated, especially in Paraleipomena. Now, if that be the case, and it cannot be easily gainsaid, the more surprising is then the fact that those who struck the Jewish coins should have taken for types objects which in popular belief had disappeared ever since the time of Josiah, and had never since been restored. Such must have been the belief of the people in the time of the Maccabean period. Why then were just those two objects selected which no doubt were meant to have a symbolical meaning, the significance of which must have been known to the people? Why just pick out the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron? The legends clustering round these two have, however, not yet been exhausted.

It is quite in the spirit of the Midrash and of religious legends to assume that an object created by God and ordered by Him to be placed in the Holy of Holies was not to be destroyed and could not disappear entirely. They were to remain as a token for generations, and therefore a time must come when they will reappear. In fact they became Messianic symbols. We find this then in the above-mentioned passages in the Mechilta completely reproduced in the Yalkut Shimeoni, and found also in the Tanhuma *ad loc.*, that the pot of manna was to be preserved for the time of the Messiah. The pot of manna was one of the three objects which the prophet Elijah is to bring to the

people at the time of the Messiah, and this would form the outward symbol of the advent of the Messiah, nay, the symbol of the Messiah himself, for he who would bring back the manna and the rod of Aaron would thereby show that he was the true Messiah. The other objects were the flask with the oil of anointment, and according to some versions also the flask for the water of purification. Here, then, we have a very definite and clear interpretation of the types used on these coins. We find also in Midrash Koheleth 101.9, where it is stated emphatically that "just as the first Redeemer (Moses) had been, so also will be the second redeemer, the Messiah; the former brought down the manna from Heaven, so the second would bring down the manna," which is to be understood he will produce the pot of manna as a sign of Messiahship. He who struck the coins selected these two objects in sympathy with the general belief in order to show that he was the real Messiah. He held, as it were in his hand, the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron. Struck on coins circulating among the people what could have been a more effective symbol of the Messianic claim than the use of these two types? It might be objected that although these legends occur in some ancient Hebrew writings, there is yet no proof of their general acceptance. Here, then, I am able to adduce another proof which will make the conclusions at which I have arrived even more satisfactory. The Samaritans hold precisely the same belief. Not only have I learnt it from them in my intercourse with them that the sign for the Taheb, the name the Samaritans give to their Messiah, would be the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron, and he who would bring these two things would thereby demonstrate before the whole world that he was the rightful Taheb. We find it also in the treatise on the Taheb in the introduction to that symbolical interpretation of the flood and the ark of Noah,

published by A. Merx, *The Taheb*, Giessen, 1909 ; cf. my review, *ZDMG.*, 1910. We read there very distinctly that the Taheb will bring the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron in his hands. In my investigations of Samaritan oral law and of their legendary traditions I have come to the conclusion that whatever Samaritans and Jews have in common in practice and belief dates back to pre-Christian times. It is not here the place nor yet the time to show the close harmony between the practices and beliefs of the so-called Sadducees, and even of the ancient Pharisees, and the practices and beliefs of the Samaritans. Their biblical exegesis is based on similar principles, and I have no hesitation in ascribing this legend of the Taheb to the same period. We have, therefore, in these types on the Jewish coins Messianic symbols.

The next question which follows of necessity is, if such be the case, who struck these coins ? If, as hitherto assumed, they were struck by Simon the Maccabee ca. 135 B.C., then one would at once have to assume that these Messianic beliefs were current in his times and were so strongly held that a Maccabean prince, who had reached such a high position according to Maccabees xiv. 41. "Also that the Jews and Priests were well pleased that Simon should be their governor and high priest for ever until there should arrive a faithful prophet" wished also to be acknowledged as the Messiah. Moreover, the Messianic principle should have then taken so deep a root and should have assumed such a definite form as to be connected with the manna and the rod of Aaron at the beginning of the second century B.C. In that proclamation, however, we read "that Simon should be their governor and high priest for ever until there should arise a faithful prophet." The reference to the advent of the faithful prophet at once precludes the idea of Simon's being in any way connected

with the Messianic principle. The people recognised Simon and his descendants to be the high priest only, and the reference is clear as to the advent of the prophet, i.e., the precursor of the Messiah, the prophet here meant being in the reference to the "faithful prophet" is Elijah mentioned in the last verse of the last prophet Malachi, who was to announce the advent of the Messiah. But at that time the prophet Elijah had not yet come, and it is questionable whether his coming at the time of the advent of the Messiah had already crystallised in the popular belief. Moreover, one would have to discuss the problem as to whether the people expected the Messiah from the house of David or from the house of Levi. The Samaritans have solved the problem in their own way, inasmuch as having rejected the house of David they have definitely proclaimed their view that the Messiah will be one of the house of Levi, "A prophet like unto me," i.e., like unto Moses who was of the house of Levi. But with the Jews it is difficult to assume that they would have recognised any of the Maccabees to be the real Messiah.

The Rev. Dr. Wicks, D.D., in his article on the "Doctrine of the Messiah in Jewish Apocrypha and Apocalyptic," which appeared in the July number of *The International Journal of Apocrypha*," 1916, p. 34 f., has brought out most lucidly the remarkable fact that the reference to the Messiah is practically missing in this whole literature with the exception of a few books such as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and the Enoch literature. Out of close upon fifty writings, more than three-fourths make no reference at all, and curiously enough in the Testaments Levi is connected with the Messiah. Thus far we see that even in the apocryphal literature the idea of the coming of the Messiah, in the second century, was a very shadowy one, and certainly not so vivid and strong as to be used by

any of the Maccabean princes in support of any claim to that exalted position.

There is now another Simon, Simon Bar Kochba, whom Akiba, as is well known, proclaimed to be the Messiah. His connexion with Eleazer of Modin, the birthplace of the Maccabees, is no proof whatever of his Levitic descent as some have assumed. Eleazer was his maternal uncle, and it is not known whether he himself was a Levite, but Bar Kochba raised the standard of revolt as a Jewish Messiah who fought for "the freedom of Jerusalem, the deliverance of the people," and this is the legend on the coin, *Leherut Yerushalaim*. The types of the pot of manna and the rod of Aaron fit admirably. With these symbols he came before the people. They understood the meaning of the types on the coins, and in a way he may have tried to impress also the Samaritans. He brought to them the same symbols as they postulated for the recognition of the true Messiah. The coins, therefore, which bear these types must be a sign to Simon Bar Kochba and not to Simon the Maccabee. Everything points in that direction. The difficulty about the years which are marked on the coins has not yet been solved in either case, but they fit in much better with the period of Bar Kochba than the time of Simon the Maccabee. Moreover, the lettering is absolutely identical between these coins, which are accepted as being coins of Bar Kochba and those coins ascribed to Simon the Maccabee. A lapse of 250 years would have changed somewhat the characters, and yet they are absolutely identical. So from every point of view we are justified in ascribing them to Bar Kochba, and in seeing in these types the Messianic emblems. An important evidence in this direction may also be found in the fact that none of the genuine Maccabean coins have either the pot or the rod. If these types were to have been a specifically characteristic

emblem for the Maccabean rule it is more than surprising that, after Simon, every one of his immediate successors, starting from John Hyrcanus, as it were obliterated this memory by all kinds of other types not even remotely resembling those of their greatest predecessor. No trace is found either of the chalice or of the blossoming rod. On the other hand we can show a definite persistence of the type in many variations and even in many remarkable applications. This will also go a long way to corroborate the right to assume that the cup or chalice represented the pot of manna. But I will go one step further. However numerous the changes may have been on the coins, the pot or chalice seems to have been retained on almost every one of them, but sometimes the rod is placed near the pot. Some people have been inclined to interpret it as a palm, I am inclined to see in it a budding rod. The design does not agree with that of a palm leaf, but it agrees much more with an attempt at describing a budding and blossoming rod.

We find, then, also sometimes a cluster of grapes, the vine, which is occasionally taken as a Messianic emblem. From olden times the vine has been identified with Messianic prophecies (Gen. xlix. 8). The allusions to the vine are numerous in the Bible ; so 1 Kings iv. 25 ; Isaiah xxxvi. 16 ; Micah iv. 4 ; Zachariah iii. 10 ; and thus in this light the passage in John xv. 1 will receive special significance when Christ called himself the true vine. I should like also to refer here to the vision of the vine and the cedar (Apoc. Baruch, 36-40, ed. Charles).

With the waning of the Messianic claim by Bar Kochba other symbols were used on his later coins. But the cup of manna and the Messianic ideas suggested thereby do not disappear with the revolt and the death of Bar Kochba. These types existed before, and he merely took them as a symbol of his own claim, and there remained

after him also Messianic types. The manna had become invested with supernatural character. The ancient legends ascribed many tastes to the manna. To babies it was like milk from the mother's breast; to old people it was like honey (Exod. Rabba 5). Among the Samaritans similar traditions exist. My codex 1169 contains a number of traditions connected with the biblical history; among them we find also the same tradition about the wonderful qualities and miraculous effects of the manna. According to Jewish tradition it was then also the divine food prepared by the angels in Heaven. As it was divine food in the past in the time of Moses, so it will be the divine food in the time of the Messiah (*vide* above). It is the heavenly food of the pious, and only the faithful are worthy to partake of it. (Midrash Tanhuma, *ad loc.*, and Yalk. Shim. 1, folio 37D.)

In the Apocalypse of Baruch we read (xxix. 8):—

“And it will come to pass at that selfsame time that the treasury of manna will again descend from on high, and they will eat of it in those years, because these are they who have come to the consummation of time.” Reference is made by Charles in the note to this passage to Psalm lxxviii. 25, where manna is called the food of the mighty ones (angels), and the Sybilline oracles (vii. 149) said that it is to be the food of the Messianic king, and in Revelation ii. 17 we find that it is to be the hidden food of the faithful. (So also in the Jewish Midrash Tehillim to Psalm lxxviii. 25 and in the Yalkut Shimeoni *ad loc.* as well as Bahya to Exodus xxxiv. 28.) Here we have then the manna as the food reserved for the time of the Messiah, when the dead will be quickened into life at the time of the Resurrection and also it is reserved even now for the inmates of Paradise. What more fitting symbol expressing the most elevated hope than the pot of manna? And this seems to me to be the only explanation of the appearance of pictures of the pot of

manna and other types accompanying it in the catacombs both Jewish and Christian. Thus the pot of manna appears there, and also other symbols which have baffled until now the ingenuity of interpreters. There is a blossoming rod side by side with the real palm leaf, the latter being taken from another cycle. There is the Ark of the Covenant, and there are also the pictures of trumpets. Down to Krauss, Lowry and Michel these symbols have not been properly understood. They stand on a different plane from the pictures from scripture which thus far have found a proper explanation. These pictures are examples of divine intercession for saving the pious from the imminent dangers. They have found their way first into prayers of a symbolical and sympathetic character like those contained in the services of the burial of the Eastern and Catholic churches, and at the same time they have found practical pictorial expression, all examples of miraculous salvation. But none of them are symbols of that hope for resurrection and the Messiah together with that happiness contained in Apocalyptic vision and in popular legends of that time. The trumpet however, which is to call the dead to life again, the ark which was hidden and was to appear again, and the pot of manna which is feeding the pious and is to feed the quickened, and the rod which is to lead and to be a symbol of power, all these were part of that Messianic hope to which those who slumbered in the dust testified, and for the realisation of which they had prayed with their dying breaths. This alone will also probably explain those gilded glasses found in the catacombs, for which an explanation has hitherto not yet been found. I venture to see in them the replica of the "golden pot of manna," the vessel given to the dead to be fed from, either during the time whilst they were lying there, or to accompany them into the world beyond, and lastly to

be waiting for them ready for the time of the resurrection.

This connected chain of evidence seems to prove that we have indeed in these types on the coins Messianic symbols, and they could only have been used at the time when they had been closely connected with the advent of the Messiah, and again they could only have been used by a man who had claimed to be the Messiah, and was acclaimed as such, and this was the case with Simon Bar Kochba. This type seems to have persisted and to have assumed many forms in the course of centuries. It is a subject which lends itself to wide speculation. It is sufficient therefore to hint at the possible connexion between the Eucharistic chalice and the pot of manna, the former claimed also to contain the divine food. This must be left, however, to the student of Christian antiquities. I only venture to add that the Eucharistic chalice had originally very little to do with the cup of wine, and that it very fittingly corresponded to the legendary pot of manna. Why, even the painting in Ravenna, which belongs probably to the eighth century if not earlier (W. Lowrie, *Christian Art and Archaeology*, figures 131 and 132, pp. 314, 344, New York and London, 1901) resembles almost in every detail the pot or chalice on the Maccabean coin. In this connexion it is not a far cry from the Eucharistic cup to the legend of the Grail. Many years ago, as far back as 1882, I compared the food given by the grail, with its manifold tastes and virtues, with those ascribed to the manna. And now, after a lapse of so many years by another route, I have come back to the same conclusion, this time intimately connected with the legends of the Messiah and with the types on the Jewish coins. The heart-shaped pot seems to recur again in many ancient illustrations and pictures given by H. Bayley in his *Language of Symbolism*, London, 1912, vol. i. p. 246 ff., where the three flowers and the stem with the three flowers

appear in the shape of those on the Maccabean coins; but in contradistinction to the latter the three flowers are put inside the vessel or chalice and not beside it, because they could not be divided on the two sides of the coin. One might go further in one's speculations and see in the pictorial representation of the three lilies within the heart of St. Mary, the faint echo of the ancient type unconsciously preserved, when the artist who applied it had probably forgotten the original meaning. He may also have been influenced by some emblematic ceremonials of the Isis worship. But whatever value may be attached to this and similar speculations, more or less of a hypothetical character, there can scarcely now be any doubt that the types on the Jewish coins can only be the pot of manna and the blossoming rod of Aaron, and that we have in them types of a Messianic character of the time of Simon Bar Kochba.

M. GASTER.

*THE TREE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND
EVIL IN GENESIS II. AND III.*

WHAT is meant by the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil was asked by Philo Judaeus in his book of *Questions and Solutions to those Questions which arise in Genesis*.¹ He replies that the narrative in which it occurs is plainly allegorical. What is meant then under this figure is prudence, which is the comprehension of science, by which all things are known and distinguished from one another, whether they be good and beautiful, or bad and unseemly—in short the discernment of every sort of contrariety.

Whether this answer satisfied the Alexandrian Platonists

¹ Bk. i. Question XI,

to whom Philo wished to commend the sacred writings of his nation, it is impossible to say. It probably did, for they were accustomed to allegorise Homer. Philo's statement, however, that the narrative in Genesis is to be interpreted allegorically not literally, will commend itself to the modern exegete, although one may well doubt whether he who first wrote that narrative regarded it as allegory rather than history. The modern student distinguishes clearly between history and allegory, primitive man did not. Myth or the explanation in the form of fictitious narrative of how things came to be as they are, is primitive man's science, history, theology and philosophy, all in one, and to interpret myths as though they were scientific or historical narrative is of course to misinterpret them. Myths are primarily of psychological value. They unveil the mind of primitive man—his doubts and fears, his hopes and beliefs, his questionings and explanations. Thus it comes about that oftentimes they enshrine his religious and social customs.

To-day it is generally recognized by students of Semitic origins that the early J sections of the Book of Genesis,¹ of which the Paradise Story (Gen. ii. 4b–iii. 24) is the first, form a selection from a much larger body of Semitic myths, some of this larger body being still preserved in the clay tablets of Assyria and Babylonia. It is also generally recognised by students of the Religion of Israel that this Jehovistic selection of Semitic myths was definitely made in the interest of that ethical monotheism which constitutes the prophetic religion of Israel. With this object in view there can be little doubt that the original myths were carefully expurgated; polytheistic and immoral elements being rigorously excluded.² It is also as generally recog-

¹ In chapters i. to xi. inclusive.

² This of course is plainly seen in comparing J's flood narrative

nised, for reasons which there is no need to give here, that the J sections of Genesis received approximately their present form from prophetic hands in the Southern or Judæan schools of the prophets some time in the ninth century B.C.

In attempting to elucidate the meaning of any portion of the Paradise Story the modern exegete will find himself engaged in a threefold task.

First, he will strive to discover what was the significance of the passage in its original and unexpurgated form ; in other words, what lies behind our present Biblical narrative.

Secondly, what did the passage signify to the Jehovistic editor, and why did he select it for his Judæan readers ?

Thirdly, what is its significance to-day, i.e., how far are the lessons, which it was intended by the prophet to teach, still valid in their essence ?

Any interpretation of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil must take into consideration the important part which trees play in the mythology of most primitive peoples.¹

Not infrequently trees are regarded as being possessed of a spirit or genius and are accordingly worshipped. Although this worship was severely condemned by the eighth century prophets in Israel, it appears to have been popular

with the Assyro-Babylonian account of the Deluge. Of course it is equally clear in a comparison of the Assyro-Babylonian and Hebrew accounts of Creation.

¹ See Frazer's *Golden Bough*, vol. i. pp. 166-232, and W. Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, revised ed. pp. 185-197. In C. J. Ball's *Light from the East*, illustrated from the British Museum collection, a number of Assyro-Babylonian sacred trees are represented. (pp. 28f.) Sacred trees attended by cherubic figures were conspicuous in the Assyrian sculptures of the middle period B.C. 900-721. The palm tree (date-palm) would seem to have been the sacred tree of the Semite of the Euphrates Valley. For him it was the symbol of life. For the Hebrew, the sacred tree was the terebinth or evergreen oak.

in connexion with the rites of the Asherim down to the period of the Exile. Even to-day in Palestine, superstitious rites in connexion with trees are not extinct. When in that country, some years ago, the writer of this paper observed both Mohammedans and Christians making trivial offerings to ancient terebinths which obviously possessed for them a semi-sacred character. A tree therefore to a primitive Semite was very much more than it is to a modern man.

Besides his belief in the sacred and semi-personal character of certain trees, the primitive Semite shared another belief which is not uncommon among primitive peoples. He believed that certain foods possessed magical properties ; they were able to endow their eater with powers and qualities which had been conspicuous in the men and animals eaten. Thus the eater of the fruit of a sacred tree might reasonably expect on the one hand to partake of the Divine life in the tree and to share in some specifically Divine gift, such as generative power, wisdom, immortality,¹ but on the other hand, he might if he were an unlawful eater render himself liable to instant death as one who had broken a taboo.

In interpreting the Paradise Story of Genesis these deeply seated primitive beliefs must be allowed some weight, for they would certainly form part of the furniture of the mind of both the writer and the reader of this ancient myth.

One of the first difficulties of interpretation which is encountered is connected with the accuracy of the text. The late Professor Cheyne, *more suo*, assumed that the Massoretic text was corrupt here and emended it conjecturally. But a number of commentators and critics more conspicuous for caution have felt, as did Cheyne, that in the original narrative there was only one tree, not two,

¹ See Tennant : *Fall and Original Sin*, p. 68.

“ in the midst of the garden,”¹ although unable to agree as to which of the two it was.

A comparison of the passages, Genesis ii. 9, 17, iii. 3-6, 22-23, seems to make it possible, if not probable, that the original narrative did deal with only one tree. Certainly it does seem strange that man should have been forbidden access to the tree of knowledge, and not have been forbidden access to the tree of life, and yet later should have been driven out of the garden lest he should eat of the tree of life. Speculation helps as little here as conjectural emendation of the text. Possibly, so it has seemed to the writer, the tree in the midst of the garden was in the original myth a double tree such as frequently figures in the Assyrian sculptures, one side bearing the fruit of knowledge, the other side the fruit of life.

The only argument the writer can urge in favour of this conjecture besides the fact of the sculptures is that what may be an Assyrian parallel narrative speaks of the tree of which certain guilty gods ate the fruit, as the Asnan fruit, and the word Asnan is interpreted by Assyriologists as meaning *double*. For the most part those critics who think that in the original narrative there was only one tree, regard that tree as the tree of knowledge.

In connexion with the tree of knowledge a problem arises as to whether this is an original feature of the Hebrew mythology or whether there are parallels to it in the Assyro-Babylonian or any other mythology. W. E. Addis, a learned Semitic scholar, regards the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as “ the original element which the Hebrew writer contributed to the Story.” His view, like that of

¹ E.g., Kent in his *Beginnings of Hebrew History*, p. 54, writes : “ ‘ The tree of life ’ does not appear to have been found in the original story. It is subsequently referred to only in the later additions to the narrative (p. 32). In iii. 3 there is but one tree in the midst of the garden and that is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.”

Kuenen, in opposition, it should be pointed out, to that of Budde, Cheyne, Gunkel, Holzinger, Kent, Stade, is that the Jehovistic writer added the tree of knowledge to the tree of life which belonged to the original narrative. He writes: ¹ "The rest of the myth is much like other myths of the golden age. But neither in Assyrian inscriptions nor elsewhere has any parallel to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil been found. There is a cylinder from ancient Babylon, and now in the British Museum, which contains the figures of a man with horns, and a woman with a serpent behind her. But it is only the fancy of Assyriologists which connected the figures with Genesis."

Yet F. Delitzsch in his *Babel and Bible*, published ten years ² later than Addis' volume, gives a drawing of the Babylonian cylinder-seal, and sees a connexion between it and the Fall Story of Genesis.³ And so judicious a scholar as Bishop Herbert Ryle, after citing Schrader's remark, "We certainly have no right to assert that the Babylonians had no story of a Fall, although no written accounts bearing upon it have hitherto come to hand," ⁴ goes on to say: "All doubt, however, has recently been removed. There can no longer be any question that a narrative of the Fall was included in the literature of the Assyro-Babylonian religion. The conclusive evidence was brought to light by the eminent English Assyriologist, Mr. W. St. C. Boscawen." The evidence in question refers to some beings who in the much mutilated Third Creation Tablet are recorded, at the instigation of the Serpent Tiamat, to have eaten "the Asnan fruit" with deleterious consequences to themselves, and with considerable damage to the tree.⁵

¹ *Documents of the Hexateuch*, vol. i. p. 3 (1892).

² 1903. ³ p. 56.

⁴ *Cuneiform Inscriptions*. E. T. Velp, p. 38.

⁵ See H. E. Ryle's *Early Narratives of Genesis*, p. 40, where a translation of the passage is given.

Where there is such a conflict of learned opinion a decisive judgment becomes impossible. To judge by what has already been learnt by comparative study of Babylonian and Hebrew mythology the Babylonian mythology is undistinguished by any ethical and monotheistic element. If the early Babylonians had a myth which accounted for human misery by disobedience to a Divine command, we can feel sure that it would in this as in the other cases lack that deep religious reverence and stern morality which characterises J's prophetic narrative.

The evidence for the existence of a Tree of Knowledge in the Babylonian mythology is only very slight, and throws no light on our Paradise story. That the Paradise story in some form came originally from the Euphrates Valley seems proved by the names of the rivers which ran through the Garden of Eden and by many other indications which Assyriology has brought to light,¹ but with which of the Assyro-Babylonian sacred trees the Tree of Knowledge in J is to be identified, or whether it is an original element in the myth or a Hebrew interpolation it is impossible to say; certain it is, however, that practically all the action and interest of the Paradise story centres round the Tree of Knowledge, the eating of whose forbidden fruit

“ Brought death into the world
And all our woe, with loss of Eden.”

Having summarised in a very compressed form the possible origin, character and relations of the Hebrew myth, we are now perhaps in a somewhat better position to interpret the meaning which the Jehovistic writer gave to the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil.

¹ E.g., Eden is in its first form not the Hebrew word for *delight*, but an Assyrian word *edinu* applied to the arable Mesopotamian plain. Cush is not Ethiopia, but Cas, a kingdom in the Euphrates Valley in the third millennium B.C.

There appear to be three probable interpretations.¹

(1) The first of the three interpretations is that: the knowledge of good and evil consisted in the power to recognise moral distinctions, the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. This is certainly the view of the great majority of patristic and ecclesiastical writers, and also of some of our greatest modern scholars.

For instance, it is the view of Dillmann, who comments thus: "The tree of knowledge of good and evil, whose fruit bestows on him who eats it knowledge concerning good and evil."² Moreover he asserts precisely that Wellhausen concludes wrongly, if he thinks that we have not to do here with moral knowledge.³

Bishop Ryle is in agreement with Dillmann. He asserts that the knowledge of good and evil which signifies "arrival at the moral sense of discernment between right and wrong . . . seems to be . . . most in harmony with the general religious character of the story, which turns upon the act of disobedience to God's command, and upon the assertion of man's will against the Divine."⁴

The same view appears to be maintained consistently by the late Professor Driver, whose weighty note, especially valuable for its cross references, deserves careful attention.

"The knowledge of good and evil—implying the power of distinguishing them, and estimating each at its proper worth—is a capacity not possessed by little children (Deut. i. 39), but gradually acquired by them (Isa. vii. 15, 16), accordingly deficient in second childhood (2 Sam. xix. 35), it is specially necessary for a judge (1 Kings iii. 9), and is pos-

¹ There is a fourth which connects it with magic, but it may be dismissed as utterly improbable.

² A. Dillmann, *Genesis*, vol. i. p. 122. (First edition, 1904.)

³ *Op. cit.* p. 139.

⁴ *Book of Genesis*, p. 62 (1914).

sessed in a pre-eminent degree by divine beings (Chron. iii. 5, 22), and angels (2 Sam. xiv. 17)."¹

Hence, eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is symbolical of the development of the moral sense. Of the latent possession of this, man had been unconscious until he roused it into consciousness by an act of deliberate disobedience to the Divine Will. He then realised what moral good and moral evil are and became conscious that he had parted with the former and become a partaker in the latter. Thus Driver writes:² "They had eaten of the tree of knowledge; and so, the idea is, they had passed in a moment—as we all pass, though only in the course of years—from the innocence of childhood into the knowledge which belongs to adult age. Their sense of guilt betrays itself unconsciously before long, in their behaviour as described in v. 8. For the present, however, the narrator notices only their acquisition of another sense, in which adult age differs from childhood, and the absence of which had been noticed in ii. 24 as a mark of innocence" (i.e., unconsciousness of their nakedness).

Many English commentators adopt the same interpretation. G. H. Spurrell is particularly interesting, as he does it on the grounds of the literal interpretation of the Hebrew phrase, which he points out should be not "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," but the tree of the knowing (a feminine verbal noun) of good and evil, "i.e. the tree, the partaking of the fruit of which would cause persons to know good and evil."

Certainly the LXX rendering of Genesis ii. 9, would seem to support Spurrell's contention—³ τὸ ξύλον τοῦ εἰδέναι

¹ *Book of Genesis* (Westminster Commentaries), p. 41 (1904).

² *Op. cit.* p. 46.

³ G. H. Spurrell, *Notes on the Text of Genesis*. Second edition revised 1896.

γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ, "the tree of the learning the knowledge of good and evil."

The difficulties and objections to this first interpretation will be considered after the other two interpretations are given.

(2) The second interpretation is that the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil symbolises the consciousness of sex. Four times in the narrative there is a reference to the nakedness of the man and his wife. Before they eat of the Tree of Knowledge they are naked and "not ashamed" (ii. 25). After eating, "the eyes of them both were opened and they knew that they were naked" (iii. 5). Their sense of nakedness is the reason assigned by them for hiding themselves from Jehovah, their fig-leaf aprons being inadequate to remove it (iii. 10). It is finally removed by Jehovah Himself clothing them with skin tunics. The Hebrew phrase rendered in the R. V. "coats of skins" might, I venture to think, be rendered with reference to the derivation of the two words "hidors of nakedness."

There seems no doubt that J believes the institution of clothes to have arisen from the sense of modesty connected with consciousness of sex. Teufelsdröckh, when he affirmed that the first purpose of clothes was not warmth or decency, but ornament, and points to tatooing and painting being prior to clothes as a proof of this,¹ would probably receive the support of modern anthropologists. Certainly the Israelite Priestly writers, as we see in their ritual prescriptions, attach a high importance to decency, superior, it would seem, to that of Israelite kings and prophets. Nevertheless the writer of the J sections, himself a prophet, attaches the highest importance to decency, for it is he who records the sin of Ham and the consequent curse (Gen. ix. 18-27, J). It may be concluded, therefore, that

¹ Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, ch. i.

he approves of clothing in much the same way in which the prophets approved of the establishment of the Israelite kingship. Had the nation been what it ought to have been, it would have needed no earthly king, Jehovah Himself being its king; had man and woman remained what they ought to have been, they would have needed no material clothing, Jehovah having given them a childlike innocence in its stead. When, however, Israel became dissatisfied with a pure theocracy, Jehovah assisted in a definite way the establishment of the kingship. So when man and woman lost their sense of childlike innocence and desired clothes, He provided clothes of a proper kind to take the place of their own unsatisfactory efforts.

It is interesting to note in connexion with prophetic elements in the Paradise story that both forms of clothing have a connexion with Palestine. The fig-tree is indigenous in Palestine, but not in Babylonia. The skin tunic may have received honourable mention by J—not, as is often assumed, because made from the skins of sacrificed animals, but—because it is possible that it corresponds in J's mind with the אֵרֶרֶת or “hairy garment” of the prophetic order. It is also possible that girdles of fig leaves were used by the worshippers in the sensuous rites of the Bamoth and Baalim. In J's narrative there is no doubt that the eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge creates a sense of the indecency of nakedness and a consequent desire for clothes, but does it follow that the eating symbolises a sexual sin? This is the prevailing Rabbinical interpretation. The serpent or, according to the Rabbinical view, Satan, Jehovah's enemy, jealous of the destiny and innocent happiness of the forefathers of the human race, induces Eve to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree. In other words he seduces her, and she thereafter seduces her husband. She herself, in the *Apocalypse of Moses*, calls her sin “the sin of the flesh,”

and Cain is regarded as begotten by Satan of Eve. This interpretation takes various forms, Satan coming to Eve in the form of an angel of light. Also he places the poison of lust on the fruit of the tree. It should perhaps be added that the serpent in Rabbinical tradition is the symbol of the sexual passion.

According to another view, Adam was seduced by female demons and had sexual intercourse with them. Dr. Tennant, in his volume, *The Fall and Original Sin*, and Mr. H. St. John Thackeray, in his *Relation of St. Paul to contemporary Jewish Thought* (pp. 50-57), cite a number of passages from the Talmud which state this view. Their more immediate sources being Weber's *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften*, and Schürer's *Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*. There seem to be reasons for thinking that this was also the view of St. Paul, a pupil of the Rabbis.¹

But the real question is: How far can we think of this interpretation being that of the Jehovistic writer? It seems highly improbable that it was. In the first place sexual relations between the man and his wife would have appeared to him perfectly lawful and altogether in accordance with the Divine Will. The account of the creation of Eve and the institution of marriage presupposes them. Because woman was originally a part of man therefore doth a man cleave to his wife and they become one flesh.² There seems no doubt that such relations existed before the Fall. When the composer of the Church of England Marriage Service asserts that marriage was "instituted in the time of man's innocence," he is adopting the obvious

¹ An examination of the following passages justifies this assertion: 1 Cor. xi. 10; 2 Cor. xi. 2-3; 1 Tim. ii. 13-15.

² The Greek myth which accounts for love between man and woman forms an interesting parallel to the Semitic myth.

interpretation of the narrative. The Assyriologists who see parallels between Adam in Paradise and the legend of Eabani and U'khat in the Gilgamesh epic are even inclined to think that Eve was a substitute for intercourse with the animals.¹ In any case, it is to be remembered that for the Hebrew worshipper of Jehovah marriage was a sacred state, shared in alike by priest and prophet, and therefore sexual relationship existing under such conditions was hallowed. To suppose, therefore, that the eating of the Tree of Knowledge consisted in the marital intercourse of our first parents, or to assume that this was forbidden by their Creator is to adopt an interpretation of the narrative which would have been alien, indeed repugnant, to the mind of the Jehovistic writer. The curious Rabbinical fancy of sexual intercourse with demons would not perhaps be alien to the period of the Jehovistic writer to judge by the ancient story of the intercourse of Elohim with the daughters of men, and their Titanic progeny, recorded in the J section (Genesis vi. 1-4), yet examination of the dialogue between the Tempter and Eve has no suggestion of sensual temptation in it. Robertson of Brighton, with his unrivalled skill as an interpreter of Scripture, and his prophetic spirit, gives, we believe, the true interpretation, when ² he writes: "Look at this sin of Eve's. It was not a sin of sensuality. The temptation appealed not to her sensual but rather to her higher nature. The food was pleasant to the eye and to be desired to make one wise. Yet at the very instant she thought she was to be as God, knowing good and evil, she found herself not as she had anticipated on the confines of heaven but on the brink of hell." Her temptation was aesthetic and intellectual—a desire for beauty and a desire for knowledge. But

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*.

² *Notes on Genesis* (1877), Lecture iv.

the result of her sin was a sense of shame, the pangs of child-birth, and a condition of subjection to the male sex. Although at first sight these consequences suggest that the sin was sexual, they do not really do so. These were the evils of woman's lot in primitive communities and one of the purposes of the myth was to account for them. They indicate for J that there is something wrong with human conditions. They represent loss and failure. He interprets them religiously and optimistically. God did not desire them, man caused them. They do not represent the divine ideal for human beings or their primal condition. Sin brought them in, and that sin was a sin of disobedience, the guilt of which was mitigated in some measure by the guile of the Tempter. Therefore, it may be concluded that the knowledge conferred by the tree was not sex-consciousness, and the eating of its fruit did not consist in sexual intercourse.

(3) The third interpretation is that the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil means not the knowledge of the moral consciousness in its power to distinguish right and wrong, nor yet the knowledge of the sexual consciousness, but knowledge generally—all knowledge; but particularly that knowledge which contributes to the intellectual and the material side of civilisation, and is the possession of the civilised man in contrast with the simplicity and ignorance of primitive man.

If the first interpretation be called the ecclesiastical, and the second the Rabbinical, the third may be called the humanist. It is that of the poets.¹ For Milton and Goethe the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is the symbol of all knowledge except religious knowledge.

Milton, in *Paradise Lost*, thus makes Satan describe the tree :—

¹ E.g., S. T. Coleridge in his poem on the Devil's Walk.

“O, sacred, wise and wisdom-giving Plant
 Mother of Science, now I feel thy Power
 Within me clear, not only to discern
 Things in their causes, but to trace the ways
 Of highest agents, deemed however wise.”

In Goethe's *Faust*, Mephistopheles closes the interview with the student who has revealed to him his ambition :

“Ich wunschte recht gelehrt zu werden,
 Und mochte gern, was auf der Erden
 Und in dem Himmel ist, erfassen,
 Die Wissenschaft und die Natur ”—

by writing in his book the words “*Eritis sicut Deus, scientes bonum et malum.*”

This interpretation has apparently considerable claims to antiquity. It seems to have been in Philo's mind. Certainly it is that of the pre-Maccabaeian portion of the Book of Enoch. Enoch thus describes his journeyings : “And I came to the Garden of Righteousness, and saw beyond those trees many large trees growing there and of goodly fragrance, large, very beautiful and glorious, and the tree of wisdom whereof they eat and know great wisdom. That tree is in height like the air, and its leaves are like (those of) the Carob tree ; and its fruit is like the clusters of the vine, very beautiful : and the fragrance of the tree penetrates afar. Then I said : ‘How beautiful is the tree, and how attractive is its look !’ Then Raphael, the holy angel, who was with me, answered me and said : ‘This is the tree of wisdom, of which thy father old (in years) and thy aged mother, who were before thee, have eaten, and they learnt wisdom and their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked and they were driven out of the garden.’ ” (Enoch xxxii. 3-6.)

This interpretation is supported by various linguistic and grammatical and literary and archaeological considerations.

First, it is to be observed that although for the thoughtful types of English mind the words "good" and "evil" immediately and dominantly suggest moral good and moral evil, especially when they occur in sacred literature, yet the Hebrew words טוֹב and רָע are very much wider in their range of meaning. In the case of the latter pair the physical or non-ethical suggestion in the form of advantage or disadvantage is more prominent and frequent than the ethical. This fact may suggest that in the case under consideration it is *a priori* probable that the terms have not an ethical significance.

Secondly, in the Semitic language there is an idiom not infrequently used to express the notion of universality or the whole by means of two mutually exclusive categories under one or other of which everything or everybody is included. The Hebrew Scriptures furnish numerous examples of this usage, e.g. "the wet and the dry" (Deut. xxix. 19), "the bond and the free" (Deut. xxii. 36), "the deceiver and the deceived" (Job xii. 16), so probably "light" and "darkness" (Isa. xlv. 71). Driver's *Deuteronomy* (*Internat. Crit. Com.* p. 376) cites some Arabic examples "he that has a companion and he that is alone," "he that moveth and he that is still," "he that giveth to hear and he that heareth." It seemed to the writer of this paper some years ago¹ that the use of the phrase "good and evil" (טוֹב וְרָע) to define the knowledge imparted by the tree of which Adam and Eve ate, might also be an example of the use of this idiom.

At that time he could find no support for this view in Dillmann's, Driver's, Spurrell's, H. E. Ryle's, H. R. Gordon's, and other well-known commentaries, but investigation has since yielded support for it from other sources. Dillmann, it is true, refuses to admit this interpretation of the phrase in

¹ See *Expository Times* of June, 1909, pp. 427, 428.

Genesis ii. 9, 17, iii. 5, 22 ; yet he admits that the phrase רַע אוֹ טוֹב (in Gen. xxiv. 50, "The thing proceedeth from Jehovah ; we cannot speak unto thee bad or good"), and the phrase מְטוֹב עַד רַע (in Gen. xxxi. 24, "Speak not to Jacob good or bad"), preceded by the negative means *nothing*.¹ Hence it is permitted to infer that were there no negative in the sentence the phrase would mean *everything*.

Driver, commenting on Genesis ii. 17, has : "The knowledge of good and evil—implying the power of distinguishing them, and estimating each at its proper worth."² Undoubtedly an important aspect of knowledge consists in the power to distinguish things that differ, and in 2 Samuel xix. 35, and 1 Kings iii. 9, the phrases in which the words good and evil occur do indicate the power to distinguish things that differ—in the first case the power to recognise physical, and in the second, moral distinctions—but in these passages the Hebrew idiom is different from that in Genesis ii. 9, 17, בֵּין ("between") being used in the two former, and so they become equivalent to the phrase in Isaiah vii. 15, 16, "to know to refuse the evil and to choose the good." But in Deuteronomy i. 39, "Your children who have no knowledge of good and evil" means surely : "Your children who have no knowledge at all." It does not seem clear, therefore, that it is the power to distinguish between good and evil, or the power to recognise moral distinctions that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge imparts to its eaters. On the contrary, the phrase suggests, in the light of the examples cited, that "the knowledge of good and evil" is a dramatic Semitic expression for *all knowledge*. This tree was the Tree of Knowledge *par excellence* ; it imparted universal knowledge to him who ate its fruit. This interpretation of "good and evil"

¹ As also in Balaam's reply to Balak. (Num. xxiv. 13.)

² *Genesis*, p. 41.

suits admirably the context of Genesis iii. 3, 22 ; “ Ye shall be as Elohim knowing good and evil.” The serpent says, “ Ye shall possess one of the Divine attributes, omniscience : ye shall know all things.”

The interpretation which Professor Driver gives, and no one who was a student of his could ever differ from him save with the very greatest diffidence, seems much too metaphysical a conception of knowledge to be read into this early prophetic narrative. Almost as probably might we expect to find a reference to knowledge in relation to subject and object as to knowledge as consisting in the power to recognise distinctions. And when Dr. Driver and other commentators proceed in interpreting this passage to limit this power of recognising distinctions to the ability to recognise moral distinctions, one cannot but feel that an anxiety to find in this narrative an account of the dawn of the moral consciousness, rather than an explanation of human misery and hardship, has led them astray. There is no reason to suppose that the Jehovistic writer ever conceived of man as not possessing a moral consciousness or of his ever being ignorant of the distinction between right and wrong. For J, obedience to Jehovah's commandment is right, disobedience is wrong, and primitive man was well aware of that before he and his wife ate of the forbidden fruit. Moreover, there is no indication that Eve was enamoured with the desire for moral knowledge. The supposition that she was tempted to eat in order that she might become aware of the deep difference between right and wrong is nowhere suggested. Sex-consciousness combined with a sense of the impropriety of nudity, which seems to become apparent after eating, is not due to the man and his wife having acquired by eating the power to realise moral distinctions, it is, as certain archaeological parallels suggest, due to a realisation of the demands of

civilisation. In a state of nature, whether you have a good conscience or a bad conscience, you may go about without clothes, but in a civilised state, however satisfactory the condition of your conscience, you feel compelled to wear clothes.

Adam and Eve before they ate the fruit desired the gifts of civilisation, and after they had eaten it they felt the pressure of its needs. Culture, not conscience, told them that they were naked. They avoided Jehovah really because they had disobeyed His command and stolen His fruit, but they made an excuse which betrayed them when they said that their hiding from Him was due to their nakedness. He knew as soon as they said that, that they had become possessed of knowledge which belonged by right to Him. Their former satisfaction with their condition was now lost. Henceforth it is their fate to travel that rough road which man treads when he turns his back on a state of nature in order to seek the dearly bought and hardly earned requisites of civilisation. He ceases to be an inhabitant of Paradise, and becomes instead a citizen of the world.

The narrative of Adam and Eve in Paradise is a primitive illustration of that buoyant sentence with which the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle opens: "All mankind naturally desires knowledge." But knowledge brings the sense of new needs, and the effort to satisfy these new needs invariably brings toil and dissatisfaction in its train, but most serious evil of all, it induces a tendency to alienate man from God; man's communion with God, man's dependence upon God, grow weaker as the pressure and the triumph of civilisation increases. The Jehovistic writer marks with prophetic eye the civilisation of the ancient world and beholds in it something which, on the one hand, is contrary to the primal will of God, and, on the other hand, is injurious to the morality and true welfare of the human race. He

loves it not. Its knowledge is of the wrong kind. It is not religious or moral, and it does not make for human happiness. It is, so the same writer asserts, the impious brood of Cain¹ to whom mankind owes the invention of the arts. They are the first to smelt metals and forge weapons, and fill the earth with violence. They are the first also to build cities. They are not of those who call upon Jehovah. Jehovah is worshipped by the simple pastoralist. The dwellers in cities are alienated from God. It ought to be observed that the presentation of Jehovah in these early sections is very anthropomorphic, and forms a striking contrast to the presentation of Him in the Priestly sections. It is to J that we owe the Babel narrative. Jehovah at first is ignorant of the design of man's Babel-building and then apprehensive of it. By means of a device worthy of Olympian Zeus He destroys the builders' power of co-operation and scatters them abroad. Thus does He remove this menace from His frontiers. In the light of this conception of Jehovah, belonging undoubtedly to a much earlier period than that of J, and possibly included in his narrative by J subconsciously rather than consciously, as a part of the heritage of his branch of the Semitic race rather than as representing his prophetic consciousness and inspiration, it is not unnatural to see in Jehovah's forbidding primitive man access to the tree of knowledge a jealous regard for His Divine prerogative of omniscience, or at any rate for such knowledge as was the rightful possession of the Divine Being. Although it ought to be observed, on the other hand, that there is much in the story of Paradise to suggest that it was also a benevolent regard for man's welfare which really led Jehovah to prohibit man from

¹ There is little doubt that the correct rendering of Cain is smith. He is the head of the tribe of Smiths, Jubal Smith, Tubal Smith, etc., the mechanics and artists of the ancient world.

eating of the Tree of Knowledge. The Hebrews, however, like many other primitive peoples, had a deep conviction that there was a sphere of knowledge, "the secret things of God," that it is His prerogative to know, and that man has no right to enter it. (Cf. Deut. xxix. 29; Job xxviii. 21.) Jehovah Himself might eat of the Tree of Knowledge, as no doubt He did also of the Tree of Life, when He walked in the Garden in the cool of the day; it was a fruit good for Elohim, but forbidden to man, and no doubt deleterious to him. Yet the fact that Jehovah took subsequent precautions to keep mankind from access to the Tree of Life does seem to indicate that as He was unwilling to allow man to share in the Divine prerogative of Immortality, a similar motive induced Him to prohibit the Divine prerogative of Omniscience. If this be so, it will mean that there is here an interesting parallel between the early Hebrew and the early Greek mythology. Adam's sin will be like that of Prometheus, and a consideration of the respective ways in which Jehovah and Zeus treat the guilty mortal will enable the student to realise the valuable help which the study of comparative mythology gives to him who seeks thereby to discover the unique genius and to realise the supreme excellence of the prophetic religion of Israel. Yet the Jehovistic writer, who of course has no belief in human immortality, may well have felt that as Jehovah was merciful in His chastisement of human frailty so also He acted benevolently, and in accordance with the constitution of man's needs and nature in preventing him from acquiring immortality. The Jehovist may have held with Schopenhauer that "The shortness of life is the least of its evils," or as all of that "goodly company" of which the Jehovist was a member have ever felt, that "What God wills is best for man."

This third interpretation of the Tree of the Knowledge

of good and evil, based on linguistic considerations and on a comparative study of the early Jehovistic sections of Genesis, receives interesting support from extra-Biblical sources. The Assyro-Babylonian Story of Ea and Adapa¹ is cited by Morris Jastrow, jun., in his *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, as furnishing a probable parallel. Adapa, created by Ea, is permitted by Ea's patronage to enter the sphere of the gods. He, a mortal, is permitted to see the interior of heaven and earth, and to learn their secrets. Jastrow, in a footnote p. 553, writes: "The phrase 'knowledge of good and evil' (Gen. ii. 17) is simply an expression equivalent to our 'everything,' or to the Babylonian 'secrets of heaven and earth.'" The gods are alarmed and jealous. Adapa knows all, are they now to make him immortal? They offer him the food of immortality, but under a misapprehension due to the deceit of his creator, he refuses it. He is offered a garment and oil. These he accepts; they are the symbols of civilisation. Jastrow remarks that the problem presented by the Hebrew and Babylonian stories is the same. Why should not man, made in the Divine likeness, know all things and be immortal? Babylonian speculation—and Babylon was the home of science—decided that man's creator was not opposed to man knowing the secrets of heaven and earth, but he would not have him become immortal. The early Hebrew solution was that both knowledge and immortality were alien to the Divine ideal for men. (pp. 548-555.)

In conclusion, it ought to be stated that this third interpretation, besides the support of Jastrow, an American, has powerful support from weighty English and German scholars: Wellhausen, in his *Prolegomena*,² asks:

¹ Found in the Tel-el-Amarna Tablets. These Tablets were written about 1500 B.C., but the story of Ea and Adapa is no doubt many centuries older.

² E.T. pp. 300-3.

“What is the knowledge of good and evil?” and replies: “The commentators say it is the faculty of moral distinction,—conscience, in fact. They assume accordingly that man was in Paradise morally indifferent, in a state which allowed of no self-conscious action and could not be called either good or evil. A state like this not being an ideal one, some of them consider that man gained more than he lost by the fall, while others admit that it could not be the Divine intention to keep him always at this stage of childish irresponsibility, and that this cannot be the view of the narrator either.

But it is plain that the narrator is not speaking of a relative prohibition of knowledge, but an absolute one; he means that it is only for God, and that when man stretches out his hand towards it he is transcending his limits and seeking to be as God. On the other side, he cannot of course mean to say that conscience is a doubtful blessing, and its possession to be deplored, or that it is a thing that God in fact refuses to men and reserves to Himself alone. The knowledge spoken of cannot be moral knowledge. What could the assertion mean that God would have no one but Himself know the difference between good and evil, and would deny to man this knowledge? One would think that conscience is a thing belonging specifically to man and not to God. And what could be the sense of representing Adam and Eve as so intent to know what was sin and what was virtue? No one is curious about that, and sin never came into existence in the way of ethical experiment, by men’s desiring to know what it is. And it is manifestly assumed that man knew in paradise that obedience to Jehovah was good and disobedience evil. And finally, it conflicts with the common tradition of all peoples to represent the first man as a sort of beast; he is regarded as undeveloped only in point of outward culture.

The knowledge which is here forbidden is rather knowledge as such, general knowledge, or getting the eyes opened as it is afterwards called. This is what transcends, in the writer's view, the limits of our nature ; prying out the secret of things, the secret of the world, and overlooking as it were, God's hand to see how He goes to work in His living activity, so as, perhaps, to learn His secret and imitate Him. For knowledge is to the ancient world also power, and no mere metaphysic. This knowing in the highest sense is the attribute of God alone, who stands in the creative centre of things and penetrates and surveys the whole ; it is sealed to man, who has to labour and weary himself at little things.

And yet the forbidden good has the most powerful attraction for him ; he burns to possess it, and instead of resigning himself in trust and reverence, he seeks to steal the jewel which is jealously guarded from him, and so to become like God—to his own sorrow. . . .

One objection certainly may be taken to this explanation ; the words are not merely knowledge, but knowledge of good and evil. But good and evil in Hebrew mean primarily nothing more than salutary and hurtful ; the application of the words to virtue and sin is a secondary one, these being regarded as serviceable or hurtful in their effects. Good and evil as spoken of in Genesis ii. 3 point to no contrast of some actions with others according to their moral distinctions ; the phrase is only a comprehensive one for things generally according to their contradictory attributes which constitute their interest to man, as they help or injure him ; for, as said, he desires to know not what things are metaphysically, but what is the use of them. Besides the lengthier expression we have the shorter one, knowledge, simply (iii. 6) ; and it must also be remarked that the phrase is not : "know the good and the evil, but know good and evil."

Smend¹ says Adam and Eve were expelled from Eden not because they had wrongly acquired, but because they possessed that knowledge which was the prerogative of Jehovah and the possession of which by them caused God to view them in their present situation as dangerous to His supremacy. The exclamation: "Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil," reflects alarm and jealousy.

Rothe regards the account of the eating of the fruit as intended to explain not the origin of sin but of "death, and all our woe and loss of Eden." It is primarily a culture myth, not a sin story.

Tennant adopts this interpretation in his book, *The Fall and Original Sin*. He writes: "We do not hesitate to conclude that the knowledge of good and evil spoken of in this narrative is the knowledge which makes man more or less the lord of Nature, the wisdom which can turn natural forces to human use."

It would seem also to be the view of Professor G. W. Wade, who points out that the eating of the Tree of Knowledge is "regarded as something more than an act of simple disobedience to the command of God; it is viewed as an act of rebellion and an encroachment upon the prerogatives of Deity."²

It may be no surprise to find that it is the interpretation favoured by the late Professor Cheyne in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, but it is of more interest to observe that it is adopted by Professor Denney in the article "Knowledge" in *Hastings' D.B.* He writes: "To know good and evil does not mean in Hebrew to have the moral consciousness developed; it means to be intelligent, 'to know what's what'! The desire to know is the desire to be like God—

¹ *Alt-Test. Religionsgeschichte*. S. 120.

² *Book of Genesis*, p. 36.

to possess His secrets, to wield His power, and so to be independent of Him. But the gratification of this desire, so the moral would originally run, always defeats itself. The impulse to know, the impulse which creates science and civilisation, is indulged at a great cost. We build Babylon and become conscious that we have lost Eden. That this appreciation of 'knowledge' which pervades the sceptical passages in *Ecclesiastes* underlies the third chapter of *Genesis* is not to be denied ; but neither can we deny that the myth is so treated as to make it yield an explanation of the transition in human history from innocence to guilt. The eating of forbidden fruit was an act in which man lost the knowledge of God, and acquired the knowledge of sin."

Enough authorities have been cited for the third interpretation to show that it is at least worthy of serious consideration. The evidence for it seems to the writer of this paper stronger than that brought forward for either of the other two interpretations. It is, moreover, an interpretation which is singularly suggestive, and especially at such a time as this, when the culture and civilisation which was worshipped as the glory of the modern world has been exhibiting its shallowness and corruption in appalling fashion. Tennyson makes one who was "the heir of all the ages, in the foremost files of time," say to himself in one of his weaker moments, as he contemplates the simple life of a South Sea Island savage :

"There methinks would be enjoyment more than in this march of mind,

In the steamship, in the railway, in the thoughts that shake mankind."

But the man of to-day feels the question in a deeper form. For him the question is not one of personal "enjoyment" but the question of the basis of our civilisation, and its whole relation to religion and morality. As know-

ledge grows, as man gains an increasing control of natural resources, must he of necessity grow less and less religious because seemingly less dependent upon God for the necessities and blessings of life ? The answer is surely this, that though the body be satisfied with food, though the intellect attain a very high degree of satisfaction in the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge, there is a side of man's nature—its very deepest side—which only the knowledge of God and obedience to the will of God can satisfy. St. Augustine's golden sentence is as true to-day as ever, "*Domine, tu fecisti ad Te, et cor nostrum est inquietum donec requiescat in Te.*"

On the other hand, it becomes increasingly clear that if the strongest and deepest type of individual life needs the knowledge of God, any satisfactory and enduring form of social and political life needs that knowledge quite as much. It is not the advances of secular knowledge, but the divorce of secular knowledge from moral and religious knowledge, which is the cause of widespread misery and disaster. The Jehovistic writer marked in his day the separation of these two kinds of knowledge ; he observed that the advance in secular knowledge was detrimental to moral and religious knowledge. It appears to him that man must choose between the two. Like Enoch he may walk with God ; or like Cain he may build cities ; but he cannot do both. The Jehovistic writer does not seem like the later Priestly writer to have thought it possible for the knowledge of God to inspire, direct and control the knowledge of the arts and sciences so that the latter become the servants, and not the enemies, of God and man. That is the ideal of the Catholic Church of Christ, but it is not easy to realise.

H. D. A. MAJOR.

THE RELIGION OF DEMONSTRATION.

II.

ELEMENTAL Religion dates as far back as the earliest forms of religious experience. Though these early forms may have little more than a historical significance, there is a valid form of Elemental Religion which has survived into and is retained in the highest Christian experience. And for a great many to-day, it is the only possible form of Religion which they are able to profess. It is the Religion without a Creed. The distinguishing mark of this religion and the thing that makes it valid, is its affinity for historical facts. The first valid form of Elemental Religion which the world has seen is the religion of the Hebrews, and the wonderful thing about that religion is its unrelenting demand for the realisation of its ideas in historical form. Above all, its hope is centralised in the figure of a Man, who shall envisage perfectly to mankind the divine nature which no man has seen or can see.

It is in this respect that such a religion as the ancient religion of India, which must always command our admiration and respect whatever we may think of its deplorable practice to-day, has failed. The Hindoo certainly thought profoundly about God, but also obscurely and vaguely. He never seemed to care whether his religious ideas could be demonstrated. He never sought to find out how far they might be true. God was for him a negative idea, neither this nor that nor in the likeness of any sensible or intelligible form, and he was content to leave the matter there. His religion never reached maturity; it never came to a point when one could say: "This is the very thing I have been looking for; here at last I see my vague gropings after the

Unseen embodied in a living form like unto my own, which I can know and understand."

In contrast with, but still more in continuance with and fulfilment of these early religions, Christianity emerges as the religion of maturity. It has satisfied the demand for demonstration expressly declared by the Hebrews and more or less vaguely felt by all religious communities. Whatever we may say in favour of Religion without a Creed, we always make the condition that, in so far as it is valid, it shows a longing to substantiate its feelings and ideas in adequate facts. No religion can subsist for long without the demonstration of fact. And Christianity will always take the supreme rank among religions, because it has provided the most exacting and convincing test, and has moreover furnished a Fact which is so adequate that it actually exhausts the most profound *a priori* conceptions of God that have ever been conceived.

It is the emergence of demonstrative fact that makes the validity of religious ideas. To a considerable extent, indeed, we may acknowledge the reality of elemental ideas of God before the demonstration of Christianity happened. Electricity was a fact of nature before it was ever discovered—it was seen in the lightning-flash, it pervaded the atmosphere, it radiated from animal bodies; still it was not known. But when it was discovered, when it came to self-consciousness in the mind of man, when it passed from an inarticulate fact of nature to an ascertained fact of science, the face of the world was changed, the intellectual, economic and social life of the race took on a new complexion. The act of discovery amounted to a literal creation of the element. In exactly the same way, the vague, elemental notions of God which floated in men's minds from time immemorial became articulate for the first time in the revelation of Jesus Christ. In discovering God, He created Him

for the world. It is true that if we analyse the New Testament revelation, we shall find nothing that is strictly new in it. The love of God existed somehow in the world before the appearance of Jesus Christ, the same in quality and power as afterwards, but not for our consciousness. Existing fully in and for itself, it only existed for the Race as a dimly suspected fact of Nature, occasionally revealing itself in brilliant flashes to individual minds. In the person of Jesus Christ the divine nature emerged as an individual fact ; it existed as it had never been known to exist before.

The true Elemental Religion has felt the need of such a demonstration ; it has cried out to have its feelings and ideas substantiated by adequate facts. Real *a priori* principles, whether in knowledge or religion, are principles which are original and universal and at the same time synthetic, productive, effecting actual syntheses of elements, leading up to and orientating the emergence of adequate facts which are capable of exhaustively illustrating their meaning. Thus, we hear a great deal in the Old Testament of the holiness and love of God ; but after all, these are only the inspirations, prophecies, dreams of pious men. Their ideas attested their own truth as self-evident for the individuals who conceived them, but beyond this immediate witness of consciousness, who could tell how far these ideas were true ? It was only a conceived holiness, a conceived love, but no convincing manifestation of these divine characters had ever been forthcoming. The pious souls were nevertheless unshaken in their conviction of the truth of their ideas. But what was the nerve of their belief ? Not simply the psychical registration of inward truth and self-evidence, but the proleptic certainty that their ideas were synthetic as well as original and underived ; that they were ideas of such a quality that they must lie in wait for the emergence of cognate facts of history, and that they will

contribute to the grouping of circumstances in which such facts can eventuate. The Holy Spirit of God, which is the original, creative unity or principle of religious apperception, has brought to pass the emergence of the personality of Jesus Christ. Apart from this affinity for incarnation, the Old Testament ideas of the love and holiness of God were nothing but pious notions, dreams of visionaries; they would have been *a priori* principles indeed, but not synthetic, and only *a priori*, original and universal because they were the fruitless analyses of empty conceptions. The prophets knew this. They staked all their hope on the appearance of a Person who would demonstrate and substantiate their ideas of God.

In Jesus Christ the holiness and love of God became a convincing fact—the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. The hitherto unattainable, the impossible, the spotless righteousness and the perfect love had now been achieved. The thing that holy men aspired to do and could never do, the thing that God alone could do, that thing was actually done. Religion had become something more than pure experience; it had become an ascertained fact. The original, underived principles of religion had at last proved their character of reality, their synthetic creative power, by finding their meaning illustrated in an exhaustive fact.

While we have been insisting on the Religion of Demonstration, we have not left behind the religion that is elemental, the Religion that is without a Creed. We have carried it forward. Elemental religion, if it is valid, survives up into the last attainments of the Christian consciousness, and deserves to be recognised definitely as an alternative method in the practice of the Christian religion. Let us see how the New Testament revelation has intensified and developed its significance. There are two chief marks of Elemental Religion: the sense of God as the Infinite, the

inaccessible, the unattainable, and man's sense of utter dependence on this transcendent Being—"Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I." By making the divine characters of holiness and love most real to us, Christ has brought the divine nature so much nearer to us. But just for that reason He has also intensified and magnified our sense of God's transcendence above us. In proportion as God has become more knowable and appreciable, He has become more and more inaccessible. The divine life having been lived before the eyes of the world, we now know what perfect righteousness and holy love are as actual things, as events in human experience; and as they have become actual for us, they are removed farther and farther from our grasp. In the Old Testament God was present, in a less degree He was present to the Hindoo, the Greek and Roman mind. In the New Testament we feel His breath upon us, and as He is brought closer to us we veil our faces and cry: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." We are really more afraid of the Father of Jesus than of the God of the Moses, just because we are able to know Him better and to love Him more: on the principle that we are inwardly more in fear of the opinion of those whom we love and respect, when we do wrong, than of persons whom we know indifferently, no matter how powerful or important they may be. The weak, mangled Christ on the cross is more awful and commands more worship and obedience than all the most terrible gods of pagan mythology and the God of the Old Testament put together. It is a noteworthy fact, that while even pious people may speak of God in a humorous or facetious way in the privileged circle of friends—and we see no harm in that—very few, and certainly none who retain their self-respect, will profane the name of Jesus Christ. Even persons who are indifferent to religion, provided they have not lost their

self-respect, resent the profane use of Christ's name. They feel that their sense of propriety has been offended. And it goes even deeper than that. They feel that a wound has been inflicted on what they have secretly cherished as the most precious and worshipful thing in the world. Now, why should it be so? It is because God had never been known as a convincing fact, never brought so near to us that we could feel His breath upon us; it is because His holiness and love had never been lived to such a degree of blinding perfection that the reproach of their vain righteousness and imperfect love were brought home to mankind with inevitable and final conviction, until Jesus Christ enacted the divine nature on the stage of human life. It is one thing to dream, think and feel the divine characters, and to see them imperfectly illustrated in outstanding individuals: it is another and quite different thing to witness these characters as historical facts. When we see God as human personality which we can know and understand, when His judgments are the judgments of a human voice like our own, and His love the love of a human friend, then God is for us higher and higher, more distant as He is become more familiar, more inaccessible as He is more beloved.

Thus in the New Testament revelation the marks of Elemental Religion have been deepened and intensified—the inaccessibility and transcendence of God, and the sense of closer dependence on Him. This double mark is the criterion of true religion. The more capable we are of loving God and of knowing Him better, and the nearer we are drawn to Him, the more worshipful does He become to us and the more sharply-defined are our respect for and obedience to Him. This great difference has been effected by the demonstration of fact. Nevertheless, our sympathies still go out to those whose immediate need can only be met

presently by the Religion without a Creed. Let them cling to it with confidence, knowing that inasmuch as the root of the matter is in it, it has the historic sense—in spite of appearances to the contrary—the inherent disposition to look out for an embodiment in fact of what they think and feel. It cannot but be that in the earnest, solemn discipline of life and of reflection on the record of the best that has been thought and felt in the world, they will inevitably seek out and recognise the Ideal of their nature and the proper object of their worship in the Perfect Man. For the convincing reality which all our knowledge of God can claim, comes from the demonstration of the divine nature in flesh and blood that Jesus Christ has made.

R. A. C. MACMILLAN.

A PREPOSITION OF ST. PAUL'S.

SOME years ago I remember hearing Dr. Rendel Harris give an address on the devotional use of the Concordance. Whether the study, of which this paper is the outcome, should be classed under that heading or not, the simple inquiries pursued I have found not without interest and use. They have served to illuminate for me a great character and to bring into fresh prominence some of his great ideas. That much, or all, set down here, will be familiar to readers of the Greek Testament, I have no doubt. Still I find it is very often the case that, when one collects and groups detail that is familiar, the result is a surprise. One had known it all before, but the mass of material is sometimes itself a new fact, and the suggestions waked by the processes of gathering and grouping take one further than one expects.

Most great writers have their mannerisms. Thucydides, it was remarked by Mr. W. H. Forbes, has a curious fancy

for recording the greatest fleet that ever sailed, the biggest disaster, the best defence on a capital charge, the most enduring counter-revolution ever effected with the smallest forces, and the like. Cicero in his letters—the most wonderful monument of what Latin can be in delicacy, precision and playfulness—is noted as having a weakness for the preposition *sub*. It serves to qualify, to tone, what he suggests rather than asserts. In the same way we find St. Paul—I will not say haunted—by two prepositions, but apt to have feelings which lead him naturally to their use. In this paper I propose to note and to consider (with perhaps a little natural digression suggested by them) his uses of the preposition *σύν*. Its compounds are very numerous in his writings; again and again we find single verses where the *συν*-words come one after another, three or four together, to develop what he means to convey.

Of course the Greek language abounds in compounds of *σύν*, which very often have lost any special suggestion which the preposition may have had. *Synagogue* etymologically is such a compound; practically it has ceased to be one, any more than Parliament or Senate. How far such words as *sympathy* keep any real value of the idea conveyed by the preposition depends a good deal on the person who uses them. Kinsmen (*συγγενεῖς*) is another word that must ordinarily have carried little reminder of its etymology, while words like *συντρίβω* (to smash, Mark xiv. 3) represent practically uncompounded ideas. All such cases we may put on one side, and confine ourselves to new coinages of St. Paul and words where the original value of the preposition survives, or is revived by him. They are very many, as I said, and the reader will be able to extend the list which I have made.

Paul uses *σύν* pre-eminently in connexion with his friends and with Christ. The word suggests the sharing of ex-

perience, and when we consider with whom he feels his experience to be shared, and how varied it is, we may gain some fresh insight into the depth and range of the man.

First, then, about his friends, and some little digression on their number and variety. It is remarkable how large a part in Paul's life is played by friendship. Wherever he goes and in whatever company, he seems to have had the gift of winning friends. When the riot at Ephesus was at its height, "certain of the Asiarchs also, who were his friends, sent unto him, desiring that he would not adventure himself in the theatre" (Acts xix. 31). The Asiarchs were official priests of a cult which Paul's religion was to dethrone, not a cult, it is true, with much passion about it, but there is a kind of stupidity about officials very often which safeguards them against friendship with men of new ideas, especially where these new ideas touch their position. This Paul overcame. He captured Felix, too, who "used to send for him and talk with him rather frequently" (Acts xxiv. 26)—not a very predictable capture. The centurion, Julius, in whose charge he went to Rome, treated Paul "courteously" (*φιλανθρώπως*), gave him liberty to go ashore for attention at Sidon (Acts xxvii. 3), and took pains to save his life in the shipwreck (xxvii. 43). The group Linus, Claudia and Pudens (2 Tim. iv. 21) are identified with people in Rome—some say, with a British strain—whom Martial celebrates; but I write at a distance from books and cannot verify this.

But it is more particularly within the Christian community that we find Paul's friends. It is surprising how many he mentions by name, and how frequently with some word of endearment. Ten, for instance, have the word "beloved" (*ἀγαπητός*)—Timothy, Tychicus (twice), Epaphroditus, Onesimus (twice), Philemon, Luke "the beloved physician," and four less known people in Romans xvi.

The general community often receives this pleasant word. Meanwhile the "brothers" occupy two columns in this concordance.

To come to those aspects of friendship suggested by our preposition, let us ask what these people share with Paul. Work, above all. Priscilla and Aquila, Urbanus, Timothy, Titus, Epaphroditus, Clement, Aristarchus, Mark, Jesus Justus, Philemon—eleven "fellow-workers" (συνεργοί) are greeted or mentioned by name, and others are indicated in the plural (Phil. iv. 3). To a man or woman of any spirit or character to be so described by one of Paul's build and grandeur must have been in itself inspiration. Partner (κοινωνός), though not a compound in form, is another word of the same type, and, like its derivative "fellow-partner" (συγκοινωνέω, Phil. i. 7), must have meant something to those who received it. The "true yoke-fellow" (σύζυγος) is bidden co-operate (συνλαμβάνου) with the women who (dare one coin it in English?) *synathletized* with Paul (συνήθλησαν)—a rather striking word, and the verse ends with "fellow-workers" unnamed—four instances in one verse of the preposition (Phil. iv. 3). The Philip-pians are to be "fellow-imitators" (συμμιμηταί) with Paul (Phil. iii. 17) and "of one soul with him" (συνψυχοί ii. 2); the Corinthians are "putting in joint work at prayer," for Paul (συνυπουργούντων—the translation is perhaps a little clumsy and colloquial; ὑπο, too, will mean by way of assistance to him; 2 Cor. i. 11), and they are in Paul's heart "to share death with and to share life with" (συναποθανεῖν καὶ συζῆν, 2 Cor. vii. 3). When it comes to Paul's relation with Christ—he is habitually the slave (δοῦλος) of Christ—well, then, Epaphroditus and Tychycus are his "fellow-slaves" (σύνδουλος, Col. i. 7, iv. 7), and this one is "beloved" as well, and the other "brother." That all this is not mere phrase, may be seen by any one

who will study Paul's record of what the absence and the coming of Titus meant to him (2 Cor. ii. 12, 13 ; vii. 6 ; viii. 23). Epaphroditus again is his "fellow-soldier" (*συστρατιώτης*, Phil. ii. 25), and so is the less-known Archipus (Philem. 2). And at the last, when the dark days come and liberty is gone, Paul has "fellow-prisoners"—"kinsfolk," two of them, Andronicus and Junia, who "were in Christ before me," and perhaps along with Stephen helped to make the ferment which preceded the conversion—Epaphroditus, again, linked by a new bond (his fourth *συν-*) (Philem. 23)—and the loyal Macedonian Aristarchus (Col. iv. 10), his companion in years of adventure, who on the day of the riot went into the Ephesian theatre and came out alive (Acts xix. 29), travelled with Paul to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 4), shared the voyage and shipwreck (Acts xxvii. 2), is grouped with figures so notable as Mark and Luke and Epaphroditus (Philem. 23), and is now "fellow-prisoner." One would like to know more of him—evidently a man of spirit, and a loyal friend.

So far we have been making lists from the concordance. Let us look over what we have gathered from a more human point of view. Does it affect our estimate of the character of Paul himself ? Does it not suggest a much more deeply affectionate nature than we sometimes think ? "Brethren" and the like have become the cant of the pulpit, happily "beloved" is dropping from the conventional vocabulary, and may some day be used again with real meaning. It is not hard to be the friend of men in the vague plural, or of humanity in the vaguer singular. With Paul it is plain that individuals counted—and immensely. He cleaves to his friends, they mean so much to him—a consideration which heightens for us the value of the "all" which he lost for Christ (Phil. iii. 8). Friendship is with him a real relation, very like a passion ; he is fond of men and enjoys

them and likes to have them about him. On their part they stick to him for years together—picked up wherever he goes at Lystra (Acts xvi. 1), at Derbe, at Thessalonica and so forth (cf. Acts xx. 4). And the dearest tie of all he finds in sharing with them his most intimate relations with Christ—the “work,” the “athletic life,” the “yoke” and the “slavery,” and the “imitation.”

When we turn to Paul's use of *σύν* in connexion with Christ, it must not be expected that, in the second half of a short article, the matters coming under survey can be treated with anything like proper fulness. They can merely be indicated, and left to the study of the reader.

We may begin here by noting the use of the preposition to bring out the part that the Gentiles have in Christ. The capture of the Gentile world—first the Roman Empire, then the peoples of the North, and in our days more and more of the ancient East—obscures for us a great deal of the wonder which Paul found in the breaking down of the middle wall of partition (Eph. ii. 14), in the mystery of the love of God which includes the Gentiles—God being so much larger, more generous and more loving than anybody could have dreamed. The Gentiles then, by the work of Christ, are “fellow-citizens of the saints” (*συμπολῖται*, Eph. ii. 19)—part of that building which rises on the foundation stone of Christ, a building “fitly framed together” (*συναρμο-λογουμένη*, a word far beyond the literal rendering of its elements in English, Eph. ii. 21)—“built in together” (*συννοικοδομεῖσθε*, Eph. ii. 22). A few verses later comes another accumulation of *σύν* compounds—the metaphors surging after one another, and (one feels) bringing the matter more triumphantly into our business and bosoms than the analogy of building. The Gentiles are (in one breath it all comes) “fellow-heirs, of one body, fellow-partakers of the promise” (*συγκληρονόμα καὶ σύσσωμα καὶ*

συμμέτοχα, Eph. iii. 6). The whole chapter is a paean to this keynote of wonder and happiness.

(In passing we may note another compound of σύν, which occurs when this very question of the Gentiles is being considered. In Peter's weak moment at Antioch, the other Jews went "synhypocritising" with him, and even Barnabas was carried away with them (συνυπεκρίθησαν, and συναπήχθη, Gal. ii. 13)).

But it is when we come to Paul's own sense of the Christian's relation with Christ that our compounds grow most wonderful, and our difficulty in understanding them greatest. The guess is sometimes made that the passage in 2 Timothy ii. 11, 12 is a fragment of a hymn. Who made it?

For if we have died with him (συναπεθάνομεν),
We shall also live with him (συζήσομεν);
If we endure,
We shall be kings with him (συμβασιλεύσομεν).

Whose language is that, whose style? At the beginning of a chapter in Romans we find it again:—"If we have died with Christ (ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ), we believe that we shall also live with him" (συζήσομεν, Rom. vi. 8). We have already seen this pair of verbs together, used of the friendship of Christian with Christian (2 Cor. vii. 3); here it suggests a stranger story of experience shared with Christ—experience not made easier for us to speak of, or explain, by the presence of still more wonderful words in the same passage—"buried with Christ" (συνετάφημεν), "of one nature with his death" (σύμφυτοι), "crucified with him" (συνεσταυρώθη). To be "crucified with Christ" is a conception which Paul also emphasises in the letter to the Galatians (Gal. ii. 20, συνεσταύρωμαι), but with a difference; here it is not "the old man" but "I" that we find sharing this crucifixion. The Christian is "buried with him and risen with him" (συνταφέντες . . . συνηγέρθητε,

Col. ii. 12), "made alive with him" (*συνεζωοποίησεν ὑμᾶς σὺν αὐτῷ*, Col. ii. 13), and "made to sit in the heavenlies with him" (*συνεζωοποίησε, συνήγειρε, συνεκάθισεν*, Eph. ii. 5-6). All this—and to it Paul adds his hope to "share the sufferings of Christ, in utter likeness with his death" (*κοινωνίαν, συμμορφούμενος*, Phil. iii. 10). And finally, a last group of *συν*-compounds in one verse of his greatest chapter—"joint-heirs (of God) with Christ, if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him (*συγκληρόνομοι, συμπάσχομεν, συνδοξασθῶμεν*, Rom. viii. 17).

I offer no comment on this last great series of words. I cannot. I have a feeling that the Christian Church to-day suffers at large for want of the passion and the experience that made the coming of such compounds possible. Behind the words and the impulse that created them, lies a larger soul than we quite understand, a soul capable of experience beyond ours; and until we reach some capability of entering into that language, our faith and religion will bear, as it does, conspicuous marks of poverty. But Paul looks on what he has been through as the common property of us all; and he calls on us, too, to "join in the imitation" (*συμμιμηταί*, Phil. iii. 17).

T. R. GLOVER.

“ CONCERNING PRAYER ” ¹

THE volume thus entitled has been prepared by the same method as *Foundations*: a group of people have met regularly at “ a series of conferences in which subjects were discussed, and essays previously drafted were criticised, to be rewritten and again discussed at later meetings.” Canon Streeter is again the editor. The advantages of the plan are evident. It is not merely that each mind learns much from the other coadjutors; it is that thinking and corporate devotion go hand in hand. These joint productions are a relatively new feature of modern life, particularly in the departments of religious and social interest. Wherever they spring out of a combination of frank debate and united worship we may be sure they will exhibit merits far outweighing any loss due to the fact that differences of opinion, even on important points, may at times impart a tone of indecision to the collective message.

The proximate cause leading to the preparation of a work on Prayer, its nature, its difficulties and its value, was the great war. Men will not pray who consider prayer waste of time. Even those who shrink from a view so drastic are nevertheless exposed to all manner of perplexities. “ Can we believe in Providence at all; or in what spirit can we pray to the Creator of a world so full of misery? Has Prayer any meaning in a Universe governed by universal Law? If God wills our good and knows our needs, why tell Him of them in Prayer? What practical results ought we to expect from Prayer? What ought we to think of God’s relation to human sin and to the Power of Evil in the world? The Mystics—have they anything to teach us? What are we

¹ *Concerning Prayer: Its Nature, Its Difficulties and Its Value.* By Eleven Writers, edited by Canon Streeter. London: Macmillan & Co., 1916.

to say of the Old Testament and its teaching in regard to God and man ? What bearing on actual life have the rites and practices of Christian Worship ? " (p. ix. f.). The Church is called, at this hour with peculiar urgency, to apply its mind to these questions. Intelligent ideas about Prayer will not of themselves bring revival but they may clear the highway for its coming.

Nothing could be more refreshing than to read a book, by instructed and believing men, which throughout is devoted to the thesis that Prayer is real religion. Recently it has been made plainer than ever that all threads of reflection upon God and the world cross at this point ; the principles of Christian philosophy all radiate from this focus. To understand what Prayer is and implies, is to have made a substantial beginning in learning the full sense of " faith," " the supernatural," " the Holy Spirit." We are at the secret source of truth. Here the kind of Prayer under review is distinctively Christian prayer. " We cannot," says one writer, " accept a description of prayer which will not be recognised by those who pray." This assumption is cardinal and has, I think, been uniformly adhered to.

My own unhesitating view is that the book ought to be studied by serious men to whom the future] of Christ's cause is dear. It is a careful, as well as a very able and devout, treatment of a subject always central to Christian religion, and never more so than now. The mutual criticism of the writers has taken nothing from the intensity of their beliefs. A steady, not too rapid, perusal will force people to ask themselves what they mean by praying, and I am sure it will help them to some purpose in formulating an answer. They will have as guides men who love truth and really believe in God. There is no Church proselytism, nor is there any undenominational flummery. I refrain from making an anthology of humorous extracts from

one or two papers which are undeniably excellent of their kind, and which would go far to assure the younger class of readers that the book is anything but dull.

The fourteen essays of which the book consists belong to two distinguishable types : those which deal with Prayer directly, and those which discuss the chief accompaniments of Prayer, its presuppositions, or its issues. There is perhaps nothing precise about this classification, but it may serve. To the first type we may assign “ Prayer and the Old Testament,” by Mr. Lofthouse ; “ Prayer as Understanding ” and “ Prayer and Bodily Health,” both by Mr. Anson ; “ Prayer and the Mystic Vision,” by Professor Rufus Jones ; “ Petition,” by Mr. Bevan ; “ Intercession,” by Mr. Hodgson ; “ Worship,” by the Editor ; “ Faith, Prayer and the World’s Order,” by Mr. Turner ; and “ Prayer for the Dead,” by the author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia* (a lady). To the second type belong “ Repentance and Hope,” by the last-named writer ; “ The Eucharist—an Anglican View,” by Mr. Matthews ; “ The Eucharist—a Free Church View,” by Mr. Micklem ; “ The Devil,” by Mr. Collingwood ; and the first essay of the book, “ God and the World’s Pain,” by the Editor. The second series, though its bearing on Prayer is rather less immediate, is of high value. “ Repentance and Hope ” is a remarkably close-knit piece of argument, fresh and fearless, and Mr. Collingwood’s paper on the Devil strikes me, purely in its character as a bit of reasoning, as perhaps the most lucid and enjoyable thing in the book. The Editor’s initial statement goes deep : he has an unusual gift of persuasion. As a whole the volume is alive with faith and hope ; its steady forward-looking temper and reliance on the abounding stores of Divine power find expression in “ tones that brace and cheer.” All facts are God’s facts, the writers seem to say, and only good can come of allowing them to tell upon us. “ Reverence for truth for

its own sake—what Socrates called willingness to follow the argument wherever it might lead—is much more important to faith than any body of theological doctrine ” ; and again, “ The great mass of sincere doubt is mostly the revolt of intellectual morality against the spiritual infidelity of Christians.” The progressive thinker has often been identified with the radical iconoclast, but what in this work we are invited to make progress in is the realisation of how infinite a world of possibility is opened to all who “ believe in God through Jesus Christ.” Let us trust our faith a little more ; let us give the Gospel a chance to dilate our mind and our imagination.

My chief purpose is to call attention to certain ideas or principles that form the constructive framework in the thought of the volume as a whole. These ideas are positive if not always traditional ; not always new, of course, but frequently enforced by new and striking argument. I shall try to set them out as informally as may be.

With all the essayists it is common ground that Prayer is supernatural in character. You cannot really give a scientific account of its genesis or its effectual operation ; it breaks out through every notion of a machine-made universe, for it is the response of man to the call of the Spirit. Prayer can be only if the Father is : and, if the Father is, Prayer is the most reasonable and rewarding of all forms of adventure. What leads to and furthers specifically Christian Prayer is a new conviction about the world generated by the knowledge that God is absolutely loving as well as absolutely free to help man. As it is put with a faint touch of technicality : “ The belief in the supernatural is the belief that the spiritual values which faith envisages as its ideal are also the forces which hold the world together ; that no limits can be set to the degree in which what we call nature is eventually capable of being moulded in response to them ” (p. 399).

All true Prayer moreover is offered in the light of God. Much is said, with emphasis but never fiercely, regarding the loss and waste of spiritual energy due to confused and ignorant ideas. Love on the high Christian level has no existence apart from knowledge ; indeed, were such insulation conceivable, it would be quite as dangerous as power without direction. If Christ is trustworthy, then it is bad thinking to conceive of God as a “ Sultan ” to whom by the nature of the case we cannot occupy any filial relationship, and whose ways of action have no consistency. “ Fearful uncertainty ” as to whether God is actually Love still taints much of popular religion. What we need, if we are to co-operate in mind with God, is untiring search for the Divine wisdom, “ a growing clarification and purification of all ideals as well as a growing devotion to them.” The soul fit to pray with prevailing power must be trained in a clearer apprehension of the Divine nature and the Divine commandments ; we must ask not simply that we may do right, but more and more that we may be brave and persistent in discovering what right is. “ Men have seldom been slow to welcome an excuse for rejecting the divine impulse to search for truth and knowledge ” ; but indolence of that sort kills genuine Prayer. It means that confidence in God sinks down into a sentimentalism which loses all sensitiveness to our culpable lack of insight, our complacent resignation to ignorance or, more often still, evil tradition. The neglect of new light by the religious—here lies the secret of much ineffectual prayer. Men have far too easily acquiesced in evil and degrading physical conditions, actually seeking grace to accept them uncomplainingly, when, had they but allowed Christ to clarify their minds, they might have understood that these same conditions were veritably anti-theistic, and that in answer to right prayer, quickened in the soul by God Himself, they would have been made wise and strong to work

reformation. In the paper " Repentance and Hope," page after page on this vital theme is nobly written. I should fix upon this summons to clear thinking, in the light of Jesus and for the sake of His aims, as one of the most valuable elements in the book. Thoughtlessness is as real a sin as despondency. God has made it dependent on us whether it shall be possible for Him to do His mightiest works for man, and we can only become the media of His power for betterment if we take pains to find out the truth about ourselves and the laws of human life which He has enshrined in past experience.

It is also a wholesome characteristic of the book, that the writers have refused to wander in certain tempting by-paths. No small answers to great questions are put forward. There is no facile suggestion, for instance, that the petitionary element ought to be excluded from Prayer, as a relic of primitive magic. " Prayer," says Mr. Bevan with emphasis, " is just the petitionary part of worship." When we pray, we offer desires to God in the belief that thereby some things will happen which would not have happened had we refrained from prayer. Of course the conception is difficult, but the difficulty is not insuperable for one who rejects the mechanist view of life and history. Nor can any difficulty hide from us the fact that Christ, the Leader of faith, prayed in just this way. If we follow Him, we shall pray for physical blessings as for others ; that is the child-like thing to do, while anything else is sophisticated, and in point of fact the philosophy that forbids it is equally fatal to prayer for inward grace. " Praying in His Name, we believe, we are certain, that an exact and wholly adequate answer to every need is always at hand. . . . The world of phenomena is not rigid ; it is plastic to him who has the mind of Christ ; and no mountain of matter is so great that it cannot be moved " (p. 92).

Again, it is wisely felt that telepathy or transference of thought in no way helps in understanding Prayer. The analogy is misleading. "Effective prayer for another is not the direction of any current from our mind to another human mind, not a 'mobilising of force,' which works like some sort of mental electricity, but a relation in the first instance to our heavenly Father and to our fellow-beings only through Him." And we ought to have nothing to do with easy allusions to the subconscious. At present the blessed word "subliminal" is being invoked to cover and explain all kinds of mystery, despite the fact that plenty of experts call it a psychological myth; one is relieved to find it plays no part here. Mr. Hodgson gives two or three effective pages to the matter. It is questionable, as he points out, whether it can ever be legitimate for one man to aim consciously at influencing another man without his knowledge, or without giving him the opportunity of refusing to be influenced. Besides, the "thought-transference" view of Prayer represents me, the intercessor, as appealing not to the man's higher conscious self but to some lower irrational part of his being—in which there is something underhand. "When a man prays for his friend he prays *to God*, the Father of both. . . . He refuses to be told that while he thinks he is speaking to God he is really, unknown to himself, exercising a subtle spiritual influence upon his brother . . . The nearest analogy we can find on earth to the attitude of the man who prays is not to be found in the wireless operator tapping his transmitter and sending out his unseen messages, but in the intercourse of child with father, of rational soul with rational soul" (p. 218). This does not necessarily imply a disdainful attitude towards psychotherapy or Spiritual Healing. We may suspend judgment upon, but we ought to read and digest inwardly, Mr. Anson's temperate plea for a genuine effort by the Church to discover and practise the method

used by Christ, which was not to aim merely at removing physical symptoms but at reconstructing the spiritual basis of life. Guided by Him, and using a control which He expected and desired His followers to use, we may be able to diagnose the spiritual lesion of the sick soul, and to heal in the deepest sense by bringing the needy into touch and correspondence with the Love that is also health. Mr. Anson's paper contains the calmest and fairest estimate of Christian Science I have ever read.

As a whole the book is an earnest and even passionate argument for more, and more consistently spiritual, Prayer ; but there is no disposition to conceive of prayer as *Deum fatigare*—on the contrary. This pagan view has repeatedly been exemplified during the last two years, as in the movement to keep up continuous intercessions for all the twenty-four hours (and even for a week or weeks), as if Christ had not said, “They think they shall be heard for their much speaking.” No doubt the parables of the Importunate Friend and the Unjust Judge seem at first to lend some colour to the wish for “perpetual intercession,” feverishly organised, in the barely chronological sense. These parables, however, do not teach that we can put force upon God, in Tennyson's phrase

Battering the gates of heaven with storms of prayer ;

they do not incite us to become so burdensome to God that He eventually yields ; they teach that we ought to persevere in prayer, as a loving child may do, and also that in answer to petition God does what He would not have done without it.

Most valuable aid, I believe, both for thinking and for practice, is to be drawn from a principle which more or less pervades the whole argument of this volume : the principle, namely, that Prayer, in essence, is an act of co-operation with God. To St. Paul, the Christian is the temple of God :

“ clothing itself upon the rational consciousness, and striving against all that is evil in it, is the Spirit of God,” with an energy that lives and moves in supplication. It is in the prayers of Jesus that the Spirit’s operation within the praying mind of man reached its highest expression, so that in His petitions the operation of God within went out to meet the operation of God in the world. A rather full quotation is requisite to set out this line of thought justly. “ Let us consider,” says Mr. Hodgson, “ a man who is praying for patience. He is not to be looked upon as kneeling and looking up to a God who sits above the skies, if perchance patience may be showered down upon him like rain upon the earth. It is he, and the Spirit of God within him, who together make that prayer, and as the Spirit is God Himself, and not only God Himself, but also the man’s true self to which he hopes to attain, he can no longer set in antithesis the God to whom he prays and the self which is praying. . . . The self which is seeking and knocking is the self which is becoming a particular instance of the universal Spirit of God. And so is the self which asks. . . . The Spirit which dwelt in fullness in Christ is the Spirit which dwells in us in part, and which prompts and wings our prayers.” Thus we share even in Christ’s intercession. “ In our lives our souls are being transformed into instances of the Spirit of God, and that Spirit which dwells in us is One with the Spirit of Him who is praying. By sharing in that Spirit we share the life of Him who intercedes for us. . . . and, indeed, it is not merely our co-operation, for in intercession as in all other prayer He Himself is active in our praying. In praying to God we are praying to Him whose life we share as we pray, and whose life is shared not by us alone but by those for whom we pray. We do seem to have found the medium through which we may influence them aright—and that medium is God Himself ” (pp. 223–228).

No one will contend that this general idea is wholly new. It is indeed as old as Romans viii. But it is expounded with so much insight as to make the devout life a more spiritually transparent thing. We may learn from it, too, how rewarding it is to fix our gaze on Christ as the one commanding instance of prayer that is equal to its idea, and to take His faith, quite uncompromisingly, as inspiring the measure of our expectation.

The writers of these essays will add impetus to an already strong movement of opinion by their steady emphasis on the life and significance of the Church. True prayer, prayer at its greatest and most effectual, is and must ever be corporate. How to attain a conscious realisation of fellowship in worship is one of the hardest problems, but one which it is absolutely necessary to solve. Only when the Body of Christ offers prayer in unison is worship what God would have it be : the richest promises to the individual still wait upon the community. As Canon Streeter puts it : “ The capacity for the highest worship will never be developed by the isolated individual.” And he adds : “ The ideal of the religious life as one of uninterrupted communion with God *solus cum solo*, without any communion with human souls as its accompaniment, has never been realised even by monks and hermits, and the attempt to realise it often defeats itself. *Solus cum solo* is well for certain moments, but just as the life of a man is necessarily social, so also that part of his life which is most clearly and consciously recognised as concentrated on religion must be at any rate in part social. Those who too frequently strive to be alone with God are in danger of ending by being alone with themselves ” (p. 253). This witness is true. From the point of view of the New Testament, the individual is not the Church *in nuce* ; by himself he cannot embody, even partially, the ideal of God’s people. He is what he is

as part of the society. No single person is called *ἅγιος*.

The devotional value of silence is touched on at more points than one, but it never degenerates into a fad. That is prevented by the healthy recoil from over-individualism I have just noted (in spite of the due acknowledgment of an incommunicable element in religion). But a strong appeal is made for "the corporate silence in which God says much, while we listen much and speak not at all"; and it is urged that the true atmosphere in which life can be received is supplied by "the living silence of a congregation which makes every earnest seeker more quick to feel the presence of God, more acute of inner ear, more tender of heart to feel the bubbling of the springs of life, than any one of them would be in isolation" (p. 124). The Church might learn something from the Quaker habit of making silence and the prayer of inward discourse the very basis of their way of worship, so that they gathered and sat down in the quiet, in the "living hush." It is mentioned that to some extent the value of silence has been recognised by the Roman Church, in a less degree by Anglican worshippers. In Scotland also, I may add, we have long given it a place in the Communion service; during the distribution by elders of the bread and wine, and thereafter, we have always a period of stillness. Many of us have wondered why the privilege should be accorded only then. It is obvious, however, and in this volume it is expressly admitted, that "suddenly to spring long intervals of silence upon a congregation not familiar with its use" would be disastrous, and could hardly fail to become meaningless, boring, and unfruitful. No suggestion is made that the practice is in any case of *supreme* value. "Calm's not life's crown, though calm is well."

The doctrinal argument as a whole is marred, I feel, by a slight tendency on the part of several essayists to be

wiser than Scripture in so far as they deny that suffering, apparently in any instance, is the judgment or punishment of God. This in all probability is connected closely with a desire to moralise, or spiritually re-interpret, the idea of Divine omnipotence by showing that it must not be conceived of as an inscrutable Divine autocracy—a desire which most people will applaud. But when it leads to the statement that God’s providence consists “ neither in direction nor in foreknowledge of the outward course of events,” or again that “ His knowledge is not the external knowledge of circumstances, but the obscure intuition of the reality of the world as contained in love,” not merely are we reminded of Bergson’s impartial and equally emphatic rejection of mechanism and finalism (as it stands, a doubtfully theistic position) ; we recall gratefully the saying of a later essayist that some people use paradox as “ a convenient bag into which to pack their unwillingness or their ability to think.” We cannot help saying with Cicero : *Haec nonne mirum est dubitare philosophos, quae nerustici quidem dubitent ?* The view of Providence as meaning not that every minute occurrence is foreseen but simply that the general outline of events, together with the great final outcome of all, is both known and secured, has been of course a quite familiar position, and was stated more than once during the nineteenth century, notably by Rothe ; but it has never greatly interested the Christian mind. “ Your thoughts of God are too human,” we say to any one who would persuade us that God may experience what we call “ suspense.” To say that complete foreknowledge is not reconcilable with moral freedom is no answer. It may be so : in that case, the fact is a reminder of the far-reaching principle that in religious thinking antinomy is not accidental, but constitutive. The believing consciousness is sure of both things : that God knows all, and that moral freedom is a reality ; it is not disposed, any more

than at many other points in the work of construing experience, to sacrifice intuitive certainty to the imperfection of its own speculative insight. In any case, cavalier treatment of a great historic problem must lessen the impact of any argument, however able.

Besides, the proposition that suffering is not the "judgment" of God upon sin, put as absolutely as it is frequently put here, is really indefensible either by faith or reason. To hold both things, that war, sickness and other calamities often are the direct consequences of sin, and yet that they are in no sense His punishments, yields a quite hopeless dualism. That suffering does not necessarily indicate the special guilt of the sufferer is agreed by all. But if suffering comes through an order of things created and maintained by God, and comes inevitably because the world has been so constituted as to be the infallible detective of sin, how can we avoid putting this fact in some direct relation to His will? Punishment is not the same thing as vengeance. It may surely be the instrument of love. Nor was the psalmist under the power of delusion when he wrote: "Before I was afflicted I went astray, but now I keep Thy word." Nay more: one of the most profoundly-moral elements in true penitence is a joy that punitive righteousness should have its way. The contrary position, indeed, is one which it is impossible to maintain consistently, and in the volume before us it breaks down at intervals. Thus on p. 28 we read: "When a painful consequence is the direct and obvious result of a sin committed by himself, one man will just lament his bad luck, another will violently resent the pain, but 'the man of goodwill' will say to himself, 'Well, I deserved it.' And in so far as he recognises it as a just punishment of his sin, the pain has morally a corrective effect upon him." Anything else would naturally be the equivalent of denying the sovereignty of God over a con-

siderable part of life. To urge that it is not His will that the sowing of wrong seed should have wrong results is to erect the order of Nature into independence of Him and also by implication to assert that it would be a kinder world in which sin did not bring pain. Not a few passages in this book virtually teach that “ punishment ” is not an idea really susceptible of a genuinely moral sense. Some of Canon Rashdall’s best pages have been devoted to exhibiting the ultimately sentimental character of this doctrine. If one believes in God, then to say that in human life cursed by sin there are no “ punishments ” but only “ consequences ” is a statement with no reality in it that I can apprehend. That God does not unconditionally will suffering is very credible, in the light of Jesus it is even certain : that He does not will that I should suffer *if I sin*, is an altogether different idea, and one which I hope is not true.

But these criticisms will have served their purpose very ill if they distract attention from the great and permanent value of what these writers have accomplished. Their book is a rich gift to the whole Church. I have seen no work on Prayer that could be named beside it. As we yield ourselves to its impression, we give thanks that the Spirit is leading men into new truth, as truth is in Jesus.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

*THE ORIGIN OF THE PROLOGUE TO ST.
JOHN'S GOSPEL.*

PART II.

IN the previous section we examined the primitive books of *Testimonies against the Jews*, in order to see whether they showed any traces of an evolution of the Logos-Christology out of a previous Sophia-Christology. The results were significant, and we were able to take the further step of affirming that the great Christological passage in the Epistle to the Colossians was like the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel in its ultimate dependence upon the eighth chapter of Proverbs. The next step would seem to be an enquiry as to whether these results are confirmed by Patristic study. Do the early Christian Fathers show, by survival or reminiscence, or in any other way, any traces of (a) the equation between Christ and Sophia, or (b) any signs that the famous statement that "the Lord created me the beginning of His way, before His works of old," has been a factor that can be recognised in the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ? To these points we may now address ourselves. In so doing, we may occasionally be repeating the evidence of the previous section, for the reason that the earliest patristic literature is coloured by the conventional *Testimonies* that were employed by Christian propagandists; but this overlapping is inevitable, and we need not discount the evidence of Irenaeus or Justin because it contains elements that run parallel to the *Book of Testimonies*: if they are saying the same things twice over, in any case, they say them from a different point of view, and by the mouth of fresh witnesses. Justin Martyr, for example, uses the method of

prophetic testimony beyond any other Christian writer ; but his evidence runs far beyond the small pocket edition of Quotations used by a primitive controversialist. Let us leave the hypothetical Book of Testimonies, and if we please, the actual Cyprianic collection, and ask the question whether Justin ever calls Christ Sophia, and whether he argues from the Sapiential books when he develops his Christology.

Here is a striking passage from the *Dialogue with Trypho* (c. 139), where Justin has been deducing plurality in the Godhead from the book of Genesis, ("Behold, the man has become one of us" and similar well-known passages), and where he goes on to quote Proverbs, under the title of Sophia, as though the real Wisdom of Solomon was the book of Proverbs itself. So he says :—

"In Sophia it is said : If I announce to you everyday occurrences I can also recall matters out of eternity. The Lord created me the beginning of his ways. . . . Before the hills He begat me."

After quoting the famous speech of Sophia from the Book of Sophia, he turns to his listeners and says that the thing which is here said to be begotten is declared by the Word of God to have been begotten before all created things, and every one will admit that there is a numerical distinction between that which begets and that which is begotten. We see that Justin uses the word Logos, not for Christ but for the Scripture ; the Heavenly Birth is not the Logos but the Divine Wisdom, which he identifies with Christ. In a previous chapter (c. 126) he definitely calls Christ the Wisdom of God, after the manner of the *Book of Testimonies*, to which he may even be referring, and he says : "Who can this be who is sometimes called the Angel of the Great Counsel, and by Ezekiel is called a man, and by Daniel like a Son of Man, and by Isaiah a child, and Christ and

God worshipful by David, and Christ and a Stone by many writers, and *Sophia by Solomon*, etc., etc."

In the sixty-first chapter of the same dialogue, Justin goes over the same ground, and introduces the matter as follows :—

"I am now going to give you, my friends, another Testimony from the Scriptures that God before all His other creatures begat as the Beginning a certain spiritual Power, which is also called Glory by the Holy Spirit, and sometimes Son, *and sometimes Sophia*, and sometimes Angel, and sometimes God, and *sometimes Lord and Word*, and sometimes calls himself Commander-in-Chief, etc." He then continues that "The Word of Wisdom will attest what I say, being itself God begotten from the Father of the Universe, and being *Word and Wisdom* and the Glory of its Sire, as Solomon affirms": after which we are again treated to Proverbs viii. 21–36. It is clear that this speech of Sophia in the eighth of Proverbs occupied a large space in the accumulated material for Justin's Christology.

Now let us turn to the writings of Theophilus of Antioch whose three books addressed to Autolyceus are dated in 168 A.D. We shall find in Theophilus the two streams of Christology flowing into one another, and we can actually see the absorption of the doctrine that

Christ is the Wisdom of God,

by the doctrine that

Christ is the Logos of God.

For awhile they flow side by side, but it needs no commentator to point out which of the two is to absorb the other. For instance, when Theophilus talks of the Creation of the world, he tells us :

Ps. xxxiii. 6 : God by His Word and His Wisdom made all things :
 for by His Word were the Heavens established ;
 and all their host by His Spirit. Very excellent
 is His Wisdom.

Prov. iii. 19 : By Wisdom God founded the earth, and He prepared the Heavens by understanding. — *Theoph. ad Autol.* i. 7.

He returns to the theme at a later point where his language will require careful consideration.

Ps. xlv. 1 : God having within Himself His own inherent Word, begat Him with His own Wisdom, having emitted him before the Universe.

This passage is, for our purpose, important, (1) for the co-existence of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God, (2) because the word *emitted* (ἐξερευξάμενος) is due to the finding of the 'good word' in Ps. xlv. (My heart is emitting a good word) : this identification of the Logos with the language of the psalm we have shown to be very early, and to have been current in the primitive Book of Testimonies. Theophilus goes on : This Word He had as His assistant in the things that were made by Him, and it was through Him that He made all things. This 'Word' is called beginning (ἀρχή) because he is ruler (ἄρχει) and lord of all things that have been created by Him. It was He, who, being the Spirit of God, and the Beginning and the Wisdom and Power of the Most High, descended on the prophets and through them discoursed of the Creation of the World and all other matters. Not that the prophets were themselves at the Creation of the World ; but what was present was the Wisdom of God that was in it (the World ?) and the Holy Word of His that was always with Him.

Here we see that the reference to the Logos as Beginning (ἀρχή) leads at once to the introduction of the Sophia who is the Archē of the O.T. The writer says as much : the Logos is Archē and Wisdom. When he states the co-existence of the Word and the Wisdom in Creation he uses of the Logos the expression 'always present with Him' (ἀεὶ

συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ) which we recognise at once as borrowed from the description of Wisdom in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. And lest we should miss the reference, and the consequent equivalence of Word and Wisdom, Theophilus explains :

This is why He speaks as follows through Solomon :

When He prepared the heavens I was by Him,

(συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ), etc. *Theoph. ad. Autol.* ii. 10.

The Logos-doctrine of Theophilus, then, although earlier than himself (as is clear not only from his well known references to the opening verses of John, but also from the use of Ps. xlv.) is based upon a still earlier Wisdom-doctrine, which it is gradually displacing.

Sophia does not, however, wholly disappear ; Theophilus goes on to talk of the creation of Light and the Luminaries, and explains that “ the three days which elapsed before the creation of the Luminaries, are a type of the Trinity, i.e. of God, and *His Word and His Wisdom*. This is the first mention of the Trinity in Theological literature, in express terms, (τριάς), and Theophilus arrives at it by a bifurcation of the original Wisdom into Word and Wisdom, the τριάς being thus an evolution of a previous δυνάς : if we prefer to put it so, we may say that Theophilus identified the Wisdom-Christ, now detached from the Logos-Christ, with the Holy Spirit. It will be seen from the foregoing that theologians will have to make a new study of the doctrine of Christ the Wisdom of God, and that incidentally, the often quoted passages in Theophilus will obtain a fresh illumination. For it is no casual remark that Theophilus has dropped ; it expresses his fundamental position : he returns to it later, when he has to explain the plurality of the language in Genesis (“ Let us make man ”) ;

To no one else did he say, Let us make man, but to *His own Logos and His own Sophia* (ii. 18) ;

and again, when he has to explain how God could appear in a garden and converse with man, he says :

It was *His Word*, by whom He made all things, *which was His Power and His Wisdom*, that assumed the Person of the Father and Lord of the Universe, and so came into the garden, etc. (ii. 22).

The foregoing passages will suffice to show the direction in which Christian thought was moving and what it was moving into.

Next let us turn to Irenaeus. We shall find that the matter is complicated by the Gnostic theories about the aeon Sophia, who has gone astray, and is now not the Redeemer, but the lost one to be redeemed.

In the following passage, Irenaeus undertakes to prove the Eternal Sonship by a quotation ; he says, " We have abundantly shown that the Logos, that is, the Son, was always with the Father, and he says through Solomon, that Sophia also, who is the Spirit, was with Him before any created thing. For " the Lord by Wisdom established the Earth, by understanding He created the Heaven. By His knowledge the depths were broken up, and the clouds drop down dew " (Prov. iii. 19, 20). And again, " the Lord created me the beginning of His way," and so on, Proverbs viii. 22-25. Here we see Irenaeus (lib. iv. c. 34, § 2, p. 253 Massuet) using the very same passage from the speech of Wisdom concerning herself, and applying it to the Holy Spirit. It is clear that the Sophia-doctrine is one of the oldest pieces of Christology that we can detect, and that it precedes and underlies the doctrine of the Christ and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

When Irenaeus has finished his quotation from Proverbs, he continues :

" So there is one God, who *by His Word and His Wisdom* has made all things " ;

in which we again see the collocation of Sophia and Logos,

and infer the replacement of one of them by the other, in accordance with our hypothesis.

Nor should it escape our notice, in view of what we detected in the Cyprianic *Testimonies* of the transfer of the Pre-eminence of Sophia to the Pre-eminence of Christ, that the very same thing is said by Irenaeus which was disclosed by Cyprian. In the chapter which precedes the one from which we were just quoting, we find the following sequence :

Omnia Verbo fecit et Sapientia adornavit, accipiens omnium potestatem, quando Verbum caro factum est, ut quemadmodum in caelis principatum habuit Verbum Dei, sic et in terra haberet principatum; . . . principatum autem habeat eorum quae sunt sub terra, ipse primogenitus mortuorum factus.

Here again we see that the passage in Colossians (i. 18) depends upon the twenty-fourth chapter of Sirach, which is used in the *Testimonies* to prove that Christ is the Wisdom of God. The groundwork of Irenaeus' argument is that "Wisdom has made the world and holds the primacy in it"; but this he expands by coupling Logos with Sophia in the opening sentence, and by substituting Logos for Sophia in the language borrowed from Sirach. The evolution of the Christology can be made out with sufficient clearness. The Logos is first substituted for Sophia, and then in the Wisdom passages, the Word and the Wisdom appear together.

RENDEL HARRIS.

(*To be continued.*)

“AND THE SUN STOOD STILL. . . .”

(JOSHUA x. 13.)

I.

THE story of the miracle which occurred at Joshua's bidding at the battle of Gibeon is well known. It is recorded in chapter x. of the book of Joshua and we find a reference to it in Ecclesiasticus xlvi. 5 f.

We need not recall the importance which was attributed to the narrative of the book of Joshua in the famous discussions about the astronomical system of Copernicus as proposed by Galileo Galilei. The notion that it is the earth that is revolving daily on its axis and yearly round the sun, and not the sun that is turning round the earth, was considered by many to be in flat contradiction with the statement in the Bible narrative that, at Joshua's command, the sun stood still for a complete day and did not go down, so that there was never a day, before or afterwards, of such length. These discussions have long since ceased, at least as far as concerns the authority or inerrancy of the inspired writer. All admit now that the inspired author had as much right as any of us to speak of the *apparent* movement of the sun and other celestial bodies, so that even on the now generally adopted hypothesis of the system of Copernicus he could without the least inaccuracy speak of the sun standing or moving. There are even Catholic theologians who are of opinion that in such purely profane matters, “things in no way profitable unto salva-

tion,”¹ the inspired author could, without detriment to his privilege of inerrancy, conform under certain conditions to the opinions which were held by all in his time and surroundings; since in such matters, which it was not his purpose to teach, the knowledge of which it was not the aim of inspiration to convey, he did not necessarily mean, in all cases, to form any judgment beyond an implicit reference to the views commonly held. Refraining from any further judgment in matters of that kind might indeed have been the very effect occasionally produced in the sacred writer’s mind by inspiration itself. If, for instance, one would maintain that in Ecclesiastes i. 5 the sacred writer plainly ascribes real, not only apparent movement to the sun, when he says: “The sun riseth and goeth down and *hasteth pantingly* (shô’ēph) to the place where it arose,” we could, according to those Catholic theologians, perfectly agree with such an admission. We could then also without any difficulty, from the notions which the ancients and especially the Eastern Semites formed about the constitution of the *kosmos*, understand what the same author of Ecclesiastes means in the same place, verse 7: (“All the rivers run into the sea . . .), unto the place from whence the rivers come they return, to flow again.” We could in the same way account for other similar statements, as when the Bible speaks of the waters which are above the firmament or sky, or of the waters upon which the earth is built and from which fountains and rivers spring, etc.

However, it is not our purpose to discuss here any theological problem of that kind. With regard to the story of Joshua’s miracle the question which we want to examine is one of a purely exegetical nature. What is it that the Bible narrative really records? What were the facts in the case? Are we to take the narrative in the sense that there

¹ St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.*, II, 9, 20.

was, objectively, a cessation or interruption of the astronomical movements of the celestial bodies, no matter whether sun or earth was primarily concerned? Very often one may hear good faithful people express some perplexity about that story of Joshua being granted the stopping of the course of the sun, in order that he might have time to win the battle. The conditions implied in the miracle seem to be tremendously far-reaching. If the rotation of the earth was stopped for a day, the whole universe, all the celestial bodies would be affected by it and the whole machinery of the kosmos would be arrested. Would there not be a striking lack of proportion between such a stupendous miracle and the end to be gained by it? Some also ask how it could ever have occurred to Joshua to wish seriously for such a thing as the standing still of the sun? Every one of us knows of course that to interrupt for a day the movements of the celestial bodies would be as easy for Almighty God as to create them with the principles and conditions of their movements. Yet, within the limits of absolute respect and submission to the word of God, considering at the same time the ways of God's Wisdom and Providence, one cannot help wondering whether for its material content the Bible narrative really proposes to our belief the fact that at the battle of Gibeon the whole universe stood still.

It will not be out of place to point out here that, in spite of commentaries, there is no definite parallelism between the supposed stopping of the course of the sun by Joshua and the statement of what happened in king Hezekiah's day,¹ when that king, being ill, was granted as a sign of his recovery that the shadow should turn backward ten steps on “the steps of Ahaz.” There is no question here of a lengthening of the day. We are not told that the line of the shadow moved backward everywhere on earth; in the

¹ Isa. xxxviii. 1 ff.; 2 Kings xx. 1 ff.

prophet's speech as well as in the statement of the narrator there is question only of the turning back of the shadow "*on the steps of Ahaz.*" Now, for a shadow to move in any direction on one particular spot, it is not necessary that the source of light should move; the same effect would be obtained by the moving of the object throwing the shadow. And so it might, and most probably would, have been with the returning of the shadow "*on the steps of Ahaz.*"

We read in Joshua x. that the Canaanite city of Gibeon having made a separate peace with the Israelites who were then engaged in the conquest of the land of Canaan, five Amorite or Canaanite kings of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jarmuth, Lachish, Eglon) leagued themselves against Gibeon to punish her for her defection. Joshua marched to the rescue of the threatened city. He went up from Gilgal "*during the whole night*" (ver. 9); the enemy were utterly beaten and routed at Gibeon; verse 11: "*and when they were fleeing from the children of Israel, and were in the descent of Beth-horon, the Lord cast down upon them great stones from heaven as far as Azekah. And many more were killed with the hailstones than were slain by the swords of the children of Israel.*" At this point follows the narrative of what happened with sun and moon, from verse 12 till verse 14. Let us follow here the Hebrew text: 12 "*Then Joshua spoke to the Lord, in the day that he delivered the Amorite in the sight of the children of Israel; and he said before them: Sun, cease at Gibeon, and thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon!* 13 *And the sun ceased and the moon stayed till the people revenged themselves of their enemies. Is this not written in the Book of the Just? And the sun stood still in the midst of the heaven and hastened not to go down for the space of a complete day.* 14 *There was not before nor after a day like this, the Lord obeying the voice of man and fighting for Israel.* 15 *And Joshua returned with all Israel into the camp of Gilgal. . . .*"

The narrative in verses 12-14 consists of two parts. The first part, verses 12-13*a*, is made up mainly by a quotation from the Book of the Just. That Book of the Just, also mentioned in 2 Samuel i. 18 as containing David's Lamentation on Saul and Jonathan, appears to have been a collection of national songs. It is to be noticed here that in the first part, recording the utterance and fulfilment of Joshua's wish, there is question, not of the sun only, but of sun and moon. In the second part of the narrative, verses 13*b*-14, the author, either from the same or, what is more likely, from some other source of information, adds a statement concerning a most wonderful phenomenon that followed; this statement is concerned with the sun only: the sun *stood still in the midst* of the heaven and *hasted not to go down for a complete day* (keyôm tāmîm). Here we are, beyond question, explicitly told that the sun stood still, that it stood still in the midst of the sky, and that for the space of twenty-four hours.

As to the real, objective fact described as a standing still of the sun for the space of twenty-four hours, we hope to make things clear in section III. But previously, in section II we must consider the first part of our narrative. In section IV we shall hear how the celestial miracle obtained by Joshua's prayer is described in Ecclesiasticus xlvi. 5-6.

Several attempts at some new interpretation of Joshua's narrative have been made of late. But as they proved inconsistent with one or another part of the text, they did not succeed in carrying their point. In order to avoid useless complication, no fresh discussion of those former views will be raised in the following pages.

II

We begin with the first and fundamental part of the narrative of the Book of Joshua: x. 12-13*a*. Our inquiry

will be carried on through three points: A. In verses 12-13a the text does not explicitly speak of a local moving or standing still of sun and moon; on the contrary, one of the verbs used points rather to a darkening of sun and moon. B. Some circumstances in the facts described confirm very strongly this surmise. C. The context proves that such an interpretation is at least the most probable.

A. According to the Latin Vulgate, and consequently according also to the English version of Douai, Joshua's wish would have been expressed in the words: *Sol, contra Gabaon ne movearis . . . = Move not, O Sun, towards Gabeon . . .*; and in the following sentence again: *steteruntque sol et luna . . . = and the sun and the moon stood still*. But the Hebrew is different. The Authorized Version has: "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon. And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed . . ." Here we have an attempt at a more literal translation, but neither is this rendering accurate or to be accepted without reserve. The verb used with regard to sun and moon in Joshua's prayer, and with regard to the sun in the statement of its fulfilment is the Hebr. *dāmām*, which signifies properly *to be silent, dumb*. Of course the verb cannot in this sense have been used of sun and moon.¹ There are other passages in Scripture where the verb *dāmām* is taken by analogy to signify *to be still*, not in opposition to speech or sound, but in opposition to any action.² Thus

¹ Though one might recall, for instance, Milton's blind Samson, saying:

"The sun to me is dark,
And *silent* as the moon
When she deserts the night
Hid in her vacant interlunar cave."

Samson Agonistes, l. 86 ff.

² In passages as Psalm xxxvii. (Vulg. 36) 7: *be subject to the Lord . . .* the meaning *to be silent* is preserved *be silent to* (= *do not murmur against the Lord*); cf. Ps. lxii. (61) 6. It is said that *dāmām* sometimes occurs with the meaning *to perish* (= *to cease altogether from existence*). But in Ps. xxxi. (30) 18, where that notion certainly is expressed, it will be

Job xxx. 27: “My inner parts have boiled *without any rest*” . . . (perhaps even here in opposition to Hebr. *hāmā*, = to growl, frequently used of inner parts to signify violent emotion); Jer. xlvii. 6: “O thou sword of the Lord, how long wilt thou not be quiet? Go into thy scabbard; rest and *be still*” (=cease *from doing harm*; or perhaps again: . . . *from clattering*?); Lam. ii. 18: “Let tears run down like a torrent day and night, give thyself no rest, and let not the apple of thy eye *cease*” (=from shedding tears).

In a similar way Joshua’s wish should be understood: O sun, *be quiet, be still, or cease* at Gibeon, and thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon!

But are there not passages in the Bible where that same verb *dāmām* can be shown to have the meaning of *standing still, motionless*? To that purpose are quoted Job xxxi. 34 and 1 Samuel xiv. 9. As for Job xxxi. 34 there is no reason to give the verb, as it stands here in the context, any other signification than the primitive one of *being silent*; according to the Hebrew Job protests that he did not fear the mob, that he never was terrified by the multitude so as to *keep silence* and not to go out of the door. 1 Samuel xiv. 9 is interesting. Jonathan revealing to his armour-bearer his purpose of attacking the Philistines, puts a dilemma; “If they say: ‘*dōmmû* till we are close to you,’ we will stand in our place; if they say: ‘come up,’ we will go up

safer to read the verb as *nīphal* of *dāmā* (yiddāmu). In Jer. viii. 14 and xlviii. 2, according to the context, the usual and proper meaning of *dāmām* (=to be silent) is to be preferred to that of *to perish*. In viii. 14 the prophet invites the people to enter the *fenced* cities and *be silent* there, because the Lord has put them to *silence* (in opposition to the clamouring Peace! Peace! when there was no peace). In xlviii. 2 Madmen is threatened with being brought to *silence*, in opposition to the *praise of Moab* that shall be no more. It is to be noticed, moreover, that in this last passage the verb *dāmām* is made use of on account of the assonance with the name *Madmen*, as in the preceding sentence the verb *chashub* answers to the name *Cheshbôn*: “In *Cheshbôn* they are brooding over the evil which threatens her. . . .”

...". Here *dômmû* (imper. of *dāmām*) is generally translated: *tarry, stand still* . . ., and we are quite prepared to accept that rendering as *materially* correct. Yet it ought not to be proposed as the only possible one. We may ask: why does Jonathan suppose that the Philistines will say either of the two things put forward in the dilemma, or anything at all? Of course because it is understood that Jonathan and his companion will begin by hailing them, by shouting to them; it is in this manner that the two Hebrew visitors are going to "discover themselves" (ver. 11); the Philistines, therefore, will have to "answer" (ver. 12 *Hebr.*). These being the conditions supposed, one might seem justified in taking here our verb *dāmām* in its proper or ordinary meaning of *being silent*: Jonathan might have expected as one of the possible answers of the Philistine guards, an order to *keep silence*, to stop shouting, "till we are close to you."

However, the current interpretation of the meaning of our verb in 1 Samuel xiv. 9 certainly is the most obvious one. Not because the verb has in itself the signification of *standing still, motionless*; but because, and in so far as, the general notion of "ceasing," "stopping" expressed by it referred, under the circumstances of the case, to the action of the two Hebrew warriors in *approaching* the hostile camp; this obviously was the action most apt to awaken the concern of the Philistine guards. Therefore we said that the rendering "stand still . . ." in 1 Samuel xiv. 9 may be considered *materially* correct.

In the case of the sun and moon referred to in Joshua things seem to appear in a different light. Not movement, but shining is the characteristic of sun and moon most in evidence. Therefore the appeal to the sun and moon that they should "cease," without any further qualification, seems obviously to be directed rather toward their shining

than toward their local movement. It may be well to notice at the same time that in the Hebrew there is no question of any action of the sun *toward* Gibeon, or even *upon* Gibeon, but according to the ordinary value of the Hebrew preposition “*be*,” of the “ceasing” of sun and moon *at* Gibeon, *in* the valley of Ajalon. This again seems to point to the action of shining or beaming as passing from the sun and moon to the earth.

It is true that in the sentence following the record of Joshua’s wish and mentioning its fulfilment we read, verse 13a : “and the sun ceased and the moon ‘*stayed*’ till the people revenged themselves of their enemies.” But the verb ‘*amadh*’ in Hebrew, even as the verb ‘to stay’ in English, is used frequently to express the notion of ceasing from any activity. Thus for instance Genesis xxix. 35 : and she (Lea) *stayed* from bearing (after Juda’s birth) ; the same phrase *ibid.* xxx. 9 ; Leviticus xiii. 23 : if the bright spot *stay* in its place and spread not . . . (cf. ver. 28) ; 2 Kings iv. 6 : and the oil *stayed* or stood (from flowing) ; 2 Kings xiii. 18 : and he (king Joash) smote thrice and *stayed* (from striking) ; Jonah i. 15 : and the sea *stayed* from her raging ; Job xxxii. 16 : they *stayed* (from speaking) and answered no more . . . etc. In the same way the meaning in our passage may be : . . . and the moon *stayed* from shining.

Thus it appears that in the first part of the narrative, embodying the old record of the Book of the Just, there is nothing which should compel us to understand the *standing still* of sun and moon ; on the contrary the use of the verb *dāmām* rather points to a different phenomenon, namely a cessation from shining.

* * * *

B. Some obvious particulars in the narrative of the fact strongly confirm our surmise. According to the traditional

view Joshua asked for a standing still of the sun in order to prolong daylight to give him time to achieve victory. Of such a purport of Joshua's prayer the narrative does not say a word. Rather is it opposed to it.

1. If Joshua had been thinking of the prolonging of daylight in order that he might have time to win the battle, he would have spoken only of the sun; as indeed in the second part of the narrative, verses 13*b*–14, when the author insists on the extraordinary length of that day, he only mentions the sun. Joshua asked for a phenomenon affecting at the same time both sun and moon. Why? Such a phenomenon would have been the covering of the sky by clouds. Not for a prolongation of daylight, but rather for a darkening of the daylight Joshua would seem to have been praying.

2. Now, to what purpose would Joshua have asked for a darkening of the sky? The reason again is suggested by our narrative. We read in the second part of the narrative, verse 13*b*, that the sun stood *in the midst* of heaven. Mark the Hebrew phrase *bachatsi*; not somewhere in the midst of heaven in an indefinite sense (*bethôkh*), but at the point where the course of the sun is divided in two equal parts. It was midday! That circumstance does not at all favour the supposition that Joshua was prompted to his wish by fear that time would fail him to achieve his victory. What the circumstance suggests is that Joshua and his men felt oppressed by the heat of the day. Therefore Joshua asked that the burning sky, poetically described as the light of sun and moon, might “cease,” might be covered by clouds so that the children of Israel could continue fighting.

* * * * *

C. We have been detained long enough by expounding presumptions suggested by the text. It is time to come

now to a more distinct proof, from the context, that the view which we are proposing is at least the most probable one.

Let us consider at what point in the succession of the facts described Joshua asked that sun and moon might “ cease ” ? Not after the battle was over of course, but during the battle. Now, the description of the battle is given and brought to an end in verses 9–11 : Joshua came up against the five Amorite kings during the whole night ; he defeated them severely at Gibeon, routed them and pursued them in their flight as far as Azekah and Makkedah . . . And as an epilogue of the whole description the narrator states at the end of verse 11 that many more of the enemy were killed by the hailstones than by the sword of the children of Israel. This evidently is a closing sentence. When, thereupon, the author in verse 12 turns to his account of the sun-miracle with the words : “ Then Joshua spoke to the Lord ” . . . , the meaning is not : *after that* Joshua spoke to the Lord ; because after that the battle was over and Joshua and his army returned into the camp of Gilgal and stayed there until the news reached him that the five kings had hid themselves in a cave at Makkedah. The meaning is : it was then, it was on that occasion that Joshua spoke to the Lord. . . . Other examples of such an emphatic use of the Hebrew particle *'az* might easily be adduced, but in the present case it is sufficiently clear of itself. Moreover the narrative most explicitly illustrates the purport of the particle : “ *Then* Joshua spoke to the Lord, *in the day that he delivered the Amorite in the sight of the children of Israel.* ” . . . The author in verses 12–14 turns back to the story of the battle already narrated in verses 9–11, in order to bring into prominence the extract of the Book of the Just recording the celebrated incident of Joshua’s successful prayer which had taken place on that occasion.

And what had really happened during the battle ? We

know it from the description in verse 11. Here we are told that whilst the enemy was fleeing before the children of Israel God threw great stones on them, and that many more were killed by the hailstones than by the sword.

Thus, as a fact, during the battle, whilst Joshua was pursuing the enemy, the sky was suddenly covered by heavy hailclouds; on the other hand Joshua's prayer concerning sun and moon occurred during that same battle, and some particulars in the narrative pointed already to the conclusion that the prayer had no other object than to ask for the darkening of the heavens at midday. Would it not have been most surprising if in the description of the battle in verses 10-11 nothing had been said at all of the stupendous occurrence to which verses 12-14 refer?

The inference which forces itself upon our mind is that the rising and spreading of the hailclouds and the “ceasing” of sun and moon for which Joshua had prayed were materially one and the same thing. The miracle consisted not in the stopping of the astronomical movement of the celestial bodies, but in the sudden covering of the sky by heavy clouds. Joshua obtained more than he had asked for. He had wished for the darkening of the sky as a relief for his men; and the darkening was granted not only as a relief for his men, but at the same time as a fatal catastrophe for the enemy.

Sun and moon stayed on that occasion in the same manner as it is said in the canticle of Habakkuk (iii. 11), that during the storm accompanying God's self-revelation sun (and) moon *stay* in their abode, so that there is no other light than that of God's arrows and the lightning of his spear.

III.

Looking only at the wording of the second part of the narrative, in verses 13b-14, the conclusion which we have

reached in our study of the first part would seem to be contradicted here in the most decided manner. For in verses 13*b*–14 it is plainly stated that the sun stood still in the midst of heaven *and did not hasten to go down*.

An objection might even be raised on this account against the method which we choose to follow in our handling of the whole question. Should we not have contrived to explain the poetical and more or less equivocal record of verses 12–13*a*, according to the luminous and explicit description in verses 13*b*–14, instead of trying to distort the latter from its natural meaning in order violently to adapt it to the result of mere subjective speculation? If this were all we intended to do the method of course would be mistaken. But we do not propose to distort any statement from its natural meaning. As for our way of dealing with the problem one has to consider that according to the biblical narrative itself the first part of it consisted of a preexisting and independent record, into the proper meaning and purport of which it was right to inquire *à part* from the consideration of the following and later description concerned with a subsequent development of facts. Then, what ambiguity there may have been in the extract from the Book of the Just considered by itself we hope to have dissipated, not by subjective speculation, but by pointing out some particulars and facts which no one has a right to overlook. The parallelism, for instance, of the episode of the sun-miracle as narrated in verses 12–14 with the description of the battle in verse 11 is one such fact. The circumstance that, according to the second part of our narrative itself, the sun stood in the midst of the heaven, is another, contradicting the current assumption that Joshua was concerned about the lengthening of daylight.

If it had been stated in the description, verses 13*b*–14,

that the sun stood still in the midst of heaven for four or five hours or so, we should have been puzzled very much indeed. But now we read that “the sun stood still in the midst of heaven and hasted not to go down for the space of a *complete day* (*keyôm tāmîm*).” The sun is supposed to have stood still for twenty-four hours, so that the famous day must have been of double length, a day of forty-eight hours. This may help us, paradoxical though the assertion may seem, to convert the objection from verse 13*b* against our interpretation of the narrative into an argument in its favour. We are able indeed from our standpoint to account in the simplest way for the circumstance that the staying of the sun lasted about a complete day, that is twenty-four hours. But for the twenty-four hours, there would probably never have been question of a standing still of the sun. The second part of the narrative fits exactly into the first as illustrated by our commentary. Let us suppose that the clouds which at midday, at Joshua’s prayer, darkened “sun and moon” persisted until night, and that, owing to the extraordinary perturbation of the atmosphere, they were not dispelled until the middây following, so that people could not perceive from which point of the sky, during the afternoon of the first day and the forenoon of the second, the dim sunlight was coming, what would have been the result? About noon of the second day the sun would reappear in the sky at nearly the same spot where it had vanished the day before. It had not been seen to hasten towards its setting; as far as experience went it had stayed, of course for a complete day, in the midst of the heaven; the one day, made up of the forenoon of the first day and the afternoon of the second, had been as long as two ordinary days. That would be exactly what is told by our narrative and held by early Jewish tradition. Let us remember that the text does not speak of a lengthening

of *daylight*, but of the lengthening of the day's duration for the space of a “complete day” or twenty-four hours.

It should be distinctly noticed that the mention of the standing of the sun in verse 13*b* is not introduced in our narrative as an explanation or comment on the phenomenon recorded in the first part of the narrative. In the Hebrew text the story goes straight forward: *And the sun stood still . . .* etc. The particles *itaque* in the Vulgate = *so* in the Douai version, are added by the translators. In the Hebrew verses 13*b*–14 are framed as a record of something new by which the wonderful miracle was completed.

As regards the terms in which the facts are described in verses 13*b*–14, one could account for them in two different ways. One might admit that the author speaks of the standing of the sun, of its not going down, according to the direct experience of the witnesses: *the sun stood still, it did not hasten to go down . . .*; that means: *to practical observation things appeared as if* the sun had stood still; *it was not seen* to have hastened towards its setting and to have risen again; when it reappeared it was still, or seemed to be still, not again, in the same place where it was twenty-four hours before; the sun apparently had not moved! . . . But it is also possible that the author, writing some considerable time after the event, as appears from his quoting the Book of the Just, simply follows the meaning or interpretation put on the phenomenon by the people and held by tradition. “(Septuaginta)—thus S. Jerome,¹—*prophetam quoque non dixerunt Ananiam, ne scilicet prophetam viderentur dicere qui propheta non erat. Quasi non multa in Scripturis sanctis dicantur juxta opinionem illius temporis quo gesta referuntur, et non juxta quod rei veritas con-*

¹ S. Hier., *In Jerem.* xxviii. 10–11 (Migne, P. L. xxiv. Opp. S. Hier. tomus iv.: col. 855).

tinebat. . ." And in another place: ¹ "*Consuetudinis Scripturarum est ut opinionem multorum sic narret historicus quomodo eo tempore ab omnibus credebatur. Sicut Joseph ab ipsa quoque Maria appellabatur pater Jesu, ita et nunc Herodes dicitur contristatus quia hoc discumbentes putabant.*" We are very well aware that the so-called difficulties which St. Jerome in both passages is about to clear up by an application of the principle of exegesis he so strongly asserts, could and in part must be explained in a different way. But the readiness of the "Doctor Maximus" in appealing to it even without necessity only makes it the more manifest how deeply convinced he was of the principle itself that there are "many things" told in Scripture, not according to the objective truth of the facts, but according to what was commonly held about them by the people. When it is said (Matthew xiv. 9) that Herod *was sorry* because the daughter of Herodias had asked for the head of St. John the Baptist, St. Jerome sees no harm in remarking that Herod was not really sorry, that he was rather glad; but the witnesses held him to be sorry, and the Evangelist speaks according to the opinion of the witnesses. So also, and perhaps with more right, one might say: when after the storm, in Joshua's story, the sun reappeared in the sky at the very place where it had been seen for the last time the day before, there would have been first an impression, then an opinion, and soon a fixed belief among the people who witnessed the facts, that the sun on the famous occasion of Joshua's victory had not moved for a complete day. And the biblical author would have told the story according to popular belief.

To account for such a popular belief as occasioned by the clouding of the sky during twenty-four hours, one would

¹ Id. *In Matt.* xiv, 8 (Migne, P. L. xxvi.; opp. S. Hier. tomus vii., col. 98),

have to be mindful of the extraordinary nature of such an occurrence under the climatic conditions of Palestine ; the more as the succession of events after the celebration of the Phase recorded in Joshua v. 10 points to midsummer as the approximate date of the battle of Gibeon. Taking into account all the circumstances of the fact the miracle was not less real for being of a meteorological rather than of an astronomical character.

Of the two possible views just proposed concerning the form of the description in verses 13*b*–14, the former one assuming that the author speaks according to practical observation and appearances, might seem the more probable on the ground of the remarks following.

IV

We have mentioned early Hebrew tradition as upholding our interpretation of the Joshua story. Such a tradition, or rather the traditional interpretation of the very narrative of the Book of Joshua among the ancient Jews, is embodied in Joshua's eulogy in Ecclesiasticus xlv. 5–6 : “ Was not the sun stopped in his anger, and one day made as two ? He called upon the most high Sovereign when the enemies assaulted him on every side, and the great and holy God answered him by hailstones of exceeding great force. . . . ” In the recently discovered Hebrew text,¹ the passage runs :

4. Did not through him the sun stay—one day become like unto two ?

5. For he called upon God the most High—when pressing on him were the enemies round about ;

and God the most High answered him by stones of hail, by stones of ice. . . .

Here we are first informed distinctly that one day was

¹ *Ed.* Israel Lévi.

made as long as two ordinary days. But what is of the greatest interest for us is that Ecclesiasticus explicitly states that the stopping of the sun was nothing but a particular aspect of the hailstorm. The sun stayed and one day was made like unto two, *for* Joshua called upon God. . . . The intimate connexion of verse 5 with verse 4 in the original Hebrew is to be carefully noted ; verse 5 is meant as an exposition of how the fact which is recorded in verse 4 was brought about. Joshua called upon God the most High : when and how did Joshua call upon God ? Of course when he said : “Sun, cease at Gibeon ! . . .” ; so much is implied in the connexion established by Ecclesiasticus between the staying of the sun and Joshua’s prayer. And how was Joshua’s prayer fulfilled, what was the result of his calling upon God ? God answered him by hailstones ! The statement is perfectly clear ; the stopping of the sun was a phenomenon implied in the hailstorm.

Let us, as one last remark, point out that the narrator in the Book of Joshua closes his account of the sun-miracle by reminding the reader that the stopping of the sun was in some way identical with God’s fight for Israel. God fought for Israel by the hailstones, as we are told in verse 11. When now at the end of verse 14 the author proclaims that there was not before nor after such a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man and “fighting for Israel,” he makes us understand that just as according to Ecclesiasticus the stopping of the sun was nothing but an aspect of the hailstorm, so also the hailstorm was nothing but an aspect of the stopping of the sun.

On account of the traditional interpretation of the narrative as recorded by Ecclesiasticus, and of the apparent consciousness of the author of the narrative himself concerning the real character of the facts, we are of opinion that the description in verses 13b–14 was intended to refer

to things as they had experimentally seemed to be, not to things as they were held by popular belief to have really been.

A. VAN HOONACKER.

EXPOSITORY NOTES ON THE EPISTLE TO
THE PHILIPPIANS.

i. 3 : εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ μου ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ μνηίᾳ ὑμῶν.

This is no melancholy prisoner. It is the same Paul who, years earlier, sang aloud at night in the jail at Philippi ; but here it is not simply confidence in God's power to keep and deliver him, it is thanksgiving for his friends at Philippi far away. Paul has always something to thank God for, and this time it is human loyalty. So much is clear. What is not quite so clear is the definition of this loyalty, the precise occasion for his gratitude to God. The words ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ μνηίᾳ ὑμῶν may mean either "every time I recall or mention you (in my prayers)" or "for all your remembrance of me," "for all your mindfulness." The former rendering would tally with 1 Thessalonians i. 2, where Paul thanks God whenever he mentions the Thessalonians in prayer. The latter suits the following phrase in verse 7 (διὰ τὸ ἔχειν με ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμᾶς), and the reference in iv. 10 (ἐχάρην δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ μεγάλως ὅτι ἤδη ποτὲ ἀνεθάλετε τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ φρονεῖν) more aptly,. In writing this letter Paul has three main objects ; he wants to cheer them up, to pull them together, and to thank them for a practical expression of their sympathy. This third aim is in his mind as he dictates not only the closing but the opening paragraph of the letter ; he is delighted at what they have "contributed" to the gospel ((ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), and this contribution ¹ includes the fin-

¹ This "financial" use of *κοινωνία* is not uncommon ; see 2 Cor. ix. 13, Rom. xv. 26, and Heb. xiii. 16, for example. Here *κοινωνία* is larger

ancial aid which they had sent to Paul repeatedly. They had not forgotten him in his absence, and they had “remembered” him in a tangible and effective manner. He begins, therefore, by expressing his thanks for this contribution, for in telling them that their help made him thank God he is delicately thanking them. Practical sympathy is precious to a man thus shut out from his friends, and he rejoices that they have remembered him and remembered him with such a present. This rendering brings out a subtle thought in his use of *φρονεῖν*. The *φρονεῖν* of the Philippians for him (iv. 10) is answered by a *φρονεῖν* of him for them which has to be of a different kind; he cannot and need not send them money in return, but he can cherish great and good hopes of their religious prospects (i. 7 *καθὼς ἐστὶν δίκαιον ἐμοὶ τοῦτο φρονεῖν ὑπὲρ πάντων ὑμῶν*). They had shown an active interest in his mission all along, they had kept in touch with him, sent him funds whenever they had the opportunity, and prayed for him. All this is implied in *πάσῃ τῇ μνείᾳ ὑμῶν*. It was the first thing which rose before his mind as he began the letter, and he tells them how grateful he was to God for it. For it was God’s doing, a “good work” (ver. 6) which He had begun in their life, i.e., this practical expression of service and co-operation which constitutes the Christian vocation in one aspect. The impulse of generosity which had prompted them to this act of thoughtful kindness was, in Paul’s view, a fresh proof that the divine movement was carrying them forward, and would carry them on like

“the rushing tide
Which rises to the level of the cliff
Because the wide Atlantic rolls behind.”

* * * * *

i. 9: *καὶ τοῦτο προσεύχομαι* (catching up *τὴν δέησιν*

than “contribution” in the sense of funds, but the financial tinge is visible,

ποιούμενος from ver. 4, and defining it), ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ὑμῶν (as evinced in your κοινωνία) ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον περισσεύῃ ἐν ἐπιγνώσει καὶ πάσῃ αἰσθήσει.

As in the case of the Thessalonian ¹ Church, so with this other Macedonian Church, he can assume the existence of a warm Christian affection among the members. What he cannot assume is that this affection will be intelligent and sufficiently open-eyed. There may be love as well as zeal οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν. But Christian love, which has been defined as "devotion to the ends of God in human personality," requires a wise and careful perception of what these ends are and of what they involve in any given case. Christian love is not to be mere impulse, a vague wish to do good. It starts with this instinctive desire, and it is so rare and precious a gift, in this world of selfishness, that one almost feels disinclined to criticise or advise it. But it is too precious to be left untrained. The Christian affection is not stupid amiability; it is, or it ought to be, more than a well-meaning disposition or a goodwill which takes men at their face-value without any attempt to study their characters and conditions. It is true that love, religious or sexual, brings with it a certain tact and insight of its own, but this insight cannot dispense with shrewdness and discrimination. Nothing lasting can be achieved without this vision of the heart, but the vision may be deceived or obstructed. Over and again, in the history of the Church, mistakes are made and opportunities missed by unenlightened love; by itself, love is no security for a wise and fruitful life; nothing can be done without the sanction of disinterested love, but something must be done with it, if it is not to prove ultimately mischievous to oneself and others, or at least less effective than it might be. This seems to

¹ 1 Thess. iv. 9 f. : περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς θεοδιδακτοὶ ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους· καὶ γὰρ ποιεῖτε αὐτὸ κτλ.

be the apostle's point in his prayer. "Let the warm heart develop the faculties of the cold brain! It requires some thinking and experience to discharge the varied relationships in which you find yourselves set throughout the home and the Church. It is my prayer that your love may be more and more rich in knowledge and all manner of insight," quick to seize opportunities, wise in handling difficult situations, skilful and competent. The letter itself furnishes several illustrations of this need. (i) For example, charity such as the Philippians were showing must be discriminating; to give money wisely, you must carefully consider the circumstances. (ii) Then again, their very affection for Paul had led them to take an unduly despondent view of his imprisonment and its possible effects (i. 12 f.). Thirdly (iii) they had to be put upon their guard against plausible evangelists and teachers (iii. 18 f.). Affectionate people in the Church are most in danger of being imposed upon. Finally (iv) the growth of Christian love requires a recognition of the broad field of morals, a sensitiveness to goodness and truth and honour in every sphere¹ of life (iv. 8). This enrichment of love, the apostle adds, is destined to cover life with a harvest of moral goodness (ver. 11 *πεπληρωμένοι καρπὸν δικαιοσύνης*), and a sentence from Marcus Aurelius (xi. 10) will help to illustrate from the negative side what is meant by *δικαιοσύνη* in this connexion. *Δικαιοσύνη*, the philosophic emperor says, will never be observed, if we are easily deceived (*εὐεξαπάτητοι*) and careless (*προπτωτικοὶ*) and fickle (*μεταπτωτικοὶ*). The apostle similarly warns the Philippian Christians that their love must develop discretion, that they must be intelligent

¹ There is a telling instance of this, or rather of the absence of it, in Newton's narrow suspicion of the circle surrounding Cowper at Olney. The minister, out of sincere affection for Cowper's spiritual welfare, took too narrow and censorious a view of this circle, and Cowper had the sense to protest.

and wary and prudent, if they are to produce the *δικαιοσύνη* which corresponds to Jesus Christ.¹ He who is devoted to others from Christian motives will not be less devoted if he learns to be a good judge of men.

* * * * *

i. 18. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ χαίρω.

In this letter Paul mentions three sources of unselfish joy for himself. (a) One is this satisfaction that the gospel spreads at Rome, even as the result of his imprisonment. It is a note of real magnanimity. There were men in the local community who had been stirred to unwonted activity in the Christian mission by a mean zeal. Whether they were older teachers, jealous of the new-comer's prestige, or Christians of more Jewish sympathies, they appear to have imagined that nothing would exasperate him more than to hear that they were spreading Christianity on lines of which he disapproved. It was a delight to them to think of how he would be irritated. On the contrary, he replies, I am sincerely glad that Jesus Christ is being made better known, whatever be the motives of His heralds.

(b) The second source of unselfish delight is the growth of the Church at Philippi; he recurs to this more than once (e.g. i. 4, ii. 2, 19, iv. 1, 10). It fills him with just pride and joy, to hear and think of their attainments.

(c) the third source is more personal; he rejoices to think that he may be honoured by martyrdom in their interests (ii. 17). "Even if my life-blood is required, I am

¹ From Wesley's *Journal* (Monday, November 5, 1770): "In all England I find no people like those of Norwich. They are eminently unstable as water. Out of two hundred whom I left here last year, sixty-nine are gone already! What a blessing is knowledge when it is sanctified! What stability can be expected without it? For let their affections be ever so lively for the present, yet what hold can you have upon a people who neither know books nor men, neither themselves nor the Bible, neither natural nor spiritual things?"

not sorry ; I am glad to forward your salvation and ratify your faith."

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ii. 16. λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες.

"Holding out the word of life" ? This would carry on the thought of the previous verse, provided that the thought is of influence upon the outside world. "In all that you do avoid grumbling and disputing, so as to be blameless and innocent,¹ *faultless children of God in a wicked and perverse generation*, where you shine like stars in a dark world" (ἐν οἷς φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ). But does this refer to influence ? Ethically it might, for a quarrelling Church cannot exercise any telling influence upon the outside world ; to do effective service, Christians require to be brotherly, and it is quite a fair plea against bad temper and strife to argue that these are a hindrance to the real vocation of the Church. A Church which knows what its business is in a dark age has no business to be wrangling. One of the safeguards against all this petty discontent is a deeper sense of responsibility for extending the gospel to others. Paul might be pleading here that the Philippians ought to be absorbed in the true mission of a Church outside, instead of letting themselves dispute and quarrel indoors. But ἐπέχοντες rather means "holding fast." The connexion of thought is this : the world is dark, but you are points of light ; don't let yourselves be extinguished, as you will be if you give way to bad temper and strife. Adherence to the gospel implies that steadfast obedience to God, that humble, unselfish spirit, which is equivalent to real "life." Harmony and humility of this divine nature, as he has been arguing in the earlier part of the chapter, are essential not

¹ ἀμεμπτοι καὶ ἀκέραιοι. Euripides describes a yeoman farmer in Argos (*Orestes* 922) as

ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπλήπτον ἡσκηκῶς βίον.

only to the well-being but to the very being of a Church ; only thus is it marked off from the rest of the world. By ἐν οἷς φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ, Paul means not influence but contrast—as we say, the Church ought to be a “ shining contrast ” to the world. The condition of this existence is adherence to the λόγος which brings life, and this is specifically defined as the unselfish spirit which abjures grumbling and party-spirit. It is substantially the idea of the message in Revelation ii. 1–5, where love is the article of a standing Church, to give up loving one another is, for the members of a Church, to fall from the sky of God, no matter how distinguished their past may be, or how brilliant their record. (The modern warning is impressively read by Professor Seeley at the close of his preface to the first edition of *Natural Religion*.) According to Paul, there are two things to do with the λόγος of God ; first to adhere to it ourselves, and then to proclaim it (i. 14 τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ λαλεῖν) ; it is the former and prior duty which he has in mind at this turn of his letter.

This seems, on the whole, to be the application of the text in Augustine's *Confessions* (xxiii. 18) : “ Verbum vitæ superius obtinentes appareamus sicut luminaria in mundo, coherentes firmamento scripturæ tuæ,” although in the context he admits the other rendering.

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ii. 27. ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἡλέησεν αὐτὸν, οὐκ αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα μὴ λύπην ἐπὶ λύπην σχῶ.

The recovery of Epaphroditus was God's mercy, not only to himself, but to Paul. The apostle had trouble and anxieties enough, without the further one of losing his friend, and he acknowledges God's goodness in sparing him this extra grief.

Augustine uses the phrase also in connexion with a friend, but in another sense (*Confessions* ix. 3). When the Milanese

scholar, Verecundus, lent his villa at Cassiciacum to Augustine, for the purpose of a religious "retreat," he remained at Rome, unwilling to join the party. Shortly afterwards he died, but not before he had become a Christian. This sad news reached the party, yet they comforted themselves with the thought that he had not died outside the pale of the Church. "Thus Thou hadst mercy not on him only, but on us also, lest we should be tortured with unbearable grief as we recalled the kindness of our friend to us and yet were unable to count him as one of Thy flock."

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iii. 1-2. τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί μου, χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ.

τὰ αὐτὰ γράφειν ὑμῖν, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐκ ὀκνηρόν, ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλές.
βλέπετε τοὺς κύνας κτλ.

What does Paul repeat? What is the advice which he does not grudge to give once more to his friends? The context does not make it absolutely clear whether the second sentence refers to the preceding words, or whether it is meant to introduce what follows; we cannot be sure what it was that he did not shrink from writing over and again. Was it the warning against these 'curs' of the Jewish faction, the noisy and impudent party which obtruded itself on his mission field? Conceivably this might be the explanation of his words, in which case the sudden break would come after *κυρίῳ*. In his (lost) correspondence with the Philippian Church he may have repeated the warning, and he would now be apologising for recurring to the subject and putting the members of the Church once more on their guard against these mischievous characters. The term *ἀσφαλές* seems to favour this view. The Philippians are not rebuked or reproached, like the Galatians and Corinthians; they have not yielded to the fascination of this party. Still Paul feels there is a danger of their lapse, and so—*ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλές*. Yet the phrase would not be out of

keeping with a reiteration of the counsel to rejoice in the Lord, for Christian joy, as Paul describes its functions, is not a luxury of the faith, but a mark of progress. Has he not already written, εἰς τὴν ἰμῶν προκοπὴν καὶ χαρὰν τῆς πίστεως (i. 25) ? The χαρά of which he speaks is the constant atmosphere of a living confidence in the Lord; χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε· πάλιν ἐρῶ, χαίρετε (iv. 4). It is the bloom on the fruit of faith, a proof of its vitality,¹ not a rare emotion whose presence or absence makes no real difference to the essence of the matter. It is surely conceivable that Paul would regard any failure to “rejoice in the Lord” as a dangerous symptom, and that what he meant was: “I am repeating this word ‘rejoice’ in my letter, but that does not tire me, and it is the safe course for you.” It is never safe to grow dispirited. Christians need to be warned against the temper of melancholy and dulness as much as against false doctrines. Any failure to “rejoice in the Lord” means an imperfect sense of what He is to us, and it is always a safe thing—ἀσφαλές—to be warned of this inward danger.

τὰ αὐτὰ γράφειν ὑμῖν. “It is not sufficiently considered,” Dr. Johnson writes in *The Rambler*, “that men more frequently require to be reminded than informed.”

* * * * *

iii. 15-16. ὅσοι οὖν τέλειοι, τοῦτο φρονῶμεν· καὶ εἴ τι ἐτέρως φρονεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἀποκαλύψει· πλὴν εἰς ὃ ἐφθάσαμεν, τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν.

“Perfect” as a rendering of τέλεισι here, misleads; it suggests no need of further advance, and this is not what the apostle meant. “Mature” is less objectionable. “Ὅσοι οὖν τέλειοι means “all those of our number who are mature,”

¹ “Rara virtus, ubi nos crucis amaritudine exacerbare molitur Satan, ut insuave sit Dei nomen, in solo gratiae Dei gustu acquiescere, ut molestiae omnes, dolores, curae, mœrores [dulcescant.” But Calvin prefers to take τὰ αὐτὰ κτλ as referring to the following warning.

or initiated into the real sense of Christianity; *τέλειοι* denotes Christians capable of advanced teaching, who are beyond the elements of the faith, but not yet with their religious education finished. The *τέλειος* is one who is not simply past the rudiments, but on the right road, one who has formed a clear idea of the true end before him, and who is constantly making progress towards that end.¹ A passage from Epictetus brings this out. "How long," he asks (*Enchir.* 51), "are you still going to put off thinking you are worthy of what is best? . . . You are no longer a child but already a mature man (*ἀνὴρ ἤδη τέλειος*). Well, if you are careless and idle and always postponing the day when you are going to attend to yourself, you will unconsciously be making no progress (*οὐ προκόψας*), you will live and you will die uneducated (*ιδιώτης*). Now then, consider you are bound to live like a grown man (*τέλειος*), making progress."

Φροεῖν has a striking range of application in this epistle; here at any rate it denotes thought determining motives, and through motives conduct. "Let this be our point of view." "God will reveal that (*καὶ τοῦτο*) to any of you who look at things differently." But this agreement may take some time. So meantime, let us live up to the light we have: "only, we must let our steps be guided by such truth as we have attained." Faithfulness to the light we have is the condition of receiving fuller light. Paul is sure that God will not let sincere souls remain unenlightened on such important matters, matters that cause divergence of opinion from the rest of the Church. Only, it is to the upright that light rises in the darkness, and uprightness here implies a conscientious fulfilment of such duties as are already clear to the mind and heart. The Greek might also be rendered, "let us walk on the same path," i.e., let us keep

¹ As he had just said of himself, *κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω*,

the unity of the Church and the faith, even when we differ temporarily in opinion. But the former interpretation suits the context rather better.

* * * *

iii. 17, 18 καθως ἔχετε τύπον ἡμᾶς · πολλοὶ γὰρ περιπατοῦσιν κτλ.

Richard Baxter, in *Gildas Salvianus* (ch. i.), gives this warning to the ministers of Worcester:—"Take heed to yourselves . . . lest you may unsay that with your lives which you say with your tongues, and be the greatest hinderers of the success of your own labours. It much hindereth our work when other men are, all the week long, contradicting to poor people in private that which we have been speaking to them from the Word of God in public ; because we cannot be at hand to manifest their folly ; but it will much more hinder if we contradict ourselves, and if your actions give your tongue the lie. . . . One proud, surly, lordly word, one needless contention, one covetous action, may cut the throat of many a sermon." Paul could appeal to his personal example, when he warned the Philippians against these errorists. When the Church encountered them, it could say, "that is not how Paul lived," as well as, "that is not how Paul taught."

* * * *

iii. 18. πολλοὶ γὰρ περιπατοῦσιν, οὓς πολλάκις ἔλεγον ὑμῖν, νῦν δὲ καὶ κλαίων λέγω, τοὺς ἑχθροὺς τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Why καὶ κλαίων ? Because his sensitive nature had had its self-control weakened by the long imprisonment ? Not altogether. This sudden emotion is the distress of all honourable men at any discredit brought by others on the cause which is dearer to them than life itself. It is a poignant grief to have the cause misrepresented and degraded by some who profess to follow it. Against the Judaist party outside the Church (iii. 2 f.) he warns the Philippians

indignantly. But when he turns to Christians who were degrading the gospel of spiritual freedom by sitting loose to moral sanctions, he is broken-hearted ; his grief overcomes him for the moment. To think that liberty can be paraded as licence by Christian teachers ! It makes him weep for shame and sorrow. These are not the tears of self-pity, or of a highly-strung nature which has been unmanned by a prolonged physical and nervous strain ; they are the tears of a strong man, forced from him by the conduct of fellow-soldiers who openly discredit the honour of the cause. These "perfectionists" presumed on their spiritual position, as if that exempted them from crucifying their passions and controlling their bodily appetites. They probably taught that the moral law no longer existed for those who were "in Christ," ¹ and this cut Paul to the heart.

There is an illustration in Carlyle's *Historical Sketches* (pp. 20 f.), in the description of Charles I's Third Parliament, when the members, under the solemn stress of opposing the king, broke into tears at the unconciliatory message from the throne. Carlyle's comment is : "Men in these days do not usually weep ; men usually are not in earnest enough for weeping. 'It is a touching thing,' says Diderot (of his father) 'to see men weep.' I call it a scandalous condition of affairs, in which one cannot weep except for the loss of one's bun."

The reason for Paul's tears is exemplified by a remark in one of Mr. Gladstone's letters to the Duchess of Sutherland (Morley's *Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 185) : "There is one proposition which the experience of life burns into my soul ; it is this, that man should beware of letting his religion spoil his

¹ The same movement threw up later forms of antinomianism, which are opposed in the First Epistle of John, and subsequently in the gnostic aberrations of the second century. It was a successor of these perfectionists who said, during the latter part of last century in England, "The believer's conflict with sin is all stuff !"

morality. In a thousand ways, some great, some small, but all subtle, we are daily tempted to that great sin. To speak of such a thing seems dishonouring to God ; but it is not religion as it comes from Him, it is religion with the strange and evil mixtures which it gathers from abiding in us."

Dr. John Duncan used to say that "the best preaching is, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and keep the Ten Commandments."

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iv. 5. τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὑμῶν γνωσθήτω πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.

Τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, forbearance, the good temper which will not always insist on having its own way—a special virtue in communities and families. The very force of the Christian faith developed strong personalities in a Church like that of Philippi, people whose sheer vitality became a temptation to self-assertion. It was an old vice of the Greek communities. "There is something strangely pathetic," says Mr. F. W. H. Myers (*Hellenica*, pp. 403 f.), in finding a broken lead plate at Dodona with "the imploring inquiry of the fierce and factious Corcyreans—made, alas! in vain—'to what God or hero offering prayer and sacrifice they might live together in unity'." The Philippians, on a lesser scale, were reminded by Paul that they owed people the sight of an harmonious society, and that the disposition which can yield is essential to the peace of the Church. To insist on one's rights or opinion at all costs in the business of the Church is sometimes regarded as a note of strength, but the really strong Christian, Paul implies, knows how to give way, and how to give way gracefully. It is not always so. Mrs Wawle, in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, "was accustomed to think that entire freedom from the necessity of behaving agreeably was included in the Almighty's intention about families," and her opinion has been widely shared by members of God's household. Perhaps Paul had

women, like Euodia and Syntiche, in mind when he dictated this counsel—we know them, men as well as women, excellent people, good workers, but touchy, crotchety, difficult to get on with, because they are so inconsiderate of other people's feelings and so overbearing even in their plans for Christian service.

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iv. 6. μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τὰ αἰτήματα ὑμῶν γνωρίζεσθω πρὸς τὸν θεόν (coram Deo).

Μετὰ εὐχαριστίας—a note of the devotional life derived from the higher reaches of Jewish piety. In the psalter and among the devout rabbis. thanksgiving formed an indispensable feature of prayer; petition rose on the wings of gratitude. Paul had struck this note already in his advice to the Colossians (iv. 2): τῇ προσευχῇ προσκαρτερεῖτε, γρηγοροῦντες ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐν εὐχαριστίᾳ, where the second clause means, “maintain your zest for prayer by ‘thanksgiving.’” To believe that God will answer prayer and fulfil our petitions, we must refresh ourselves with the evidence of His willingness in the past to do us good and be mindful of past benefits; before we ask for something we have not got, we must thank God for what we do have from His hand already. Thankfulness gives us confidence in our petitions; it also makes them modest.

Pusey's comment is (*Spiritual Letters of E. B. Pusey*, p. 110): “Thanksgiving is a great nourisher of love and of peace too, as God tells us; ‘In everything by prayer and supplication *with thanksgiving* let your requests be made known unto God: and the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus.’ Observe that *and*; pray, thank, and the peace will come.” True, but thanksgiving has a vital connexion with prayer which also should be noted. To make any request to God humbly and wisely, one must cherish a

grateful sense of what He is to us and has already done for us. His lovingkindness towards us is always being "continued"; it is not something we need to awaken in Him, and yet that is the impression often left by urgent petitions which have omitted to acknowledge His grace and goodness hitherto.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE PLACE OF THE SACRAMENTS IN THE TEACHING OF ST. PAUL.

THE tendency of modern Free Church theologians has been either to ignore the sacramental elements in the teaching of St. Paul or to assume that his views were in accord with their own. Bruce, for instance, attacked with the utmost vigour the position of Weiss that "baptism is the second great principle of salvation not less indispensable for regeneration or the reception of the Holy Spirit than faith is for justification," and maintained that "it is not necessary, in order to do full justice to the Apostle's argument, to assign to baptism more than a symbolical significance."

In recent years, however, the pendulum of criticism has swung in the opposite direction, and the position represented by Bruce has been challenged from many quarters. The attack is all the more significant because it has come from scholars who cannot be suspected of the slightest bias towards sacramentarianism. We may take as illustrations of the new movement the following statements.

Wernle, in his *Beginnings of Christianity*,¹ says, "It was Paul who first created the conception of a Sacrament . . . He would have baptism regarded as a miracle and a mystery. The baptized convert should believe that he steps forth from the water a different person from what he

¹ E. T., i. pp. 273, 274.

was when he entered it. . . . It appears to us to-day exceedingly strange that the hero of the word should at the same time have become the creator of the Sacrament."

Pfleiderer, in his *Primitive Christianity*,¹ is equally definite in his statement that in the theology of St. Paul "baptism appears as the foundation of the life in the Spirit and at the same time as the *means* by which He is communicated."

Kirsopp Lake, in his *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*,² regards this interpretation of St. Paul's teaching as absolutely incontrovertible. "Baptism is for St. Paul and his readers universally and unquestioningly accepted as a 'mystery' or sacrament which works *ex opere operato*: and from the unhesitating manner in which St. Paul uses this fact as a basis for argument, as if it were a point on which Christian opinion did not vary, it would seem as though this sacramental teaching is central in the primitive Christianity to which the Roman Empire began to be converted."

The same conclusion has been reached by scholars of such diverse outlook as Weinel, Feine, Titius, Heitmüller, and Schweitzer (to mention but a few), all of whom—some of them with extreme reluctance—have come to the decision that the sacramental principle is a vital element in the teaching of St. Paul.

If there is any sound basis for this new movement, it is perfectly clear that a very serious problem will be raised for Free Church Theology—or at any rate for that section of it which has been in the habit of regarding the sacraments as merely symbolical. The whole question of the doctrine of the sacraments will need to be re-examined in the light of modern criticism and "the comparative method" of investigation.

¹ E. T., i. p. 387.

² P. 385.

I.

Let us examine the case upon which the sacramental interpretation of Paulinism rests and let us deal first of all with the question of Baptism.

At first sight the arguments in support of the position of Bruce and Holtzmann, who deny that Baptism was anything more than a symbol to the mind of St. Paul and his converts, appear to be very weighty.

(1) In the first place Paul never works out in detail his doctrine of Baptism as he does his doctrine of justification by faith. His position has to be determined from incidental allusions and stray references, and there are less than a dozen of these in the whole of the Epistles that bear his name. If Baptism was as fundamental to Paul as modern critics assume, how are we to explain the paucity of his references to the subject? If he regarded it as an essential factor in the process of regeneration, why is there no reference to it in the first five chapters of the Epistle to the Romans which explain his doctrine of salvation?

(2) On one occasion in writing to the Corinthians (1 Cor. i. 14-17) Paul makes the definite statement, "I thank God that I baptized none of you save Crispus and Gaius . . . for Christ sent me, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel." Now if baptism was regarded by St. Paul as the vehicle by means of which Divine grace was communicated to the recipient, could the Apostle have written a sentence of this sort? Would he not have been bound to feel that in refusing baptism he was depriving his Corinthian converts of a necessary means of grace? Does not the very form of the sentence—"to preach and *not* to baptize"—imply a disparagement of the rite of Baptism, as being something of altogether secondary and subordinate importance?

(3) The famous *locus classicus* in Romans vi., on which

such stress is laid by the modern exponents of Pauline sacramentarianism—"We who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death," need not necessarily bear the construction that is put upon it. We must not forget the strain of poetry in the temperament of St. Paul. As Bruce puts it, "It cannot be shown that baptism is for the Apostle more than a familiar Christian institution which he uses *in transitu* to state his view of the Christian life in vivid, concrete terms which appeal to the religious imagination. He employs it in his free poetic way as an aid to thought, just as elsewhere he employs the veil of Moses and the allegory of Sarah and Hagar."

(4) The sacramentarian interpretation of Baptism seems to be absolutely opposed to the general tenour of St. Paul's theology taken as a whole. Weinel admits the discrepancy between the two halves of Paulinism—the spiritual and the sacramental. "In St. Paul's writings we have the two forms of religion—the sacramental and the purely spiritual—standing side by side without any attempt at co-ordination. At one time it is faith that brings the Spirit, at another time baptism; sometimes it is faith that unites with Christ, sometimes the Lord's Supper. These two series of conceptions have not as yet been united under any one system. They cannot be harmonised." But is it possible to assume such a hopeless antinomy in the thought of the Apostle? Does not Weinel's inability to discover a *modus vivendi* between the two elements in Paulinism throw suspicion upon his interpretation of the sacraments? Moreover, are we to suppose that Paul, who attacked so stoutly the rite of circumcision and entirely denied its religious value, would have allowed himself or anybody else to substitute another ordinance, equally external and equally physical, in its place? Is there any argument which Paul urged against circumcision which does not *mutatis mutandis*

apply to the sacramentarian conceptions which these modern writers read into his statements about Baptism ?

III.

These arguments, however, though *prima facie* they appear to be weighty, are nothing like so convincing when we come to examine them. In the first place, it is not a sound canon of criticism to assume that there is any *ratio* between the importance of a subject and the amount of space devoted to it in the Epistles. The paucity of the references to Baptism need imply no more than the fact that it was not a subject of controversy and that it was not therefore necessary for St. Paul to write at length about a matter upon which all sections of the Church were unanimous. There were so many points of disagreement which needed discussion and argument, that it need occasion no surprise that the Apostle passes lightly over such a topic as Baptism upon which there is no indication that any difference of opinion existed.

In the second place, Paul's statement, "Christ sent me not to baptize but to preach," must be read in the light of the context. Paul is protesting against the party spirit in the Church of Corinth and rejoices that he himself had never done anything to create or accentuate it. If Paul refused to baptize his converts at Corinth with his own hands, the explanation may be, not that he undervalued the rite, but that he wished to avoid the possibility that the Corinthian Church might regard itself "as baptized in the name of Paul," and so consciously or unconsciously place him on the throne which only Christ had the right to occupy. Paul's refusal may simply have been his way of safeguarding the "crown rights of the Redeemer."

The third argument begs the question altogether. Poetry

and mysticism are undoubtedly blended in the opening paragraph of the sixth chapter of Romans, but it is pure assumption to state without further proof that the phrase "as many as were baptized into Christ Jesus" is merely a poetical expression.

There is much more force in the fourth argument. The discrepancy between the spiritual and sacramentarian elements in Paulinism seems at the first view to be fatal. There are two considerations, however, which may serve to mitigate the force of the argument. Are we quite sure that the Apostle Paul ever wrought out his theology into a harmonious system? Are there not other indications in the Epistles of theological impulses which are not always co-ordinated? Do we not sometimes find other cases of antinomy in Pauline thought? Is it much more easy to relate the juridical and the mystical sides of Paulinism than it is to find a place for the sacramentarian in relation to the other two elements in his theology? Or again, we may adopt an alternative explanation. We may say that the apparent discrepancy between the sacramentarian and the spiritual sides of Paulinism may be due to the limitations of our own understanding. It exists for us, but it did not exist for Paul. We may yet be able to discover the higher unity in which the seeming antinomies are resolved. There are three facets which gleam from the crystal of Paulinism—the juridical, the mystical, and the sacramental. Some men see only one facet, and very few see all three, and these few are lost in wonder that three such different rays of light can emanate from the same source.

IV.

So far we have only shown that the arguments which can be marshalled in support of the contention of Bruce and Holtzmann are not necessarily final. The real weakness of

these arguments, however, lies in the fact that they do not explain the whole of the data. There are some statements in the Epistles which seem to make it absolutely impossible to suppose that the Apostle Paul regarded the rite of Baptism as nothing more than a beautiful symbol.

Let us take, for instance, the reference to Baptism in 1 Corinthians vi. 11. "Be not deceived ; neither fornicators nor idolaters . . . shall inherit the kingdom of God. And such were some of you : but *ye were washed* (or *ye washed yourselves*), ye were sanctified, ye were justified." The best commentary on the phrase "ye were washed" is to be found in Acts xxii. 16 where Ananias is represented as saying to Paul on the day of his conversion, "Arise and be baptized and wash away thy sins." In both these statements there seems to be a very definite nexus between Baptism and the forgiveness of sins. It would rob the statement in Corinthians of all its force if we paraphrased the phrase "ye were washed" into "ye were baptized as a symbol of your conversion."

Then there is the remarkable and much debated expression in 1 Corinthians xv. 29, "Those who are baptized for the dead" (*οἱ βαπτίζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*). There is probably no text in the New Testament which has been so violently wrested by exegetes in their efforts to evade the plain meaning of the words. Thirty-six different interpretations of this clause have been enumerated, and thirty-five of them are ingenious attempts to pervert the clear sense of a perfectly unambiguous Greek phrase. There is no reasonable doubt that St. Paul is referring to the practice of vicarious baptism by living Christians on behalf of those who had died in an unbaptized condition. But if Baptism is merely a symbol, how are we to explain the existence of this practice ? The only ground for the origin of such a custom is to be found in the fact that Baptism

was believed to confer some spiritual endowment which could not be obtained in any other way, and it was hoped that vicarious Baptism might remedy the defect for those who had died without it—a defect which otherwise seemed irremediable.

But it is in the Epistle to the Ephesians (which, in spite of the arguments of Dr. Moffatt and other modern scholars, I still hold to be Pauline) that the most indubitable evidence is to be found. Take for instance the great passage in the fourth chapter, where Paul appeals to Christians to maintain the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace on the ground that there is “one body, one spirit, one Lord, one faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all.” Why is Baptism assigned a place in this great hierarchy of spiritual realities? There is no mention of the Eucharist. There is no reference to the Apostolate. If Baptism was merely a symbol and nothing more, it is difficult to find the reason which led St. Paul to set it on so high a pinnacle. But the clearest and most incontrovertible statement is to be found in v. 26: “Christ loved the Church and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify it, *cleansing it by the washing of water with the word.*” These words are perfectly categorical and definite. No amount of ingenuity can eviscerate their clear meaning and significance. They are corroborated by the Epistle to Titus (which, though it was not written by Paul, certainly emanated from the Pauline School), where it is written (iii. 5), “He saved us through the washing of regeneration (*διὰ λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας*), and the renewing of the Holy Spirit.”

In the light of these statements it is difficult to believe that the more neutral phrases, e.g., “baptized into Christ,” “baptized into one body,” imply a merely symbolical interpretation of Baptism.

With this evidence before us, it seems very hard to resist

the conclusion (however little we may like it) that if the Epistles of St. Paul do not enunciate the ecclesiastical doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, they at any rate approximate very closely to it—with this difference, of course, that there is no shred of real proof that Baptism was ever administered to infants in the Apostolic age.

Nor is our impression of the significance of Baptism in St. Paul's conception of Christianity lessened when we come to consider the functions which the sacrament discharges. It seems to play a part in all the initial stages of the Christian experience. It cleanses from the defilement of sin (1 Cor. vi. 11 ; Eph. v. 26). It creates the mystical union between the believer and Christ (Rom. vi. 3 ; Gal. iii. 26), and it is the means by which he is incorporated into the Church as the body of Christ (1 Cor. xii. 13).

V.

We come now to the question of the Eucharist. We are not concerned with any of the critical problems with which this subject bristles. We need not for instance stay to discuss the relation between St. Paul's account of the origin of the Sacrament and the parallel accounts in the synoptic gospels. The only issue which is at all relevant to our investigation is this, "What import did Paul attach to the sacrament and what function did he assign to it in the creation and maintenance of the Christian life ? "

That he regarded it as a memorial feast and related it to his eschatological conception of the Parousia of Christ is of course patent to the most casual reader of 1 Corinthians. "This do in remembrance of me, for as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come." Now if the great passage in 1 Corinthians xi. were all that Paul said upon the subject, and if it ended at verse 27, we should have some justification for maintaining that the

commemorative theory represented his view as to the right interpretation of the sacrament. But there are other statements which seem to make it absolutely certain that such an interpretation does not exhaust the significance which Paul attaches to the Eucharist.

There is, for instance, a passage which is far more important for determining St. Paul's doctrine of the Eucharist than the *locus classicus* in 1 Corinthians xi. It is the remarkable paragraph in the previous chapter (1 Cor. x. 16-21), which commences with the significant words, "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a participation in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a participation in the body of Christ?" The importance of this statement lies in the fact that the reference to the Eucharist is introduced incidentally and forms part of the argument which Paul uses in the discussion of another question. It may therefore be assumed that these words represent not merely the Apostle's own view, but the theory which was universally accepted and regarded as axiomatic by the Christian Church in his day. Another interesting point about this paragraph is the analogy which is drawn between the Christian Eucharist and the feasts in the pagan temples. "The things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to demons and not unto God; and I would not that ye should have any participation (or communion) with demons. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons; ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons." The assumption which clearly underlies these words is the belief that to participate either in the Eucharist or the pagan religious festivals involved also the participation in the nature of the particular deities in whose honour the festival was held. In some mysterious way the life of the God is conveyed into the life of the worshipper through the medium of the material elements which are

consumed in the course of the meal. To St. Paul, therefore, the bread and the wine of the Eucharist are not merely emblems of the sacrifice that was once offered for the sins of the world; they are the vehicle by means of which the virtue of that sacrifice is appropriated by the participant.

Kirsopp Lake is quite right when he sums up the gist of the passage in the words, "St. Paul clearly means that the Corinthians knew quite well that the Eucharist is a rite which really conveys that which the heathen erroneously thought to obtain in their sacrificial meals—that is participation in the Divine Nature"—but he exaggerates the results which follow from this conclusion when he says, "The Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is much more primitive than the Protestant."

Turning back now to the *locus classicus* in chapter xi., it becomes obvious that we must read the passage in the light of Paul's statements in the previous chapter. In the first part of this paragraph there is nothing that is inconsistent with the Zwinglian theory, as it is called. But when we reach the closing verses, ideas are found which seem to transcend that view entirely. Verse 29 is perhaps the strongest illustration of this. "He that eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself if he discern not the body." The last phrase—"if he discern not the body" (*μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα*)—has always been a serious stumblingblock to Protestant commentators. The usual interpretation, "if he distinguish not between the sacramental elements and common food," is too loose a paraphrase to have any claim to be regarded as a fair rendering of the Greek words; it introduces ideas which are not found in the text, and what is more important still, it leaves out of account the ideas that are there. If Paul had wished to say this, he would have said it in a perfectly clear and unambiguous way. Honest exegesis requires us to say

that the phrase "not discerning the body" must be interpreted in the light of Paul's previous statement. "The bread which we break, is it not a participation in the body of Christ?" There are many commentators who regard the body of Christ, in which the Christian participates at the Eucharist, as the heavenly spiritual body which Christ assumed after the Resurrection, and by this means they try to evade the Catholic and Lutheran doctrine of the Sacrament. But the words which Paul puts into the mouth of Christ, at the moment when He was instituting the sacrament, "This is my body, which is [broken] for you" seem to render it unlikely that such a view was really what was in Paul's mind when he wrote the words "not discerning the body."

There is another point, too, which is often overlooked or glossed over by exegetes. St. Paul states most explicitly that the Eucharist produces physical as well as spiritual effects upon the communicant. Speaking of the abuses which existed in the Church at Corinth he says, "For this cause many among you are weak and sickly, and not a few sleep" (verse 30, πολλοὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἄρρωστοι καὶ κοιμῶνται ἱκανοί). These words cannot possibly refer to moral and spiritual deterioration. The two adjectives are frequently used in the New Testament to denote physical maladies, and the second is never used in any other sense. The verb is a technical term employed in the New Testament to describe the sleep of death. The text, therefore, admits of only one interpretation. St. Paul definitely attributes a large number of cases of illness among the Corinthian Christians (many of which had proved fatal) to the misuse of the sacrament of the Eucharist. We can scarcely argue, as Ellicott and some other commentators do, that St. Paul is here describing a unique experience which was peculiar to the Apostolic age. We have no

right to suppose that the ordinary laws of cause and effect were modified in the Apostolic age in order that swifter and more spectacular forms of punishment might be meted out to offenders. There is no evidence to prove that the principle of Divine Retribution adopted a distinctive *modus operandi* in the Apostolic age. We are shut up to the conclusion that St. Paul held that the health of the body no less than the health of the soul is absolutely dependent upon the right use of the sacrament of the Eucharist.

Taking all these facts together, it becomes very doubtful whether any theory that falls short of the Lutheran doctrine of Consubstantiation will adequately explain the utterance of St. Paul in reference to the Eucharist.

VI.

The conclusions which we have reached with regard to the sacramental teaching of St. Paul are corroborated by the scanty references to the subject which we find in the other books of the New Testament. In the appendix to Mark (xvi. 16) Jesus is represented as saying, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." According to this statement there are two conditions necessary to salvation—Faith and Baptism, and we have no warrant for saying that the one is less essential than the other. In the crucial passage in 1 Peter iii. 21, after a reference to the eight souls in the ark who were saved "through water," the writer goes on to add the significant words "which (i.e., water) also in the antitype doth now save you, even baptism." The force of this expression is not cancelled by the sentence which follows, "not the putting away of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience toward God." This latter clause deals simply with the mode in which baptism works, and states that its efficacy consists not in the physical effect produced by the water in cleansing the body, but in

“the interrogation of a good conscience,” whatever this much-debated phrase may mean (a point which does not concern us at this stage of our enquiry). The essential point in the passage is the categorical statement that Baptism is an agency by means of which salvation is rendered possible. The climax of the New Testament statements about Baptism, however, is reached in the words which the author of the Fourth Gospel puts into the mouth of Jesus in the course of his conversation with Nicodemus, “Verily, verily I say unto thee, except a man be born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” There seems to be no way of avoiding the decision that what these words signify is this—Baptism is essential not merely to the *bene esse* (to use a time-honoured expression), but to the very *esse* of the Christian life.

In the light of the reference to Baptism, it seems to be almost impossible not to see an allusion to the Eucharist in the sixth chapter of St. John’s Gospel. The arguments which are used by Westcott and others against such an interpretation of the passage do not seem to me to be very convincing. The crucial phrases, “Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man ye have not life in yourselves,” and “He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life. My flesh is meat indeed and my blood is drink indeed,” seem to be too definite to denote a purely spiritual process. And, moreover, they do not seem to arise naturally out of the situation described in the chapter. We shall not be far wrong if we regard them as the writer’s summary of the Eucharistic doctrine which prevailed in his day. To what extent he is correct in assuming that this doctrine goes back to the teaching of Jesus is another problem which lies altogether outside the province of our present discussion. The only point which we are making now is the argument that the sixth chapter of St. John bears out the interpreta-

tion which we have placed on the Eucharistic utterances of St. Paul.

VII.

If these arguments are sound, we are forced to admit that as far as exegesis is concerned the sacramentarian interpretation of Paulinism has won a decisive victory and the Symbolical school has been driven off the field. There can be no doubt whatever that Baptism and the Eucharist stood for far more in the life of the Apostolic Church than they do in the estimation of the bulk of the members of the Free Churches to-day. The evidence seems to me to be so clear upon this point as to amount almost to demonstrative proof.

Now if this be the case, the problem at once arises, what is to be our attitude towards the situation which has been created for us by the new and more scientific study of Paulinism? There is little hope to be looked for from the renewal of hostilities on the field of exegesis. We might perhaps ease the pressure a little as far as Baptism is concerned if we surrendered the Pauline authorship of Ephesians, but even this would not really restore the position. Sacramentarian ideas are too strongly entrenched in 1 Corinthians, the authenticity of which is unassailable, to make it possible for the sacrifice of Ephesians to bring any real relief. Whether exegesis has spoken its last word upon this subject must of course be a matter of opinion, but as things stand at present there seems little prospect that a new campaign against sacramentarian exegesis would be attended with any considerable success, and modern scholarship will no longer tolerate the subterfuges and devices which used to be employed.

There seem, therefore, to be only two alternatives left open to us. The first alternative is that we should revise

our own conceptions of the sacraments. There is a feeling in some quarters that the Free Churches have never yet entered into the full sacramental heritage, and that to that extent their spiritual life has been beggared and impoverished. No one can read the biographies of the great mediæval saints without realising that there are whole regions of spiritual experience which are a *terra incognita* to ordinary Free Churchmen. What an infinite gulf, for instance, there is between the religious life of St. Catherine of Genoa, the heroine of Baron von Hügel's book on *The Mystical Element in Religion*, and the normal Christian experience of the majority of the members of our Churches to-day! St. Catherine seems to live in one hemisphere, and we in another, and the difference is not so much due to her mysticism as to the place which the sacrament holds in her devotional life. May it not be that in the fervour of our protest against sacerdotalism and a merely mechanical view of religion (a protest that was Divinely inspired and has been abundantly justified by its works) we have allowed our iconoclasm to carry us too far, and as a result we have attached too light a value to ordinances which to other Christians have been not merely "the medicine of immortality and the antidote against corruption," as Ignatius put it, but the mainstay of the faith of the soul in the life that now is?

The first course open to us, therefore, is to advocate a return to the sacramentarian teaching of St. Paul and the other writers of the New Testament. There are two serious difficulties, however, that confront us in this direction. The first is this, we cannot acquiesce in a theological position that involves the dualism which Weinel finds in the antinomy between the spiritual and sacramental elements of Paulinism. We cannot live on a faith that is split up into two unconnected halves. We cannot travel at one and the same time along two parallel roads that never meet. We can never

abandon the spiritual side of Paulinism. It is "bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh." It is woven into the very tissue of our spiritual life. It is the faith in which we "live and move and have our being." Before we can accept the sacramentarian position, we must accomplish what Weinel regards as an absolute impossibility, we must discover the higher unity which combines the two apparently antagonistic strains of thought into an intelligible harmony. But there is a second difficulty equally serious. Is it possible for us to go the length to which Paulinism seems to carry us? We could very easily accept Calvin's interpretation of the Eucharist (which as a matter of fact many of us have always held)—but can we accept Luther's? We can easily appreciate the spiritual value of Baptism as a means of grace, but to maintain that it is one of the essential conditions of regeneration is a different matter altogether and one that would prove a serious stumblingblock to many of us. If Pauline sacramentarianism is indeed all that it seems to be, and if it really involves, as it appears to do, an *ex opere operato* theory of Baptism and a doctrine of the Eucharist that is practically equivalent to Luther's consubstantiationism, it will be very difficult for us to come to terms with it, since it seems to traverse the fundamental principles and convictions which have made us what we are and which seem to us to be the very truth of God.

VIII.

But there is a second alternative open to us, which offers a way of escape from the dilemma. We may argue, as a large number of scholars do to-day, that Pauline sacramentarianism in its more extreme forms is not native to the soil of Christianity, but is one of those alien elements which have filtered into his thought from the atmosphere of the age. Its origin is to be traced, not to the teaching of Jesus

or the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but rather to current beliefs and practices which prevailed in certain pagan forms of religion at the time. Sacramentarianism arose not as the natural evolution of the primal seed of Gospel Truth, which was revealed to the world in the teaching and work of Jesus Christ, but rather as an "involution" or product of its environment.

There is abundant evidence that sacramental ideas analogous to those which we find in St. Paul existed in connexion with the Greek Mysteries and other forms of contemporary religion. Apuleius and Tertullian tell us that a rite of baptism formed the means of entrance into the pagan religious societies connected with the worship of Mithras and Isis and the Mysteries of Eleusis. The poet Ovid protests against the common belief that water could wash away the stain of sin.

Ah, nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina caedis
Flumineâ tolli posse putetis aqua!

One of the best illustrations of the prevailing belief in the efficacy of Baptism is to be found in the famous liturgy of Mithras, edited by Dieterich, though there is some doubt whether the document is really a liturgy and whether it is connected with Mithras worship at all. The significant words for our purpose are these, "Hail to thee, Lord of Water, Founder of the Earth, Ruler of the Spirit . . . born with the birth that begets life, I am redeemed unto death, and go the way which thou hast appointed, as thou hast ordained and instituted the sacrament." We must be on our guard, however, against attaching too much importance to this statement. The origin and character of the document are obscure, and it is quite possible that some of the ideas which it contains may be due to the reflex influence of Christianity itself. Still there seems to be no doubt that a belief akin to the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration was very widely

spread at the time when Christianity was formulating itself. There can be little doubt that large numbers of pagans would have subscribed to the view of Tertullian, "With the increase of the grace of God water also acquired more power : that which once healed ills of the body now restores the soul : that which once worked only temporal good now renews to eternal life ! "

The same phenomenon is also seen in the case of the Lord's Supper, though the analogies are not so close or striking. St. Paul himself suggests the parallel which existed between the Christian Eucharist and the feasts in the heathen temples. And Justin Martyr was so impressed by the resemblance between the Christian and pagan Mysteries that he accused the latter of plagiarising.

It would take too long to go into the details of the evidence, but enough has been said to prove that the atmosphere of the age was charged with sacramental ideas. We know that at a later stage in its history Christianity was very susceptible to the influences of current thought and philosophy. This has been clearly demonstrated in Hatch's *Hibbert Lectures*. May not the infiltration of the environment have commenced at an earlier stage than Hatch supposed and may not the sacramentarianism of St. Paul be one of its products ? There seems no reason to doubt the probability that this was actually the case.

But we have not settled the question (as most people seem to think we have), when we have shown that Paul's sacramental ideas (or at any rate the extreme form which they sometimes assume) penetrated into Christianity from foreign sources. The origin of an idea is no criterion as to its worth. Many of the categories which were used for the interpretation of Christianity in the later creeds were borrowed from Greek philosophy, but that does not in itself prove that the interpretation is unsound. The fact that

Paul borrowed from the Greek Mysteries for the construction which he put upon the Christian sacraments is by no means fatal to the truth of his doctrines. The Greek Mysteries themselves may have been, nay in so far as they represent a genuine quest for God must have been, part of the *Preparatio Evangelica*. It would be no discredit to the author of the Fourth Gospel nor to his theology, if it could be proved that his Prologue was based upon the teaching of Philo, and it is no discredit to the Apostle Paul (nor to his theology) if he borrowed the categories of Greek religion to explain the meaning of the Christian sacraments.

The battle of the sacraments can be settled neither by exegesis nor the historico-critical method of investigation. A decision can only be attained in the higher regions of theology. And we have now reached the point at which a New Testament scholar must hand over the problem to the theologian. The data which have been gathered are (1) The theology of St. Paul involves certain very definite sacramental positions. (2) Analogies to these positions are to be found in the current religious circles of the time. The problem is—Does the second proposition cancel the first? If it does, what are the grounds upon which such a result is attained? This last question can only be answered when we have settled the larger issue, “What is the seat of authority for the Christian Faith?”

HERBERT T. ANDREWS.

*THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD AND THE SONSHIP
OF JESUS.*

III.

WE have accepted the conclusion that the ideas of Religion, which are succinctly contained in the name of Holy Love, owe their strength of conviction and vitality to their prophetic character—the power of expecting and soliciting the historical conditions in which they may be adequately realised. There must, then, be a point at which this demand is fulfilled, if the validity of religious ideas is to be confirmed.

We shall now ask for some explanation of the way in which the Word became Fact. What is the best way to understand the relation between the Fact of Christianity, which is Jesus Christ, and God, who is the source of all the ideas and principles of religion, the “transcendental unity” of all religious experience? It is proposed in this article to put forward as the best and simplest method of explanation the Instinct of Fatherhood—“God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son.”

The parental instinct is the deepest and holiest in the race, and for that reason it should be the most fruitful method of approach to the interpretation of the Fatherhood of God, and the Sonship of Jesus. A man may live deeply and never suspect the presence of this instinct in his nature, and still less that he may owe much to it although he has never been a father. We do not miss what we have not got. But when he becomes a father he realises what a deep need of his nature this instinct is. It is more fundamental than love. The love of man for woman owes the greater part of its quality to the passion for fatherhood. And it is still more true that the love of woman for man springs from the

passion for motherhood. It is the priority of the parental instinct that most of all registers the difference between animal and human affection. The affection which unites the male and female among animals is so much less precious and so much less intensive and enduring than human love because the parental instinct is so shortlived. When its young are taken from it, the animal quickly gets over its loss. But a father and mother may never recover completely from the sudden check by death of the parental instinct. Passion only exists where the parental instinct is developed.

Our chief point of interest at present is the motive of fatherhood. It is a revelation that grows with increasing insight into the new and rapidly developing relationship that has come into existence. It is a wonderful thing for the father to see in his child something that is himself and yet not himself. He sees his own personality set free, acting an independent part, as we see our own selves in dreams acting spontaneously a detached character. In a dream our own counterpart is accepted as an independent personality without any sense of incongruity, dreams being the perfect exemplar of Art in which the improbable is rendered probable without suspicion of effort or artificial contrivance. But Life is not Art ; and when the father sees his counterpart in the character of his child, the sense of the difference between them is maintained with an increasing sense of wonder that it should be so much the same and yet so different. Some fathers are anxious to see the exact repetition of themselves in their children, but the glory of creation is the independence and spontaneity with which the offspring reproduces the original. The motive of fatherhood, then, is the desire to reproduce personality ; not in terms of identity, but in terms of identity and difference ; not as repetition but as independent crea-

tion. It is a phase of the instinct of immortality, and in Aristotle's opinion the instinct of fatherhood was powerfully reinforced in men because it was the nearest substitute they could find for the vain hope of a life beyond the grave.

Now God, the Creator of all fathers, is essentially a Father. He is indeed the Father of all men, but He wanted something more. We speak as men. There is a sense in which we can say that every person is the creator of his own world—his world of scientific or business interests and of associations of friendship. But the average man is not satisfied with this achievement. He wants to be the father of a son who is all his own, in a far more intimate and individual sense than the little world he has created. So God was not content with the world of men and things which He created, the world which is His interest, His business, His care. He wished to have a Son whom He could call His own. It is true that we are all made in His image. But God wanted more than that. He desired to have a Son who is not simply made in His image, but made of His essence; an only-begotten Son who will be Himself, and yet not Himself; a Son who will be substance of His substance and spirit of His spirit, and still be an independent, free creation with a will all His own and a destiny all His own. That man was Jesus Christ.

What God wished to see in this Son was not a perfect reproduction of Himself, a piece of stage automatism, but His own essential nature in free play independently reproduced. The Person of Jesus Christ was not the recapitulation of a heavenly state, in which He reproduced on earth a previous state of personal existence. He was God as Human Personality. We do not bring out the truth about Jesus if we say simply that He was God made man, but God with the incalculable difference that He is made man—possessed of an independent personal will, God wrought

out in flesh and blood, God made manifest as He was never known to exist before either by men or angels. It is an only-begotten Son.

Jesus had a will of His own, just as the child is the image of the father and yet different. Jesus was sinless only in the sense that by His holy will He determined to please His Father and deny Himself, not in the sense that He was incapable of sin. Such a statement will probably provoke the criticism, that the perfection of His character was accidental. But it is forgotten that there is nothing accidental in a perfectly good will. The Temptation rests on the assumption of an independent will, otherwise it is a piece of pure docetism. The assertion of His unity with the Father—"I and the Father are one"—is an implication of difference. In the Temptation we learn that bodily satisfaction, worldly ambition, magical power and political influence could appeal to His mind. This is not the place to consider the objection, that a man who is susceptible of such influences cannot be sinless. It may be sufficient now to indicate the principle, that saintliness does not imply ignorance of evil but a profound appreciation of the power of evil. We are told that *He learnt* obedience by the things that He suffered. He wrought out and confirmed His identity with God by His own independent will. That is why God loved Him so. Like a son who strives to be like his good father, Jesus endeared Himself above all men to God. We know what a good son means to his father. And if God is not a negative, indifferent Existent like the God of the Upanishads, if He is susceptible in any intelligible sense of sorrow or joy, we are bound to affirm that He had a distinctive joy in beholding this crowning glory of His creative Fatherhood. If a father knows how to rejoice in the precious worth of a really good son, what must a pure, sinless person mean to God who

loves Himself only as He loves goodness ? Here was something of imperishable worth, a permanent achievement that outrivalled the creation of the world and man, a person who ought to live for ever *on this earth*, a man who was of such a character that God who alone has life in Himself gave Him also to have life in Himself, a man who ought never to see death because He was the only one who made the world a joy to God.

As we follow the motive of divine Fatherhood further, we strike a deeper note. It is said that God gave His only-begotten Son for the sake of the world. When ? It has been commonly supposed that God gave up His Son at the moment of His birth, that it was then the sorrowful parting took place between Father and Son, that the tragedy which culminated in the death of Jesus began when He left the bosom of the Father. On the contrary, we think that the only intelligible sense in which we can speak of God giving up His Son, was when He gave Him up to die upon the cross. We must abandon statements which are not sufficiently protected against the reproach of being fictitious. We know nothing of the Person of Jesus Christ except what has been seen and heard of Him as He lived and as He died. Whatever we are told concerning His pre-existence, even when it is a New Testament author who speaks, can only be a construction on the evidence of facts ; and while the facts are constant, the construction is variable. If we keep our eyes upon the facts we know it would be much nearer the truth to express our inarticulate thought by saying, that God was never happier than when Jesus Christ was born. He rejoiced in His birth, He rejoiced in His life. If we are to make a distinction of moments at all, we are old-fashioned enough to believe that the death of Jesus was more decisive than either His life or birth, both in respect of His own Sonship and of the Fatherhood of

God. He should have lived as long as this world lasted, because He was the only one who made the world a real joy to God.

But now something dark threatens the joy of Fatherhood. A shadow falls aslant the halo of glory around the head of the darling Son. Was God prepared for this? We speak as men. Did the joy and pride of Fatherhood anticipate where the independent will of Jesus would lead Him? God saw Jesus working out His destiny in the direction of shame, ruin and death. If He has the heart of a father, He must restrain His Son. But He cannot do that. For the Son was only doing what God Himself would have done, He was only living up to the self-sacrificing character of His Father. Is He risking fame and life on a great venture? God cannot disapprove of that. Is He going to compass His own ruin that He may save others? That was the very thing the Father wished Himself to do. Has He become the friend of sinners, despised and rejected of men? More and more like His Father! What then must God do? Can He deny Himself? Can He forbid the destiny Jesus chose for Himself? No, He must make the great renunciation. He must give up this glorious Being, and lay it in the dust. The dream of fatherhood must end, never to be repeated. Never again can God beget a second Jesus. The Joy of the Father must be destroyed, never again to walk the earth as man. He who knew no sin, He whom alone God could love as He can love Himself, was made to be sin. "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son."

In the unutterable grief of the Father and in the shadow of the Son's dark sorrow, Father and Son discovered their closest identity. It was in the death of Jesus that the motive of the divine Fatherhood came to its perfect expression. Jesus was never so much like God as when He was

made to be sin for us. It was what God Himself wished to be for the creatures He had made, but there was no man to stand in His stead and enact His self-sacrificing, atoning love. In giving up His Son God gave Himself, and it was not until that moment that the divine nature was exhaustively demonstrated and confirmed as fact. The Cross marks a point where the sacrifice of Jesus and the sacrifice of God are indistinguishable. In the moment that Jesus surrendered His own will, God gave up the dream of Fatherhood. They stood revealed to one another in the unity of Divine Personality. Like Abraham and Isaac, father and son, they went, both of them together to the mountain of sacrifice. Which things are an allegory of truth that cannot be defined.

R. A. C. MACMILLAN.

CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY.

CARLYLE, in one of his books, tells of a certain Duke of Orleans who did not believe in Death, so that when his secretary stumbled upon the word, "the late King of Spain," he angrily demanded what he meant by it. The attendant, who wished to please, replied, "My lord, it is a title which some of the kings of Spain have taken." There are few such lunatics in the world to-day, for, whether we will or no, death stares us in the face. War slays men and women all at once—alive one moment and dead the next. Death takes them as it often does the animals, unawares, dying without warning, in a strange place. The subject of Immortality then assumes at the present time a greater importance than ever, and I wish in this article to consider afresh the doctrine known as "Conditional Immortality."

The instinct of Immortality is one of the deepest in the

human soul. In all ages and among all peoples the feeling finds expression. Looking at the religions of the lower races as a whole (says Dr. Tylor), we shall at least not be ill-advised in taking as one of its general and principal elements the doctrine of the soul's future life." The idea of annihilation was unthinkable to the Greek mind. If they had no choice left them but entire extinction and an eternity of torment in Hades, they would have chosen the latter," says Plutarch. Yes, the instinct of duration, persistence, superiority to the ravages of time has the broad fact of the human consciousness in its favour. Conditional Immortality, however, holds that man is created, not immortal, but capable of receiving immortality as a gift. If he had been left alone he would have become extinct. His immortality is a gift of God conferred only through Christ, and received only in Christian experience. "The natural immortality of the soul is, according to Dr. Heard, a fiction, a natural fiction of the Greek genius." Our former quotation, however, would imply that immortality is not confined to the specifically Christian experience. Of course, in a general sense, all mankind depend for their continuance as well as for their being on God. But Conditional Immortality is not merely this general truth, but is essentially a specific theological and religious doctrine.

Our first task then is to see what Scripture, or rather Christ, indicates regarding the question and, thereafter, we shall examine the doctrine, whether it be a true theological one, i.e., if founded on a real religious experience, and how far it meets the needs of such. Christ gives no proof or actual demonstration of a future existence. Such is by nature undemonstrable; hence there is nothing of the theologian or metaphysician about His statements. But His whole work and life implies for men a universal immortality. Much of what He has said is otherwise unmeaning. The destiny

of man He considers is endless life implying the awfulness of the issues with which our life here and now deals. The essential impression Christ's teaching gives may be summed up in a sentence like this: "For the hour is coming in the which all that are in their graves shall hear His voice and shall come forth; they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation." In fact, it is in Christ's teaching that we find the most absolute and certain statement of the fact of retribution: "And they shall go away into eternal punishment (eternal punishment cannot mean annihilation here), but the righteous into life eternal." He shall have to say to some also, "Depart from Me: I never knew you." "There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." And all these sayings of Christ's have a direct reference to the importance of the eternal issues of this earthly life. This life in the theatre of human fates decides our future.

What we shall be depends entirely upon what we are, and that fact implies a universal resurrection to life. Of course Christ gives no exact chart of the world beyond. A few momentous truths He teaches, such as that the present life contains unspeakable significance for the world to come; that a final judgment awaits all men when they shall have to answer for the deeds done here, and that the end of all is to set up an everlasting kingdom of the Father from which all evil ones are excluded. Say at once that there is annihilation, and it seems to me that the above facts lose much, if not all, of their significance. Yet the remarkable thing is that it is just to modify or explain the above facts that the doctrine of Conditional Immortality has been formulated, and so it is now desirable to examine the doctrine itself in more detail.

Dr. Huntington argues that search the Scriptures where you care, and you will not find it said that man is a being

who will inevitably exist for ever. But an argument like this proves nothing. It is nowhere explicitly said "There is a God," but both are implied all through. So to quote, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," proves nothing either way. The central religious fact of importance in this doctrine of Conditional Immortality is that Redemption concerns man's *being* as well as his *state*. Man is not immortal in virtue of his original constitution, but is *made* immortal by a special act of grace. Salmond says that their view is that "the very object of redemption is to change our nature, not only from sin to holiness, but from mortality to immortality." The holders of the theory may not exactly say this, but it is undoubtedly a necessary implication of their view. It involves the fact that redemption changes our nature, for immortality is peculiar to the saved.

But this view of Redemption involves fatal difficulties. It cuts a sheer chasm between man and man; in fact, between a man and himself, for we can never conceive of immortality as a superadded element. While a sinner I am mortal, and when I become converted I blossom into an immortal. Such a view takes away the whole depth and nature of the process. The very meaning of sin and holiness is that either of them can be possible states of a nature (i.e., the *same* nature). But to say that only the holy are immortal and that the sinful are mortal implies such a difference that they become different species altogether. They become two separate classes of beings, differing not merely in *nature*, but in actual being or constitution. If man is made in God's image they must all be made *immortal*. Sin blurs it perhaps almost to obliteration. But if we say it destroys it we miss the whole point and significance of the fact. Sinful man then becomes worse—ininitely worse—than the beasts that perish, for they die and all is

over ; but he arises merely to be finally annihilated for ever. Why this mockery of resurrection ?

No ; the immortality of the just inevitably implies the immortality of the unjust. If one is true so must be the other, for they are meaningless apart. Thus again, if man is a spiritual being—and to have any meaning all men must be so—death is but an event in life. We have not two lives—one here and another in a world beyond—but two parts of one life of the spirit. “The probable evidence of survival,” says White, “is far from carrying with it an equal probability of eternal survival.” Of course, it is impossible for man, who is a being shut up in this “seed-plot of time,” to know what eternal survival exactly means. If he makes the attempt to soar to such heavenly heights he inevitably falls flat down, like “Milton’s Satan,” in a vast vacuity. But the existence of which these mystic voices within us whisper is not one to which they put any limit. And as it has been well said, “The notion of a soul which is immortal enough to live through *death*, but not immortal enough to live *for ever* is too childish to be entertained beyond the little school of literalists who delight in it. The world outside will be content to believe that that which proves its power to live through death claims its immortality.”

But if this doctrine of Conditional Immortality does injustice to reason, how does it fare regarding the facts of Scripture ? If it could explain them better and were true to religious experience then reason may retire for ever. But Conditional Immortality misinterprets the Biblical terms “life” and “death.” Man—the creation of God—is a finite copy of his Maker, and so every man is fundamentally different from the beasts that perish. The meaning of “life” and “death” in the New Testament is respectively “Union with Christ” and “Separation from Christ.” In

a spiritual sense life and death never mean merely existence and non-existence. They are far grander and deeper terms, and are used within the moral and spiritual sphere, and to be so they both imply actual real existence. The doctrine of Annihilation then is one from which the Christian consciousness shudders. We cannot hold God and such a conception together. The view of Conditional Immortality is that sin gradually reduces the sinner to nonentity. Annihilation thus becomes the natural end of a life of sin. But sin is not a merely *physical* thing. Our experience tells us that. Its sad pathos and tragedy lies in the fact that sin only deepens sin—not that it destroys our being. If sin were merely a means of killing a man in the same way as poison causes physical death then the problem of life would be simpler. Many might then say with the Persian poet :

Come fill the cup, and in the fire of spring
Your winter garment of repentance fling.
The bird of Time has but a little way to fly,
And lo the bird is on the wing.

If annihilation is all, why not take the sleep of death in this pleasant path of sin ? But man is such a being that he *cannot* take this primrose path with ease of conscience. He feels that death is not all, but that there are eternal questions involved. He feels that there is a righteous outcome in consequence of his course of living, and that not simply annihilation. Conditional Immortality is too pleasant and simple a doctrine for a complex being like man. For any teaching that renders the great fact of retribution unreal and uncertain in the human mind is dangerous as well as false to religious experience. Nothing in the nature of sin—which is an affair of the spirit and not a physical excrescence—offers any hope of its ending thus ; for sin, if persisted in, only deepens. This life tells us that in a world

to come retribution is a sure certainty, as sure indeed as is the Being of God and the nature of man. That Retribution is a glorious yet terrible reality, that we know ; but what exactly it may be we cannot tell. There could be no retribution if there were mere annihilation, for retribution is an affair of the spirit. Its very meaning involves remorse and that involves life. If mere annihilation is the end of the wicked the world is robbed of its deepest spiritual realities. God, we believe, does not look on lost souls, wandering forlorn through the shades of darkness, without pity and love. One would almost think that there are means of salvation even then. But there are *some* who even then would *not* be saved. The parable of the rich man in hell teaches us that in that world beyond the day of opportunity is gone ; for "there is a great gulf fixed, so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot, neither can they pass to us who would come from thence." Such should make us guard against the too common idea that there is a possibility of moral change hereafter, and so men need not trouble to break off sin here and now. But what we have and know is the fact of real life of actual existence, and our opportunity is now. Final restoration is, after all, a dim hope. What we know from concrete Christian experience is that sin bears its consequences and that this life determines what it shall be in the next. A shallow belief then in universal restoration as well as in partial annihilation is a real danger leading us to ignore the tremendous seriousness of spiritual realities. Yet retribution is, after all, an agency of grace, and we do not know what hidden ways belong to the Father of mercy for the "hidden things belong unto God." To sum up, "Conditional Immortality" then involves a view of man as spiritual and of Christ's work at once inadequate and unthinkable. Man becomes a bundle of contradictions. Beings who are by nature mortal are thus

made to survive for a time in direct opposition to their nature merely to find that ultimate death is theirs. Had the incarnation never taken place sinful man would have passed, like the brutes, into non-existence at death, which is their true end ; and instead of that they survive death only to be plunged in a deeper night, for *ex hypothesi* there can be no salvation for the sinner who has died in his sins. It is a melancholy doctrine after all. With this view the act of Redemption entirely shifts its centre. The acceptance of Christ means chiefly immortality ; His rejection simply means death. It is a simple alternative. To say, however, that to “accept” or “reject” Christ means in either case that we eternally do so, seems to me a brighter and a deeper thing.

And we should remember that, in the last analysis, we are dealing here with subjects beyond our sphere of vision. Theology must recognise its necessary limitations. “Conditional Immortality” savours of too much knowledge. Death—annihilation for the wicked—is a very simple solution. But we do not know what “everlasting punishment” means with God. We may be sure it will be “justice tempered with mercy.” And it seems to me a sounder instinct, based upon a truer religious experience as well as a less sombre doctrine, to believe thus than to believe the hard positive fact of actual annihilation or death. It is a sad commentary on existence this surely which ultimately renders meaningless the existence of sin at all. What we know is the actual fact of sin, the real existence of sinners. As has been well said, “All that Conditional Immortality says in favour of annihilation of the wicked may be said with greater justice in favour of their never being brought into being at all.” But they are here, and their existence is fraught with eternal significance. And of course, to ask, “Why do sinners exist?” or “Why is there sin at all?”

is as meaningless as the question, "Why did God make the revelation of His Son on this planet" when so many others exist? Such questions lead only to a labyrinth of puzzles because they are entirely without the religious experience, and hence remain unsolved because they are insoluble. As regards the nature of God then Reason and Scripture together teach us to believe that He has some better and deeper way of using sinful man than by mere extinction. Just as we believe that man is made in *His* image, and hence with powers and qualities able to resist His will infinitely, and so implying the eternal endurance of the penalties of such resistance.

That man's moral and religious decisions in this world are fraught with eternal consequences, that the result thereof in the other world is one of eternal blessedness or of the opposite, is a doctrine grand in its very justice. All we know is that we *carry ourselves* into the future life. That is all, and it is enough, and we can leave the rest to the eternal wisdom of a God of Grace.

WILLIAM JOHNSTONE.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROLOGUE TO ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

(Continued.)

THE same enquiry can be made in other writers of the same period, Tertullian, for example. In writing against Praxeas, whose Sabellianism was to be confuted, it became necessary for Tertullian to re-state the doctrine of the Trinity in such a way as to preclude the "Crucifixion of the Father."

He tells us to listen to Sophia as a second created person. Then follows the famous passage in Proverbs, "The Lord created me the Beginning," and he explains that Sophia is a constituent of Logos. He then points out it is the Son in His own person who *under the name of Sophia* confesses the Father. For though in the passage quoted it might seem as if Sophia were herself created by the Lord for His works and His ways, *yet we must remember that elsewhere it is said that all things were made by the Logos, and nothing made without Him.* Thus Tertullian accordingly replaces Sophia by Logos in the passage from the eighth of Proverbs, and this proves that the Logos is not the Father. It is easy to infer that the displacing Logos is itself a derivative from that which it displaces. At all events, Tertullian saw clearly the interdependence of the Wisdom passage and the Prologue. They cannot be kept apart.

Much more is said by Tertullian on the relation of the Divine Wisdom to the Divine Word in his tract against Hermogenes, who would have the universe created out of previously existing matter. Tertullian denies the existence of this uncreate matter: "the apostles and prophets did

not thus explain the creation of the world by the mere appearance of God and His approach to existing matter; they never mention matter at all, but *first of all they say that Sophia was created the Beginning of His ways for His works*, as in the eighth chapter of Proverbs; and *after that came the emitted Word* by whom all things were made and nothing made without Him.

Here we see the same collocation of the Sophia story and the Logos prologue, and that Sophia has a certain priority to the Logos.

It is not necessary to deal with the matter at greater length in this connection. All students of Theology and of Church History know that the Wisdom passages in Proverbs became the standard proof-texts for the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship, and that around the words "The Lord created me," etc., raged the battle with the Arians, who, like their antagonists, regarded the Greek text with its *ἐκτίσεν* for *ἐκτίσματο* as sacrosanct. All that we have to do is to note the theological interdependence of the eighth of Proverbs and the Johannine Prologue, and to emphasise that one of them is, by admitted consanguinity, derived from the other.

It may be interesting to find out whether Origen has anything to say on the collocations which we have made and the inferences which we have drawn. We shall find that, like the earlier Fathers and the authors of the Testimony books, he identifies the Logos with the *Eructatio* of the forty-fourth Psalm, and then finds himself in the difficulty that the Psalm continues with *Audi filia*. How could the Logos be addressed in the feminine? His explanation is that such changes of persons are common; we have to remember that the Logos was in the Beginning, but it is conceded from the Testimonies in the Proverbs that Sophia is the Beginning, for "the Lord created me the

Beginning, etc.”; and this makes Sophia a prior concept to Logos which expresses it. Hence the Evangelist does not merely say that the Logos was with God, but the Logos was in the Beginning (sc. in Sophia) with God.

There is much more of the same in the Commentary of Origen upon John, but this will suffice to show that Origen also has clearly before him the connexion between the Prologue and Proverbs, and that he holds, in a certain sense, the subordination of Logos to Sophia. (See Origen in *Joann.* lib. I. capp. 34, 39, etc.) ¹

The chain of Patristic interpretation which deduces Logos from Sophia is practically unbroken: the finding of the investigation may be summed up in the *Prophetic Eclogues* of Eusebius (pp. 98 sqq.), who tells that the whole of the Book of Proverbs appears to be written in the person of Wisdom, who sometimes lays down ethical principles, and sometimes takes to herself the words of others: at one time offering us riddles, and at another teaching us concerning herself and instructing us as to her own divine dignity. From these we may select whereby to learn that Wisdom is indeed a Divine creature and altogether to be praised in her nature, being the same as the second cause of the Universe after the prime Deity, and as the Word-God who was in the beginning with God, and as the Providence of God which regulates and orders all things, and penetrates to matters terrestrial, which Wisdom was created before every other Being and Substance, being the Beginning of the Ways of the whole creation. And what she, Sophia, says herself is on this wise:

Then follows Proverbs viii. 12:—This, then, is the teach-

¹ Πάλιν δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ὁ αὐτός· ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ὁ αὐτός. ἀρχὴ γὰρ, ὥς ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις μεμαθήκαμεν, καθὼ σοφία τυγχάνει, ἐστὶ γέγραπται γοῦν. Ὁ Θεὸς ἐκτίσέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ· καθὼ δὲ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ ἦν ὁ λόγος.

ing of Wisdom concerning herself ; and who she is the holy Apostle teaches us, saying :

Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24).
And again—

Who of God is made unto us Wisdom (1 Cor. i. 30).

It is Christ, then, who is the speaker in the passage from Proverbs. Wisdom is also the Word of God, by whom all things are made. For “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him,” and—

By Him were all things created, whether in Heaven or on Earth, whether visible or invisible, as the Apostle says (Col. i. 16). And just as in one aspect He is called the Word of God, and in another Life and Truth and True Light, and whatever other names the Scriptures give Him, *so also He is entitled Sophia*, the Handmaid of the Father for the Providence and Regulation of the Universe.

In these words Eusebius hands on the ecclesiastical traditions which we have been considering, identifying Sophia and Logos, and explaining the Prologue in John and the Christological passage in Colossians by the help of the viiith chapter of Proverbs, from which they are thus admitted to have been derived.

It is not for the sake of multiplying references that we cite one Father after another, but with the object of showing the continuity and consistency of the Patristic tradition, which appears to have been inadequately treated by leading commentators of our day, who did not see the meaning of the constant reference to Christ as the Wisdom of God, nor recognise the close connexion between these early Patristic commentaries and the primitive collections of Testimonies from the Old Testament. To illustrate the matter once more from a fresh point of view, suppose we:

go back to the opening capitulations of the second book of Cyprian's *Testimonies*, the book that contains the prophecies concerning Jesus Christ. We pointed out that these opening summaries of the sections that are to follow bore evidence of having been somewhat modified; for example, that the theme of the first chapter was originally the identification of Christ with the Wisdom of God, and that this Wisdom was the firstborn (primogenita), the adjective being applied to Sophia in the first instance. Now if we were to turn to Eusebius, *Evangelical Demonstration*, we should find the very same theme before us, the collection of prophetic arguments for Christological purposes; and it would be quite easy to show that Eusebius, while working with great freedom, is not independent of the approved Testimonies which have come down from the early days of the Church.

The first chapter of the fifth book of the *Demonstratio Evangelica* has for its heading the statement that "among the Hebrews the most wise Solomon was aware of a certain *firstborn* (πρωτότοκος) Power of God, which he also entitles His Wisdom and His Offspring, with the same honour that we ourselves also bestow." Compare that with the Firstborn Wisdom of the Testimonies, and then note how the writer plunges at once into Proverbs viii., and after enumerating the praises of Wisdom, remarks that Wisdom is the Divine and all-virtuous Substance that precedes all created things, the intellectual (νοερός) and firstborn (πρωτότοκος) Image (εἰκών) of the Unbegotten Nature, the true-born and only-born (μονογένης) Son of the God of all.

Here Christ is declared to be the Wisdom of God, in *the terms in which Wisdom is described in Proverbs and the other Sapiential Books*. (See especially Sap. Sol. vii. 22 sqq.). And just as in the early Testimonies which

have come down to us, Eusebius goes on to quote Colossians (i. 15, 17) and complete the proof that Christ is the First-born of every Creature ; for Christ, he says, was speaking in His own person when Wisdom (apparently) spoke in hers. The equation between Christ and the Wisdom of God covers the whole of the argument.

Reviewing the course of the enquiry, we see that the commentators upon the great Christological passages in the New Testament, the Prologue to St. John, and the parallel passage in Colossians, have failed to set these passages in the true line of their historical evolution. We have tried to restate the texts upon which the accepted Christology is based, first by correcting a grammatical error in the first verse of St. John's Gospel, which ought to have been obvious to an unsophisticated reader ; second, by showing that the theology of the Church is best seen in the first days of its making by a careful consideration of the primitive books of Testimonies ; it follows from these corrections and identifications that the key to the language of the Johannine Prologue and to St. Paul's language in the Epistle to the Colossians lies in the Sapiential tradition, and not in the reaction from Plato or Philo or Heraclitus.

It is not pretended that this point of view is altogether new. Many critics and interpreters have occasionally come near to it ; few have altogether ignored it ; but it is not sufficient to put a stray marginal reference to Proverbs or Sirach in the New Testament ; we must examine those occasional references, and disclose the system to which they belong. It will perhaps surprise some students to know that it was Alford who came nearest to what we believe to be the right solution : at least, the following sentences from his commentary are significant for the identification of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God :

“We are now to enquire how it came that St. John found this *word λόγος* so ready made to his hands, as to require no explanation. The answer to this will be found by tracing the *gradual personification* of the *Word* or *Wisdom of God*, in the Old Testament. . . . As the *Word* of God was the constant idea for his revelations *relatively to man*, so was the *Wisdom* of God for those which related to *His own essence* and attributes. That this was a later form of expression than the simple recognition of the Divine Word in the Mosaic and early historical books, would naturally be the case. . . . In Sap. Sir. i. 1 Wisdom is said to be—

παρὰ κυρίου καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

Then in c. xxiv. 9 21, the same strain is continued,

πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἔκτισέν με.

. . . In the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon . . . we find a similar personification and eulogy of Wisdom. In this remarkable passage we have Wisdom called

πάρεδρος τῶν σῶν θρόνων (c. ix. 4),

and said to have been

παρουσα ὅτε ἐποίεις τὸν κόσμον,

and parallelised with

ὁ λόγος σου (c. ix. 12, c. xvi. 12).”

The foregoing passages indicate the right way to approach the subject, and are only in error in the assumption that the Sophia of the Old Testament is a later development of the Logos.

If we are substantially right in the foregoing investigation, the next step will be to see how much further elucidation of John’s Prologue will result from the restoration of Sophia to its right place in the theme. This further enquiry will involve important considerations.

Before, however, we turn to this part of the enquiry it will be interesting to show that the suggestion of hymns in honour of Sophia, produced in the time that is adjacent to that in which the Fourth Gospel was written, is not a hypothesis destitute of illustration outside of the Scriptures. We actually have a Sophia-hymn of the kind that we have described in the *Odes of Solomon*.

The thirty-third Ode of this collection, after a somewhat obscure opening, in which Divine Grace appears to be speaking in the Person of Christ, goes on to tell of a Perfect Virgin, who stands and cries to men :

“ There stood a perfect Virgin, who was proclaiming and calling and saying, O ye sons of men, return ye, O ye daughters, come ye : and forsake the ways of that corruption and draw near unto me, and I will enter into you and will bring you forth from perdition, and make you wise in the ways of truth ; that you be not destroyed nor perish : hear ye me, and be redeemed. For the Grace of God I am telling among you, and by my means you shall be redeemed and become blessed. I am your judge ; and they who have put me on shall not be injured ; but they shall possess immortality in the new world : my chosen ones, walk ye in me, and my ways will I make known to them that seek me, and I will make them trust in my name.”

One has only to recall the language of the Book of Proverbs in the beginning of the eighth chapter,

Doth not Wisdom cry ?
 And Understanding put forth her voice ?
 * * * * *
 Unto you, O men, I call ;
 And my voice is to the sons of men.

It is clear that the Virgin speaker is *Sophia* and we are to illustrate the Ode in question by Proverbs viii., upon which it is based. It will be easy to adduce fresh parallels to the language, but what is really important for us to

note is that the Sophia who speaks exchanged personality with the Christ. "I will make them trust in my name "; and the " Grace who stands on a lofty summit " (at the beginning of the Ode) and cries from one end of the earth to the other, is only a modification of the figure of Wisdom in Proverbs viii. 2, who " standeth on the top of high places."

Thus we have actually found a Sophia-Christ-Ode in the early Christian Church, quite unconnected with the Sophia that we discovered in the *Testimony-Book*. Note in passing that she describes herself as a Preacher of Divine Grace.

In the preceding series of arguments we have attempted to show that St. John in his Prologue was working from existing materials, which comprise the *Praises of Sophia* in the Sapiential Books, and perhaps from some Sophia-songs that are no longer extant. There are foundations apparent underneath his edifice ; and it is only reasonable to ask whether we can go further in the detection of the sources, and whether we can thereby throw any further light upon the language of the Prologue.

For example, we have in the seventh chapter of this book of Wisdom a description of Wisdom as the Radiance of the Eternal Light, and it is natural to compare this with the Johannine doctrine that Christ is the Light, and the doctrine of the Epistle to the Hebrews that Christ is the Radiance of the Father's Glory. When we read a little further we find (Sap. Sol. vii. 29) that Sophia is " more illustrious than the Sun and brighter than the positions of all stars," and that compared with all ' created ' Light (or with ' day '-light) she is found to be anterior ;

φωτὶ συγκρινομένη εὐρίσκεται προτέρα :

this answers very well to the statement in the Fourth Gospel that " in Him was Life and the Life was the Light

of men ” ; we may imagine, if we please, an earlier form that

In her was *Life*, and the *Life* was the *Light* of men :
or

In her was *Light* and the *Light* was the *Life* of men ;
but now see what follows : the writer goes on to argue for the priority and the permanence of the *Light* in these words :

Night, indeed, follows on created Light,
*But no evil overpowers Wisdom.*¹

Here we evidently have the origin of the phrase in the Johannine Prologue, which is commonly rendered,

and the darkness comprehended it not :
but which is better expressed in Moffatt's translation,

Amid the darkness the Light shone,
But the darkness did not master it.

There can hardly be a reasonable doubt that the explanation of the phrase in John is to be found in the passage of the Wisdom of Solomon. It does not require any philosophical reference to dualistic conflicts between Good and Evil, and Light and Darkness, *except as such conflicts are assumed in the language of the Wisdom of Solomon*. The darkness which masters the light is the darkness which comes on at the end of the day, existing potentially throughout the day but operating triumphantly when the end of the day comes. We are to take *κατέλαβεν* in John i. 5 as the equivalent of *ἀντισχύει* in Sap. Sol. viii. 30, and to say that Wisdom, being the Radiance of the Everlasting Light, has no ending to the day which it produces. Thus the chapter which furnished us with the explanation of

¹ The corresponding sentence in Proverbs appears to be iii. 15, οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται αὐτῇ (sc. σοφίᾳ) οὐδὲν πονηρόν.

the Johannine *Only-Begotten*, the *Radiance* of Hebrews, and the *Image* in Colossians, furnishes us also with the clue to the argument in John i. 5, and with the right way to translate the words.

Our next instance shall be the great Incarnation verse (John i. 14), which tells us that

The Word became flesh and dwelt among us :

where there is much discussion as to the meaning of the word ἐσκήνωσεν, which is connected by etymology with the word σκηνή (a tabernacle or tent) and so with the Hebrew word *Shekinah*. Moffatt, indeed, discards this explanation, perhaps as being too subtle and mystical, and tells us to translate,

So the Logos became flesh and tarried among us :

and the first impulse of an educated theologian would be to annotate the rendering as inadequate. Yet Alford says “sojourned or tabernacled . . . the word is one technically used in Scripture to import the *dwelling of God among men*” : and there is not much difference between “sojourned” of Alford and “tarried” of Moffatt. Since, however, we are arguing from the hypothesis that the Logos has been evolved from Sophia, the first thing to be done is to ask whether σκηνόω or its equivalent κατασκηνόω is one of the Sapiential words, and in what sense it is used in the *Praises of Wisdom*. The answer is that it occurs over and over again in the *Ἀἰνεσις Σοφίας* in the twenty-fourth chapter of Sirach : for example :

Sir. xxiv. 4 : I dwelt (κατεσκήνωσα) on high :

* * * * *

Sir. xxiv. 8 : He that created me pitched *my tent* (σκηνήν),
And said, *Dwell thou* in Jacob (κατασκήνωσον).

Let thy inheritance be in Israel :

Before the world from the Beginning He created
me,

(=Prov. viii. 22): 'And said' unto the end of the world I will not forsake thee.

In the Holy Tabernacle (σκηνη) before Him I ministered,

And thus was I established in Zion :

In the beloved City likewise He made me to rest,

And in Jerusalem was my authority :

I took root among the honoured people ;

In the Lord's portion of His inheritance.

Reading these rhythms carefully we see they are founded on the eighth chapter of Proverbs, and that they essay to prove that Wisdom has made her dwelling among the Jews, and especially in Jerusalem. He says this over and over in eight different ways and he uses the etymology of σκηνόω from σκηνη and suggests that we may have to employ the awkward word *Tabernacle* instead of *dwelling* or *tarriance* if we are to bring out the force of his words. It results, moreover, from these Sapiential passages, which lead up to the *Dwelling* or *Tabernacled* of the Logos, that we ought to understand in John i. 14 that the Logos made His dwelling among the Jews, and in this case we must look back a sentence or two, and understand the words "He came to His own, and His own received Him not," in the sense that "He came to the Jews," and here we shall be again surprised to find Alford saying : "τὰ ἴδια cannot well mean *the world*, or οἱ ἴδιοι *mankind in general*: it would be difficult to point out any Scripture usage to justify such a meaning. But abundance of passages bear out the meaning which makes τὰ ἴδια his own inheritance or possession, i.e. Judaea; and οἱ ἴδιοι the Jews: compare especially the parable Matthew xxi. 33 ff. and Sirach xxiv. 7 ff." Here Alford actually quotes from the *Praises of Wisdom*, only beginning at an earlier point with the words,

With all this I sought for rest,

And in whose inheritance *shall I make my dwelling?*"

Nor is it less interesting that Westcott makes the very

same explanation and quotes the very same passage : what they both appear to miss is that the references (which are more to the point than they imagined) carry with them the sense of ἐσκήνωσεν in John i. 15, and that, therefore, if, as Westcott supposes, ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν refers to the indwelling of Christ in believers, and not to anything of a racial character, it can only carry this meaning as an antithesis to the known dwelling of Sophia amongst the Jews in Jerusalem. It is, however, doubtful if we ought to resort to antithesis. The first draft of the argument appears to have been of the type that

In Jewry God is known ;

and the first persons who received the Messiah are of the group described as οἱ ἴδιοι, i.e. of the Jews. Naturally we go on to refer to such believing Jews the words,

The Sophia-Logos dwelt among us.

RENDEL HARRIS.

(*To be continued.*)

THE STAR IN THE EAST.

I.

THE story of the Star in the East that guided the Magi to "the house" where "they saw the child [Jesus] with Mary his mother" will be acknowledged by almost all to be spiritually suggestive ("the wise men" doing homage to "the child") as well as poetically beautiful. It will be beautiful for all generations. But it raises—for our generation at all events—several questions that demand answers. One of these arises out of the first sentence of the narrative: "Now after Jesus had been born in Bethlehem of Judæa, in the days of Herod the king, behold, wise men' (*Gr.* magi) from the east came to Jerusalem, saying, Where is he that was brought forth [as] King of the Jews? For we saw his star in the east and came to worship him." ¹

The Magi assume that the Jerusalemites knew what "his star" meant. But what would it mean to the latter? Would they suppose it to be a natural star or astral combination "under" which, in the language of Jewish as well as foreign astrologers or calculators of horoscopes, any child might be described as being "born"? Or would it mean some special and supernatural star, such as would be

¹ Matt. ii. 1-2. Much depends on the exact words. The sequel implies that γεννηθέντος, "after he had been born," and ὁ τεχθεὶς, "he that was brought forth," refer to what had happened nearly two years ago: "Where is he that was brought forth [as] King of the Jews [nearly two years ago]?" It does not follow that the Child was still in the place where "he was brought forth," though Herod takes this for granted in his question "Where is the Christ [destined-to-be] born (γεννᾶται)?" and in his action ("having sent them to Bethlehem"). The Diatessaron and Ephrem assume that Herod, while attempting to deceive the Magi, was himself deceived.

expected by none except Jews and such foreigners as had an exceptional acquaintance with Hebrew history and Jewish expectations based upon it?

The former alternative is negatived by the non-use of "the star of so-and-so" as a customary astrological phrase in Hebrew Scripture and in Greek and Roman literature.¹ The latter is affirmed by a Scriptural prediction—uttered indeed by Balaam the unrighteous enemy of Israel, but by Balaam divinely constrained to testify to Israel's righteousness—concerning "a star" that should "come forth out of Jacob," and "a sceptre" that should "arise out of Israel."² This is also preceded by two mentions of "a king."³ Corresponding to this Star out of Jacob in the East, there was also a Star of Cæsar in the West, much famed in the first century. It was not a star at all, but a comet. It was called a star, however, and represented as a star in sculpture as well as in poetry. It burst into splendour shortly after Cæsar's death and flamed for several days. Horace calls it the Julian Star, shining like the moon amid lesser lights.⁴ Virgil sings of it in the *Eclogues* as the beginning of a new *era*.⁵ In the *Æneid* he describes Augustus Cæsar at the battle of Actium, "with his father's star above his head," contending against Cleopatra and the monstrous gods of the East.⁶

¹ Dr. McNeile, whose edition of Matthew I have often found instructive, quotes on this point nothing definite except Cic. *De Divin.* i. 47, as referring to "the constellation from which, on the birthnight of Alexander, Magians foretold that the destroyer of Asia was born." But the passage mentions no "constellation" but only the light of daybreak: "On the night on which the temple of Ephesian Diana was burned down—on that same night it is notorious that when *daybreak had begun* (ubi *lucere coepisset*) the Magi exclaimed, 'The bane and ruin of Asia was born last night.'"

² Num. xxiv. 17.

³ Num. xxiii. 21, "the shout of a king is among them"—the first Biblical mention of a king for Israel; the second is Num. xxiv. 7, "his king shall be higher than Agag."

⁴ Hor. *Odes*, i. 12, 47.

⁵ Virg. *Ecl.* ix. 46-7.

Virg. *Aen.* viii. 678-700.

Augustus himself, in his Diary, mentions this star above Cæsar's head as sculptured in the Forum, and Pliny calls this "the only place in the world where a comet is worshipped."¹ Comets were recognised by Seneca and Plutarch as omens (to the popular mind) of revolution and change, mostly, though not always, for evil.² Writing about a comet that appeared early in Nero's reign, Tacitus says that people began to ask at once who would be the next Emperor, "as though Nero were already overthrown."³ Toward the end of Nero's reign, most of the Jews—so Tacitus tells us—were convinced "from the ancient writings of their priests that the East would attain power and men coming from Judæa would gain the mastery over the world."⁴

All this indicates that the source of Matthew's narrative may have been something very different from a tradition about astrological calculation of horoscopes. The whole Empire knew of Cæsar's Star, the Star in the West. The whole of Palestine and the Jews throughout the Empire, taught by "the ancient writings" of Moses recording the prophecy of Balaam, expected "a star" to come forth "out of Jacob." This, as being the Star in the East antagonistic to the Star in the West, they would naturally regard as the sign of a "King of the Jews"—the Leader of those who were to "come from Judæa" (as Tacitus writes) and "gain the mastery over the world."

These aspirations have actually left their mark on Jewish history, and even literally on its coinage. In the time of Hadrian, during the second revolt of the Jews, the celebrated Rabbi Akiba, playing on the name of the leader of the revolt, Bar Cosiba, as if it were Bar Cochba, "Son of the Star," declared that this man fulfilled the prophecy in Numbers and was the expected Messiah; and coins of that

¹ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* ii. 93-94.

² See Wetstein on Matt. ii. 2, quoting Senec. *Q.N.* i. 1 and vii. 17.

³ Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 22.

⁴ Tac. *Hist.* v. 13.

date are extant in which a small star is seen placed above the Temple.¹ Some have assigned coins thus stamped to the first revolt, and even an earlier date ; but apart from such disputed points the undoubted genuineness of these coins of the second revolt, and Akiba's application of the prophecy, suffice to shew that in the first as well as in the second century the "star out of Jacob" would probably be connected by multitudes of Jews with the thought of antagonism to the Star of Cæsar and with expectations of a militant Messiah.

That the Gospel is referring to the Star in Numbers is also indicated by the following facts. "Star," in the singular, is of the rarest occurrence in Scripture, occurring in the Old Testament nowhere except in Numbers and (once) in Amos.² The Gospel and Numbers both connect it with "King." The soothsayer or magician, Balaam, comes "from the east."³ So do the Magi. It may be objected that, if Matthew regarded himself as quoting prophecy, he would have added his usual formula "that it might be fulfilled." But this is met by the reply that Balaam, though constrained on this special occasion to speak the truth, would be regarded by Matthew as a false prophet not worthy to be quoted as a prophet in the full sense of the term, nor as one whose words must needs be "fulfilled."

But the Magi not only come "*from the east*," they also say "*We saw his star in the east*."⁴ "East" here represents a Greek word (*anatolè*) which will richly repay a little

¹ See Madden's *Jewish Coinage*, pp. 68, 171, 200, 209, and Schürer, I. ii. 299, 301. *A Catalogue of Coins of Palestine in the British Museum*, 1914, say: [(p. xcv.), "The type of Alexander Jannæus, generally called a sun or star, is . . . better described as a wheel. . . . A star, it is true, occurs as an adjunct on tetradrachms of the Second Revolt."

² Amos v. 26, "the star of your god."

³ Num. xxiii. 7.

⁴ Matt. ii. 1, "from the east," ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν pl.; Matt. ii. 2, "in the east," ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ sing.

attention. The LXX uses it to mean, not only "east," but also "branch," in the sense of "a branch (*or*, scion) of the house of David." This can easily be explained. It means "uprising," and may mean (1) "uprising [of the sun]," *i.e.* east, or (2) "uprising [of vegetation]," *i.e.* shoot, branch, etc. The second meaning must claim notice later on. But as to the first we have to ask at once: "If the Magi came *from* the uprising [of the sun], in what sense would they say, 'We saw the star *in* the uprising'? Would they mean (1) 'We, [being] in the east, saw the star'? Or (2) 'We saw the star in the eastern quarter of the sky'? Or (3) 'We saw the star in the uprising [thereof]'—that is, when it first rose above the horizon?"

Interpreters differ on this point. The Sinaitic Syrian has "We have seen his star *from* the east," and, later on, "There appeared unto them that star—which they had seen in the east going before them—until it came and stood over where the lad was." If we punctuate thus, the most natural interpretation is that of Ephrem, who assumes that it had "disappeared" and now "appeared" again and remained as their Guide to the end.¹ It had disappeared before they reached Jerusalem. But now, when they left the City, the Star—which is regarded as partly star, partly angelic Guide—changing its course in order to deceive Herod, "appeared [continuously] until it came and stood over where the lad was"—that is, according to the Diatessaron, not in Bethlehem but in Nazareth.

This is really a very sensible way of taking the facts if they are to be taken as facts. For, as Chrysostom asks, how could any star—even the lowest of stars, the moon—

¹ Ephrem, ed. Moes. p. 29, "*Disparuit autem, ne via recta Bethlehem venirent.*" It will appear, later on, that Tatian would omit "*via recta*," his view being that the Star disappeared and then reappeared in order to guide them, *not to Bethlehem, but to Nazareth.*

indicate a town or village, much less a single house in a village,¹ unless it descended almost to the earth, and "came and stood" exactly "over" the house? But if this is the meaning it increases the resemblance between the Star of the East and the Star of the West. For the former is to be regarded as standing "over" the head of the King of the Jews very much as the latter, in the Roman Forum, stood over the head of Cæsar, and as Virgil saw it, in his picture of the battle of Actium, standing over the head of Cæsar's son.

No one, however, will deny that Matthew's "saw in the east" is ambiguous. And Luke might be influenced by the uncertainty of its meaning all the more because of a curious ambiguity connected with the Julian Star. There were two ways of looking at it. Did it pay a final honour to Cæsar's departure? Or did it pay an initial honour to the new Cæsar's accession? The people, Pliny tells us, took the former view; but the new Cæsar himself took the latter.² The Star appeared at the games instituted to Cæsar's reputed ancestress Venus Genetrix. In the minds of the people, the Star would represent Venus the evening Star, but others might interpret it as the precursor of the morning, inaugurating a new era of quietness and peace after many years of desolating strife and war. Such was the interpretation (Servius tells us) given by the Haruspex in the Assembly of the Senate, and such is that adopted by Virgil when he forbids Daphnis to "look up to the ancient up-risings of constellations," for "behold, the star of Dionæan Cæsar hath come forth."³

¹ Comp. Matt. ii. 11, "and having come to the house," and see Chrys. on the context. ² See Wetstein on Matt. ii. 2.

³ See Wetstein on Matt. ii. 2, quoting the comment of Servius on Virg. *Eclog.* ix. 47, "Daphni, quid antiquos signorum suspicis ortus? Ecce Dionæi processit Cæsaris astrum." "Dionæi" implies Venus Genetrix, comp. *Æn.* iii. 19, "sacra Dionææ matri . . . ferebam."

These facts go a little way toward establishing a probability that Matthew's "star in the east," with its Hebrew and Jewish suggestions of militarism, might influence Luke by suggesting another view of the "star in the east" as the morning star and the star of peace, in an account of another epiphany, not to foreigners but to Christ's own countrymen. And we are led further on in the same direction when we find Luke, in his Introduction, taking up Matthew's ambiguously used word *anatolè*, and using it in a quite new sense, to mean spiritual illumination, or "dayspring from on high." This he does in connexion with guidance—not, however, the literal guidance of Magi or of shepherds, but spiritual guidance, as follows: "The dayspring from on high shall visit us, to shine upon them that sit in darkness and the shadow of death; to guide our feet into the way of peace."¹

This view of God's illuminating guidance, instead of a tradition about "coming from the *anatolè* (or, *east*)," substitutes a tradition about the *anatolè* itself as coming to those who are in darkness. And it suggests to us the thought that, although Matthew felt bound to insert "from the east"—perhaps because Balaam came literally "from the east," and because he believed the Magi to have done the same—yet subsequent evangelists and interpreters found it difficult to give the phrase a spiritual significance. Philo, however, spiritualises it. He suggests, in connexion with Balaam's coming "from the east," that there is a bad *anatolè* as well as a good one, an "uprising" of darkening self-conceit and pride, as well as an "uprising" of illuminating righteousness.² Origen follows him. "There is," he says, "an Orient contrary to the [true] Orient."³

¹ Luke i. 78-9.

² Philo, i. 414-5 (on Num. xxiii. 7) quoting Gen. ii. 8 and Zech. vi. 12, "the Branch (LXX ἀνατολή)."

³ Origen, *Comm. Num.* xv. 1 (Lomm. x. 172) referring to Balaam.

To modern readers it will seem infinitely improbable that such fancies could influence early Christian traditions about the Epiphany. But the improbability is diminished by Ezekiel's picture of idolaters in God's own Temple turning their backs on God and worshipping "eastward."¹ At all events we find almost all early Christian comments on the Star in the East assuming, or declaring, that it moved like a celestial Person and that its advent brought the destruction of all sorcery and magic.

Ignatius is the earliest witness to this general Christian belief: "A star shone forth in the heaven above all the stars. . . . and its strangeness caused amazement; and all the rest of the constellations with the sun and moon formed themselves into a chorus about the star; . . . and there was perplexity to know whence came this strange appearance. . . . From that time forward² every sorcery (lit. *magic*) and every spell was dissolved . . . the ancient kingdom was pulled down."³ The writer omits almost all Matthew's special words, including "from the east," but he probably regarded it as meaning "from the land of magic and false illumination." In the only instance in which he uses the word *anatolè* he plays on its literal and spiritual meanings, "east," and "uprising."⁴

Justin Martyr nowhere mentions Balaam. But he

¹ Ezek. viii. 16. The word there used for "east" means lit. "before," "in front," LXX ἀπέναντι, Aq. ἀρχῇθένδε, Sym. πρὸς ἀνατολήν, Theod. κατ' ἀνατολὰς (comp. Matt. ii. 1-2, which has pl. and sing. of ἀνατολή).

² "From that time forward" = ὅθεν. I should prefer to render it "for which cause," as in Ign. *Eph.* § 4.

³ Ign. *Eph.* § 19 (transl. Lightf.). "Perplexity" = παραχή. Comp. Matt. ii. 3, "Herod was perplexed (ἐταράχθη)." Ignatius has previously spoken of the mysteries of Christ's birth as being "hidden from the prince of this world," whose representative he probably sees in Herod.

⁴ Ign. *Rom.* § 2. "The bishop of Syria hath been counted worthy by God to be found [carried] to the going-down (δύσιν) [of the sun]—[God] having sent for him from the uprising [of the sun]. Good [is it] to go-down (δύναι) from the world to God that I may arise [like the sun] (ἀνατελεῶ) to Him."

quotes him twice—once along with Isaiah, and once with Zechariah—as saying: “There shall *uprise* a star out of Jacob.”¹ After the second quotation, commenting on the words “*Uprising* is his name,” he adds: “Accordingly, when there *uprose* also in heaven a star, at the moment when He was born [on earth], . . . the Magi from Arabia, having recognised [His birth] from this [star], came to [Him] and worshipped Him.”

Why does Justin say “the Magi from Arabia” and not (as Matthew does) “Magi from the east”? Probably for two reasons. First, Scripture had said, and Justin had quoted, “The Kings of the *Arabians* (LXX) and Saba *shall offer gifts*,” and “the gold of *Arabia* (LXX)”; and he regarded the “gifts” that the Magi “offered” as fulfilling this prophecy.² Secondly, he prefers to reserve the word *anatolè*, when used absolutely, for “the [uprising] Branch” predicted by Zechariah.³ And hence, since he regarded the word as primarily meaning Christ, he did not like to represent the Magi as coming “*from the Anatolè*.”

¹ *Apol.* 32. “And Isaiah and another prophet [*i.e.* Balaam] prophesying the same things in other words, spake thus (Num. xxiv. 17), ‘There shall *uprise* a star out of Jacob’ (Isa. xi. 1), ‘And there shall come up a flower (LXX) from the root of Jesse.’”

Dial. 106. “And that he would *uprise* like a star, through the race of Abraham, Moses indirectly shewed when he spake thus (Num. xxiv. 17), ‘There shall *uprise* a star out of Jacob and a leader out of Israel.’ And another scripture, too, says (Zech. vi. 12), ‘Behold, a Man; *Anatolè* [*i.e.* Uprising or Branch] is his name.’”

The two passages illustrate one another. Both shew an avoidance (in different ways) of the name of Balaam, and a desire to support Balaam’s prophecy by quoting some other prophet as well.

² *Dial.* 34, quoting Ps. lxxii. 10–15. This is the first mention of Arabians or Arabia; the next is 77, “*Magi who came from Arabia*,” and “*Magi from Arabia*” is henceforth his regular phrase.

³ *Ἀνατολή* nom. occurs in Just. *Dial.* 100, 106, 121, 126. Clark renders it always “east.” It would be safer to transliterate it, or to render it “Branch,” for it always refers to the “name” in Zech. vi. 12 (R.V.) “Branch.”

Irenæus mentions Balaam by name as predicting the Star which the Magi, "coming from the east," say that they have "seen in the east."¹ But he makes no attempt to explain the latter phrase. Neither he nor Clement of Alexandria appears to make much, if any, use of Zechariah's prophecies about the Messiah as *Anatolè*, to which Justin so frequently refers.² Clement describes the Star as "turning itself in ways that are new, ways that bring salvation," and as being "the Lord Himself, the guide of men."³ Thus he blends the literal guidance of the Magi with the metaphorical guidance of mankind, but without explaining the former so as to enable us to realise the "turning" locally or geographically.

Tatian's Diatessaron, on the other hand, if we adhere faithfully to his text, does appear to attempt an explanation of this "turning." For the Diatessaron tells us that, after the Presentation in the Temple, the parents of Jesus "returned to *Galilee, to Nazareth, their city*"⁴—not to Bethlehem—"and, after that, the Magi came, . . . saying, 'Where is the King of the Jews, who was [some time since] brought forth?' " They ask, in effect, "Where is He *now*?" But Herod, deceived by Providence, confuses this with "Where was He born?" So, having ascertained from the Sanhedrin that the birthplace must be Bethlehem, Herod "sent them" thither. He "sent them," but they

¹ Iren. iii. 9, 2.

² Zech. iii. 8, vi. 12 do not appear in their Scriptural Indices.

³ Clem. Alex. 986.

⁴ Canon Box's very instructive treatise on *The Virgin Birth*, p. 63, says that Tatian "arranges the incidents in the following order," placing the Presentation third, and then :—" (4) *Return from Jerusalem to Bethlehem*. (5) About a year later, the Visit of the Magi to Bethlehem, and the appearance of the Star." But the words I have italicised are not justified by the text of the Diatessaron either in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library or (I am informed) in the version of J. Hamlyn Hill, 1894 (T. and T. Clark).

"Returned to Galilee, to Nazareth their city," is in Luke ii. 39, and it is not inserted by the Diatessaron anywhere else. If it is cancelled here it is cancelled altogether.

did not go. The Star intervened to prevent them from going thither. Having previously disappeared, it now reappeared—to their great joy, so that they “rejoiced when they saw the star”—and guided them to the right place, not to the manger in Bethlehem, but to “the house” where “the child [in truth] was”—*that is to say, not Bethlehem, but Nazareth.*

The more we reflect on Tatian’s curious dovetailing of Matthew with Luke, the more probable it will appear that Luke wrote his Introduction, having Matthew in view, so as to make some such dovetailing practicable with the smallest possible alteration of Matthew’s tradition. For indeed, up to this point, Matthew has not said anything incompatible with the view that the residence of the Child’s parents was “Nazareth their city,” though the birthplace was Bethlehem.”¹

Tertullian regards “the east” as the home of astrology, and therefore of the Magi, but does not explain the meaning of “seeing in the east.”² He refers once to Zechariah’s “Branch,” and renders it by the Latin “Oriens,” in a context that speaks about the light, “the Orient” being to him “the figure of Christ.”³ He nowhere quotes Balaam’s prophecy.

Jerome makes no attempt to remove any of the difficulties in Matthew or to reconcile Matthew with Luke. Indeed, he actually represents his pious friend Paula as placing the adoration of the Magi before the coming of the shepherds.⁴ But he has the merit of recognising that the

¹ The incompatibility does not come till Matt. ii. 22–3, “to a city called Nazareth.” This is incompatible with Luke’s view—that Nazareth had been, from the first, “*their city.*”

² Tertull. *Adv. Jud.* § 9, quoting Ps. lxxii. 10, 15; *De Idol.* § 9.

³ Tertull. *Adv. Valent.* § 3. “The Dove, the figure of the Holy Spirit, loves the Orient, the figure of Christ.”

⁴ Jerome, *Epist.* 108 (transl. Fremantle). “She protested in my hearing that she could behold with the eyes of faith the infant Lord wrapped in

Magi represented the Gentiles, "the successors of Balaam," and that "Out of Egypt have I called my son" (applied to the Child Jesus by Matthew) *might be illustrated from the prophecy of Balaam as well as from Hosea*.¹ Also in his commentary on Jeremiah, when rendering "I will raise up a righteous *Branch*," he gives us an alternative, "righteous *Bud*, or righteous *Orient*," and illustrates this from a Psalm that speaks about the *budding* of righteousness, and from the *Anatolè* of Zechariah.² Commenting on Zechariah's first use of the term "my servant the *Orient*," and quoting, "Behold, a Man, *Orient* is his name," he adds, "Also in Malachi it is said, '*There shall arise*' (orietur) . . . the sun of righteousness,' and in Numbers '*There shall arise* (orietur) a star out of Jacob. . . .' In the Gospel also most manifestly we read about Christ, 'Wherein the *Orient* (R.V. *dayspring*) from on high hath visited us to illuminate them that sit in darkness . . .'"³

In all this, there is nothing that can compare (for straightforward clearness) with Chrysostom's comment and its conclusion: "The Star was not of the common sort, but rather not a star at all (as it seems to me), but a kind of invisible Power, transformed into this appearance." But still Jerome, by keeping our minds fixed on Balaam's prophecies as being at the root of Matthew's narrative, helps us to understand its militant tone as contrasted

swaddling clothes and crying in the manger, the wise men worshipping Him, the star shining overhead, the virgin mother, the attentive foster-father, the shepherds coming by night . . ."

¹ Jerome on Matt. ii. 1-15. "Testimonium proferimus ex Numeris, dicente Balaam (Num. xxiii. 22; xxiv. 8), '*Deus ex Ægypto vocaviterum* . . .,'" after quoting Hos. xi. 1.

² Jerome on Jerem. xxiii. 5, quoting Ps. lxxii. 7, "orietur," Zech. vi. 12, "Oriens." "Orior" here represents two distinct Hebrew words.

³ Jerome on Zech. iii. 8, quoting Zech. vi. 12, Num. xxiv. 17, Mal. iv. 2, Luke i. 78-9. Of three Heb. words here rendered "orior," only one, *tsamach* (in Zech.) means "uprise as vegetation." The Syr. equivalent regularly means "*shine*," and the Hebrew is rendered thus in Isa. iv. 2 (LXX), ἐπιλάμψει. For another instance see Levy, iv. 197a.

with that of the Lucan parallel. The "sceptre" that was to accompany the Star of Jacob was to "smite" and "break down" the enemies of Israel.¹ Moses was not the Star, but he was the precursor of it, and Josephus tells us how Egyptian soothsayers warned Pharaoh of the impending birth of "a certain person" to the Israelites who would exalt Israel and lay Egypt low.² Balaam's words about the failure of "enchantments" against Israel might apply to the past failure of Pharaoh and his astrologers against Moses, the Leader of Israel, as well as to future failures against a future Leader.

If Christians borrowed from Balaam, and applied to Christ, the prediction of the Star, as being uttered by an astrologer to a king, they might naturally blend together the warning of Balaam to king Barak with the warning of the Egyptian astrologers to Pharaoh, and might seek a parallel to the hostile kings in Herod, and a parallel to the threatened child, Moses, in Jesus. Naturally confusion would arise when Christians thus blended (as Jerome blends) Balaam and Hosea and applied them to the Gospel. For Balaam and Hosea meant "Out of [*the servitude and perils of*] *Egypt* did I call him (*or, my son*)"; but the Gospel means "Out of [*the refuge of*] *Egypt* did I call my son." We may feel astonished that Matthew should venture to quote Scripture in a sense so opposite to the original one. And perhaps he would not have thus quoted the words of Balaam the soothsayer had they stood alone. But when they come to him supported by Hosea ("the prophet") the case is altered. A prophecy might seem to Matthew worth applying even if it was only verbally applicable.

¹ Num. xxiv. 17.

² Joseph. *Ant.* ii. 9, 2. "A certain person (τινάς)," not "a child," as Whiston renders it. It implies mysteriousness. There are similar stories about Moses in the Midrash on Exod. i. 22, and in Jer. Targ. on Exod. i. 14-15.

According to this view, the Massacre of the Innocents—which is mentioned by no other ancient and independent writer, and which is antecedently very improbable—is to be explained, not as an invention, but as a development from prophecy. Matthew seems to have proceeded on the supposition that, since Balaam's prophecy about the "going forth of a Star" applied to Jesus, *his prophecy about the "calling out of Egypt" must have had a similar application.* All that he, the Evangelist, had to do was to insert this "calling" in the most suitable place, having regard to the circumstances at the time, when the Infant King of the Jews was in hourly peril from the action of His own friends and worshippers, the Magi, because they had unconsciously given a warning against Him to Herod, His enemy and would-be destroyer.

Herod's death was soon to follow. Nothing more, therefore, was needed except that the Child should be saved from immediate destruction. This could be effected by fleeing at once to some other country. Thus, by inserting a flight to Egypt, the Evangelist not only harmonises the event as a whole, but also preparês the way for a second fulfilment of prophecy. The first prophecy was already fulfilled. The "Star" had "gone forth." The fulfilment of the second prophecy was now at hand, so that it could be said, in accordance with Scripture, "Out of Egypt have I called my Son."

Reviewing Matthew's story of the "star seen in the east," we perceive that, in its Hebrew origin, the Star was the Star in Numbers, a Star of War. It was rightly interpreted as such by Christians from Ignatius onwards, though in a spiritual sense. But "the east" did not lend itself to spiritual interpretation but rather to the encouragement of disaffected Jews against Rome. And if the Christians desired to avoid the suspicion of disaffection by substitut-

ing "uprising" for "east," such a substitution needed an amplified illustration. Thus, as being deficient, ambiguous, and politically injurious to the Church—quite apart from historical considerations—Matthew's narrative might well be regarded by Luke as requiring some addition that would be at once a supplement, an explanation, and also indirectly a vindication of Christians against any Roman charge of sympathising with Jewish rebels, and of favouring the Star of the King of the Jews against the star of the great Cæsar.

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(To be continued.)

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROLOGUE TO ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

It will now be clear that this investigation divides itself into two parts, (1) the discovery of those Johannine and Colossian terms which belong to the Sapiential tradition; (2) the enquiry whether in either John or Colossians an additional Sapiential document should be assumed to underlie the Christian teaching. A good deal has been done in the way of defining which terms are really Sapiential: we can underline ἀρχή and ἀπαύγασμα and εἰκὼν and ἐσκήνωσεν and πρωτότοκος and μονογενής, as well as certain sentences in which the action of the Divine Wisdom is intimated. Some of these sentences do not require a special bridge to be built for them from the Sapiential books to the New Testament: the statements

πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο (John i. 3),

and

ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα (Col. i. 16),

are equivalents to the language of Proverbs which are capable of immediate deduction, so soon as we have agreed

that Jesus is the Wisdom of God. So also the doctrine that

αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων (Col. i. 17)

is an immediate consequence of the existence of Sophia *πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος*, and similarly for other obvious deductions. It is not so easy, however, to infer the immediate derivation of such terms as *Μονογενής* or *Πρωτότοκος*. No doubt *Monogenēs* is a Sapiential term, but it is as unique in use as it is in meaning. When we come to the Gospel we find that it is one of the current words of the New Testament Religion, and it is difficult to believe that it acquired currency so immediately, as that it became, by one stroke, from an obscure adjective, one of the leading terms of theology. We seem to need an intermediate document, but do not quite see how to prove that it is absolutely required. To suspect is not enough.

Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe that Colossians does not exactly agree with St. John in its treatment of the Logos-theme. In Colossians i. 18 Jesus is the *ἀρχή* in agreement with Proverbs,

ἀρχὴν ἔκτισέν με.

But in John this is somewhat obscured, and the language of Proverbs is interpreted to mean *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, ; the source is the same, the treatment is different. In Colossians, Jesus is the Firstborn who has the First Rank, even among the dead. We have shown reason to suspect that this is an interpretation of a primitive *ἡγήσατο*, used of the First-born taking the lead ; but in the Gospel we have what looks like a variant of the same theme, viz., that "the Only-Born . . . *ἐκείνος ἐξηγήσατο*," where the difficulty of interpreting *ἡγήσατο* has been partly got over. Yet it is not really got rid of, for *ἐξηγέομαι* can also mean "to take the lead," "to have the front place," and does not necessarily mean anything different from the *πρωτεύειν* of Paul.

Both writers, then, are working on the same theme, and working independently, but John is working more freely than Paul. The passage in Colossians resembles a list of the titles and offices of Christ ; the Prologue in John is more like a poem, and in so far as it is poetic, is nearer to the Sapiential origins, even though in detail it may be more remote from them.

Consequently, if there is a Sophia-document missing, it underlies John rather than Paul ; or if it underlies both of them, John is nearer to the form of the document.

As we have learnt a good deal by comparing the Colossian doctrine of the Logos with the Johannine, we make a further observation, and we notice that both writers have the doctrine of the Pleroma, which in later days, i.e. in Gnostic circles, acquired such prominence.

The Gospel has it in the form that " we have all received of the Pleroma of Jesus and grace for grace." The Epistle tells us that " according to the good pleasure of the Father all the Pleroma dwelt in the Son." After what we have already seen of the relation of the Gospel and Epistle *inter se*, it is not too much to say that they are working here from a common vocabulary. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any trace of the use of this word in the Sapiential Books upon which we have been working ; and the word itself is so striking when used as expressing a communication of Divine Attributes, that we have a right to say that it has been found in some document intermediate between the Sapiential books and the New Testament. It may have been a hymn in praise of Sophia.

That it is Sophia who possesses the Pleroma may be seen in another way. The language of the Gospel is :

and we have all received of His Pleroma, grace piled on grace ; for the law was given by Moses, Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ.

The antithesis is recognised as being one between Law and Grace, the latter of which displaces the former. If, then, the writer is modifying a previous document and replacing Sophia by Jesus, we ought to have a sentence connecting Law and Truth with Sophia. The missing sentence is found in Proverbs iii. 16⁷:

Out of her mouth goeth forth Righteousness,
Law and Mercy she bears on her tongue.
 ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτῆς ἐκπορεύεται δικαιοσύνη,
 νόμον δὲ καὶ ἔλεον ἐπὶ γλώσσης φορεῖ.

The bridge between Proverbs (Law and Mercy) and the Gospel (Grace and Truth) will be found in Sap. Sol. iii. 9, and iv. 15. *Grace and Mercy* to his elect.

οἱ πεποιθότες ἐπ' αὐτῷ συνήσουσιν ἀλήθειαν⁸

* * * * *

ὅτι χάρις καὶ ἔλεος τοῖς ἐκλεκτοῖς αὐτοῦ (Sap. Sol. iii. 9).

The suggestion to replace Law by Grace, so natural to the primitive Christian, had already been made in part by the Wisdom of Solomon. We can see the passages growing from one form to another before our eyes. But this will require that the Pleroma also should be a transfer from Sophia to Jesus. And I think that we may find the origin of the Pleroma : it was a Pleroma of Law. That was the way in which Wisdom was to find expression. In order to see this, we may take two related passages of Sirach, as follows :

They that fear the Lord will seek out His good pleasure (εὐδοκίαν)
 And they that love Him will be filled with the Law (ἐμπλήσθουσιν
 τοῦ νόμου), Sir. ii. 16.

He that fears the Lord will accept chastening,
 And they that rise early will find His good pleasure (εὐδοκίαν);
 He that seeks Law will be filled with it (ἐμπλησθήσεται).

Sir. xxxv. 14, 15.

The two passages are, as we have said, cognate : they imply a Pleroma of Law, and this is what pleases God ; the Law is the Good Pleasure.

Now let us turn to Colossians and see how the Pleroma is introduced : we are told that "it was the Father's good pleasure that all the Pleroma should make its residence in the Son,"

ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι,

where we have again the connexion between the εὐδοκία and the πλήρωμα.

The displacement of the Sophia that is interpreted as Law by the Sophia that is interpreted by Grace, may be illustrated from an actual equation made by the Jewish Fathers between Thorah and Wisdom, as represented in the eighth chapter of Proverbs : thus in *Pirge Aboth* (vi. 10) we learn that the Holy One has five possessions in the world ; of these, Thorah is one possession. . . . Thorah, whence ? because it is written, *the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old* (Prov. viii. 22). Here Sophia is clearly equated with Thorah.

Other cases of the same equation will be found in Taylor (*Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, ed. 2, p. 173) ; e.g., Bereshith Rabbah begins with Proverbs viii. 30, "Then was I by him as one brought up with him . . . and I was daily his delight as one brought up with him." Thorah is here identified with Wisdom, and is also made to say with reference to Proverbs *l.c.*, "I was the instrument by which he created the world." See *Aboth* iii. 23. "Beloved are Israel that there was given to them the instrument with which the world was created."

It appears to be quite natural that the Law should turn up in the praises of Sophia, when Sophia is interpreted in a pre-Christian sense, and that it should be spoken of depreciatingly, when Sophia is interpreted in a Christian sense.

From the foregoing considerations it follows that there is an anti-Judaic element in the Fourth Gospel, from its

very first page. The law is antagonised and the people to whom the Law came.

When we make that statement and follow Alford and Westcott in what is certainly the right explanation of "His own who did not receive Him," we are again treading on the heels of the first composers of books of Testimonies against the Jews; for a scrutiny of Cyprian's *First Book of Testimonies* shows conclusively the very same rejection of the Jews on the ground that they have rejected the Lord.

Let us turn to the third chapter of the book in question. It is headed as follows :

That it was foretold that they (i.e. the Jews) would neither recognise the Lord nor understand *nor receive Him*.

Then follow the proofs, and we readily anticipate the opening verses of Isaiah, with its appeal to a sinful nation, Israel that doth not know, my people that doth not understand. But a little lower down we come upon a reference to Proverbs i. 28 ff: as follows :

Item apud Solomonem: Quarent me mali et non inuenient. Oderunt enim *Sapientiam*, sermonem autem Domini non receperunt.

Here we have the Logos and Sophia side by side in the same verse, and the statement that the Wisdom has been hated and the Word not received. The parallel with John i. 11 is obvious. That verse is of the nature of an anti-Judaic Testimony. It is an adaptation of the LXX of Proverbs i. 29.

ἐμίσησαν γὰρ σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦ κυρίου οὐ προσείλαντο.

The transition from σοφία to λόγος is natural and easy, and a primitive statement that Wisdom came to the Jews and the Jews did not receive her, would readily be re-written in terms of the Logos, who

Came to His own, and His own did not receive Him.

The two statements are in part equivalent; and Alford's interpretation was right as far as it went.

In this connexion belongs a curious chapter in the Book of Enoch, which Dr. Charles had actually suggested to be parallel with the Prologue of John.

The forty-second chapter of Enoch opens as follows :

Wisdom found no place where she might dwell ;
 Then a dwelling place was assigned her in the heavens,
 Wisdom came to make her dwelling among the children of men,
 And found no dwelling place,
 Then Wisdom returned to her place,
 And took her seat among the angels.

The parallels with the Logos who dwelt among us, and who had not been received by his own, are striking. And we are confirmed by our belief that the Prologue to the Gospel can be turned back from a Logos-Hymn to a Sophia-Hymn.

One more illustration may be given of the derivation of the language of the Prologue from the Sapiential sources which preceded it.

The Gospel, after reciting the unresponsiveness of the Jewish people generally to the Logos who had come among them, goes on to explain that there were some who did receive the Logos, and that, in consequence of this reception they became *children of God*, and experienced a spiritual birth ; “ to as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the children of God, owing their birth not to carnal generation nor human impulse, but to the Divine Will.” ¹ It may be asked whether this striking passage has any counterpart in the Sophia literature upon which we have been drawing.

The answer is that to this beautiful description of the appearance of the Life of the Spirit as given in the Gospel, there is a parallel, shorter indeed, but almost as beautiful

¹ If we follow the very early reading $\delta\varsigma \dots \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\theta\eta$, the latter part of the sentence relates to the Logos, and goes back to $\acute{o} \kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma \gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon$ of Proverbs viii. 25.

in the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon, from which we have already taken so many illustrations. "In all ages Wisdom entering into holy souls, makes them *Friends of God* and prophets."

It is this work of Sophia in the making of "Friends of God" (φίλους Θεοῦ) that has prompted the "Children of God" (τέκνα Θεοῦ) who result from the reception of the Logos.¹

In explaining ἐξηγήσατο of John i. 18 as being the equivalent of ἡγησάμην in Sirach xxiv. 6, we have found the reason for the little inserted testimony in John the Baptist in John i. 15, which is also occupied with the doctrine of the priority and primacy of Jesus. It may, however, be urged that in thus changing the interpretation of ἐξηγήσατο, we have broken sequence with the statement that precedes it as to the "invisibility of God," whom it is the business of the Unique-Born Logos to *expound* to men.

The sentence as to the invisibility of God is another Sapiential loan: it is parallel to Colossians i. 15.

ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου,

where it is followed by

πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως

just as the passage in John is followed by the reference to the *Monogenes*: both sequences are Sapiential, and are suggestive of a common document and a common sequence of thought. In such a document ἡγησάμην must be interpreted in the sense that Sophia had the first rank, after God, in the order of being. Note carefully that neither in Sirach nor in John is there any object attached to ἡγέομαι: it is therefore, to be taken intransitively. The case of ἐκδιηγέομαι in Sirach xlii. 15, xlii. 31 is, therefore, not an objection to the intransitive interpretation, for here the object is expressed.

¹ Hence, perhaps, the masculine οἱ in John i. 13.

Was there anything in the underlying document that corresponded to the statement that "the Word became flesh"? Will the critical reagent bring it up?

Suppose we turn to Methodius, the *Banquet of the Ten Virgins* (iii. 4. P.G. ix. 18. 65), we shall find a very curious passage, whose obscurity has baffled both translators and interpreters; the writer has been explaining the difficulties which arise from the Pauline language when the Apostle compares Christ and the Church mystically with Adam and Eve in the Book of Genesis. How could the comparison have been made between the pure and the impure? we might as well compare odd and even. No wonder that persons have taken exception to the comparison between the First Adam and the Second. Methodius explains that it was the Wisdom of God that was joined to the First Adam, and became incarnate: and this Wisdom was Christ. His language is very peculiar, and needs closer examination.

It was appropriate, says Methodius, that Wisdom (the Firstborn, the First Offshoot, the Only-Born of God) should be united with the First and First-Born Man (Adam) by an incarnation. We notice the array of Sapiential terms with which we have become familiar.

The result of this incarnation was Christ, "a man filled with the pure and perfect Godhead, and God received into man." In other words, *Christ is the Incarnate Wisdom of God*. Thus there lies behind the phrase

ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο,

the expression

ἡ σοφία σὰρξ ἐγένετο.

If Christ is Firstborn, and only-born, He has derived these appellations from Sophia.

Methodius continues the explanation: "it was most suitable that the oldest of the aeons and the first of the Archangels (viz. Sophia), when about to hold communion

with men, should dwell in the oldest and the first of men, even in Adam."

The passage suggests for Sophia a description almost identical with the Johannine language, that "the Word became Flesh and dwelt among us"; for "the Word" restore "Wisdom." It is interesting to note further that Methodius has elsewhere identified Christ with the Wisdom of God, by a combination of the language of Proverbs with that of St. John's Gospel. In his discourse on the Resurrection, he tells us that "Wisdom, the Firstborn of God, the parent and artificer of all things, brings forth everything into the world . . . whom the ancients called Nature and Providence, because she, with constant provision and care, gives to all things birth and growth. For, *says the Wisdom of God*, 'my Father worketh still, and I work (John v. 17).'"

We note the identification of Jesus with the Wisdom of God, and compare the way in which the passage from John is introduced with the similar feature which we observed in the Gospel of Luke xi. 49).

An even more remarkable equation between Christ and the Wisdom of God will be found in the fragments of Methodius on *Created Things*, which are preserved to us in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius. Here the equivalence of the opening verses of the Prologue with the eighth chapter of Proverbs is insisted on:

"Methodius says, of the words 'In the Beginning God created the Heavens and the earth,' that one will not err who says that the Beginning is Wisdom. For Wisdom is said by one of the Divine Band to speak in this manner concerning herself: 'The Lord created me the Beginning of His ways for His works; from eternity He laid my foundation.' It was fitting and more seemly that all things which came into existence should be more recent than Wisdom, since they existed through her. Now, consider whether this saying 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God,'—whether these statements be not in agreement with those."

(Photius, *Bibliotheca*, Cod. 235.)

The doctrine of Methodius appears to have been that Sophia became incarnate in the First Adam and also in the Second. In the eighth chapter of the Banquet he sums up the results of his mystical investigations as follows :

"It has been already established by no contemptible arguments from Scripture, that the first man may probably be referred to Christ Himself, and is no longer a type and representation and image of the Only-Begotten, but has actually become Wisdom and Word."

There is still a good deal of obscurity in the statements of Methodius, but it is quite clear that the Incarnation of which he speaks is the Incarnation of Wisdom. Whether it is Christ or Adam or both that are the subject of the Incarnation is not quite clear.

Now let us try to restore the Prologue to something like its intermediate form. It should run as follows :—

Prov. viii. 22 ff. : The Beginning was Wisdom,
 Wisdom was with God,
 Sap. Sol. ix. 4 : Wisdom was the assessor of God.
 All things were made by her ;
 Apart from her nothing that was made came to be.
 Sap. Sol. vi. 26 : With her was Light, and the Light was the Life
 of men.
 That Light shone in the Darkness,
 Sap. Sol. vi. 29 : And the Darkness did not overmaster it.
 For no evil overmasters Wisdom.
 Wisdom was in the World,
 In the World which she had made ;
 Prov. i. 28 : The world did not recognise her.
 Sir. xxxiv. 13 ff. : She came to the Jews, and the Jews did not receive
 Enoch xli. 1 ff. : her.
 Sap. Sol. vii. 27 : Those that did receive her became Friends of God
 and prophets.
 Sir. xxxiv. 6 : She tabernacled with us, and we saw her splendour,
 Sap. Sol. vii. 25 : the splendour of the Father's Only Child,
 Sap. Sol. iii. 9 : Full of Grace and Truth.
 Ode Sol. 33 : (She declared the Grace of God among us).
 Sir. xxxv. 15 : From her pleroma we have received Grace instead
 of Law,
 For Law came by Moses,

Sap. Sol. iii. 9 : Grace and Mercy came by Sophia ;
 Sap. Sol. ix. 26 : She is the Image of the Invisible God ;
 Sap. Sol. vi. 22 : She is the only Child of God, in the bosom of the
 Sir. xxxiv. 6 : Father, and has the primacy.

RENDEL HARRIS.

*THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS : A LETTER
 OR A SERMON ?*

THE Epistle to the Hebrews, in spite of the very considerable attention bestowed upon it by scholars in recent years, still remains in some aspects the most mysterious of all the New Testament writings. Its author, its destination, and the nationality of its readers are wrapt in obscurity while its precise literary character is one of the most strongly contested points of modern New Testament criticism. I do not propose in this paper to touch upon the question of the authorship because no decisive evidence in favour of any one of the many claimants to that honour has been brought to light, and on that matter we must still rest content with Origen's *dictum*: "Who the author is God only knows." The literary character of the document is, however, a problem which does not depend upon the assistance of any extraneous material and must be decided by the internal evidence which the Epistle itself provides, and it may, therefore, be discussed with profit.

Roughly speaking there are three theories current as to the original form and purpose of what we now call "the Epistle to the Hebrews," which may be formulated as follows:

1. It was a theological treatise addressed to the Christian world as a whole, and, as such, is the earliest example of artistic Christian literature that we possess.

2. It was a letter written to a particular Church or circle of Christians which had a definite purpose in view.

3. It was originally not a written document at all, but a sermon delivered to a particular audience, which was afterwards published and given an epistolary form by the addition of the concluding paragraph xiii. 22-25.

Taking these hypotheses in order, the strongest advocate of the first was Wrede, who in *Das literarische Rätsel des Hebräerbriefs*, 1908," summarised his view in the following words: "Strike out xiii. 19 and 22-24 and nothing remains of an epistolary character. The relations of the author to his readers are obscure ; no concrete questions, anxieties, or interests ever arise, and there are no allusions to names or persons. The exhortations are all of the same pattern and are only variations of the one theme of steadfastness in the faith. The epistolary character is altogether lacking." Deissmann is equally dogmatic on the point and regards the writing as a piece of pure literature illustrating the endeavour of Christianity in its literary aspect to rise from the *stratum* in which it had its origin to a higher level of learning and culture. It is, according to him, consciously dictated by theological interests, and dominated, in contrast to St. Paul's letters, by theological methods, and an attempt to attain to beauty of form. All that seems letter-like in it is mere ornament, and if this crumbles off the character of the document is not essentially altered. (*Light from the Ancient East*, pp. 236, 243.) But neither of these distinguished scholars has done justice to those factors in the Epistle which suggest a definite destination, nor have they weighed the evidence which speaks of a personal relationship, not of the most intimate character perhaps, which existed between the author and his readers. The Christian circle addressed is not a mere nebulous unit which had being only in the imagination of the writer, but is a definite and concrete entity, as a study of the following passages shows. Combining v. 12 with ii. 3, we gather that its members were

not neophytes in the faith and that they had been evangelised by those who had received the Gospel from the Lord's own lips. They had enjoyed the leadership of men of mark and reputation (xiii. 7), and their present officials were such as demanded respect and obedience (xiii. 17). The community had at some time in its history passed through the furnace of persecution and with credit to itself (x. 32), a persecution which did not involve actual loss of life (xii. 4), but consisted in insults, public reproaches, and confiscation of their goods (x. 32-34). Their services to Christ and to the Church at large were specific and praiseworthy (vi. 10). When the document was written they were still subject to hostility, which was apparently not being endured with complete Christian patience and forbearance (xii. 4-11), and the community was not exhibiting that firmness of attitude in the face of trials and tribulations which was the glory of the Christian Church as a whole at that period (xii. 12-16; xiii. 8-9). Wrede's description of the Epistle is, therefore, wide of the mark and is not true to the actual contents of the document. Deissmann has also been led astray by his instinct for literature. That the Epistle to the Hebrews is distinguished by an admirable literary style which in some sections approaches that of the best classical models, and that it is in this respect almost unique in the New Testament, is unquestionably true, but the conclusion that Deissmann draws from these facts is not necessarily valid. The history of literature supplies abundant proofs that writings addressed to a particular audience and animated by a specific motive can and do reach the highest level of culture and artistic beauty, and we can assert with perfect confidence that among the richest gems of the literary world none shine more brilliantly than the private letters of gifted and cultured writers. The problem of the original character and purpose of this Epistle

is, therefore, not to be solved by its rank as literature, but by the evidence that it itself provides as to its destination and motive. In this matter the contents of our document are decisive and we may dismiss the first hypothesis as unsatisfactory without further discussion.

Our enquiry, then, becomes narrowed to the alternative, letter or sermon ? The features in the Epistle which point to a definite and concrete community being in the author's mind are compatible with either solution, because both letter and sermon imply a particular audience, and a modicum of acquaintance with the circumstances and situation of that audience. From that point of view, therefore, neither theory possesses much advantage over the other. In favour of the epistolary hypothesis, however, is the very potent argument that the document *as it stands* possesses in the concluding paragraph the unquestionable marks of a letter, and that tradition from the earliest ages has taken that view of its character. Further, this view also commends itself to the great majority of modern students of the Epistle whose opinions seem to be gradually crystallising in favour of regarding it as addressed to a House-church in Rome, although Dr. Nairne, in his very illuminating book *The Epistle of Priesthood*, has a theory all his own as to the character of the community the Epistle had in view, with which, however, we are not directly concerned here. The onus of proof, therefore, rests with those who question this conclusion, and we shall find it convenient to devote the remainder of this article to a consideration of the grounds upon which the plea that this document is a published sermon are based. The hypothesis is set forth with considerable detail by Perdelwitz in the *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1910, pp. 59 ff. and 105 ff., and we cannot do better than study the argument as it is stated in these pages.

Perdelwitz sums up his conclusion in the following terms. "The Epistle to the Hebrews is a carefully planned address, delivered by a nomadic preacher to a Christian community in Asia Minor, which concluded with the Doxology and Amen at chapter xiii. 21. A hearer took or obtained a copy of it and sent it to a circle of Christians, probably in Rome, whom he had known before and hoped to see again shortly, and to the copy added a few words of his own, in the form of a commendatory note, which now constitute the concluding paragraph of the Epistle."

In his argument in favour of the assumption that the document was originally an address or sermon, and not a letter, he lays stress upon the following points.

As against the possibility of its being a letter he objects that—

1. It lacks the definite purpose which we generally associate with a letter. Much the greater part of it is concerned with purely abstract questions, such as the superiority of Christ over angels and the difference between the High Priests of the Old and New Covenants, so that the proportion between the theoretical and strictly practical sections of it fully justifies Wrede's description of it as "a very small building erected on an enormous pedestal."

2. It lacks an address, and no current explanation of that phenomenon, such as that a page of the original MS. has been lost, or that the address has been deliberately suppressed from one motive or another, is quite convincing. More serious, perhaps, than the absence of the address is the fact that the specific matter consisting of thanksgiving, exhortation, and prayer which generally follows the address in the normal New Testament letter, is also lacking.

3. There are certain expressions which point to an oral utterance rather than a written document, such as the frequent use of the phrase "we speak" instead of "we

write," and the definite allusion to an audience in v. 11 in the expression "dull of hearing."

He also points out that on the other hand there are positive factors which support the view that the Epistle is a published sermon to which a concluding paragraph was afterwards attached.

1. It is definitely described in xiii. 22 as a "word of consolation," an expression which in Acts xiii. 15 stands for St. Paul's address in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch.

2. In xiii. 19 the words "that I may be restored to you the sooner" do not imply that the author is a prisoner, as they are generally understood to mean, but simply express a wandering preacher's hope that he may again soon pay a visit to the community that he is addressing.

3. In vi. 3, "and this will we do if God permit," the preacher is explaining that owing to want of time he is unable to enter as fully into the deeper doctrines of Christianity as he would wish, but comforts his hearers by promising to come again.

4. xiii. 13-16. "Let us go forth unto Him without the camp, bearing His reproach." The writer's exhortation is generally interpreted as contemplating the forsaking of fellowship with unbelieving Jews and the bearing of the reproach which He had suffered from His own people, on the part of the community. But the author, we are told by Perdelwitz, is not thinking of his audience at all but of himself. He, like Christ, is going forth into the world perhaps to suffer shame and reproach at the hands of the enemies of the Gospel. It is he that has no abiding city, but wanders from place to place preaching the word of God. Again in xv. 15-16 he contrasts the services which he himself can render to the Church with those incumbent upon the community that he is addressing: "*I will offer the fruit of my lips, but do ye do good and communicate.*"

5. The personal element that is discoverable in the Epistle is too general and the relations between the author and his audience are not intimate enough to account for a letter, while they are perfectly compatible with a sermon of an edifying and religious character, delivered by a preacher who was only paying a casual visit to the community. The author's reserve in passages like v. 11, vi. 8 and x. 24-31, and the fact that censure is nearly always followed by a compensating meed of praise are more natural in a preacher who has neither the authority nor the knowledge to justify him in being content with mere fault-finding than in one who was qualified by his position to write a letter.

6. There are also traces of a different hand having been employed in the writing of the concluding paragraph from that which is concerned with the main document, such as—

(a) The ἡγούμενοι of xiii. 17 are different from the πάντες ἡγούμενοι of xiii. 24. The first expression refers to the leaders of the community actually addressed in the sermon, the second to the leaders of the more important circle of Christians to which the copy of the sermon was sent with the postscript.

(b) A comparison of xiii. 19 with xiii. 23 shows that there are two individuals in question. In xiii. 19 the preacher is fettered in his movements, but in xiii. 23 the writer of the postscript speaks with absolute certainty of his future action.

(c) The expression in xiii. 22, διὰ βραχέων ἐπέστειλα ὑμῖν, is unnatural if used of the letter as a whole, but is quite intelligible if it applies only to the short paragraph at the end.

Perdelwitz is of opinion that the character of the trials delineated in the Epistle is not severe enough to enable us to identify them with any of the persecutions known to have swept over the Church in Rome during the latter half of the first century. At the same time they correspond well with

the occasional storms which burst over many a local Church in Asia Minor as the result of popular disturbances. The original sermon could not, therefore, have been primarily delivered to a Christian community in Rome. He also finds support for his suggestion that the community in question was situated in Asia Minor in the Gnosticism which is combated and which forms the background in the picture, such as the emphasis on *τελειοῦν*, the contrast between milk and solid food and between infants and full-grown men as well as the references to various strange doctrines and contempt of marriage, all of which point to Asia Minor, which was the seed-plot of Gnosticism. The fact that the Epistle was known and used in Rome at a very early date he explains by the hypothesis that it was to a group of Christians in Rome that the published sermon was sent with its accompanying postscript. There its value as a Christian literary document was quickly recognised and many copies of it made, and in these the concluding paragraph was gradually incorporated with the original document whence we get our extant Epistle.

The preacher was a Jewish resident of Asia Minor deeply imbued with Alexandrian modes of thinking and well acquainted with the writings of Philo, and was a typical member of the Diaspora in his knowledge and appreciation of the LXX. The hearer, who made a copy of the sermon and thought it deserving of wider circulation, belonged to a colony of Italian traders in a city of Asia Minor and sent a copy of it, accompanied by a short note of recommendation, in which he includes greetings from his fellow-colonists (xiii. 24), to a circle of Christian friends in Rome whom he hopes to see again shortly. The community in Asia Minor to which the sermon was first addressed included a strong Gentile element, but was not necessarily exclusively Gentile in character.

Such then is Perdelwitz' theory in its main outlines. At first sight it might appear that he has gone far towards establishing his main conclusion, but a close examination of the individual factors in his argument soon removes that impression. The very foundation upon which the whole of his hypothesis rests, is decidedly shaky, and a failure to prove his fundamental postulate means that the whole of his elaborately stated thesis falls to the ground.

It will be noticed that his theory is entirely based upon the assumption that the concluding paragraph did not form an integral part of the original document, but is an addition by a later hand. Now there is not the slightest support for this arbitrary treatment of the text in any single MS. that is known, and the very character of the paragraph in question tells strongly against any such supposition. There is no trace of any abrupt break of sequence between it and the main document, it blends admirably with what has gone before, and constitutes a perfectly natural epistolary conclusion to the writing as a whole. On the other hand, it has none of the features that we look for in a commendatory postscript added by a later hand, and is demonstrably inadequate for any such purpose. And further, the arguments adduced to show that it is not the work of the author of the writing as a whole do not bear inspection.

(a) It is quite possible that the *ἡγούμενοι* of xiii. 17 are not identical with the *πάντες ἡγούμενοι* of xiii. 24, but this does not prove a separate identity for the writer of the postscript. The author of the Epistle might well have had in mind another circle of Christians in the second reference, and if the popular suggestion that the Epistle was written to a House-Church is correct the "leaders" in v. 17 would represent those of the smaller community while the wider reference in v. 24 would have in view the

“leaders” of the local Church as a whole, of which the House-Church formed only a part.

(b) The comparison of xiii. 19 with xiii. 23 does not necessarily postulate the existence of two separate writers. If the author implies in v. 19 that his movements are not quite free, and the Greek by no means demands this interpretation, his future action in v. 24 is also conditional and dependent upon the liberation and future plans of Timothy. The hesitation as to his coming visit is, if anything, more pronounced in the second than in the first paragraph. There is, therefore, no difference of outlook in the two passages, and certainly not the slightest reason to think that they refer to two separate individuals.

(c) The phrase *διὰ βραχέων ἐπέστειλα* in xiii. 22 must not be pressed literally as implying a document of a short character and, therefore, of necessity referring to the postscript only. The allusion is obviously to *λόγος τῆς παρακλήσεως* in the same verse, and it may be compared with *δι’ ὀλίγον ἔγραψα* of St. Peter v. 12, and *ἐσπούδασα κατὰ μικρὸν πέμπειν* in the Epistle of Barnabas. The papyri also show that it was a conventional epistolary expression, and bore no real relation to the actual length or shortness of a document or sermon. Moulton and Milligan in their *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* quote an amusing instance of its use at the end of a very long petition which concludes with the phrase *τῶν βραχέων μου γραμμάτων*. The appearance of a similar formula at the end of the Epistle to the Hebrews is obviously of the same character as the above and proves nothing as to the length of the document in question.

Perdelwitz’ attempt, therefore, to prove from the contents of the concluding paragraph of our Epistle that it is the work of a later hand fails at every point, and we should be perfectly justified in bringing our article to a close here, and

in dismissing the theory that the Epistle is a sermon without further discussion because the foundation upon which it is based crumbles into pieces when it is closely examined. But to subject the theory in all its details to a searching criticism will be both interesting and useful, if only as an illustration of how a very imposing German edifice can be built out of the most flimsy materials.

Starting with the objections which he brings forward against the traditional view that the Epistle is a real letter, we find that in almost every instance they can be adduced with equal force against New Testament documents of whose epistolary character there can be very little doubt.

1. The First Epistle of St. Peter, if we dispense with the strictly epistolary sections at the beginning and the end of it, is almost a complete parallel to the Epistle to the Hebrews in its lack of what Perdelwitz demands in a letter, viz., a definite purpose and motive. It also, like our Epistle, is almost entirely devoid of anything like concrete questions, and the references to the persecution which was harassing the Churches addressed and called forth the sympathy of the Apostle in this letter are as vague and indeterminate as those which are meant to meet a similar situation in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Furthermore, Perdelwitz, in his description of our Epistle as being two-thirds composed of lengthy disquisitions upon the superiority of Christ over angels, and the difference between the High Priests of the Old and New Covenants, has lost sight of the fact that in both cases the disquisitions lead to practical exhortations and conclusions, and are not left in the air as mere theological essays without any definite object or purpose. Cf. ii. 1-4 ; iv. 14-16 ; x. 19-25.

2. The First Epistle of St. John is more deficient in the conventional elements of a letter than even the Epistle to the Hebrews. Not only has it no address, but it has no

subscription, and it contains not a single definite allusion, personal, historical, or geographical. It opens in the same abrupt way as our Epistle, and with a similar grave and eloquent pronouncement of Christological doctrine, and yet there are few who deny that it possesses the essentials of a letter. It is instinct through and through with intense personal feeling and with the consciousness of authority to guide and counsel on the part of the writer, and implies a definite community with whose position and history the writer is intimately acquainted.

3. If the use of the expression "we speak" instead of "we write" is proof that the document is a published sermon, and not a letter, we are forced to acknowledge that many of St. Paul's letters were also originally sermons, for he makes frequent use of the same terminology. As a matter of fact the expression is simply an epistolary usage on the part of the Apostolic writers, as is shown by reference to the following passages: Rom. vii. 1 ; xi. 3 ; 1 Cor. vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. vi. 13 ; vii. 3 ; Eph. v. 32 ; 1 Thess. i. 8, and affords not the slightest ground for suggesting that a document in which the phrase occurs must have been originally a public oral utterance. Its frequency in the Pauline Epistles may owe something to the fact that most of them were dictated to an amanuensis, although its use is perfectly natural in a document written by the author's own hand.

The expression *νωθοροὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς* in v. 11 gives exactly the same amount of support to the "sermon" hypothesis as the epistolary use of the phrase "we speak." That the words should not be taken literally as implying merely "dulness of hearing" is quite clear from the context, and especially when we take into consideration the word *δυσερμηνεύεως* which immediately precedes it. What the author has in mind is evidently his own difficulty of making himself understood fully, which is caused by the small intellectual

and spiritual capacity of his readers. This becomes still clearer if we study the use of the word *νωθοὶ* in vi. 12, where the author is warning them against the danger which threatens them, should the dullness which had come over their powers of spiritual intelligence extend to the whole of their Christian life. To confine the "dullness of hearing" in v. 11, to the mere physical disability and to use this as an argument to prove that we are concerned with a sermon is, therefore, to lose sight of the significance of the term *νωθοὶ* both here and in vi. 12.

4. The description of the Epistle as a *λόγος τῆς παρακλήσεως* might seem to be a strong point in favour of Perdelwitz' hypothesis because it is specifically applied to St. Paul's address at Antioch in Pisidia in Acts xiii. 22, but a reference to Acts xv. 31 shows that *παρακλήσις* is there used in a similar context in connexion with the Apostolic Decrees, which were certainly contained in a written document. The phrase in question, then, might equally signify a letter or a sermon.

5. The statement in vi. 3, "this will we do if God permits," which Perdelwitz interprets as an expression of the preacher's intention to accomplish at some future visit what he cannot find time to do now, has obviously no such meaning. The author is simply explaining the course that he proposes to follow in the Epistle itself, and in this very chapter he promptly translates his purpose into action.

6. The softening of rebuke by a subsequent word or two of praise which is alleged to be more natural in a preacher than in a letter-writer is no uncommon feature in a genuine letter. Philippians iv. 2-4 is as good an illustration of this procedure as we could wish. There St. Paul tones down his pointed rebuke to the women Euodia and Syntyche for the jealousy and ill-feeling that existed between them by a grateful acknowledgment of the valuable services that

both had rendered in the past to the Church of Christ.

7. The weakest link of all in the argument we are discussing is the assertion that in xiii. 13-16 the author is not thinking of his audience but of himself, and that the words "Let us, therefore, go forth unto Him without the camp, bearing His reproach" are not the summing up of the exhortation addressed to the readers in the preceding verses, but the preacher's expression of his own venturing forth into a hostile world where he will meet with insult and reproach even as his Master did. A weaker climax to a passage of great weight and solemnity than this which is suggested by Perdelwitz it would be difficult to imagine. It reduces the writer's impassioned plea to a mangled torso, and introduces an alien element into the passage which entirely destroys the force of the writer's argument, and that without a tittle of justification. The further suggestion that the change from the first person plural subjunctive to the second person plural imperative in v. 15 implies that the author is contrasting his own duty with what he considers to be the duty of his hearers, "*I* will go forth and preach Christ, but *you* will do good and communicate," is equally inept. The interchange of the subjunctive and imperative moods and of the first and second persons plural is characteristic of the Epistle throughout, and it is perfectly clear that the writer has his audience in view in all cases. The use of the first person plural subjunctive may occasionally emphasise his identification of himself with his audience, but in no instance is there any intention to contrast his own sentiments or action with theirs.

So much, then, for this somewhat fantastic theory, the weakness of whose foundation is seen to be only equalled by the flimsiness of the materials of which it is composed. Unless some very much more potent arguments are produced than those upon which Perdelwitz bases his hypothesis

the reputation of the Epistle to the Hebrews as a genuine letter is safe for many a year.

That section of his paper in which he endeavours to prove that the Epistle's primary objective was a Christian circle in Asia Minor and that this was a mixed community of Jewish and Gentile Christians is of much higher value than his attempt to prove that it was originally a sermon which was copied and sent with an accompanying note to Rome. He makes an exceedingly good case for the presence of a strong Gentile element in the community for which the document was destined, which deserves more consideration than I can give it in the space now at my disposal. With the editor's permission I may return to it on a future occasion.

MAURICE JONES.

“ON GIVING THE DEVIL HIS DUE.”

“Yet Michael the Archangel, when contending with the Devil . . . durst not bring against him a railing accusation.”---*St. Jude ver. 9.*

I AM not going to try to create the context of these rather mysterious words, or to revive for our own minds the meaning which such words most probably conveyed to those for whose guidance they were directly spoken. It is enough for my purpose simply to feel that whatever else these words and this illustration may have signified, it was at least something upon which the writer and his readers were agreed.

The use which he is making of some story which was familiar both to them and to him is the use which in the process of an argument or appeal we may make, say of a proverb, or of some well-worn story which we have all known from our childhood, whose principles we have all accepted. We say, in effect, “If you agree with that

ancient proverb, or with that classical illustration, you must agree with what I am saying now ; for what I am saying now is simply an example of the very thing."

But indeed we have only to read the few fiery verses which lead up to this illustration to see the writer's point. He has recalled from their history certain instances of disaster coming upon God's people, upon the whole nation, or upon some group or class within the nation. And he asks them to believe that such disasters were not merely so many sad accidents ; that, on the contrary, they happened in obedience to certain principles which are rooted in reason and in God ; that it will not do to be merely contemptuous of great events, or to interpret them in a frivolous and unbelieving way ; that—and here he uses the illustration—even in the controversy between the Archangel Michael and the Devil, the Archangel—they would remember—was not permitted to indulge, so to speak, in personalities, but was required to listen to his adversary's case, to try to grasp his argument, and to answer him with self-control and on the ground of principle.

This strange verse of Scripture then seems to me to urge upon us all an exercise which is naturally rather uncongenial. It declares in effect that things on the great scale happen in this world, not by chance, and not necessarily as the result of conscious and deliberate badness on the part of their agents : that rather they come to pass for reasons, perhaps not good reasons, but still reasons. They found their first opportunity in some unguarded region of our common human nature, or, like a disease, in some undrained and neglected backwater where the evil thing grew strong, organising itself until it became a kind of kingdom or system, and winds sprang up spreading the evil thing broadcast. And so, we are bidden, in these strange words of Holy Scripture, to look beneath the surface of the

large events of history and of our own experience, especially if those events are disastrous ; not simply to call them bad, or terrible, or mysterious. We are asked—and it is not an exercise that we like—to search for the reasons and the causes of things, never for one moment doubting that reasons and causes there are.

Now, when we come to think of it we see that to believe that things happen for reasons and by the working out of principles, is one way of declaring our belief in God. To hold that the opposite is the truth, namely, that things in this world simply occur either for no reason whatsoever, or through some mysterious evil agency so subtle that the human conscience can never detect it, and the human mind can never hope to deal with it,—that is the real denial of order and of God, and it commits us all to a kind of moral paralysis, which at the best is relieved by moods of superstition.

And so, to put what I have said in other words, this strange verse of Holy Scripture summons us, face to face with the dark and shaking events of history, to hold fast the faith that things are related to one another, that one thing leads on to another, that, once certain things are set agoing in the world, certain other things follow as surely as night follows day. If this were not the truth, then the history of man would be altogether a heartbreaking record. But what makes history in a real sense the grave word of God is that we may learn from its cruel and tragic pages how in bygone days things led on to other things, small things, caught up in the flood of human passion, to larger things—in order that we may become quick to detect in our own day the beginnings of evil, and to deal in the region of our own heart with those passions, those prejudices, those half-truths, which in other days, as we perceive, let loose upon mankind the earthquake and the avalanche.

And now, let us, quite simply and frankly, and in the very spirit of this word from God which forbids us using the language of mere raillery and contempt, see whether there are not certain matters which we ought rather to take to heart, making it our business now and hereafter to deal with them. It is much too soon, I know well, for us to listen to any one who suggests that it was we who were responsible for the outbreak of the present conflagration. On the very contrary, we may without misgiving await the judgment of history upon our attitude, assured that it will only confirm the clear approval of our own conscience. And yet I am sure I am speaking for all really serious and patriotic people to-day when I say that there could be no prospect more intolerable for us than the prospect that in five or ten or twenty years hence the world should again be convulsed, and those who are to-day our prattling children should, on the threshold of their youth, be called upon to endure afresh such agonies as we have known.

And yet we have no right to look forward to a wiser world emerging from the present fury, unless we, who are now the effective members of society, clearly perceive certain things which either caused or occasioned, or may well have caused or occasioned this horror; and perceiving them, deal with them.

Let me then try to make distinct, were it only to my own mind, certain charges which the Sombre Spirit, who works out the tragedy of things, might, with at least a show of reason, have brought against us. For it seems to me to be the very instruction in this strange strong verse which forbids a merely railing accusation against the devil, that we are to allow even Satan to state his case.

Well now, there is no single thing on which our enemies were so confident as that we as a people had lost the qualities,

physical, moral, political, spiritual they would even have said, which are the signs of a nation's power to survive and of its right to survive. Amongst the ignorant, this charge was supported by rough and ready illustrations, which might either be true or false. But it was not a charge which was made by the ignorant. It was, we must try to believe, a view held with conviction by those who form and guide opinion. It was supported by learning and accepted as a state of matters for which it might be we were not altogether to be blamed, for it was a stage in the inevitable evolution of the race. As a flower passes from the firm and promising bud, through a day of fine strength and beauty, to another day of falling leaves and wilting stem, so we as a people, having passed our climacteric in the glorious days of Drake and Shakespeare, had no longer the potency, the sap and virtue, which would have made us worthy to maintain the reach of our earlier achievement. We were a tired people, going to pieces with interminable domestic irritations, loving ease, pleasure, backing the wrong things, honouring the wrong things. Liberty with us had become the right of every one to think as he liked and to do as he liked. And so we were on the edge of revolution. We had lost our fear of God ; and we had no other fear. Like France, we were beginning to tamper even with the wells of life, so that in our literature and in every other way in which the real mind of a nation comes to light, we were quite evidently trifling with the last fountain and sanctity of things. We were becoming more and more provincial, it was alleged. It is true we were not openly withdrawing our armies from the outlying frontiers, as Rome recalled hers when her natural force began to abate. But we had no longer a sense and vision of ourselves and of a *rôle* which we were called upon by God or destiny to play, such as sends out nations upon hard tasks, and binds them

together in the joy of a common secret life. We spent largely, grossly indeed; but it was all upon ourselves, little in the interest of ideas or of unworldly causes, or for the moral greatness of our country. And so, it came to pass that many a small nation surpassed us in the measure of its services to the business of research into the causes of disease and for the sake of disinterested knowledge, or gave more of its wealth and thought to the creation of things of beauty. In fact, we stood for nothing; and therefore, though we were not aware of it, it was really not by our own choosing that we had become frivolous, extravagant, and mean towards ideal enterprises, but simply because we could not be otherwise.

It was another consequence of the same want of idealism, the same want of such faith in anything as should lead us to die for it, that we had developed such bitterness in our domestic policies. We had no great dream, no great imagination of what the world by our assistance might be. We had nothing within ourselves so good for man that we could wish that every nation on earth had a share of it. We had nothing to unify us, to subdue our divisiveness, to consecrate and summon us. There was nothing before which at the last we, however we might be divided upon passing things, stood upright, recognising its glorious supremacy. There was not anything for which we were ready to die: that is, we were not alive. . . .

Thus Satan, our accuser, whom the Bible describes as standing from time to time before God, making his report, charged us; and we can see how wise it is for us, as we are commanded here, not to rail at his accusation, but to ask ourselves whether there may not have been something in it; and, humbling ourselves before God, before whom it is no disgrace but a high honour for a man or for a nation to fall down in grief or shame, to rise to our feet again with

indignation at ourselves, finding such truth as there may have been in the long indictment.

For there is this truth in the philosophy of those who planned this tremendous disturbance of the accepted habits of the world. It is true, it is but fair, that a people must never be permitted to usurp the earth, cumbering the ground. It is just, that at every hour in our history we should be able to believe that it is good and even necessary for the world that we keep our place. It is right, that there should be something in our individual and social and religious type the blotting out of which would bring a real loss to mankind and cast a sinister shadow on the future. The day in which a long-established people like ourselves rudely awakened, cannot produce from its breast its passport into the future, unless speedily it becomes a day of contrition, comes to be a day of conscious sickness and failure. All that is true, and it is a sharp kind of truth which we must see to it that we can meet without too great uneasiness.

For we live in a severe world, where, in the long run, nothing survives which is merely a pretence or a mere husk and memory of former vitality. ~

Our blessed Lord—gentlest of Teachers for the poignant sorrows of individual souls—did not keep back the stern announcement of this truth. That God is no respecter of persons, was the hard truth over which His ancient people stumbled. That God is able from the stones to raise up children to Abraham ; that they who have faith are of the holy and surviving seed ; that a tree which bears no fruit, however it may seek to conceal with hanging leaves its barrenness, is doomed—all this is of the very essence of that revelation of God to which no nation on earth has had such access as have we.

And so let us not rail at our accuser ; but, receiving with meekness what truth we may perceive in his perversion,

let us err rather on the side of a new moral sensitiveness and resolution. Let us be very sure that only that which rests fairly upon the nature of things will survive and ought to survive. Let us see to it that we live not for ourselves but for the future. Let us recover that sense of life as a trust and stewardship which, in the long run, alone brings security and permanence.

In this disastrous time, when so many high hopes have become incredible and ridiculous, there may be a danger that we think too gloomily of the prospects and capacities of our poor human nature. And yet I believe that, given a nation of people manifestly obedient to some high vision which consecrates its natural strength and subdues its merely secular pride; given a nation which lives in some dominant way for beautiful and wise things such as will only be perfectly achieved when they are shared by the whole earth; given a nation whose guiding words and public policies are such that it will always be for the good of other nations to repeat her maxims and accept her wisdom; given a nation which on a fair judgment will be acknowledged as on the whole standing for things such as it would chill and darken the soul of man to think of as departed for ever; and, though we live in days when it is hard to prophesy, I believe that there is something in such a nation which always, before things have gone too far, will reconcile its detractors and disarm its foes.

Let us begin then to watch ourselves, the secret play of our own preferences and inclinations, the kind of things we value, the kind of things we praise. Let us put it for ever beyond dispute or discussion that there is something at the heart of all mere aggressiveness, and self-seeking, and greed and violence which sets up within our lives, and the life of the nation, and the life of the world, a seed of torment. And let us put equally upon some undisputed place this also

which completes the other, that he who loseth his life, who loseth it in any generosity of the soul, who loseth it in any friendly and hospitable attitude towards others, far from hindering his own future, has in fact made that future richer and more secure.

Let us see our nation uniting itself and bending itself, as, praise God, we find we have still the power to do, uniting itself and bending itself to complete its own spiritual career, to promote the great causes which, by the manifest pressure of God's Spirit in our history, lie most near to our deep and enduring interests ; let us return to our sources and have our souls baptized anew in the well of life from which in all our great hours we have refreshed ourselves—we from whose loins have sprung Wilberforce, and Carey, and Livingstone—those lovers of the souls of men ; let us seek to live, as we have not lived for far too long, in more vivid recollection of the great things which God has given us, obeying without fear that mark upon our soul which came to the people of these islands with the Bible, and with the missionaries of the Cross of Christ, that calling which we have never indeed repudiated, but which of late years we had honoured with only a difficult fidelity ;—let us be worthy of ourselves, of our history, of our most characteristic personalities in Church and in State alike, and—though we may not be spared the reproach of the Accuser, and indeed it might minister to our pride and weakness were his voice silent towards us, still—we shall have the comfort of a good conscience, and in any depth of unusual misfortune we shall have—as in these terrible times we do have—an invincible endurance, and even should the worse come to the worst, we shall rise again from the dead.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

THE WORLD AND THE WORLD-SPIRIT.

Is the world in, and of, itself evil or not ? We can only hope to answer this question rightly by realising clearly what we mean by the term "world." And for all practical human purposes the "world" is surely the time-state of man : including his material environment and physical condition from the cradle to the grave. At death man passes away from this worldly condition. Whether he then altogether loses active touch with the world we do not for certain know. Probably not. Yet this much is sure. He then becomes other-worldly. After death his state, his employments, his interests, his valuations change. None of these things can be just the same out of the body as in the body. His body is part of the physical universe. It binds him closely to things visible and material ; and although he happily may have aspirations, imaginings, fears and hopes, which transcend his time-state, yet even these most far-reaching and high-soaring flights are all bounded by bodily limitations. His mind cannot leap beyond the capacities of his brain, or his affections beyond those of his heart, or his sympathies beyond those of his reins. In this sense man is part of the world and both man and the world are materialistic. True : yet all through the material world there shines an inner spiritual essence of order, beauty, law and love ; as in embodied man there sometimes shines a mystic glory streaming from fountains beyond the realms of sense. None the less in his embodied state man is both in the world and of the world. Things visible and material largely employ his powers and absorb his attention. His bodily needs, such as food and raiment ; his bodily sensations of pleasure and pain ; his worldly possessions and standing, all necessarily

force themselves upon his thoughts and care. And seeing that this necessity is not of his own making, that he has been temporarily placed in this relation to the world without his will or consent, there can be neither fault nor sin in his being and living as of the world worldly within the limits of this necessity.

Again, the world is God's. He made it, preserves it, loves it. To deem the world to be the devil's, or to deem the devil to be a co-partner with God in the making and governing of the world, is a Zoroastrian hypothesis for the explanation of the moral confusions manifest in the world ; but not a Scriptural doctrine or Christian tenet. The Hebrew revelation is that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof": that the fertility of fields, the succession of seasons, the faculty of seeds, and all living creatures, to bring forth after their kind ; that the fear of man implanted in beasts and his consequent dominion over them ; that sunshine and rain, thunder and lightning, the redness of the sky, the vesture of flowers, the preservation of birds—everything indeed in the world, and of the world, is the work and ordering of God, and therefore good. As the Pauline phrase runs : "The invisible things of God are clearly seen in the visible creation of the world." Even evil, pain, suffering, and death lie under His feet and work together for good to them who dwelling in the love of God make a divine use of these things.

What, then, is meant by such expressions as "The friendship of the world is enmity against God" ; "Love not the world neither the things of the world" ; "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him" ; "The prince of this world cometh and hath nothing in ME," and the like ? The customary explanation of these expressions is that the world, which was originally "very good," has, through the Fall, become very bad. But what mean we

by "The Fall"? Do we mean the outcasting of God from the throne of the world and the handing of it over to the usurped dominion of the devil? In whatever light we regard the early chapters of Genesis, whether as story or allegory, their message on this matter is perfectly clear. The first human beings who fell into sin were the victims of their bodies and of sensible things. They saw that the forbidden tree "was good for food and pleasant to the eyes and a tree to be desired" for the satisfaction of their curiosity; "so they took of the fruit and did eat." They yielded to the fascination of visible and material attractions and were disobedient to the voice of discipline and duty speaking to them from an Authority invisible and intangible. From the first they had been at liberty to enjoy the garden of God's good world under well-defined restrictions and limitations; but they scorned these limitations and spurned these restrictions. They put visible things first, and invisible things second; which is equivalent to putting them nowhere. For it is a law of the spiritual universe that God must be either first or nowhere; all in all or nothing at all. He cannot occupy any second place. If He does not sit on the throne of our being He will not dwell in us and with us in any subordinate position. The Lord our God is a jealous God, and will not share His glory with another. This is what Jesus taught when He said, "If a man hate not his father and mother he cannot be My disciple." We know from the testimony of the Cross how deeply and tenderly, and to the last, Jesus loved His mother; yet in comparison with the vastness and intensity of His love of His Father His love of His mother was as hatred, as the cold of a frost to the heat of a fire. All true love of God is like this love of Jesus. Every pure human love, indeed, is divine in its origin, a spark from the heavenly flame; but in comparison with the love of God, every human love is infin-

itely small and always second. And the oriental way, adopted by Jesus, of expressing the smallness of the one love in comparison with the vastness of the other is to call the smaller love by the antithetical term "hatred," reserving the great name "love," when human and divine love are mentioned together, for the love of God alone. In the story of the Fall there is no indication that the Edenites intended to forget God—indeed they were not allowed to do this—all they meant to do was to put visible and material things first: food before obedience, the indulgence of the eye before duty, curiosity before self-control. It was this inversion of the true spiritual order—the world of visible things before God the Invisible—which caused the entrance of sin into the world with all its train of woe. God did not make the world evil. The world is not evil now. It is we who make the world an evil, and a source of evil, when we invite or suffer it to displace God from the throne of our lives and to reign over us in His stead.

This preference of the seen to the unseen, of things material over things spiritual, is the root and cause of all sin, whether original or actual. Physics and psychology have taught us something in recent years of the mysteries of heredity in all departments of human life; mental and moral, no less than physical and corporeal. Original sin is now being revealed not as an abstruse theological doctrine but as an absolute scientific fact. Acquired taints, like acquired talents, descend to posterity. If the fathers eat sour grapes their children's teeth are set on edge. Our Edenite ancestors set their affections on things visible; and the taint of their low material preference has descended to us their children. No one who examines himself, and learns truly what manner of being he is, can doubt the fact that his normal bias is towards things visible and material. Things seen have a stronger natural attraction than things unseen.

We find it easier and more pleasant, at least to the eyes and all outward appearance, to live by sight than by faith. We are born with this materialistic tendency—this preference for the visible and tangible world—and this innate materialistic tendency is called original sin because it is an inherited preference, and like every other preference which postpones God to a second place, is sin. The Manichæans of every age (and in all ages, including our own, there are multitudes of Manichæans, frequently styling themselves Christians) confuse this preference with the things preferred. But the evil is not in matter, but in men who prefer matter to God. If we were a race of innocent creatures who, free from materialistic taint, always put God first, the world would still be, as to unfallen Adam and Eve, a pure and glorious Paradise. In some mysterious way, inexplicable but certain, the world of matter is now suffering from the sin of man : the earth is fruitful in thorns and thistles : a wildness has fallen on beasts : the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain waiting for its redemption from the woes brought on it by the materialisation of man. This intimacy of the doom of matter with the doom of man is altogether unfathomable by our present capacities ; but obviously the penalties laid upon the earth and the lower animals are not the result of their own sinfulness, seeing that they have never had sufficient knowledge of God to be capable of sinning against Him. The animal world is a fearsome and a suffering world, but its sufferings are not the consequence of its own sins, but of man's. And it may help us to realise something of the appalling character, and permeation, of human sin, if we steadily bear in remembrance the dreadful fact that every misery and ferocity in the world of brutes—its dumb endurance, its redness both in tooth and claw—are due to the curse which man's self-indulgence first brought into the world.

The doctrine of Evolution as taught not by Darwin, but by some of his extravagant followers, ascribes the material and animal dispositions in man not to the Fall but to the persistence of the propensities in those lower stages of being through which he has passed while mounting the ladder of life to his present highly developed condition. We owe an immense debt to the doctrine of evolution as propounded in modern times. It has made some of the confusions of the world less unintelligible ; has created a clearer atmosphere for thought in every department of study, including religion, and is opulent in boundless hope. But its ascription of the world-spirit in man to his ascent from the brutes seems, to me at least, to bristle with far greater difficulties and to make far heavier claims on the credulity which takes things for granted than does the story of his spiritual declension through the Fall ; for it requires us to believe, without much help from probability, and none from proof, in the vast journey of man from his protoplasmic state across innumerable and stupendous gulfs, such as rational thought, rational speech, rational speculations and beliefs concerning sin and immortality ; God-consciousness and all its accompanying host of ideals, duties and delights : which are never crossed by lower creatures now, and contain no ruins of bridges to indicate that they ever have been crossed. The story of the Fall may be a myth, but unlike some of the myths of evolution, it is a myth with a permanent meaning ; it accords with common experience and fits in with the actual condition of man to-day, and his present relations to the world, more closely and intelligibly than any other account which has yet been furnished.

For in the story of the Fall the assumption obviously is that the only evil creature in the world is man : and man is evil because of his non-resistance to the prince of evil ;

and the prince of evil can only persuade man to non-resistance by persuading him to prefer things material and visible to things invisible and spiritual. This is exactly the universal experience of mankind to-day. The story of the Fall in Genesis is just the story of the Fall of every human being who has personally and actually fallen. No man has ever fallen while putting God first. In the way of God's commandments there are no pitfalls. And if to-morrow every human being in all the world would put God first, would walk by faith and not by sight, not only would mankind be again very good, but the world would be found very good also. Much of its pains and sorrows and sufferings would immediately cease. And what benign effect this universal goodness would have upon the earth itself, its thistles and its thorns, as well as upon the lower denizens of the earth, who can dream or who can tell?

The world, then, is the universe of visible and material things, and man is necessarily of the world during his present stage of being in so far as he is a physical creature with material wants and time-bound aims and occupations. But neither the world itself, which is God's world, nor the necessities of man laid upon him by the conditions of his physical state, are essentially evil. Nay, it is wonderful to observe to what glorious heights of moral elevation these necessities may exalt man—heights of selfless industry and love—if he only uses them aright and does not abuse them. The true use of the world lifts man to God. It is only its abuse which dwarfs and degrades him. And the core and essence of this abuse consist in putting the world before God, finite and visible things before things infinite and unseen, the things of sense before those of spirit. So long as we give God the pre-eminence in all things we may rightly love the world, and spend our lives in using it and serving it, as Jesus our Lord and Saviour did.

But in serving the world we must serve it as servants of God, not as the bondsmen of the world-spirit. This is the difference between godly worldliness and the worldliness which is wicked. Godly worldliness has God for its master and guide in all things; the worldliness which is wicked is under the dominion and tyranny of things transient and tangible. And this materialising world-spirit is wicked not only because it dishonours God, but because it is unworthy of a spiritual creature made in the divine image and capable of a divine destiny.

The present war is bringing to clearer light and fiercer strength both the world-spirit and the spirit which, while in the world, overcomes the world; for it is more than a conflict between earthly empires. It is a gigantic struggle between the materialising world-spirit and the developing goodness of the world. It began with a brazen bid for sovereignty sustained by force in the material world. Its advent had been heralded by several generations of the prophets of a materialistic philosophy, a materialistic culture, a materialistic patriotism, a materialistic religion, a materialistic God. On our side also there had been no lack, but rather a great and grievous abundance of the world-spirit, in industry and commerce, in political and social life, even in sacred things which were rapidly tending towards emphasis on material conditions and visible attractions. The war, however, has proved that we were not entirely given over to the sway of materialism, or sold to its bondage; but that we had splendid, though secret, stores in all classes of the commonwealth of selfless heroism, of ungrudging sacrifice, and of spiritual devotion. We have no material gains to win by this war. We are fighting and suffering and dying to help the weak, to consecrate truth, to crush tyranny, to set justice and liberty free, and to kindle the hope of better days for all the world, including our

enemies. In these aims and aspirations there is nothing materialistic. Each of them is essentially spiritual. They all come from God : and are all meant for the crushing of the world-spirit and the re-consecration of the world to God, its Maker and Preserver. How far the world will go on its way towards perfection during the course of the ages, or whether the Son of Man on His return shall find faith, not force, triumphant in the world or not, are questions which we cannot answer categorically. But the doctrines of evolution, even in their most restricted and probable form, lend us hope. The history of mankind strengthens that hope : for on a general view the succession of the ages has been a gradual ascent. And the deepest purpose of the Christian religion is to convert the kingdoms of this world into a universal kingdom of Christ. But this can only be accomplished by the subjection in ourselves of things material to things spiritual ; thus exorcising the evil world-spirit in us which abuses and perverts the goodness of God in the creation and maintenance of the physical world for our sustenance and joy.

This, then, appears to be the fundamental distinction between the world which is good and which we ought to love and serve, and the world-spirit which is evil and which we ought to hate and subdue and destroy. It is when the world is with us too much early and late, when it is the master of our higher and diviner self, that it becomes the world-spirit which is enmity against God. Our Saviour never wished, never prayed, that His disciples should be taken out of the world—for the world is a magnificent arena for the spiritual exercises of His disciples and athletes—but only that they should be kept from the world-spirit which is the evil preference of things visible and material before things spiritual and unseen, which walks by sight not by faith ; and dethrones God from His primary and absolute

sovereignty. To confuse the world with the world-spirit leads to Manachæism with all its train of heresies in religion and the sacraments of religion ; and substitutes asceticism and its selfish salvation for the social and spiritual redemption of mankind.

J. W. CARLIOL.

*THE POOR IN SPIRIT : ANCIENT AND MODERN.*¹

ST. MATTHEW v. 3.

"Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

FIRST, a few words of exegesis. We are accustomed to speak of these verses as the "Beatitudes"; but that is perhaps a shade too strong. The oldest Latin rendering was "Happy"—"Happy are the poor in spirit," and so on; and that rendering should have been kept. As Dr. Driver remarks in the Glossary to his *Parallel Psalter*, "Happy is a less solemn expression than *Blessed*, without any explicit reference to God." The verse just describes the human state or condition of those whose place is secure within the Kingdom of God or of heaven. And there is no doubt a touch of intended paradox; everything is regarded from the point of view of the Kingdom, in contrast to the view of the world. A series of qualities are singled out which are just what the world does not count happy; and these, one after the other, are selected for special felicitation. They are so many marks of the citizens of the Kingdom. To the eye of the world they are objects of compassion; but really they have a deep happiness of their own.

The first of these qualities is that of those who are called "poor in spirit." It is not "poor of spirit," deficient in spirit, but rather "poor" or "humble" in respect to the spirit—like the "pure in heart," i.e. in respect to the heart,

¹ Preached before the University of Oxford on October 29, 1916.

a little lower down. This particular quality is an attitude or attribute of the spirit.

It will be remembered that St. Luke (vi. 20) has "Blessed or Happy are ye poor," which might be explained of literal poverty. But I think there can be little doubt that the First Evangelist has interpreted the words rightly. For they have a long history behind them, and that history is indeed one of the most important links between the Old Testament and the New. There is a whole group of words connected with poverty which is very prominent throughout the Old Testament, but especially in the Psalms. Literal poverty or indigence is expressed by the word that is most often translated "needy." There is another word that means rather "weak" or "feeble," literally "thin" or "lean," like the "lean kine" of Pharaoh's dream. But the words that have the most religious significance are two that in the Hebrew are very like each other in form and sound. This close resemblance has led to their being rather often confused in the MSS., so that one appears in the Hebrew text and the other in the margin. In English the distinction is naturally more strongly marked. The word which in A.V. and R.V. is most commonly rendered *meek*, is translated by Dr. Driver *humble*, as "of one who humbles or submits himself voluntarily, especially under the hand of God." Comparing the two words, Dr. Driver says that in meaning they "differ materially, that rendered 'poor' denoting one *humbled* involuntarily by external circumstances, while this (which is translated 'meek') denotes one who is voluntarily *humble* himself: nevertheless they do not differ greatly in application, especially in the Psalms, both being designations of the pious servants of Jehovah, the one term describing them from the point of view of their external condition, the other from that of their mental character or disposition."

Under the word for "poor" it is noted that "the idea of *humbled* or *afflicted* must always have been felt to be present in the word ; and sometimes it seems to predominate so much " that it is better that it should be so rendered ("the affliction of the afflicted," as in Ps. xxii. 24, etc.).

The history of these expressions seems to be something of this kind.

In the case of Israel there was a certain amount of prejudice to be got over, because the tendency was to regard worldly prosperity as the natural reward of a good life, and poverty was regarded as a mark of God's displeasure. In spite of this, the older prophets (Isaiah, Amos, Jeremiah) stand forth as champions of the poor and needy. Just because they were not in a position to protect themselves, it was a special duty of the judge or king to protect them. If the human ruler failed in this duty God Himself would take up their cause. The Jewish Law is very tender towards the poor, especially the Book of Deuteronomy. The stranger, the fatherless and the widow, have their rights carefully guarded ; and these rights extend beyond the limits of the Chosen People. "Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy strangers that are in thy land within thy gates" (Deut. xxiv. 15). The hired labourer is to have his pay before the sun goes down, because he depends upon it. The widow's raiment is not to be taken in pledge, and so on. Beautiful pictures are drawn of kindness towards the poor : as in that famous passage of the Book of Job, "When the ear heard me, then it blessed me ; and when the eye saw me, it gave witness unto me," etc. (Job xxix. 11). Even more glowing still is the description of the true fast in Isaiah lviii. 6 ff. : "Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house ? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him ; and that

thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh? Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy healing shall spring forth speedily."

Passages like these take us well on into the Exile and after the Return. By that time a great change had come over the spirit of the people. The Israel of the Monarchy had been rebellious and stiff-necked. Small and insignificant as the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah had been, they enjoyed a certain limited independence. The people were vigorous and full-blooded; they held stubbornly to their own ways, and did that which was right in their own eyes. But the two Captivities, following each other at an interval of only eleven years, and the deportation of a great part of the people and of most of the upper classes to Babylon, broke this froward spirit and gave it an altogether different turn. From this time onwards it might be described as really chastened. The temper of the people, especially of the most religious among them, became submissive and humble, just as it is expressed in those two cognate words of which I spoke at starting. It was not merely a passive but an active humility, the haughty will deliberately bowed beneath the hand of God. The Psalmist can now speak of "a broken and a contrite heart," not as a sign of weakness but as the expression of a truly religious attitude, the attitude of a soul conscious of its sins and yet conscious also of its love and of its devotion to God.

As time goes on once more the position changes. The community of the Exile gradually settles down under the new conditions. In both its centres, Babylonia and Judæa, it begins to recover something at least of its former prosperity. With that the old antithesis of rich and poor begins to revive. With the end of the Persian and the establishment of the Greek rule the movement was accelerated. The policy of Alexander was liberal towards the

Jews. It was he who first founded the large and flourishing Jewish colony in Alexandria. The mercantile activities of this great colony must have reacted upon the fortunes of the Jews of Jerusalem, who for more than a hundred years enjoyed peace and tranquility under the Ptolemies. At the beginning of the second century B.C., when Judæa passed over from the Ptolemies to the Seleucidæ, the intercourse of Jews and Greeks or Græcising Syrians became still more considerable. So the tendency was for the rich to be also the more worldly, the more open to pagan influences, the more ready to adopt the manners and customs which went with this new and seductive civilisation. The rich were the freethinkers, the careless and unscrupulous. The faithful adherents of the Old Law were found mainly among the poor. And the tendency was for the quiet religious souls to be found among the scattered poor. Among the godly there were two types: those who congregated in cities and lent each other mutual support by forming the party of the Pharisees, and the religious people who lived more in retirement and isolation, described in Psalm xxxv. 20 as those who are "quiet in the-land." In the earlier days especially, throughout the third century and the first quarter of the second century B.C., before the Pharisees had hardened down into what they became later, the boundary line between the two classes would still be very fluid. All this time the poor and humble, those who were lowly in their own eyes, were so conspicuously God's people that there came to be a tendency to identify them with the godly. It is remarkable how many of the Psalms seem to have been written from this point of view. The rich, the worldly, the latitudinarian and Hellenising party are the oppressors, and the poor and humble, the pious servants of Jehovah, are the oppressed.

The language of the Psalms is as a rule so sincere that it

need not be discounted; and yet there were naturally differences of degree. There were doubtless some cases in which the identification of the poor and humble with the godly was more or less conventional. And I am afraid there is one reservation that has to be made. I mentioned at the outset that in the English Versions the word for "humble" is usually rendered "meek." Yet it can hardly have included all the qualities that we associate with "meekness." It is largely from this group that the language of vindictiveness, which is the one great blot upon the Psalter, the one great flaw upon so much that is deeply and genuinely religious, comes. The two Psalms, sixty-nine and a hundred and nine, are conspicuous examples. Of course there is much to excuse the bitterness of feeling that finds expression in these; but it is just here that the New Testament makes the greatest advance upon the Old.

One is apt to think—and it is indeed true to think—that this "religion of the poor" is specially characteristic of the Bible, in both its parts, Old Testament and New. The pagan religions can show nothing like what is found there in depth and variety. And yet there are distinct parallels, both in Egyptian and in Babylonian religion.

It has for some time been noticed that there is a group of Egyptian documents, inscriptions and manuscripts, which is very similar in character to what we find in the Psalms. The texts have been lately brought together in a very scholarly way by Mr. Battiscombe Gunn in *The Journal of Egyptian Archæology* for April of the present year. I must ask leave to quote the two paragraphs in which these texts are characterised and noted as presenting a marked exception to the general drift and tendency of Egyptian religion.

"Now, the impression obtained by a general view of Egyptian religion in its classic and official documents is

that this relation between the worshipper and his God was, on the worshipper's side, one of extraordinary complacency and self-sufficiency. . . . If we turn to the great mass of writings expressing religious or moral sentiment which have been preserved to us, whether the funerary inscriptions, or the sacred books, or manuscript copies of uncanonical hymns and prayers, we find almost everywhere the same feeling. The Egyptian, as reflected in these texts, was little disposed to humble himself before deity. A careful respect, with strict observance of the commerce of sacrifice and ceremony against accordant benefits, was at all times necessary to be maintained: but the attitude of the 'miserable sinner,' so characteristic of the Christian and other Semitic religions, is unknown to these writings. . . . These people, one would say, never took God into their confidence, nor would permit themselves to plead guilty at any divine tribunal, or to sue for mercy. Whether this attitude arose from the intense spiritual and material pride (probably unequalled elsewhere in the world) of the Egyptian aristocracy, which would not suffer them to admit the least fault—the middle classes imitating their betters in this—or whether it was a consequence of the profound belief in the creative power of the spoken word, the solemnly uttered affirmation magically translating itself into a colourable reality; or whether again much of it was plain lying with intent to bluff gods or posterity: is a problem more easily posed than solved.

“ But a notable contrast to the tone of this, the main current of traditional Egyptian religious feeling, is afforded by a small and far less-known group of hymns and prayers, all of which fall within the limits of the century and a half occupied by the Nineteenth Dynasty (B.C. about 1350–1200), and which stand quite in a class by themselves. In these the change of orientation of the worshippers, the

revolution in that personal relation to deity upon which we have laid stress, is truly remarkable. All the (in the popular sense of the word) Pharisaic complacency of the priestly and official texts, the facile formalities of veneration, cold descriptions of the qualities and energies of the gods, sanctioned by the use of ages, with which these works were so easily put together, are absent. In their place we find the very spirit of that self-abasing and sorrowful appeal, conscious of unworthiness, which Matthew Arnold, dealing with a similar contrast in its most eminent examples, called the Hebraic attitude as opposed to the Hellenic. Those who wrote these psalms (as we may fairly call some of them), or for whom they were written, were men conscious, as they confess, of their 'many sins'; who approach the gods, not as creditors who have fulfilled their side of a contract and calmly await their recompense, but as 'humble men' and 'helpless ones,' hoping for mercy; who proclaim, not that they are perfect, unspotted even by contact with the erring, but 'ignorant' and 'foolish,' 'not knowing good from bad,' deserving of punishment but saved by the grace of a god who prefers the silent before the eloquent, the distressed before the mighty, who cannot be bargained with, is a surer help than man, whose wrath is soon past, and who sends no earnest suppliant empty away."

This description, even in the abridged form in which I have given it, is so full and so clear that I must economise time by giving only a single very brief and partial specimen from one of the inscriptions.

"Thou art Amûn, the Lord of him that is silent :
 Who comest at the voice of the humble man.
 I call upon thee when I am in distress :
 And thou comest that thou mayest save me ;
 That thou mayest give breath to him that is wretched ;
 That thou mayest save me that am in bondage.

* * * * *

He said :—

Though the servant was disposed to do evil,
 Yet is the Lord disposed to be merciful.
 The Lord of Thebes pauses not a whole day wroth :
 His wrath is finished in a moment, and nought is left.
 The wind (?) is turned again to us in mercy :
 Amûn turns with his air.
 As thy Ka endureth, mayest thou be merciful !
 May that which has been turned away not be repeated ! ”

These are parts of an inscription set up by a father and son in gratitude for the recovery from sickness of another son. The father was a draughtsman attached to the Necropolis at Thebes ; and it is noted that most of the other documents came from the same locality, though there is evidence to show that this special outlook and manner was not confined to it. It would also seem that it was not directly connected with the reforms of the heretic Pharaoh Amenophis IV. or Ikhnaton, whose Hymn to the Sun or Disk of the Sun is one of the most remarkable religious monuments of pagan antiquity. It does, however, belong to the period which followed that of the reforming king and may be taken as an indication of the wave of living religion that was then set in motion.

Similar phenomena on a rather broader scale are found in the religion of Babylonia. It has been known for some that the Babylonian Penitential Psalms in particular present a considerable amount of resemblance in language and attitude of mind to those in the Biblical Psalter. I am afraid that I can only give one or two brief specimens. The priest presents and endorses the prayer of the penitent.

Penitent :

“ (Look graciously) on the prostration of living beings !
 (I), thy servant, full of sighs cry to thee.
 The appeal of him who has sinned, do thou accept !
 If thou lookest on a man, that man lives,
 O almighty lady of mankind,
 Merciful one to whom it is good to turn, accept my petition ! ”

Priest :

“Because his god and his goddess are
Angry with him, he cries to thee.
(Turn thy countenance to him), take hold of his hand ! ”

In another example the priest describes the sufferings
of the penitent :

“ (His heart is full of) misery and (woe),
Sickness, suffering, misery and distress,
Which have befallen him have weakened his sighing.
Those who have overcome him have silenced his plaint
(i.e., the {demons who have brought on his sickness have so
weakened him that he can barely speak).
He has sinned and weeps bitterly before thee.
His spirit is depressed, he is consumed before thee.

Overpowered by tears that stream like a rainstorm.
Entirely overcome he sits as one no longer living.
Like a mourner he breaks forth in lamentation,
By imploring he manifests his misery.
What has my lord decided and planned in regard to his servant ?
May his (the god's) mouth proclaim what I do not know.”

Penitent :

“Many are my sins which I have committed,
May I escape this (misfortune), may I be rescued from this
distress ! ”

In yet another example the penitent speaks for himself :

“O lord, do not cast thy servant
Into the waters of the marsh ! Take hold of his hand !
The sin that I may have committed, turn to grace !
The transgression that I may have committed,
May the wind carry off.
Tear asunder my many misdeeds like a garment !
O my god, my transgressions are seven times seven, forgive my
transgressions.
O my goddess, my transgressions are seven times seven, forgive
my transgressions !
O god, whoever he may be, my transgressions are seven times seven,
forgive me my transgressions !
O goddess, whoever she may be, my transgressions are seven times
seven, forgive me my transgressions !
Forgive my transgressions that I may in humility serve thee !

May thy heart like the heart of a mother return to its place !
 Like the heart of a mother who has given birth (the heart of)
 a father who has begotten—return to its place !”¹

I think we may truly say that prayers like these are the utterances of those who are “poor in spirit.” They go to show that, in this respect, as in others, God had not left Himself without witness in the pagan world. There is indeed nothing elsewhere that equals the weight and volume of the Biblical teaching ; but these outside examples are just light buttresses, thrown out as it were at the sides of the main building. They are parts—fragmentary parts—of the preparation for Christ. They have their centre in that consummate passage which is the key to such wide stretches of human life :

“Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me ; for I am meek and lowly in heart : and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light ” (St. Matt. xi. 28–30).

This passage, I repeat, is central. It has been felt to be central through all the centuries of the Christian Religion. It is possible that objections may have been raised of which I am not aware ; but to the best of my belief it was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that it came to be seriously called in question.

I refer, as you may suppose, to Nietzsche.

You will be aware that Nietzsche held that Christian morals—and especially this side of Christian morals, humility, meekness, self-effacement, everything that savoured of consideration for the weak and poor—represented a conspiracy on the part of the weak to get themselves placed on the same level with the strong. The last of Nietzsche’s published writings was *The Antichrist*, which came out in 1888. The second paragraph of this work is a

¹ Jastrow, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 470–4.

short catechism, summing up Nietzsche's views on the subject. I may give it as it stands.

"What is Good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.

"What is Bad?—All that proceeds from weakness.

"What is happiness?—The feeling that power is growing—that resistance is being overcome.

"Not contentment, but more power; not peace all round, but war; not virtue, but capacity. . . .

"The weak and misbegotten must go down: that is the first proposition of our philanthropy. And they must be helped to go down.

"What is more damaging than any kind of vice?—Active sympathy with all things misbegotten and weak—(in other words) Christianity. . . ."

I have little doubt that the writings of Nietzsche, and especially this side of his writings, contributed not a little to bring about the present war. By that I do not mean to say that he has a large following in Germany. I do not think he has, in the sense that he has a large body of disciples who would call themselves his disciples. At the same time he has been very widely read, and has had no small influence, of a diffused kind, on the younger generation. There has been, indeed, a great convergence of influences from various quarters, theoretical and practical, all tending towards that idolatry, as we may call it, of Force or Power, which holds so conspicuous a place in the German doctrine. You would observe how many of the current catch-words are included in the first answer of the catechism that I have just quoted: power, feeling of power, will to power.

However, I would not have it thought that my present intention was either to denounce Nietzsche or to denounce the Germans. I must confess to a mixed feeling about

Nietzsche. The poor man was struggling all his life against acute brain trouble which caused him intense pain; he went out of his mind the year after he wrote this last book, and remained in that condition until he died eleven years later. You will have seen, from that single specimen, how very much he had the courage of his opinions. He was a brilliant, and very often a beautiful writer. We are told that he liked to compose, and did a good deal of his composing in the open air; he spent much time on the Riviera and among the Higher Alps, and the feeling of contact with nature in such surroundings is constantly present with him. His ideas always have a certain loftiness about them; he is always straining after something greater and nobler than has ever been before. It was in this way that he came to dream of a race of supermen; it is an aspiration. Indeed it might be said that his ideas are all aspirations. And they are clothed in forms of beauty. Nietzsche was a poet rather than a philosopher. His style had distinction and it was all his own. He wrote in aphorisms; and his aphorisms are like flashes of lightning. A German critic has said of him:

“Nietzsche possessed in an uncommon degree the faculty for seeing things otherwise than as they appear to use and wont and to inherited tradition, for seeing them newly and for presenting them from opposite sides: the gift of reconciling the conflict of views, of binding together the opposition in a higher unity—the synthetic gift of the philosopher was not his in the same measure” (Alois Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche, der Künstler und der Denker*, p. 161).

I believe this to be perfectly true. Nietzsche has done good service by breaking up conventions and compelling people to look at old facts in new lights; but to think of him as a philosopher taking a calm and comprehensive survey of all the facts of life and building up a great constructive theory that should put them all in their place, would be utterly wide of the mark. Nietzsche's supermen

are a dream, and a dream that could never be fitted into the framework of reality. It is only the German fondness for abstractions which gives it any sort of plausibility. It would be a very different thing to work in such fancies into the infinitely complex web of actual life.

Nietzsche was an antidemocrat as well as an antichristian. The idea of the equality of men was one of his bugbears. He held that some men are born to rule as others are born to serve ; and he would put no limit to the rights of the ruling class over the ruled. No doubt, on the other hand, it is easy to press the democratic idea unduly and in cases to which it does not apply. The doctrine of the equality of men is a political doctrine with a definite political object. It does not mean more than this—that for the purpose of political constitution and government it is best to take the individual as the unit. In other words, the doctrine of the inequality of men—on which Nietzsche builds—though it has a certain amount of obvious truth upon the surface is yet a great deal less true than it may appear. There are so many different kinds of superiority, and the man who is superior in one way may be anything but superior in another. We are seeing the proof of this all round us at the present moment. How many a high-placed officer has been sent home as unequal to the tasks laid upon him ; and what astonishing feats are performed by men of no previous reputation ! Experience shows that the world is full of latent capacities which have to be called out by circumstances, and many of which are never called out at all.

Nietzsche certainly does not make anything like enough allowance for this. There is no such clear-cut line as he supposes between the master and the slave. If there had been such a clear-cut line, it would be impossible for us to discover it ; and, if we fancied that we did discover it, we should find ourselves constantly in error. We may be

pretty sure that a great part even of Nietzsche's aristocracy would prove to be after all conventional and a sham. The real greatness and distinction would be very largely outside.

Such is the constant fate of the attempts that are made from time to time to simplify life by suppressing or leaving out of account elements in it that do not lend themselves to a theory. That is just the mistake that the Germans have been making. They have given an exaggerated importance to Force or Power. They have thought that everything political and a great deal that is not political can be expressed in categories of Force or Power, and that they can ignore all the rest. They will find out in time how wrong they have been. And then, I believe, they will come to see that the truth of things is far more in accordance with the Christian scheme of morals and religion. Of course it is always possible to make out a case against a thing, if you begin by caricaturing it. It is possible to make out a case against the Christian virtues if they are taken in a sense that was never intended. Christian meekness and humility are not the meekness and humility of Uriah Heep. But if we take them in their true sense, the sense in which they are presented in the New Testament, we shall find how precious and indispensable they are, what an integral part they are intended to play in the world as it is designed by the " manifold " or " multiform " wisdom—the *πολυποίκιλος σοφία*—of God.

Our own consciences bear witness to them ; they bear witness to their truth as well as to their beauty. Our consciences assure us that their place is permanent and indestructible in that far-off ideal of civilization

"Towards which the whole creation moves."

W. SANDAY.

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